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Love, which is nothing else than the enjoyment of a thing
and union therewith, we shall divide according to the
qualities of its object; the object, that is, which man seeks to
enjoy, and to unite himself with.
Now some objects are in themselves transient; others, indeed, are not transient by virtue of their cause. There is yet a third that is eternal and imperishable through its own power and might. The transient are all the particular things which did not exist from all time, or [N1] have had a beginning. [Note N1]: B: but. The others are all those modes [N1] which we have stated to be the cause of the particular modes. [Note N1]: B: the general modes. But the third is God, or, what we regard as one and the same, Truth. Love, then, arises from the idea and knowledge that we have of a thing; and according as the thing shows itself greater and more glorious, so also is our love greater. In two ways it is possible to free ourselves from love: either by getting to know something better, or by discovering that the loved object, which is held *by us* to be something great and glorious, brings in its train much woe and disaster. It is also characteristic of love that we never think of emancipating ourselves from it (as from surprise and other passions); and this for the following two reasons: (1) because it is impossible, (2) because it is necessary that we should not be released from the same. It is impossible because it does not depend on us, but only on the good and useful which we discern in the object; it is necessary that these should never have become known to us, if we would not *or should not* love it; and this is not a matter of our free choice, or dependent on us, for if we knew nothing, it is certain that we should also be nothing. It is necessary that we should not be released from it, because, owing to the weakness of our nature, we could not exist without enjoying something with which we becorne, united, and from which we draw strength. Now which of these, three kinds of objects are we to choose or to reject? As regards the transient (since, as remarked, we must, owing to the weakness of our nature, necessarily love something and become united with it in order to exist), it is certain that our nature becomes nowise strengthened through our loving, and becoming united with, these, [N1] for they are weak themselves, and the one cripple cannot carry the other. And not only do they not advance us, but they are even harmful to us. For we have said that love is a union with the object which our understanding judges to be good and glorious; and by this we mean such a union whereby both the lover [N2] and what is loved become one and the same thing, or together constitute one whole. He, therefore, is indeed always wretched who is united to transient things. For, since these are beyond his power, and subject to many accidents, it is impossible that, when they are affected, he should be free from these affects. And, consequently, we conclude: If those who love transient things that have some measure of reality are so wretched, how wretched must they be who love honour, riches, and pleasures, which have no reality whatever! [Note N1]: B: with things which are transient.
[Note N2]: A and B: love.
We said before that the things which are transient are beyond our power. *But* let us be well understood; we do not mean to say that we are a free cause depending upon nothing else; only when we say that some things are in, others beyond our power, we mean by those that are in our power such as we can produce through the order of or together with Nature, of which we are a part; by those which are not in our power, such as, being outside us, are not liable to suffer any change through us, because they are very far removed from our real essence as thus fashioned by Nature. To proceed, we come now to the second kind of objects, which though eternal and imperishable, are not such through their own power. [N1] However, if we institute a brief inquiry here, we become immediately aware that these are only mere modes which depend immediately on God. And since the nature of these is such, they cannot be conceived by us unless we, at the same time, have a conception of God. In this, since he is perfect, our Love must necessarily rest. And, to express it in a word, if we use our understanding aright it will be impossible for us not to love God. [Note N1]: B continues: "but are modes which depend immediately on God" -- and omits the next sentence. The Reasons why, are clear. First of all because we find that God alone has essence only, and all other things are not essences but modes. And since the modes cannot be rightly understood without the entity on which they immediately depend; and [as] we have already shown before that if, when loving something, we get to know a better thing than that which we then love, we always prefer it immediately, and forsake the first; it follows, therefore, incontrovertibly that when we get to know God, who has all perfection in himself, we must necessarily love him. Secondly, if we use our understanding well in acquiring a knowledge of things, then we must know them in [relation to] their causes. Now then, since God is a first cause of all other things, therefore, from the nature of the case (ex rerum natura), the knowledge of God is, and remains, before the knowledge of all other things: because the knowledge of all other things must follow from the knowledge of the first cause. And true love results always from the knowledge that the thing is glorious and good. What else, then, can follow but that it can be lavished upon no one more ardently than upon the Lord our God? For he alone is glorious, and a perfect good. So we see now, how we can make love strong, and also how it must rest only in God. What more we had still to say about love, we shall bear in mind to say [N1] it when we consider the last kind of knowledge. In what follows here we shall inquire, as we promised before, as to which of the passions we are to entertain, which we are to reject. [Note N1]: A: do. |
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