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Let us now examine the true and the false, which
indicate to us the fourth, and last, consequence
of true belief.
Now, in order to do this, we
shall first state the definitions of Truth and
Falsity. Truth is an affirmation (or a denial)
made about a certain thing, which agrees with
that same thing; and Falsity is an affirmation
(or a denial) about a thing, which does not
agree with the thing itself. But this being so,
it may appear that there is no difference
between the false and the true Idea, or, since
the [affirmation or] denial of this or that are
mere [N1] modes of thought, and [the true and
the false Idea] differ in no other way [N2]
except that the one agrees with the thing, and
the other does not, that they are therefore, not
really, but only logically [N3] different; and
if this should be so, one may justly ask, what
advantage has the one from his Truth, and what
harm does the other incur through his falsity?
and how shall the one know that his conception
or Idea agrees with the thing more than the
other does? lastly, whence does it come that
the one errs, and the other does not?
[Note N1]: Literally "true," but the translator probably mistook merus for verus. [Note N2]: In B this sentence begins as follows: "But since the affirmation or denial of this or that are mere [N1 above] modes of thought, there seems to be no difference between the true and the false idea except that," &c.
[Note N3]: door reeden [through reason.]
These remarks also explain to some extent what we said about God being the Truth, or that the Truth is God himself. Now the reason why the one is more conscious of his truth than the other is, is because the Idea of [his] affirmation (or denial) entirely agrees with the nature of the thing, and consequently has more essence. [N1] It may help some to grasp this better if it be observed that Understanding (although the word does not sound like it) is a mere or pure passivity; that is, that our soul is changed in such a way that it receives other modes of thought, which it did not have before. Now when some one, in consequence of the whole object having acted upon him, receives corresponding forms or modes of thought, then it is clear that he receives a totally different feeling of the form or character of the object than does another who has not had so many causes [acting upon him], and is therefore moved to make an affirmation or denial about that thing by a different and slighter action (because he becomes aware of it only through a few, or the less important, of its attributes).[N2] From this, then, we see the perfection of one who takes his stand upon Truth, as contrasted with one who does not take his stand upon it. Since the one changes easily, while the other does not change easily, it follows therefrom that the one has more stability and essence than the other has: likewise, since the modes of thought which agree with the thing have had more causes [to produce them] they have also more stability and essence in them: and, since they entirely agree with the thing, it is impossible that they should after a time be made different or undergo some change, *all the less so* because we have already seen before that the essence of a thing is unchangeable. Such is not the case with falsity. And with these remarks all the above questions will be sufficiently answered. [Note N1]: B: . . . because in the former case the Idea of the affirmation (or denial) which entirely agrees with the nature of the thing has so much more essence. [Note N2]: Text imperfect. See Commentary. |
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