[The correspondent had asked, with regard to the particular methods which seem to be used by some people in their study of Spinoza's ideas, why they study their own particular nature rather than seeking to acquire "the more perfect nature of the divine being." The following is part of the reply:] If you stand back a bit from Spinoza's "Ethics" and "The Improvement of the Understanding" (as though you were coming to them for the first time) how would you explain his concentrating so much on the need to distinguish between the true idea and fictitious, false, and doubtful ideas? And why does he spend so much time in part 2 of the Ethics on the nature and cause of inadequate and confused ideas and then go on in parts 3 and 4 to show how the particular emotions (confusions) work if he did not consider it important to study our own nature? Why not just say something like "Well, we all have had the experience of finding ourselves confused about something or being caught in an emotional situation but rather than dwell on those things let me give you some clear ideas." Clear ideas about what? If you look at part 2 he shows that we most commonly mistake the modifications of our own body for "reality" or "the external world" and that this confusion accounts for much of what keeps the mind so occupied that it has little power to form clear and distinct ideas about anything. [The correspondent had also questioned the usefulness of examining actual events from our ordinary daily life as experienced through our senses and memory and expressed that such study "leads nowhere."] To me, Spinoza's Ethics is like a pyramid where each new level is built on the preceding levels, each and all resting on a solid foundation, and the top level is what he has built it to support. So what does he talk about in part 5? He first deals with such things as:
==========
E5: PROP. 3. An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a passion, as soon
as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof.
E5: PROP. 3, Corollary.--An emotion therefore becomes more under our
control, and the mind is less passive in respect to it, in proportion as it
is more known to us.
E5: PROP. 4. There is no modification of the body, whereof we cannot form
some clear and distinct conception.
E5: PROP. 4, Corollary.--Hence it follows that there is no emotion, whereof
we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. When he says above "There is no modification of the body, whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception" do you think he is suggesting that we attempt to form a clear and distinct conception of the modifications of bodies in general or in abstraction? or is he referring specifically to our particular mind forming a clear and distinct conception of our particular body? If the latter does not seem to be the case then what do you make of:
========== E5: PROP. 4 Corollary, Note:
To attain this result, therefore, we must chiefly direct our efforts to
acquiring, as far as possible, a clear and distinct knowledge of every
emotion, in order that the mind may thus, through emotion, be determined to
think of those things which it clearly and distinctly perceives, and wherein
it fully acquiesces: and thus that the emotion itself may be separated from
the thought of an external cause, and may be associated with true thoughts;
whence it will come to pass, not only that love, hatred, etc. will be
destroyed (E5P2), but also that the appetites or desires, which are wont to
arise from such emotion, will become incapable of being excessive (E4P61). When he says: "...in order that the mind may thus, through emotion, be determined to think of those things which it clearly and distinctly perceives, and wherein it fully acquiesces" whose emotions do you believe he is referring to if not yours or mine specifically? Do you think he means: "in order that a hypothetical mind may thus, through a hypothetical emotion, be determined to think of those hypothetical things which it abstractly perceives, and wherein it fully acquiesces"? I believe this is what most people imagine when they read the Ethics. They never even dream that Spinoza might mean for his readers to apply these ideas to the study of their own particular nature. But don't take my word for it. You said: "It isn't so much human nature that we need to acquire, than the more perfect nature of the divine being." If that is so then what do You make of:
========= E5: PROP. 15.: And how do you propose putting this idea that Spinoza expresses into practice? Spinoza himself says a bit further on:
========== E5: PROP. 20, Note:
I have now gone through all the remedies against the emotions, or all
that the mind, considered in itself alone, can do against them. Whence it
appears that the mind's power over the emotions consists:--
1. In the actual knowledge of the emotions (E5P4CN). "...its own emotions"; My particular mind, My particular emotions. But of course I'm older and wiser now and don't need to follow this advise. I just want to "cut to the chase" so when I get to the last part of that note he says:
========== Ah, the Cap Stone, the Pure Gold, that's for me and that should be my reward for having endured all that crap in Parts 3 and 4 about those nasty old emotions that everybody else but me seem to suffer so much from. I'm a modern educated being with a good intellect so I'll just take the elevator to the top of this pyramid and avoid all that difficult labor. So, what do I find near the top?:
========= E5: PROP. 30: Oh Damn, he's telling me I have to use My particular mind to know both Itself and My particular body but I was hoping that I could just bypass all that and "acquire" the "divine nature" (whatever that is) directly. Rats, I guess I'll go comfort myself by displaying my vast knowledge and collection of books to those who can really appreciate my great intellect. [See Spinoza's definitions of Pride and Ambition and how these confusions work.] What do I need with the ramblings of some 17th century philosopher that hardly anyone at the Academy pays any attention to anyway.
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