As regards the first, [N1] namely, whether there is a God, this,
we say, can be proved.
[Note N1]: B: this. *I.* In the first place, a priori thus: 1. Whatever we clearly and distinctly know to belong to the nature [N1] of a thing, we can also truly affirm of that thing. Now we can know clearly and distinctly that existence belongs to the nature of God; Therefore... Otherwise also thus:[N2] 2. The essence of things are from all eternity, and unto all eternity shall remain immutable; The existence of God is essence; Therefore...[N3] [Note N1]: Understand the definite nature through which a thing is what it is, and which can by no means be removed from it without at the same time destroying that thing: thus, for instance, it belongs to the essence of a mountain that it should have a valley, or the essence of a mountain is that it has a valley;[N1N1] this is truly eternal and immutable, and must always be included in the concept of a mountain, even if it never existed, or did not exist now. [Note N1N1]: B simply: to the essence of a mountain belongs a valley. [Note N2]: B omits these three words.
[Note N3]: [[This note is flagged to the following paragraph in the
original but Wolf believed it to belong here]] If a man has an idea of God, then God must exist formaliter; Now, man has an idea of God; Therefore...
The first we prove thus: 1. That the number of knowable things is infinite; 2. That a finite understanding cannot apprehend the infinite; 3. That a finite understanding, unless it is determined by something external, cannot through itself know anything; because, just as it has no power to know all things equally, so little also has it the power to begin or to commence to know this, for instance,[N1] sooner than that, or that sooner than this. Since, then, it can do neither the one nor the other it can know nothing. [Note N1]: B omits for instance The first (or the major premise) is proved thus: If the imagination of man were the sole cause of his ideas, then it would be impossible that he should be able to apprehend anything, but he can apprehend something; Therefore... The first [N1] is proved by the first principle, namely, that the knowable things are infinitely numerous. Also, following the second principle, man cannot know all, because the human understanding is finite, and if not determined by external things to know this sooner than that, and that sooner than this, then according to the third principle it should be impossible for it to know anything.[N2] [Note N1]: Instead of this paragraph B has the following: Again, since according to the first principle the knowable things are infinite, and according to the second principle the finite understanding cannot comprehend everything, and according to the third principle it has not the power to know this sooner than that, and that sooner than this, it would be impossible for it to know anything, if it were not determined by external things.
[Note N2]: Further, to say that this idea is a fiction,
this also is false: for it
is impossible to have this [idea] if it [the ideatum] does not
exist; this is shown on page [this], and we also add the following:
From what has been said so far it is clearly manifest that the idea of infinite attributes in the perfect being is no fiction; we shall, however, still add the following: According to the foregoing consideration of Nature, we have so far not been able to discover more than two attributes only which belong to this all-perfect being. And these give us nothing adequate to satisfy us that this is all of which this perfect being consists, quite the contrary, we find in us a something which openly tells us not only of more, but of infinite perfect attributes, which must belong to |