[snip personal comments]

    Spinoza, in the Ethics, writes directly in several places that he is expressing things there in the Ethics itself by Reason or Knowledge of the Second Kind although of course he also shows by Reason that he is aiming toward helping his readers to come to Intuitive Knowledge or Knowledge of the Third Kind which he only addresses as he gets near the end of Part 5. Spinoza explicitly defines what he means by each of the 3 Kinds of Knowledge in the 2nd Note to Proposition 40 of Part 2 and I would recommend that you read the whole note and then go back and focus your attention on what he writes there about Reason (after all, if he says he is using Reason throughout the Ethics it might be important for us to understand what HE means by Reason and not just stick with some vague imagination we may have about it.) Keep in mind that in the Ethics, as I mentioned when we met together, he reduces the 4 Kinds of Knowledge which he had previously written about elsewhere down to 3 (by combining what had been the first 2 into 1) but these are just words and names, each particular kind of knowledge remains the same regardless of what he names it as should be clear when we compare what he writes about each, whether in the Ethics or elsewhere.

    Now, if we come back to "Reason" in that note, he writes:

"...we, in many cases, perceive and form our general notions... from the fact that we have notions common to all men, and adequate ideas of the properties of things (E2P38C, E2P39, E2P39C, and E2P40); this I call reason and knowledge of the second kind."

    What do we do at this point? Spinoza gives us a hint that he wants us to understand that those "adequate ideas" which are "common to all men" are the ones he wrote about in some preceding propositions including the proposition to which this note is appended (E2P40.) So, what do we find when we go back over those specific Propositions? What are those "adequate ideas common to all men"? I will leave it as an exercise for you to discover what he says but I will point out that it is these very same adequate ideas which he says form "the bases of Reason" (see proof of E2P44, Corollary 2) and which also are used, and therefore must be understood, to prove the proposition:

======= E5: PROP. 4:
    There is no modification of the body, whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception.

Proof.--Properties which are common to all things can only be conceived adequately (E2P38); therefore (E2P12 and E2P13L2) there is no modification of the body, whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. Q.E.D.
=======

and of course he wrote in the Preface to Part 3, where he is about to go into the origin and nature of the emotions, that he is going to use (and also expects his readers to follow) what he has previously defined as reason:

======= E3: Preface:
...Such persons will, doubtless think it strange that I should attempt to treat of human vice and folly geometrically, and should wish to set forth with RIGID REASONING [my emphasis] those matters which they cry out against as repugnant to REASON, frivolous, absurd, and dreadful. However, such is my plan....
=======

    I don't think it is possible to emphasize too strongly the importance of Reason to Spinoza if we are interested in clarifying the confusions involved in each of our passive emotions using his expressed ideas.

    Let me know what you think after your study of this. I would enjoy further discussion with you about it since that can only help to clarify, just as writing this message to you has already helped to clarify, my own thinking.

    Best Regards,
       Terry

[snip]

    Towards the end of our meeting last Saturday I mentioned to you an incident that had occurred back when [Y] and I were first meeting together where [X], who usually met with us, was absent. During a study of the proof of some particular proposition in Part 3 or 4 of the Ethics (I don't recall the particular one right now) we followed back along the chain of reasoning as Spinoza had indicated and found ourselves studying a proposition in Part 1 involving Substance --not surprising since everything expressed in the Ethics is ultimately rooted in Part 1 --and I recall that as we read together that proposition involving Substance it became very clear to me that what Spinoza had expressed by the original proposition that we had been studying followed necessarily and clearly from those earlier ideas he was reminding us of in its proof. One of us had just finished reading aloud and we sat in silence for some time and then both of us looked up and at the same time as I said out loud; "How simple!", [Y] said "How complex!", and we just looked at each other and said no more for some time.

    I remember thinking at that moment that by his words [Y] seemed to have been contemplating (I don't know for certain of course what he was actually contemplating) the apparent complexity of the infinite attributes of Substance as if he was attempting to examine the individual countless drops of water making up the ocean while what I had in mind (I cannot adequately express this in words) when I said "How simple!" was that Absolutely Infinite Substance is by necessity Utterly Simple! -not divisible, not made up of parts, not limited by any other thing, etc.

    When I tried to describe this incident to you on Saturday you referred to what Spinoza wrote at the end of the Ethics: "All things Excellent are as difficult as they are rare" and I believe you may have mistaken my reference to Substance as being ultimately simple as meaning that understanding Substance is "easy" which of course it is not. Such is the nature of language that the same word can acquire different meanings and so you may have been thinking:

Simple vs. Difficult

    as though I meant:

Easy vs. Hard

    But I was using the word Simple in a different sense as:

Simple vs. Complex

    or as in:

Not made of parts vs. made of many parts

    Look at how Spinoza uses the word "simple" in the following note as related to certain "PRIMARY IDEAS" he says we need to pay attention to in order to Understand God's Existence (which of course in the Ethics he shows to be identical to God's Essence):

======= TPT06-P14 [capitalization in the following is mine -Terry]:
    As God's existence is not self-evident, [Note 6 below] it must necessarily be inferred from IDEAS so firmly and incontrovertibly true, that no power can be postulated or conceived sufficient to impugn them. They ought certainly so to appear to us when we infer from them God's existence, if we wish to place our conclusion beyond the reach of doubt; for if we could conceive that SUCH IDEAS could be impugned by any power whatsoever, we should doubt of their truth, we should doubt of our conclusion, namely, of God's existence, and should never be able to be certain of anything. Further, we know that nothing either agrees with or is contrary to nature, unless it agrees with or is contrary to THESE PRIMARY IDEAS; wherefore if we would conceive that anything could be done in nature by any power whatsoever which would be contrary to the laws of nature, it would also be contrary to OUR PRIMARY IDEAS, and we should have either to reject it as absurd, or else to cast doubt (as just shown) on OUR PRIMARY IDEAS, and consequently on the existence of God, and on everything howsoever perceived. Therefore miracles, in the sense of events contrary to the laws of nature, so far from demonstrating to us the existence of God, would, on the contrary, lead us to doubt it, where, otherwise, we might have been absolutely certain of it, as knowing that nature follows a fixed and immutable order.
======= [Note 6]:
    We doubt of the existence of God, and consequently of all else, so long as we have no clear and distinct idea of God, but only a confused one. For as he who knows not rightly the nature of a triangle, knows not that its three angles are equal to two right angles, so he who conceives the Divine nature confusedly, does not see that it pertains to the nature of God to exist. Now, to conceive the nature of God clearly and distinctly, it is necessary to pay attention to a certain number of VERY SIMPLE NOTIONS, called general notions, and by their help to associate the conceptions which we form of the attributes of the Divine nature. It then, for the first time, becomes clear to us, that God exists necessarily, that He is omnipresent, and that all our conceptions involve in themselves the nature of God and are conceived through it. Lastly, we see that all our adequate ideas are true. Compare on this point the prologomena to book, "Principles of Descartes's philosophy set forth geometrically."
=======

    In particular in the Note he says:

"...to conceive the nature of God clearly and distinctly, it is necessary to pay attention to a certain number of VERY SIMPLE NOTIONS called general notions, and by their help to associate the conceptions which we form of the attributes of the Divine nature. It then, for the first time, becomes clear to us, that God exists necessarily, that He is omnipresent, and that all our conceptions involve in themselves the nature of God and are conceived through it."

    Now, do you think these VERY SIMPLE NOTIONS might have anything to do with what we have been discussing and that Spinoza has identified in the Ethics as those "things common to all" and which he says in Part 2 are the "bases of reason"?

    It seems to me that many of us have a tendency to focus on the complexities of the apparent world, our apparent life in it, and the emotions felt by us associated with it as though we have to first clear up all the confusions involved and then maybe we can contemplate the Eternal and Infinite Substance. However, Spinoza tells us quite the opposite in several places such as in his definition and explanation of Reason and also here:

====== E2: PROP. 10 Corollary, Note:
...I think the cause for such confusion is mainly, that they do not keep to the proper order of philosophic thinking. The nature of God, which should be reflected on first, inasmuch as it is prior both in the order of knowledge and the order of nature, they have taken to be last in the order of knowledge, and have put into the first place what they call the objects of sensation; hence, while they are considering natural phenomena, they give no attention at all to the divine nature, and, when afterwards they apply their mind to the study of the divine nature, they are quite unable to bear in mind the first hypotheses, with which they have overlaid the knowledge of natural phenomena, inasmuch as such hypotheses are no help towards understanding the Divine nature. So that it is hardly to be wondered at, that these persons contradict themselves freely.
======

    There is nothing in itself wrong with examining our emotions (which involve those "objects of sensation", also known as "external bodies", referred to above) but if we are waiting until we conquer our emotions before we turn to contemplate these other SIMPLE NOTIONS which Spinoza says will help lead us to the Idea of [God: ...substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality] then we may have a long and frustrating wait. It seems to me that along with studying our emotions we need to spend some time developing what Spinoza defines as Reason if we are to aid our mind toward attaining Intuitive Knowledge of our Self, God, and Things.

    Warm Regards,
       Terry

[snip]

    I've looked over E5P10 and the Note and several thoughts came to mind, some related to our recent talks, and as an exercise in examining and organizing my own thinking about this I've written the following which I would like to share with you.

    First, the proposition:

======== E5: PROP. 10:
    So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, we have the power of arranging and associating the modifications of our body according to the intellectual order.

Proof.--The emotions, which are contrary to our nature, that is (E4P30), which are bad, are bad in so far as they impede the mind from understanding (E4P27). So long, therefore, as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, the mind's power, whereby it endeavours to understand things (E4P26), is not impeded, and therefore it is able to form clear and distinct ideas and to deduce them one from another (E2P40N2 and E2P47N); consequently we have in such cases [by E5P1] the power of arranging and associating the modifications of the body according to the intellectual order. Q.E.D.
========

    By this particular proposition Spinoza seems to me to be showing that we do not have the power to analyze or otherwise clearly understand our passive emotions contrary to our nature while they occur, rather he shows that these passive emotions themselves impede the mind from understanding anything. He wrote that:

"So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature...",

that is, at those times when we do NOT find ourselves experiencing passive emotions contrary to our nature, THEN, and only then is it the case that:

"...we have the power of arranging and associating the modifications of our body according to the intellectual order."

    In the proof he shows that it is the power of REASON that enables the mind to:

"...form clear and distinct ideas and to deduce them one from another"

    This is shown where he refers (in the proof above) to:

========= E4: PROP. 26:
    Whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to REASON is nothing further than to understand; neither does the mind, in so far as it makes use of REASON, judge anything to be useful to it, save such things as are conducive to understanding.
=========

    Keep in mind here what it is that Spinoza says he means by REASON (E2P40N2) and what he says are the bases of REASON (see the proof of E2P44C2), that is, what those things are which are common to all, which are equally in a part as in the whole, and which can only be conceived adequately, namely:

========= E2: P13, LEMMA. 2:
    All bodies agree in certain respects.

Proof.--All bodies agree in the fact, that they involve the conception of one and the same attribute (E2D1). Further, in the fact that they may be moved less or more quickly, and may be absolutely in motion or at rest.
=========

    You will notice that every passive emotion Spinoza discusses in the Ethics is based on the motion and rest of our own body and that, from the above Lemma, etc. therefore it follows that:

========= E5: PROP. 4:
    There is no modification of the body, whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception.

Proof.--Properties which are common to all things can only be conceived adequately (E2P38); therefore (E2P12 and E2P13L2) there is no modification of the body, whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. Q.E.D.
=========

    It appears that Spinoza appended the note to E5P10 to explain to us how to use the idea of that proposition (E5P10) and how we might make use of our own mind's power of rightly arranging and associating the bodily modifications according to the intellectual order. In that note he says that we should often think over "the particular circumstances which now and again meet us in life", not some particular emotion contrary to our nature that we are at the moment experiencing or still feeling the effects of and which is therefore keeping us from thinking clearly at this time (by the first part of E5P10 above) --in that case we have already entered into the power of that confusion and so we can only struggle as best we can at that time and examine it more closely as soon as we regain some power of reason. So, when not in a passive emotion, but with an eye towards warding off such passive emotional experiences in the future, he suggests that, under the guidance of REASON we:

"...frame a system of right conduct, or fixed practical precepts, to commit it to memory, and to apply it forthwith to the particular circumstances which now and again meet us in life, so that our imagination may become fully imbued therewith, and that it may be always ready to our hand."

    Again, the proposition says that we need to do this when we are able to think clearly, not as we are being affected already by an emotion contrary to our nature. Looking back at our particular emotions and identifying them and studying what Spinoza writes about them is part of knowing what we as individuals need to develop in the way of "a system of right conduct, or fixed practical precepts" but the purpose in giving this forethought and arrangement is so that we develop the ability, by memory associations with our sense experience, to "see the emotion coming" before it picks up steam and either avoid it all together or lessen its power in which case we might afterwards make an adjustment to the particular rule of our particular system or precepts and go forward in life.

    Spinoza closes this note with:

======= E5: PROP. 10, Note:
...Thus he who would govern his emotions and appetite solely by the love of freedom strives, as far as he can, to gain a knowledge of the virtues and their causes, and to fill his spirit with the joy which arises from the true knowledge of them: he will in no wise desire to dwell on men's faults, or to carp at his fellows, or to revel in a false show of freedom. Whosoever will diligently observe and practice these precepts (which indeed are not difficult) will verily, in a short space of time, be able, for the most part, to direct his actions according to the commandments of reason.
=======

    By which he shows his intent that we follow his reasoning in the Ethics only in part to become free of the control of the passive emotions as far as possible --by diligent observation and practice of those precepts mentioned above, which he says are not difficult, so that we will:

"...in a short space of time, be able, for the most part, to direct [our] actions according to the commandments of reason."

    So, with diligence and practice of these precepts ("which indeed are not difficult" according to Spinoza) and, after this "short space of time", the aim is not to become an expert in the world of passive emotions but rather, he writes, it is by the love of freedom that we strive:

"...to gain a knowledge of the VIRTUES and their causes, and to fill [our] spirit with the joy which arises from the true knowledge of them [that is, the VIRTUES]"

    But what are the "VIRTUES" he refers to?:

======= E4: DEF. 8:
    By VIRTUE (virtus) and power I mean the same thing; that is (E3P7), virtue, in so far as it is referred to man, is a man's nature or essence, in so far as it has the power of effecting what can only be understood by the laws of that nature.
=======

and he goes on to show that in relation to the human mind:

======= E4: PROP. 24:
    To act absolutely in obedience to VIRTUE is in us the same thing as to act, to live, or to preserve one's being (these three terms are identical in meaning) in accordance with the dictates of REASON on the basis of seeking what is useful to one's self.

Proof.--To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is nothing else but to act according to the laws of one's own nature [by E4D8]. But we only act, in so far as we understand (E3P3): therefore to act in obedience to VIRTUE is in us nothing else but to act, to live, or to preserve one's being in obedience to REASON, and that on the basis of seeking what is useful for us (E4P22C). Q.E.D.
=======

"...in accordance with the dictates of REASON..."

and so we're back to: What is REASON in Spinoza's world [E2P40N2]?

    I would be interested in your thoughts on the above.

[snip]

    Thanks for sharing your thoughts. Yes, E5P2 has proven to me to be the most powerful FIRST STEP in breaking free from the bondage of a passive emotion. It is for me the first clear idea which the mind must come to, both in the preparatory work Spinoza advises us to do in E5P10Note:

"...frame a system of right conduct, or fixed practical precepts..."

and, of course, when that system is put into effect during an actual emotional event. This FIRST STEP powerfully changes the focus of the mind from the exclusively outer direction and from identification with those external objects of the senses toward the "inner direction" (like the second arrowhead in Ouspensky's illustration of Self-Remembering.) However, I notice a tendency in my own experiences, when this first step brings with it such a relief from the pain involved, to simply "go on with life" and ignore the part where Spinoza says:

"...and unite it to other thoughts..."

    I have of late been more and more staying with this new "inner direction" as the SECOND STEP and I find that the "other thoughts" Spinoza speaks of involve and focus on the ideas expressed in Part 2 of the Ethics. These other thoughts have their own real power and involve those "things common to all, which are equally in the part as in the whole", and, most importantly, my mind knows these to be "adequate ideas" involving the motion and rest of my own body and what that means about my usual imagination of "the world", "my life", and those seemingly separate "external bodies", none of which have any actual existence at all outside of the modifications of my own body [see E2P16C2].

    You may notice that I have been focusing on what Spinoza calls "the bases of Reason" in Part 2 and that I am much less focused on Intuition in my talk and writing (although Intuition is of uppermost importance in my Inner Life.) [snip a private reference to a mutual acquaintance] I believe Reason is confused with Logic by most everyone and that Spinoza goes even further in his understanding than every other philosopher and so his idea of Reason is much different from that commonly imagined by academics as well as the ordinary person. [I would add here that we often in life apply logic to the things of our imagination but that does not make our conclusions true nor does that constitute what Spinoza defines as Reason.]

    I would be interested to hear your thoughts on what it is that Spinoza defines as Reason and how you are using the "bases of reason" Spinoza refers to in your study of your own particular nature. I would not myself be interested in participating in a group such as I perceive [Z's] students to have in mind, but a group which focused on Reason as Spinoza defines it, and on following Spinoza's Reasoned direction in the Ethics, that group I would gladly participate in. So far though, in my necessarily limited experience, I have not found any such group already existing.

[snip]

    It is not clear to me by reading your email, or from our resent [see the following message on this typo] conversations, whether or not you have looked very closely at what Spinoza says HE means by Reason --which, to me is not at all an easy task since I believe we all imagine that we already know what "reason" is and that we don't need to think much more about it. When I asked you if you were aware of how Spinoza defines Reason you did not know and did not know where to look and seemed not to even know that he goes into some depth explaining what he identifies as "the bases" of reason (again, as he defines Reason) and so whenever you use the word "reason" I'm leery of what you mean by the term.

    Let me take a few of the statements from your email and comment on them to try and explain what I mean:

"What I understand as the bases for reason is to understand."

    Spinoza explicitly names and explains what HE means by "the bases of reason" and it is not something so general as "to understand" and so I don't think you have grasped Spinoza's idea of Reason. You then say:

"Reason helps us discern what is confused and what is clear. Reason helps us understand the laws that manifest from God.", etc.

    This merely states something general about the value of what you name reason but not what reason is. You then give an example of what you apparently mean by reason following which you say:

"In the latter reason plays a big part in our coming to ideas to follow what is best in preserving our nature. This is how I apply reason to help me understand how to best preserve my being and the highest level."

    Here again you refer to the value of what you name reason by showing how you apply it but also again, it is not clear to me that you have grasped what Spinoza says HE means by Reason and I believe that you think you already know what he means whenever he uses the term.

    I notice the same thing often happening in my own thinking and I have to force myself to look more frequently and to think more deeply about what, specifically Spinoza wrote about Reason since I very easily slide back into thinking that I already know, and have always known, what "reason" is. In focusing on the specifics that Spinoza wrote about Reason I am finding that every place in the Ethics where he uses that term takes on a new meaning and from that new meaning my own mind affirms a new direction and Inner Authority.

    You ask:

"Can you give me a specific experience that you've recently have had that helped you understand how REASON can be applied."

and the mere fact that you ask me to describe an experience that I've had tells me that you cannot have looked very closely at what Spinoza names "the bases of reason". No matter what I might offer to you in the way of describing a particular experience it can only invoke particular things in your own imagination which cannot have anything to do with my Inner Experience of "Things Common to All", and which are "Equally in a Part and in the Whole", and which "Does Not constitute the essence of Any Particular Thing."

    I appreciate your dilemma but I would suggest that you concentrate on what Spinoza wrote explicitly about Reason, being careful not to just read the words, identify the proposition numbers, etc. and then assume that you know what he means. I've been working on understanding what Spinoza means by Reason for some time now and for me it is nothing which can be simply spoken out in words and then forgotten about as though we need think no more about it.

[snip]

[snip]

    My last message to you was composed and sent rather more quickly than I prefer since I had something else I wanted to do at the time and I was running late. One effect of my haste was several typos which my subsequent rereading revealed --the most amusing of which (to me anyway) was my typing "resent" in the first sentence rather than "recent". Perhaps there was in my imagination a sense that you might "resent" some of what I have said to you in "recent" exchanges. Be that as it may, I had some further thoughts about your email and I would like to share them with you. I am aware that you may not at first like what you read but I trust that you will think it over and I assure you that I find myself often in the same predicament that you seem to be in when trying to make something out of Spinoza's words.

    You provided an example of what you think to be reason:

"An example would be when we desire food, say a candy bar verses an apple. A candy bar satisfies a desire for pleasure and that pleasure in localized within our taste buds, hunger and our psychic, it is mostly sugar which is refined with no substance. However an apple is a complex carbohydrate, with an abundance of nutrients, vitamins, etc... In the latter reason plays a big part in our coming to ideas to follow what is best in preserving our nature."

    If you consider what Spinoza wrote about Reason and what are the "bases" [the plural of "basis", meaning, in this case; "foundation: something that acts as a support or foundation, especially of an idea or argument"] that he identifies, then I do not believe that your example is one of Reason but rather of "hearsay" (you read "[a nutrition book]", etc.) and probably "experience" (you tried some of what you read about and, your experience felt good). Spinoza names this the First Kind of Knowledge or Imagination and he says in the Improvement that nearly all of our practical knowledge of life is of this kind. I do not mean to say of course that eating candy is the same as eating food considered to be more nutritious but what I am saying is that for you and me, and I would dare say even for most of the scientists whose research is referred to in such books as "[a nutrition book]", the knowledge of the subject is not of the Second Kind that Spinoza defines and also names Reason. Do you or I have "adequate ideas", which follow from other adequate ideas, and which themselves follow from what Spinoza says are the "bases of Reason" with regard to nutrition or the other things of ordinary life?

    I will make this bold statement, which has just come to me this morning and so I am still thinking about it, by saying that: "The only object from which we can Reason is our own body" and I will say too, boldly and without verifying by looking it up, that Spinoza makes this idea quite clear in Part 2 of the Ethics. Every place he talks about or expresses Reason (which is throughout the Ethics) must be traceable in our own thinking back to these "bases" or else we are not Reasoning but merely dealing with hearsay and experience. And, lest anyone might think that I am forgetting about the Third Kind of Knowledge or Intuition, which is only found within our own Being, the Ethics merely points us in that direction using Reason --as a map may help lead us to the treasure but cannot show us the Actual Treasure.

    To "begin again" we must let go of many of our long-cherished beliefs, which for us are nothing but hearsay and experience, and especially we must examine closely the belief that we have been using Reason as Spinoza defines and uses the term.