Spinoza - Ethics 2, Propositions 14-31

E2: PROP. 14. The human mind is capable of perceiving a great number of things, and is so in proportion as its body is capable of receiving a great number of impressions.

Proof.--The human body (by E2POST3 and E2POST6) is affected in very many ways by external bodies, and is capable in very many ways of affecting external bodies. But (E2P12) the human mind must perceive all that takes place in the human body; the human mind is, therefore, capable of perceiving a great number of things, and is so in proportion, etc. Q.E.D.

Referenced in: E3P11,- E4P38

E2: PROP. 15. The idea, which constitutes the actual being of the human mind, is not simple, but compounded of a great number of ideas.

Proof.--The idea constituting the actual being of the human mind is the idea of the body (E2P13), which (E2POST1) is composed of a great number of complex individual parts. But there is necessarily in God the idea of each individual part whereof the body is composed (E2P8C) [Maybe should be (E2P7C)?]; therefore (E2P7), the idea of the human body is composed of these numerous ideas of its component parts. Q.E.D.

Referenced in: E3P3

E2: PROP. 16. The idea of every mode, in which the human body is affected by external bodies, must involve the nature of the human body, and also the nature of the external body.

Proof.--All the modes, in which any given body is affected, follow from the nature of the body affected, and also from the nature of the affecting body (by E2P13Ab1), wherefore their idea also necessarily (by E1A4) involves the nature of both bodies; therefore, the idea of every mode, in which the human body is affected by external bodies, involves the nature of the human body and of the external body. Q.E.D.

Referenced in: E2P17,- E2P18N,- E2P19,- E2P23,- E2P25,- E2P26,- E2P27,- E2P28,- E2P38,- E2P39,- E3P27,- E4P5

E2: PROP. 17. If the human body is affected in a manner which involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will regard the said external body as actually existing, or as present to itself, until the human body be affected in such a way, as to exclude the existence or the presence of the said external body.

Proof.--This proposition is self-evident, for so long as the human body continues to be thus affected, so long will the human mind (E2P12) regard this modification of the body--that is (by the last Prop. E2P16), it will have the idea of the mode as actually existing, and this idea involves the nature of the external body. In other words, it will have the idea which does not exclude, but postulates the existence or presence of the nature of the external body; therefore the mind (by E2P16C1) will regard the external body as actually existing, until it is affected, etc. Q.E.D.

Referenced in: E2P17C,- E2P19,- E2P44C1N,- E2P47,- E3P11N,- E3P12,- E3P13,- E3P18,- E3P18N1,- E3P19,- E3P25,- E3P27,- E3P28,- E3P56,- E4P1N,- E4P9,- E5P7

E2: PROP. 17, Corollary.--The mind is able to regard as present external bodies, by which the human body has once been affected, even though they be no longer in existence or present.

Proof.--When external bodies determine the fluid parts of the human body, so that they often impinge on the softer parts, they change the surface of the last named (E2POST5); hence (E2P13Ab2) they are refracted therefrom in a different manner from that which they followed before such change; and, further, when afterwards they impinge on the new surfaces by their own spontaneous movement, they will be refracted in the same manner, as though they had been impelled towards those surfaces by external bodies; consequently, they will, while they continue to be thus refracted, affect the human body in the same manner, whereof the mind (E2P12) will again take cognizance--that is (E2P17), the mind will again regard the external body as present, and will do so, as often as the fluid parts of the human body impinge on the aforesaid surfaces by their own spontaneous motion. Wherefore, although the external bodies, by which the human body has once been affected, be no longer in existence,the mind will nevertheless regard them as present, as often as this action of the body is repeated. Q.E.D.

Referenced in: E2P17CN,- E2P18,- E2P40N1,- E2P44C1N,- E2P49CN,- E3P18,- E3P25,- E3P30N,- E3P47N,- E4P13

E2: PROP. 17 Corollary, Note. --We thus see how it comes about, as is often the case, that we regard as present things which are not. It is possible that the same result may be brought about by other causes; but I think it suffices for me here to have indicated one possible explanation, just as well as if I had pointed out the true cause. Indeed, I do not think I am very far from the truth, for all my assumptions are based on postulates, which rest, almost without exception, on experience, that cannot be controverted by those who have shown, as we have, that the human body, as we feel it, exists (E2P13C).
   Furthermore (E2P17C, E2P16C2), we clearly understand what is the difference between the idea, say, of Peter, which constitutes the essence of Peter's mind, and the idea of the said Peter, which is in another man, say, Paul. The former directly answers to the essence of Peter's own body, and only implies existence so long as Peter exists; the latter indicates rather the disposition of Paul's body than the nature of Peter, and, therefore, while this disposition of Paul's body lasts, Paul's mind will regard Peter as present to itself, even though he no longer exists.
   Further, to retain the usual phraseology, the modifications of the human body, of which the ideas represent external bodies as present to us, we will call the images of things, though they do not recall the figure of things. When the mind regards bodies in this fashion, we say that it imagines.
   I will here draw attention to the fact, in order to indicate where error lies, that the imaginations of the mind, looked at in themselves, do not contain error. The mind does not err in the mere act of imagining, but only in so far as it is regarded as being without the idea, which excludes the existence of such things as it imagines to be present to it. If the mind, while imagining non-existent things as present to it, is at the same time conscious that they do not really exist, this power of imagination must be set down to the efficacy of its nature, and not to a fault, especially if this faculty of imagination depend solely on its own nature--that is (E1D7), if this faculty of imagination be free.

Referenced in: E2P26C,- E2P35N,- E2P40N1,- E2P49CN,- E3POST2,- E3P11N,- E3P12,- E3P27,- E3P56,- E4P9,- E5P21,- E5P34

E2: PROP. 18. If the human body has once been affected by two or more bodies at the same time, when the mind afterwards imagines any of them, it will straightway remember the others also.

Proof.--The mind (E2P17C) imagines any given body, because the human body is affected and disposed by the impressions from an external body, in the same manner as it is affected when certain of its parts are acted on by the said external body; but (by our hypothesis) the body was then so disposed, that the mind imagined two bodies at once; therefore, it will also in the second case imagine two bodies at once, and the mind, when it imagines one, will straightway remember the other. Q.E.D.

Referenced in: E2P40N1,- E2P44C1N,- E3P11N,- E3P14,- E3P52,- E4P13,- E5P1,- E5P10N,- E5P12,- E5P13

E2: PROP. 18, Note. --We now clearly see what memory is. It is simply a certain association of ideas involving the nature of things outside the human body, which association arises in the mind according to the order and association of the modifications (affectiones) of the human body.
   I say, first, it is an association of those ideas only, which involve the nature of things outside the human body: not of ideas which answer to the nature of the said things: ideas of the modifications of the human body are, strictly speaking (E2P16), those which involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies.
   I say, secondly, that this association arises according to the order and association of the modifications of the human body, in order to distinguish it from that association of ideas, which arises from the order of the intellect, whereby the mind perceives things through their primary causes, and which is in all men the same.
   And hence we can further clearly understand, why the mind from the thought of one thing, should straightway arrive at the thought of another thing, which has no similarity with the first; for instance, from the thought of the word pomum (an apple), a Roman would straightway arrive at the thought of the fruit apple, which has no similitude with the articulate sound in question, nor anything in common with it, except that the body of the man has often been affected by these two things; that is, that the man has often heard the word pomum, while he was looking at the fruit;
   similarly every man will go on from one thought to another, according as his habit has ordered the images of things in his body. For a soldier, for instance, when he sees the tracks of a horse in sand, will at once pass from the thought of a horse to the thought of a horseman, and thence to the thought of war, etc.; while a countryman will proceed from the thought of a horse to the thought of a plough, a field, etc. Thus every man will follow this or that train of thought, according as he has been in the habit of conjoining and associating the mental images of things in this or that manner.

Referenced in: E2P40N2,- E3P11N,- E3P52,- E3DOE4,- E4P13,- E5P21

E2: PROP. 19. The human mind has no knowledge of the body, and does not know it to exist, save through the ideas of the modifications whereby the body is affected.

Proof.--The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the human body (E2P13), which (E2P9) is in God, in so far as he is regarded as affected by another idea of a particular thing actually existing: or, inasmuch as (E2POST4) the human body stands in need of very many bodies whereby it is, as it were, continually regenerated; and the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes (E2P7); this idea will therefore be in God, in so far as he is regarded as affected by the ideas of very many particular things. Thus God has the idea of the human body, or knows the human body, in so far as he is affected by very many other ideas, and not in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; that is (by E2P11C), the human mind does not know the human body.
But the ideas of the modifications of body are in God, in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, or the human mind perceives those modifications (E2P12), and consequently (E2P16) the human body itself, and as actually existing [E2P17]; therefore the mind perceives thus far only the human body. Q.E.D.

Referenced in: E2P23,- E2P29C,- E2P43N,- E2P47,- E3P30,- E3P53

E2: PROP. 20. The idea or knowledge of the human mind is also in God, following in God in the same manner, and being referred to God in the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of the human body.

Proof.--Thought is an attribute of God (E2P1); therefore (E2P3) there must necessarily be in God the idea both of thought itself and of all its modifications, consequently also of the human mind (E2P11). Further, this idea or knowledge of the mind does not follow from God, in so far as be is infinite, but in so far as he is affected by another idea of an individual thing (E2P9). But (E2P7) the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes; therefore this idea or knowledge of the mind is in God and is referred to God, in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of the body. Q.E.D.

Referenced in: E2P22,- E2P23,- E2P43,- E2P43N

E2: PROP. 21, Note. --This proposition is comprehended much more clearly from what we said in the note E2P7CN. We there showed that the idea of body and body, that is, mind and body (E2P13), are one and the same individual conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension; wherefore the idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing, which is conceived under one and the same attribute, namely, thought. The idea of the mind, I repeat, and the mind itself are in God by the same necessity and follow from him from the same power of thinking; Strictly speaking, the idea of the mind, that is, the idea of an idea, is nothing but the distinctive quality (forma) of the idea in so far as it is conceived as a mode of thought without reference to the object; if a man knows anything, he, by that very fact, knows that he knows it, and at the same time knows that he knows that he knows it, and so on to infinity. But I will treat of this hereafter.

Referenced in: E2P43N,- E4P8,- E5P3

E2: PROP. 22. The human mind perceives not only the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of such modifications.

Proof.--The ideas of the ideas of modifications follow in God in the same manner, and are referred to God in the same manner, as the ideas of the said modifications. This is proved in the same way as E2P20. But the ideas of the modifications of the body are in the human mind (E2P12), that is [E2P11C], in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; therefore the ideas of these ideas will be in God, in so far as he has the knowledge or idea of the human mind, that is (E2P21), they will be in the human mind itself, which therefore perceives not only the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of such modifications. Q.E.D.

Referenced in: E2P23,- E2P43N,- E2P47,- E4P8

E2: PROP. 23. The mind does not know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body.

Proof.--The idea or knowledge of the mind (E2P20) follows in God in the same manner, and is referred to God in the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of the body. But since (E2P19) the human mind does not know the human body itself, that is (E2P11C), since the knowledge of the human body is not referred to God, in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; therefore, neither is the knowledge of the mind referred to God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; therefore (by the same Coroll. E2P11C), the human mind thus far has no knowledge of itself.
Further the ideas of the modifications, whereby the body is affected, involve the nature of the human body itself (E2P16), that is (E2P13), they agree with the nature of the mind; wherefore the knowledge of these ideas necessarily involves knowledge of the mind; but (by the last Prop. E2P22) the knowledge of these ideas is in the human mind itself; wherefore the human mind thus far only has knowledge of itself. Q.E.D.

Referenced in: E2P29C,- E2P43N,- E2P47,- E3P9,- E3P30,- E3P53,- E3DOE1

E2: PROP. 24. The human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the parts composing the human body.

Proof.--The parts composing the human body do not belong to the essence of that body, except in so far as they communicate their motions to one another in a certain fixed relation (E2P13D), not in so far as they can be regarded as individuals without relation to the human body. The parts of the human body are highly complex individuals (E2POST1), whose parts (E2P13L4) can be separated from the human body without in any way destroying the nature and distinctive quality of the latter, and they can communicate their motions (E2P13Ab1) to other bodies in another relation; therefore (E2P3) the idea or knowledge of each part will be in God, inasmuch (E2P9) as he is regarded as affected by another idea of a particular thing, which particular thing is prior in the order of nature to the aforesaid part (E2P7). We may affirm the same thing of each part of each individual composing the human body; therefore, the knowledge of each part composing the human body is in God, in so far as he is affected by very many ideas of things, and not in so far as he has the idea of the human body only, in other words, the idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind (E2P13); therefore (E2P11C), the human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body. Q.E.D.

Referenced in: E2P28,- E2P36,- E2P43N

E2: PROP. 25. The idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body.

Proof.--We have shown [E2P16] that the idea of a modification of the human body involves the nature of an external body, in so far as that external body conditions the human body in a given manner. But, in so far as the external body is an individual, which has no reference to the human body, the knowledge or idea thereof is in God (E2P9), in so far as God is regarded as affected by the idea of a further thing, which (E2P7) is naturally prior to the said external body. Wherefore an adequate knowledge of the external body is not in God, in so far as he has the idea of the modification of the human body; in other words the idea of the modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body. Q,. E.D.

Referenced in: E2P26C,- E2P27,- E2P28,- E2P29C,- E2P38,- E2P43N

E2: PROP. 26. The human mind does not perceive any external body as actually existing, except through the ideas of the modifications of its own body.

Proof.--If the human body is in no way affected by a given external body, then (E2P7) neither is the idea of the human body, in other words [E2P13], the human mind, affected in any way by the idea of the existence of the said external body, nor does it in any manner perceive its existence. But, in so far as the human body is affected in any way by a given external body, thus far (E2P16 and E2P16C1) it perceives that external body. Q.E.D.

Referenced in: E2P26C,- E2P29C,- E2P43N,- E5P21,- E5P29

E2: PROP. 26, Corollary.--In so far as the human mind imagines an external body, it has not an adequate knowledge thereof.

Proof.--When the human mind regards external bodies through the ideas of the modifications of its own body, we say that it imagines (see E2P17CN); now the mind can only [E2P26] imagine external bodies as actually existing. Therefore (by E2P25), in so far as the mind imagines external bodies, it has not an adequate knowledge of them. Q.E.D.

Referenced in: E2P43N

E2: PROP. 27. The idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body itself.

Proof.--Every idea of a modification of the human body involves the nature of the human body, in so far as the human body is regarded as affected in a given manner (E2P16). But, inasmuch as the human body is an individual which may be affected in many other ways, the idea of the said modification, etc. [See E2P25] Q.E.D.

Referenced in: E2P29,- E2P29C,- E2P38,- E2P43N

E2: PROP. 28. The ideas of the modifications of the human body, in so far as they have reference only to the human mind, are not clear and distinct, but confused.

Proof.--The ideas of the modifications of the human body involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies (E2P16); they must involve the nature not only of the human body but also of its parts; for the modifications are modes (E2POST3), whereby the parts of the human body, and, consequently, the human body as a whole are affected. But (by E2P24, E2P25) the adequate knowledge of external bodies, as also of the parts composing the human body, is not in God, in so far as he is regarded as affected by the human mind, but in so far as he is regarded as affected by other ideas. These ideas of modifications, in so far as they are referred to the human mind alone, are as consequences without premisses, in other words, confused ideas. Q.E.D.

Referenced in: E2P29C,- E2P36,- E2P43N

E2: PROP. 29. The idea of the idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human mind.

Proof.--The idea of a modification of the human body (E2P27) does not involve an adequate knowledge of the said body, in other words, does not adequately express its nature; that is (E2P13) it does not agree with the nature of the mind adequately; therefore (E1A6) the idea of this idea does not adequately express the nature of the human mind, or does not involve an adequate knowledge thereof.

Referenced in: E2P29C,- E2P43N,- E4P64

E2: PROP. 29, Corollary.--Hence it follows that the human mind, when it perceives things after the common order of nature, has not an adequate but only a confused and fragmentary knowledge of itself, of its own body, and of external bodies.

For the mind does not know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of body (E2P23). It only perceives its own body (E2P19) through the ideas of the modifications, and only perceives external bodies through the same means [E2P26]; thus, in so far as it has such ideas of modification, it has not an adequate knowledge of itself (E2P29), nor of its own body (E2P27), nor of external bodies (E2P25), but only a fragmentary and confused knowledge thereof (E2P28 and note E2P28N) Q.E.D.

Referenced in: E2P40N2,- E2P43N,- E3P3

E2: PROP. 29 Corollary, Note. --I say expressly, that the mind has not an adequate but only a confused knowledge of itself, its own body, and of external bodies, whenever it perceives things after the common order of nature; that is, whenever it is determined from without, namely, by the fortuitous play of circumstance, to regard this or that; not at such times as it is determined from within, that is, by the fact of regarding several things at once, to understand their points of agreement, difference, and contrast. Whenever it is determined in anywise from within, it regards things clearly and distinctly, as I will show below.

Referenced in: E2P43N

E2: PROP. 30. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body.

Proof.--The duration of our body does not depend on its essence (E2A1), nor on the absolute nature of God (E1P21). But (E1P28) it is conditioned to exist and operate by causes, which in their turn are conditioned to exist and operate in a fixed and definite relation by other causes, these last again being conditioned by others, and so on to infinity. The duration of our body therefore depends on the common order of nature, or the constitution of things. Now, however a thing may be constituted, the adequate knowledge of that thing is in God, in so far as he has the ideas of all things, and not in so far as he has the idea of the human body only. (E2P9C) Wherefore the knowledge of the duration of our body is in God very inadequate, in so far as he is only regarded as constituting the nature of the human mind; that is (E2P11C), this knowledge is very inadequate in our mind. Q.E.D.

Referenced in: E2P31,- E2P43N

E2: PROP. 31. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of particular things external to ourselves.

Proof.--Every particular thing, like the human body, must be conditioned by another particular thing to exist and operate in a fixed and definite relation; this other particular thing must likewise be conditioned by a third, and so on to infinity. (E1P28) As we have shown in the foregoing proposition (E2P30), from this common property of particular things, we have only a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body; we must draw a similar conclusion with regard to the duration of particular things, namely, that we can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration thereof. Q.E.D.

Referenced in: E2P31C,- E2P43N,- E4P62N

Ethics Part 2, Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind
Propositions 14-31

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Ethics Part 2, Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind Propositions 14-31

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Ethics Part 2, Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind
Propositions 14-31

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P23- P24- P25- P26- P27- P28- P29- P30- P31