|E5: PROP. 1. Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and associated in the mind, so are the modifications of body or the images of things precisely in the same way arranged and associated in the body.
|Proof.--The order and connection of ideas is the same (E2P7) as the order and connection of things, and vice versa the order and connection of things is the same (E2P6C and E2P7) as the order and connection of ideas. Wherefore, even as the order and connection of ideas in the mind takes place according to the order and association of modifications of the body (E2P18), so vice versa (E3P2) the order and connection of modifications of the body takes place in accordance with the manner, in which thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and associated in the mind. Q.E.D.
|Referenced in: E5P10
|E5: PROP. 2. If we remove a disturbance of the spirit, or emotion, from the thought of an external cause, and unite it to other thoughts, then will the love or hatred towards that external cause, and also the vacillations of spirit which arise from these emotions, be destroyed.
|Proof.--That, which constitutes the reality of love or hatred, is pleasure or pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause (Def. of the Emotions, E3DOE6 and E3DOE7); wherefore, when this cause is removed, the reality of love or hatred is removed with it; therefore these emotions and those which arise therefrom are destroyed. Q.E.D.
|Referenced in: E5P4CN,- E5P20N
|E5: PROP. 3. An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a passion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof.
|Proof.--An emotion, which is a passion, is a confused idea (by the general Def. of the Emotions E3DOE). If, therefore, we form a clear and distinct idea of a given emotion, that idea will only be distinguished from the emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind only, by reason (E2P21 and E2P21N); therefore (E3P3), the emotion will cease to be a passion. Q.E.D.
|Referenced in: E5P18CN,- E5P20N
|E5: PROP. 3, Corollary.--An emotion therefore becomes more under our control, and the mind is less passive in respect to it, in proportion as it is more known to us.
|Referenced in: E5P42
|E5: PROP. 4. There is no modification of the body, whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception.
|Proof.--Properties which are common to all things can only be conceived adequately (E2P38); therefore (E2P12 and E2P13L2) there is no modification of the body, whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. Q.E.D.
|Referenced in: E5P4C,- E5P14
|E5: PROP. 4, Corollary.--Hence it follows that there is no emotion, whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception.
|For an emotion is the idea of a modification of the body (by the general Def. of the Emotions E3DOE), and must therefore (by the preceding Prop. E5P4) involve some clear and distinct conception.
| E5: PROP. 4 Corollary, Note.
--Seeing that there is nothing which is not followed by an effect
(E1P36), and that we clearly
and distinctly understand whatever follows
from an idea, which in us is
(E2P40), it follows that everyone
has the power of clearly and distinctly
himself and his
if not absolutely, at any rate in part, and consequently of
bringing it about, that he should become less subject to them.
To attain this result, therefore, we must chiefly direct our efforts to acquiring, as far as possible, a clear and distinct knowledge of every emotion, in order that the mind may thus, through emotion, be determined to think of those things which it clearly and distinctly perceives, and wherein it fully acquiesces: and thus that the emotion itself may be separated from the thought of an external cause, and may be associated with true thoughts; whence it will come to pass, not only that love, hatred, etc. will be destroyed (E5P2), but also that the appetites or desires, which are wont to arise from such emotion, will become incapable of being excessive (E4P61).
For it must be especially remarked, that the appetite through which a man is said to be active, and that through which he is said to be passive is one and the same. For instance, we have shown that human nature is so constituted, that everyone desires his fellow-men to live after his own fashion (E3P31CN [or E3P31C]); in a man, who is not guided by reason, this appetite is a passion which is called ambition, and does not greatly differ from pride; whereas in a man, who lives by the dictates of reason, it is an activity or virtue which is called piety (E4P37N1 and E4P37 Proof 2).
In like manner all appetites or desires are only passions, in so far as they spring from inadequate ideas; the same results are accredited to virtue, when they are aroused or generated by adequate ideas. For all desires, whereby we are determined to any given action, may arise as much from adequate as from inadequate ideas (E4P59). Than this remedy for the emotions (to return to the point from which I started), which consists in a true knowledge thereof, nothing more excellent, being within our power, can be devised. For the mind has no other power save that of thinking and of forming adequate ideas, as we have shown above (E3P3).
|Referenced in: E5P20N
|E5: PROP. 5. An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive simply, and not as necessary, or as contingent, or as possible, is, other conditions being equal, greater than any other emotion.
|Proof.--An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to be free, is greater than one towards what we conceive to be necessary (E3P49), and, consequently, still greater than one towards what we conceive as possible, or contingent (E4P11). But to conceive a thing as free can be nothing else than to conceive it simply, while we are in ignorance of the causes whereby it has been determined to action (E2P35N); therefore, an emotion towards a thing which we conceive simply is, other conditions being equal, greater than one, which we feel towards what is necessary, possible, or contingent, and, consequently, it is the greatest of all. Q.E.D.
|Referenced in: E5P6
|E5: PROP. 6. The mind has greater power over the emotions and is less subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things as necessary.
|Proof.--The mind understands all things to be necessary (E1P29) and to be determined to existence and operation by an infinite chain of causes [E1P28]; therefore (by the foregoing Proposition E5P5), it thus far brings it about, that it is less subject to the emotions arising therefrom, and (E3P48) feels less emotion towards the things themselves. Q.E.D.
|Referenced in: E5P10N
|E5: PROP. 6, Note. --The more this knowledge, that things are necessary, is applied to particular things, which we conceive more distinctly and vividly, the greater is the power of the mind over the emotions, as experience also testifies. For we see, that the pain arising from the loss of any good is mitigated, as soon as the man who has lost it perceives, that it could not by any means have been preserved. So also we see that no one pities an infant, because it cannot speak, walk, or reason, or lastly, because it passes so many years, as it were, in unconsciousness. Whereas, if most people were born full-grown and only one here and there as an infant, everyone would pity the infants; because infancy would not then be looked on as a state natural and necessary, but as a fault or delinquency in Nature; and we may note several other instances of the same sort.
|E5: PROP. 7. Emotions which are aroused or spring from reason, if we take account of time, are stronger than those, which are attributable to particular objects that we regard as absent.
|Proof.--We do not regard a thing as absent, by reason of the emotion wherewith we conceive it, but by reason of the body being affected by another emotion excluding the existence of the said thing (E2P17). Wherefore, the emotion, which is referred to the thing which we regard as absent, is not of a nature to overcome the rest of a man's activities and power (E4P6), but is, on the contrary, of a nature to be in some sort controlled by the emotions, which exclude the existence of its external cause (E4P9). But an emotion which springs from reason is necessarily referred to the common properties of things (see the def. of reason in E2P40N2), which we always regard as present (for there can be nothing to exclude their present existence), and which we always conceive in the same manner (E2P38). Wherefore an emotion of this kind always remains the same; and consequently (E5A1) emotions, which are contrary thereto and are not kept going by their external causes, will be obliged to adapt themselves to it more and more, until they are no longer contrary to it; to this extent the emotion which springs from reason is more powerful. Q.E.D.
|Referenced in: E5P10N,- E5P20N
|E5: PROP. 8. An emotion is stronger in proportion to the number of simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused.
|Proof.--Many simultaneous causes are more powerful than a few (E3P7): therefore (E4P5), in proportion to the increased number of simultaneous causes whereby it is aroused, an emotion becomes stronger. Q.E.D.
|Referenced in: E5P10N,- E5P11
|E5: PROP. 8, Note. --This proposition is also evident from E5A2.
|E5: PROP. 9. An emotion, which is attributable to many and diverse causes which the mind regards as simultaneous with the emotion itself, is less hurtful, and we are less subject thereto and less affected towards each of its causes, than if it were a different and equally powerful emotion attributable to fewer causes or to a single cause.
only bad or hurtful, in so far as it hinders the
mind from being able to think
E4P27); therefore, an
whereby the mind is determined to the contemplation of several
things at once, is less hurtful than another equally powerful
which so engrosses the mind in the single contemplation of a few objects
or of one, that it is unable to think of anything else; this was our first
Again, as the mind's essence in other words, its power (E3P7), consists solely in thought (E2P11), the mind is less passive in respect to an emotion, which causes it to think of several things at once, than in regard to an equally strong emotion, which keeps it engrossed in the contemplation of a few or of a single object: this was our second point.
Lastly, this emotion (E3P48), in so far as it is attributable to several causes, is less powerful in regard to each of them. Q.E.D.
|Referenced in: E5P20N
|E5: PROP. 10. So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, we have the power of arranging and associating the modifications of our body according to the intellectual order.
|Proof.--The emotions, which are contrary to our nature, that is (E4P30), which are bad, are bad in so far as they impede the mind from understanding (E4P27). So long, therefore, as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, the mind's power, whereby it endeavours to understand things (E4P26), is not impeded, and therefore it is able to form clear and distinct ideas and to deduce them one from another (E2P40N2 and E2P47N); consequently we have in such cases [by E5P1] the power of arranging and associating the modifications of the body according to the intellectual order. Q.E.D.
|Referenced in: E5P20N,- E5P39
| E5: PROP. 10, Note.
--By this power of rightly arranging and associating the bodily
modifications we can guard ourselves from being easily affected by evil
For (E5P7) a greater force is needed for controlling the
when they are arranged and associated according to the
order, than when they are uncertain and unsettled. The best
we can do, therefore, so long as we do not possess a perfect knowledge of
is to frame a system of right conduct, or fixed practical
precepts, to commit it to
memory, and to apply it
forthwith [constantly] to the
particular circumstances which now and again meet us in life, so that our
may become fully imbued therewith, and that it may be always
ready to our hand.
For instance, we have laid down among the rules of life (E4P46 and E4P46N), that hatred should be overcome with love or high-mindedness, and not requited with hatred in return. Now, that this precept of reason may be always ready to our hand in time of need, we should often think over and reflect upon the wrongs generally committed by men, and in what manner and way they may be best warded off by high-mindedness: we shall thus associate the idea of wrong with the idea of this precept, which accordingly will always be ready for use when a wrong is done to us (E2P18) If we keep also in readiness the notion of our true advantage, and of the good which follows from mutual friendships, and common fellowships; further, if we remember that complete acquiescence is the result of the right way of life (E4P52), and that men, no less than everything else, act by the necessity of their nature: in such case I say the wrong, or the hatred, which commonly arises therefrom, will engross a very small part of our imagination and will be easily overcome;
Or, if the anger which springs from a grievous wrong be not overcome easily, it will nevertheless be overcome, though not without a spiritual conflict, far sooner than if we had not thus reflected on the subject beforehand. As is indeed evident from E5P6, E5P7, and E5P8.
We should, in the same way, reflect on courage as a means of overcoming fear; the ordinary dangers of life should frequently be brought to mind and imagined, together with the means whereby through readiness of resource and strength of mind we can avoid and overcome them.
But we must note, that in arranging our thoughts and conceptions we should always bear in mind that which is good in every individual thing (E4P63C and E3P59), in order that we may always be determined to action by an emotion of pleasure. For instance, if a man sees that he is too keen in the pursuit of honour, let him think over its right use, the end for which it should be pursued, and the means whereby he may attain it. Let him not think of its misuse, and its emptiness, and the fickleness of mankind, and the like, whereof no man thinks except through a morbidness of disposition; with thoughts like these do the most ambitious most torment themselves, when they despair of gaining the distinctions they hanker after, and in thus giving vent to their anger would fain appear wise. Wherefore it is certain that those, who cry out the loudest against the misuse of honour and the vanity of the world, are those who most greedily covet it.
This is not peculiar to the ambitious, but is common to all who are ill-used by fortune, and who are infirm in spirit. For a poor man also, who is miserly, will talk incessantly of the misuse of wealth and of the vices of the rich; whereby he merely torments himself, and shows the world that he is intolerant, not only of his own poverty, but also of other people's riches.
So, again, those who have been ill received by a woman they love think of nothing but the inconstancy, treachery, and other stock faults of the fair sex; all of which they consign to oblivion, directly they are again taken into favour by their sweetheart.
Thus he who would govern his emotions and appetite solely by the love of freedom strives, as far as he can, to gain a knowledge of the virtues and their causes, and to fill his spirit with the joy which arises from the true knowledge of them: he will in no wise desire to dwell on men's faults, or to carp at his fellows, or to revel in a false show of freedom. Whosoever will diligently observe and practise these precepts (which indeed are not difficult) will verily, in a short space of time, be able, for the most part, to direct his actions according to the commandments of reason.
|Referenced in: E5P20N