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Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being:
Part 1, Chapter 07.
- ON THE ATTRIBUTES WHICH DO NOT PERTAIN TO GOD

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    Here we shall take up the consideration of those attributes [N1] which are commonly attributed to God, but which, nevertheless, do not pertain to him; as also of those through which it is sought to prove the existence of God, though in vain; and also of the rules of accurate definition.
[Note N1]: As regards the attributes of which God consists, they are only infinite substances, each of which must of itself be infinitely perfect. That this must necessarily be so, we are convinced by clear and distinct reasons. It is true, however, that up to the present only two of all these infinites are known to us through their own essence; and these are thought and extension. All else that is commonly ascribed to God is not any attribute of his, but only certain modes which may be attributed to him either in consideration of all, that is, all his attributes, or in consideration of one attribute. In consideration of all [it is said], for instance, that he is eternal, self-subsisting, infinite, cause of all things, immutable. In consideration of one [it is said], for instance, that he is omniscient, wise, &c., which pertains to thought, and, again, that he is omnipresent, fills all, &c., which pertains to extension.

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    For this purpose, we shall not trouble ourselves very much about the ideas that people commonly have of God, but we shall only inquire briefly into what the Philosophers can tell us about it. Now these have defined God as a being through or of himself, cause of all things, Omniscient, Almighty, eternal, simple, infinite, the highest good, of infinite compassion, &c. But before we approach this inquiry, let us just see what admissions they make to us.

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    In the first place, they say that it is impossible to give a true or right definition of God, because, according to their opinion, there can be no definition except per genus et differentiam, and as God is not a species of any genus, he cannot be defined rightly, or according to the rules.

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    In the second place, they say that God cannot be defined, because the definition must describe the thing itself and also positively; while, according to their standpoint, our knowledge of God cannot be of a positive, but only of a negative kind; therefore no proper definition can be given of God.

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    They also say, besides, that God can never be proved a priori, because he has no cause, but only by way of probability, or from his effects.

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    Since by these assertions of theirs they admit sufficiently that their knowledge of God is very little and slight, let us now proceed to examine their definition.

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    In the first place, we do not see that they give us in it any attribute or attributes through which it can be known what the thing (God) is, [N1] but only some propria or properties which do, indeed, belong to a thing, but never explain what the thing is. For although self-subsisting, being the cause of all things, highest good, eternal and immutable, &c., are peculiar to God alone, nevertheless, from those properties we cannot know what that being, to whom these properties pertain is, and what attributes he has.
[Note N1]: That is to say, when he is considered as all that he is, or with regard to all his attributes; see on this point see note to nnn

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    It is now also time for us to consider the things which they ascribe to God, and which do not, however, pertain to him, [N1] such as omniscient, merciful, wise, and so forth, which things, since they are only certain modes of the thinking thing, and can by no means be, or be understood without the substances [N2] whose modes [N3] they are, can, consequently, also not be attributed to him, who is a Being subsisting without the aid of anything, and solely through himself.
[Note N1]: B: through which the thing (namely God) can be known.

[Note N2]: B: substance.

[Note N3]: A: essences (wezens); B: modes (wijzen).

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    Lastly, they call him the highest good; but if they understand by it something different from what they have already said, namely, that God is immutable, and a cause of all things, then they have become entangled in their own thought, or are unable to understand themselves. This is the outcome of their misconception of good and evil, for they believe that man himself, and not God, is the cause of his sins and wickedness -- which, according to what we have already proved, cannot be the case, else we should be compelled to assert that man is also the cause of himself. However, this will appear yet more evident when we come to consider the will of man.

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    It is necessary that we should now unravel their specious arguments wherewith they seek to excuse their ignorance in Theology.

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    First of all, then, they say that a correct definition must consist of a "genus" and "differentia." Now, although all the Logicians admit this, I do not know where they get it from. And, to be sure, if this must be true, then we can know nothing whatever. For if it is through a definition consisting of genus and differentia that we can first get to know a thing perfectly, then we can never know perfectly the highest genus, which has no genus above it. Now then: If the highest genus, which is the cause of our knowledge of all other things, is not known, much less, then, can the other things be understood or known which are explained by that genus. However, since we are free, and do not consider ourselves in any way tied to their assertions, we shall, in accordance with true logic, propose other rules of definition, namely, on the lines of our division of Nature.

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    Now we have already seen that the attributes (or, as others call them, substances) are things, or, to express ourselves better and more aptly, [constitute] a being which subsists through itself, and therefore makes itself known and reveals itself through itself.

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    As to the other things, we see that they are but modes of the attributes, without which also they can neither be, nor be understood. Consequently definitions must be of two kinds (or sorts):

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    1. The first, namely, are those of attributes, which pertain to a self-subsisting being, these need no genus, or anything, through which they might be better understood or explained: for, since they exist as attributes of a self-subsisting being, they also become known through themselves.

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    2. The second [kind of definitions] are those [of things] which do not exist through themselves, but only through the attributes whose modes they are, and through which, as their genus, they must be understood.

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    And this is [all that need be said] concerning their statement about definitions. As regards the other [assertion], namely, that God can [not] be known by us adequately, this has been sufficiently answered by D. des Cartes in his answers to the objections relating to these things, page 18.

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    And the third [assertion], namely, that God cannot be proved a priori, has also already been answered by us. Since God is the cause of himself, it is enough that we prove him through himself, and such a proof is also much more conclusive than the a posteriori proof, which generally rests only on external causes.
 
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