Spinoza - Ethics 3, Propositions 37-47

E3: PROP. 37. Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred or love, is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater.

Proof.-- Pain diminishes or constrains man's power of activity (E3P11N), in other words (E3P7), diminishes or constrains the effort, wherewith he endeavours to persist in his own being; therefore (E3P5) it is contrary to the said endeavour: thus all the endeavours of a man affected by pain are directed to removing that pain. But (by the definition of pain), in proportion as the pain is greater, so also is it necessarily opposed to a greater part of man's power of activity; therefore the greater the pain, the greater the power of activity employed to remove it; that is [by E3P9N], the greater will be the desire or appetite in endeavouring to remove it.
Again, since pleasure (E3P11N) increases or aids a man's power of activity, it may easily be shown in like manner, that a man affected by pleasure has no desire further than to preserve it, and his desire will be in proportion to the magnitude of the pleasure.
Lastly, since hatred and love are themselves emotions of pain and pleasure, it follows in like manner that the endeavour, appetite, or desire, which arises through hatred or love, will be greater in proportion to the hatred or love. Q.E.D.

Referenced in: E3P38,- E3P39,- E3P43,- E3P44,- E4P15,- E4P37,- E4P44

E3: PROP. 38. If a man has begun to hate an object of his love, so that love is thoroughly destroyed, he will, causes being equal, regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it, and his hatred will be in proportion to the strength of his former love.

Proof.--If a man begins to hate that which he had loved, more of his appetites are put under restraint than if he had never loved it. For love is a pleasure (E3P13CN) which a man endeavours as far as he can to render permanent (E3P28); he does so by regarding the object of his love as present, and by affecting it as far as he can pleasurably [by E3P21]; this endeavour [by E3P37] is greater in proportion as the love is greater, and so also is the endeavour to bring about that the beloved should return his affection (E3P33). Now these endeavours are constrained by hatred towards the object of love (E3P13C and E3P23); wherefore the lover (E3P11N) will for this cause also be affected with pain, the more so in proportion as his love has been greater; that is, in addition to the pain caused by hatred, there is a pain caused by the fact that he has loved the object; wherefore the lover will regard the beloved with greater pain, or in other words [by E3P13CN], will hate it more than if he had never loved it, and with the more intensity in proportion as his former love was greater. Q.E.D.

Referenced in: E3P44

E3: PROP. 39. He who hates anyone will endeavour to do him an injury, unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby accrue to himself; on the other hand, he who loves anyone will, by the same law, seek to benefit him.

Proof.--To hate a man is (E3P13CN) to conceive him as a cause of pain; therefore he who hates a man will endeavour to remove or destroy him. But if anything more painful, or, in other words, a greater evil, should accrue to the hater thereby--and if the hater thinks he can avoid such evil by not carrying out the injury, which he planned against the object of his hate--he will desire to abstain from inflicting that injury (E3P28), and the strength of his endeavour (E3P37) will be greater than his former endeavour to do injury, and will therefore prevail over it, as we asserted.
The second part of this proof proceeds in the same manner. Wherefore he who hates another, etc. Q.E.D.

Referenced in: E3P40N,- E3P40C2,- E3P41N,- E3DOE34,- E3DOE36,- E4P34,- E4P37N2,- E4P45,- E4P45C1,- E4P45C2

E3: PROP. 39, Note. --By good I here mean every kind of pleasure, and all that conduces thereto, especially that which satisfies our longings, whatsoever they may be. By evil, I mean every kind of pain, especially that which frustrates our longings. For I have shown (E3P9N) that we in no case desire a thing because we deem it good, but, contrariwise, we deem a thing good because we desire it: consequently we deem evil that which we shrink from;
everyone, therefore, according to his particular emotions, judges or estimates what is good, what is bad, what is better, what is worse, lastly, what is best, and what is worst. Thus a miser thinks that abundance of money is the best, and want of money the worst; an ambitious man desires nothing so much as glory, and fears nothing so much as shame. To an envious man nothing is more delightful than another's misfortune, and nothing more painful than another's success. So every man, according to his emotions, judges a thing to be good or bad, useful or useless.
The emotion, which induces a man to turn from that which he wishes, or to wish for that which he turns from, is called timidity, which may accordingly be defined as the fear whereby a man is induced to avoid an evil which he regards as future by encountering a lesser evil (E3P28). But if the evil which he fears be shame, timidity becomes bashfulness [modesty]. Lastly, if the desire to avoid a future evil be checked by the fear of another evil, so that the man knows not which to choose, fear becomes consternation, especially if both the evils feared be very great.

Referenced in: E3P51N,- E3DOE34,- E3DOE39,- E3DOE42,- E4P70

E3: PROP. 40. He, who conceives himself to be hated by another, and believes that he has given him no cause for hatred, will hate that other in return.

Proof.--He who conceives another as affected with hatred, will thereupon be affected himself with hatred (E3P27), that is [by E3P13CN], with pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause. But, by the hypothesis, he conceives no cause for this pain except him who is his enemy; therefore, from conceiving that he is hated by some one, he will be affected with pain, accompanied by the idea of his enemy; in other words, he will hate his enemy in return. Q.E.D.

Referenced in: E3P40C1,- E3P40C2,- E3P41,- E3P43,- E3P45,- E3P49N,- E4P34

E3: PROP. 40, Note. --He who thinks that he has given just cause for hatred will (E3P30 and E3P30N) be affected with shame; but this case (E3P25) rarely happens. This reciprocation of hatred may also arise from the hatred, which follows an endeavour to injure the object of our hate (E3P39). He therefore who conceives that he is hated by another will conceive his enemy as the cause of some evil or pain; thus he will be affected with pain or fear, accompanied by the idea of his enemy as cause; in other words, he will be affected with hatred towards his enemy, as I said above.

Referenced in: E3P41,- E3P41N,- E4P34

E3: PROP. 40, Corollary 1.--He who conceives, that one whom he loves hates him, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love.

For, in so far as he conceives that he is an object of hatred, he is determined to hate his enemy in return [by E3P40]. But, by the hypothesis, he nevertheless loves him: wherefore he will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love.

Referenced in: E3P41C

E3: PROP. 40, Corollary 2.--If a man conceives that one, whom he has hitherto regarded without emotion, has done him an injury from motives of hatred, he will forthwith seek to repay the injury in kind.

Proof.--He who conceives, that another hates him, will (by the last proposition E3P40) hate his enemy in return, and (E3P26) will endeavour to recall everything which can affect him painfully; he will moreover endeavour to do him an injury (E3P39). Now the first thing of this sort which he conceives is the injury done to himself; he will, therefore, forthwith endeavour to repay it in kind. Q.E.D.

Referenced in: E3DOE37,- E4P37N2

E3: PROP. 41, Note. --If he believes that he has given just cause for the love, he will take pride therein (E3P30 and E3P30N); this is what most often happens (E3P25), and we said that its contrary took place whenever a man conceives himself to be hated by another. (See note to preceding proposition. E3P40N)
This reciprocal love, and consequently the desire of benefiting him who loves us (E3P39), and who endeavours to benefit us, is called gratitude or thankfulness.
It thus appears that men are much more prone to take vengeance than to return benefits.

Referenced in: E3DOE34,- E4P49,- E4P57N

E3: PROP. 42. He who has conferred a benefit on anyone from motives of love or honour will feel pain, if he sees that the benefit is received without gratitude.

Proof.--When a man loves something similar to himself, he endeavours, as far as he can, to bring it about that he should be loved thereby in return (E3P33). Therefore he who has conferred a benefit confers it in obedience to the desire, which he feels of being loved in return; that is (E3P34) from the hope of honour or (E3P30N) pleasure; hence [by E3P12] he will endeavour, as far as he can, to conceive this cause of honour, or to regard it as actually existing. But, by the hypothesis, he conceives something else, which excludes the existence of the said cause of honour: wherefore he will thereat feel pain (E3P19). Q.E.D.

Referenced in: E4P70

E3: PROP. 43. Hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can on the other hand be destroyed by love.

Proof.--He who conceives, that an object of his hate hates him in return, will thereupon feel a new hatred, while the former hatred (by hypothesis) still remains (E3P40). But if, on the other hand, he conceives that the object of hate loves him, he will to this extent (E3P30) regard himself with pleasure, and (E3P29) will endeavour to please the cause of his emotion. In other words, he will endeavour not to hate him (E3P41), and not to affect him painfully; this endeavour (E3P37) will be greater or less in proportion to the emotion from which it arises. Therefore, if it be greater than that which arises from hatred, and through which the man endeavours to affect painfully the thing which he hates [by E3P26], it will get the better of it and banish the hatred from his mind. Q.E.D.

Referenced in: E3P49N,- E4P46

E3: PROP. 44. Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes into love: and love is thereupon greater than if hatred had not preceded it.

Proof.--The proof proceeds in the same way as E3P38: for he who begins to love a thing, which he was wont to hate or regard with pain, from the very fact of loving feels pleasure. To this pleasure involved in love [see its definition in E3P13CN] is added the pleasure arising from aid given to the endeavour to remove the pain involved in hatred (E3P37), accompanied by the idea of the former object of hatred as cause.

Referenced in: E4P46

E3: PROP. 44, Note. --Though this be so, no one will endeavour to hate anything, or to be affected with pain, for the sake of enjoying this greater pleasure; that is, no one will desire that he should be injured, in the hope of recovering from the injury, nor long to be ill for the sake of getting well. For everyone will always endeavour to persist in his being, and to ward off pain as far as he can. If the contrary is conceivable, namely, that a man should desire to hate someone, in order that he might love him the more thereafter, he will always desire to hate him. For the strength of the love is in proportion to the strength of the hatred, wherefore the man would desire, that the hatred be continually increased more and more, and, for a similar reason, he would desire to become more and more ill, in order that he might take a greater pleasure in being restored to health: in such a case he would always endeavour to be ill, which (E3P6) is absurd.

E3: PROP. 45. If a man conceives, that anyone similar to himself hates anything also similar to himself; which he loves, he will hate that person.

Proof.--The beloved object feels reciprocal hatred towards him who hates it (E3P40); therefore the lover, in conceiving that anyone hates the beloved object, conceives the beloved thing as affected by hatred, in other words (E3P13CN), by pain; consequently [by E3P21] he is himself affected by pain accompanied by the idea of the hater of the beloved thing as cause; that is, he will hate him who hates anything which he himself loves (E3P13CN). Q.E.D.

E3: PROP. 46. If a man has been affected pleasurably or painfully by anyone, of a class or nation different from his own, and if the pleasure or pain has been accompanied by the idea of the said stranger as cause, under the general category of the class or nation: the man will feel love or hatred, not only to the individual stranger, but also to the whole class or nation whereto he belongs.

Proof.--This is evident from E3P16.

E3: PROP. 47, Note. --This proposition can also be proved from the Corollary to E2P17C. Whenever we remember anything, even if it does not actually exist, we regard it only as present, and the body is affected in the same manner; wherefore, in so far as the remembrance of the thing is strong, a man is determined to regard it with pain; this determination while the image of the thing in question lasts, is indeed checked by the remembrance of other things excluding the existence of the aforesaid thing, but is not destroyed: hence, a man only feels pleasure in so far as the said determination is checked:
for this reason the joy [pleasure] arising from the injury done to what we hate is repeated, every time we remember that object of hatred. For, as we have said, when the image of the thing in question is aroused, inasmuch as it involves the thing's existence, it determines the man to regard the thing with the same pain as he was wont to do, when it actually did exist. However, since he has joined to the image of the thing other images, which exclude its existence, this determination to pain is forthwith checked, and the man rejoices afresh as often as the repetition takes place.
This is the cause of men's pleasure in recalling past evils, and delight in narrating dangers from which they have escaped. For when men conceive a danger, they conceive it as still future, and are determined to fear it; this determination is checked afresh by the idea of freedom, which became associated with the idea of the danger when they escaped therefrom: this renders them secure afresh: therefore they rejoice afresh.

Referenced in: E3DOE11,- E3DOE32

Ethics Part 3, On the Origin and Nature of the Emotions
Propositions 37-47

P37- P38- P39- P40- P41- P42- P43- P44- P45- P46- P47

Ethics Part 3, On the Origin and Nature of the Emotions Propositions 37-47

P37- P38- P39- P40- P41- P42- P43- P44- P45- P46- P47

Ethics Part 3, On the Origin and Nature of the Emotions
Propositions 37-47