|
We shall now begin to speak of Hope and Fear, of Confidence,
Despair, and Vacillation, of Courage, Boldness and
Emulation, of Pusillanimity and Timidity *and lastly of
Jealousy,* and, as is our wont, we shall take them one by
one, and then indicate which of these can hinder us, and
which can profit us. We shall be able to do all this very
easily, if only we attend closely to the thoughts that we can
have about a thing that is yet to come, be it good, be it bad.
*The ideas which we have about things have reference either
1. To the things themselves; or,
Next, as regards him who thinks about the thing, the case is this: he must do something either in order to advance the thing, or in order to prevent it. Now from these thoughts all these passions result as follows: when we think that a certain thing which is yet to come is good and that it can happen, the soul assumes, in consequence of this, that form which we call hope which is nothing else than a certain kind of joy, though mingled with some sorrow. And, on the other hand, if we judge that that which may be coming is bad, then that form enters into our soul which we call fear. If, however, the thing is regarded by us as good, and, at the same time, as something that necessarily must come, then there comes into the soul that repose which we call confidence; which is a certain joy not mingled with sorrow, as hope is. But when we think that the thing is bad, and that it necessarily must come, then despair enters into the soul; which is nothing else than a certain kind of sorrow. So far we have spoken of the passions considered in this chapter, and given positive definitions of the same, and have thus stated what each of them is; we may now proceed in a converse manner, and define them negatively. We hope that the evil may not come, we fear lest the good should not come, we are confident that the evil will not come, we despair because the good will not come. Having said this much about the passions in so far as they arise from our thoughts concerning the thing itself, we have now to speak of those which arise from the thoughts relating to him who thinks about the thing; namely: If something must be done in order to bring the thing about, and we come to no decision concerning it, then the soul receives that form which we call vacillation. But when it makes a manly resolve to produce the thing, and this can be brought about, then that is called courage; and if the thing is difficult to effect, then that is called intrepidity or bravery. When, however, some one decides to do a thing because another (who had done it first) has met with success, then we call it emulation. *Lastly,* If any one knows what he must decide to do in order to advance a good thing, and to hinder a bad one, and yet does not do so, then we call it pusillanimity; and when the same is very great, we call it timidity. Lastly, jealousness or jalousie is the anxiety which we feel that we may have the sole enjoyment and possession of something already acquired. Since we know now whence these passions originate, it will be very easy for us to show which of them are good, and which are bad. As regards Hope, Fear, Confidence, Despair, and Jealousy, it is certain that they arise from a wrong opinion. For, as we have already shown above, all things have their necessary causes, and must necessarily happen just as they do happen. And although Confidence and Despair seem to have a place in the inviolable order and sequence of causes [N1] *or to confirm the same,* yet (when the truth of the matter is rightly looked into) that is far from being the case. For Confidence and Despair never arise, unless Hope and Fear (from which they derive their being) have preceded them. For example, if any one thinks that something, for which he still has to wait, is good, then he receives that form in his soul which we call Hope; and when he is confident about *the aquisition of* the supposed good, his soul gains that repose which we call Confidence. What we are now saying about confidence, the same must also be said about Despair. But, according to that which we have said about Love, this also can have no place in a perfect man: because they presuppose things which, owing to the mutability to which they are subject (as remarked in our account of Love), we must not become attached to; nor (as shown in our account of Hatred) may we even have an aversion to them. The man, however, who persists in these passions is at all times subject to such attachment and aversion. [Note N1]: A adds here: (because there all is inviolable and unalterable.) As regards Vacillation, Pusillanimity, and Timidity, these betray their imperfection through their very character and nature: for whatsoever they do to our advantage comes only negatively from the effects of their nature. For example, some one hopes for something which he thinks is good, although it is not good, yet, owing to his vacillation or pusillanimity, he happens to lack the courage necessary for its realisation, and so it comes about that he is negatively or by accident saved from the evil which he thought was good. These *passions,* therefore, can also have no place whatever in the man who is guided by true Reason. Lastly, as regards Courage, Boldness, and Emulation, about these there is nothing else to be said than that which we have already said about Love and Hatred. |
|
|
|
|
| Slack padding. |