As man is a created finite thing, &c., it necessarily
follows that what he has of Thought, and what we call the
Soul, is a mode[N1] of the attribute which we call Thought, and
that nothing else except this mode belongs to his essence:
so much so that when this mode comes to naught, the soul
perishes also, although the above attribute remains
unchanged. Similarly as regards[N2] what he has of Extension;
what we call Body is nothing else than a mode of the other
attribute which we call Extension; when this is destroyed,
the human body also ceases to be, although the attribute
Extension remains unchanged.
[Note N1]: A: an attribute; B: a mode.
[Note N2]: B omits "as regards," and inserts "and" after "Extension."
Now in order to understand what this mode is, which we
call Soul, and how it derives its origin from the body, and
also how its change (only) depends on the body (which to
me constitutes the union of soul and body) it must be
1. That the most immediate mode of the attribute which
we call thought contains objective the formal
essence of all things; so much so, that if one could posit a
real thing whose essence was not objective in the
above-named attribute, then this would not be infinite, nor
supremely perfect in its kind; contrary to what has already
been proved in the third proposition.
And since, as a matter of fact, Nature or God is one being of
which infinite attributes are predicated, and which contains
in itself all the essences of created things, it necessarily
follows that of all this there is produced in Thought an
infinite Idea,[N1] which comprehends objective the whole
of Nature just as it is realiter.
[Note N1]: A: it necessarily follows that of all that which is
produced in Thought there is an infinite Idea...; B: ...that there is
produced in thought an infinite idea thereof...
2. It is to be observed that all the remaining modes, such
as Love, Desire, Joy, *&c.,* derive their origin from this first
immediate mode; and that, too, in such wise, that if it did not
precede, then there could be no love, desire, *nor joy,* &c.
Whence it clearly follows that the natural love which
prompts everything to preserve its body (I mean the mode)[N1]
cannot have any other origin than in the Idea or the
"objective" essence of such body which is in the
thinking attribute. Further, since for the real existence of an
Idea (or "objective" essence) no other thing is required than
the thinking attribute and the object (or "formal"
essence), it is certain, as we have said, that the Idea, or the
"objective" essence, is the most immediate[N2] mode of the
*thinking* attribute. And, consequently, there can be in the
thinking attribute no other mode, that should belong to the
essence of the soul of every[N3] thing, except only the Idea,
which must be in the thinking attribute when its object exists:
for such an idea brings with it the remaining modes of Love,
Desire, *Joy,* &c. Now as the Idea comes from the existence
of the object, therefore according as the object changes or
perishes, so its Idea must change or perish, and such being
the case, it is that which is united with the object.[N4]
[Note N1]: B omits the words in brackets.
[Note N2]: I call that mode the most immediate mode, which, in
order to exist, requires no other mode in the same attribute.
[Note N3]: A: gelijken [like]; B: iegelik'n [every].
[Note N4]: B: ...so this idea of it must change or perish in the same degree
or measure of change or annihilation, because it is thus united with the
Lastly, if we should want to proceed and ascribe to
the essence of the soul that through which it can be real, we
shall be able to find nothing else than the
attribute [Thought] and the object of which we have
just been speaking; and neither of these can belong
to the essence of the Soul, as the object has
nothing of Thought, and is realiter different from
the Soul.[N1] And with regard to the attribute, we have
also proved already that it cannot pertain to the
above-mentioned essence, as appears even more
clearly from what we said subsequently;[N2] for the
attribute as attribute[N3] is not united with the
object, since it neither changes nor perishes,
although the object changes or perishes.
[Note N1]: B: as the object of Thought has nothing thereof, but is
realiter different from it.
[Note N2]: B: as will be seen from what we shall say later.
[Note N3]: B omits "as attribute."
Therefore the essence of the soul consists in
this alone, namely, in the existence of an Idea or
"objective" essence in the thinking attribute,
arising from the essence of an object which in fact
exists in Nature. I say, of an object which in fact
exists, &c., without more particulars, so as to
include under this not only the modes of extension,
but also the modes of all the infinite attributes,
which have also each its soul, just as in the case
of extension. And in order that this definition may
be somewhat more fully understood, it should be
borne in mind what I have already said when
speaking about the attributes, which, I said, are
not different as regards their existence,[N1] for they
are themselves the "subjects" of their essences;
also that the essence of every one of the modes is
contained in the above-named attributes, *and,
lastly, that all the attributes are attributes* of
One infinite Being. Wherefore also, in the ninth
chapter of the First Part, I called this Idea a
creation created immediately by God; since it
contains objective the "formal" essence of all
things[N2] without omission or addition. And this is
necessarily but one, considering that all the
essences of the attributes, and the essences of the
modes comprehended in these attributes, are the
essence of one only infinite being.[N3] But it has
still to be remarked that these modes, now under
consideration, [even when]
none of them exists, are nevertheless equally comprehended
in their attributes; and as there is no inequality whatever
in the attributes, nor yet in the essences of the modes, there
can be no particularity in the idea when there is none in
Nature. But as soon as ever some of these modes take on
their particular existence, and thereby become in some way
different from their attributes (because then their
particular existence, which they have in the attribute, is
the "subject" of their essence), then there shows itself a
particularity in the essences of the modes, and consequently
in the "objective" essences of these which are necessarily
comprehended in the Idea.[N4] And this is the reason why we
said, in the definition, that the Idea[N5] arises from an
object,[N6] which really exists in Nature.
And with this we think we have sufficiently explained what
kind of a thing the soul is in general, understanding
by this expression not only the Ideas which arise from *the
existence of* corporeal modes, but also those which arise
from the existence of every mode of the remaining
[Note N1]: B omits the nine words that follow.
[Note N2]: B:...I called the thinking attribute, or the understanding in the
thinking thing, a son, product, or creation created immediately by God, since
it contains the "objective" essence of all things...
[Note N3]: B omits this sentence, and continues: For it has to be remarked...
[Note N4]: B: in the Thinking Attribute.
[Note N5]: B: the soul, the idea, or objective essence in the thinking
attribute (which is all one to me) arises...
[Note N6]: B: from the essence of an object...
But, since we have no such knowledge of the remaining
attributes as we have of extension, let us just see whether,
having regard to the modes of extension, we can discover a
more special definition, and one that shall be more
appropriate to express the essence of our souls, for this is
the real task before us. Now we shall presuppose here, as
something already demonstrated, that extension contains
no other modes than motion and rest, and that every
particular material thing is nothing else than a certain
proportion of motion and rest, so much so indeed that, even
if extension contained nothing else except motion only or
rest only, then no particular thing could be shown or exist
in the whole of extension; the human body, therefore, is
nothing else than a certain proportion of motion and rest.
Now the "objective
essence" of this actual ratio *of motion and rest* which is in
the thinking attribute, this (we say) is the soul of the body;
so that whenever one of these two modes changes into more
or less (motion or rest)[N1] the Idea *or the soul* also changes
accordingly. For example, when the [amount of] rest
happens to increase, while the [quantity of] motion is
diminished, then there is produced thereby that pain or
sorrow which we call cold; but if, on the contrary, this
[increase] takes place in the [amount of] motion, then there
is produced thereby that pain which we call heat.[N2] And so
when it happens that the degrees of motion and rest are not
equal in all the parts of our body, but that some have more
motion and rest than others, there arises therefrom a[N3]
difference of feeling (and thence arises the different kind of
pain which we feel when we are struck in the eyes or on the
hands with a cane).[N4] And when it happens that the external
causes, which bring about these changes, are different from
one another, and have not all the same effect, then there
results from this a difference of feeling in one and the same
part (and from this results the difference of feeling
according as one and the same hand is struck with a piece
of wood or of iron).[N4] And, again, if the change which occurs
in a part restores it to its first proportion *of motion and
rest,* there arises from this that joy which we call repose,
pleasurable activity, and cheerfulness. Lastly, now that we
have explained what feeling is, we can easily see how this
gives rise to an Idea reflexiva, or the knowledge of
oneself, Experience and Reasoning. And from all this (as
also because our soul is united with God, and is a part of
the infinite Idea, arising immediately from God) there can
also be clearly seen the origin of clear knowledge, and the
immortality of the soul. But, for the present, what we have
said must be enough.
[Note N1]: B: whenever of these two modes, be it motion or rest, changes into
more or less...
[Note N2]: B continues as follows: But if the proportion of motion and rest
is not the same in all parts of our body, but some of them are provided with
more motion or rest than the others, there arises thence a difference of
feeling: such as we experience when we are struck with cane in the eyes or on
the hands. Moreover, when the external causes happen to be different, and
have not all the same effect, there results therefrom a difference of feeling
in one and the same part: such as we experience when the same hand is struck
with a piece of wood or of iron. But when the change which occurs in some
part restores it to its previous proportion of motion and rest, there
[Note N3]: A: the.
[Note N4]: A gives the words in brackets immediately after "happens."