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Here, then, let us see how, as we have said, the
passions derive their origin from
opinion. To do this well
and intelligently we shall take some special ones, and prove
what we say by using these as illustrations.
Let Surprise, then, be the first. This is found in one who knows a thing after the first manner [of Knowledge]; [N1] for, since from a few particulars he draws a conclusion which is general, he stands surprised whenever he sees anything that goes against his conclusion; [N2] like one who, having never seen any sheep except with short tails, is surprised at the sheep from Morocco which have long ones. So it is related of a peasant that he had persuaded himself that, beyond his fields there were no others, but when he happened to miss a cow, and was compelled to go and look for her far away, he was surprised at the great number of fields that there were beyond his few acres. And, to be sure, this must also be the case with many Philosophers who have persuaded themselves that beyond this field or little globe, on which they are, there are no more [worlds] (because they have seen no others). But surprise is never felt by him who draws true inferences. This is the first. [Note N1]: A refers to the following note already here; B. at the next semi-colon.
[Note N2]: This should on no account be taken to mean that a
formal inference must always precede astonishment; on the contrary,
it exists also without that, namely, when we tacitly believe that a
thing is [always] so, and not different from what we are accustomed
to see it, hear or think about it, &c. For example, Aristotle says,
a dog is a barking animal, therefore he concludes, whatever barks is
a dog; but when a peasant says a dog, he means tacitly just the
same that Aristotle did with his definition. So that when the peasant
hears the barking he says, a dog; and so, if they had heard some
other kind of animal bark, the peasant, who had drawn no [explicit]
inference, would stand just as astonished as Aristotle, who had
drawn an inference. Furthermore, when we become aware of
something about which we had never thought before, it is not really
such the like of which, whether as a whole or in part, we have not
known before, only it is not so constituted in all respects, or we
have never been affected by it in the same way, &c.
[Note N1]: The substance of the next three paragraphs is given in the following simpler order in B: The second is Love. This arises either, 1, from hearsay, or 2, from opinion, or 3, from true ideas. As regards the first, we generally observe it in the attitude of children to their father; because their father tells them this or that is good they incline towards it, without knowing anything more about it. We see it also in those who, from Love, give their lives for the Fatherland, and also in those who from hearsay about something fall in love with it. As regards the second, it is certain that whenever any one sees, or thinks he sees, something good, he is always inclined to unite himself with it, and, for the sake of the good which he discerns therein, he chooses it as the best, outside which he then knows nothing better or more agreeable. Yet if ever it happens (as it mostly does happen in these things) that he gets to know something better than this good at present known to him, then his love changes immediately from the one (first) to the other (second). All this we shall show more clearly when we treat of the freedom of man. As to love from true ideas, as this is not the place to speak of it, we shall pass it over for the present. [See note [to ST203-P05] on [this page] ] As regards the first, it is certain that whenever any one sees, or thinks he sees, something good, he is always inclined to unite himself with it, and, for the sake of the good which he discerns therein, he chooses it as the best, outside which he then knows nothing better or more agreeable. Yet if ever it happens (as it mostly does happen in these things) that he gets to know something better than this good at present known to him, then his love changes immediately from the one (first) to the other (second). All this we shall show more clearly when we treat of the freedom of man. As to love from true ideas,[N1] since this is not the the place to speak of it, we shall pass it over now, and speak of the third, and last, namely, the Love that comes from hearsay only. This we generally observe in the attitude of children to their father: because their father tells them that this or that is good they incline towards it, without knowing anything more about it. We see it also in those who from Love give their lives for the Fatherland, and also in those who from hearsay about some thing fall in love with it. [Note N1]: Love that comes from true ideas or clear knowledge is not considered here, as it is not the outcome of opinion; see, however, chapter 22 [ST222] about it. Next, Hatred, the exact opposite of love, arises from error which is the outcome of opinion. For when some one has come to the conclusion that a certain thing is good, and another happens to do something to the detriment of the same thing, then there arises in him a hatred against the one who did it, and this, as we shall explain afterwards, could never happen if the true good were known. For, in comparison with the true good, all indeed that is, or is conceived, is naught but wretchedness itself; and is not such a lover of what is wretched much more deserving of pity than of hatred? Hatred, lastly, comes also from mere hearsay, as we see it in the Turks against Jews and Christians, in the Jews against the Turks and Christians, in the Christians against the Jews and Turks, &c. For, among all these, how ignorant is the one multitude of the religion and morals of the others! Desire. Whether (as some will have it) it consists only in a longing or inclination to obtain what is wanting, or (as others will have it [N1]) to retain the things which we already enjoy, it is certain that it cannot be found to have come upon any one except for an apparent good [sub specie boni]. It is therefore clear that Desire, as also Love which we have already discussed, is the outcome of the first kind of knowledge. For if any one has heard that a certain thing is good, he feels a longing and inclination for the same, as may be seen in the case of an invalid who, through hearing the doctor say that such or such a remedy is good for his ailment, at once longs for the same, *and feels a desire for it.* [Note N1]: The first definition is the best, because when the thing is enjoyed the desire ceases; the form [of consciousness] which then prompts us to retain the thing is not desire, but a fear of losing the thing loved. Desire arises also from experience, as may be seen in the practice of doctors, who when they have found a certain remedy good several times are wont to regard it [N1] as something unfailing. [Note N1]: B: are wont to resort to it. All that we have just said of these, the same we can say of all other passions, as is clear to every one. And as, in what follows, we shall begin to inquire which of them are rational, and which of them are irrational, we shall leave the subject now, and say no more about it. What has now been said of these few though most important [passions] can also be said of all others;[N1] and with this we conclude the subject of the Passions which arise from Opinion. [Note N1]: B omits the first half of the concluding sentence ("What ... Others"). |
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