Spinoza - Ethics 4, Propositions 63-73

E4: PROP. 63. He who is led by fear, and does good in order to escape evil, is not led by reason.

Proof.--All the emotions which are attributable to the mind as active, or in other words [E3P3] to reason, are emotions of pleasure and desire (E3P59); therefore [E3DOE13], he who is led by fear, and does good in order to escape evil, is not led by reason.

Referenced in: E4P67,- E4P73

E4: PROP. 63, Note. --Superstitious persons, who know better how to rail at vice than how to teach virtue, and who strive not to guide men by reason, but so to restrain them that they would rather escape evil than love virtue, have no other aim but to make others as wretched as themselves; wherefore it is nothing wonderful, if they be generally troublesome and odious to their fellow-men.

E4: PROP. 63, Corollary.--Under desire which springs from reason, we seek good directly, and shun evil indirectly.

Proof.-- Desire which springs from reason can only spring from a pleasurable emotion, wherein the mind is not passive (E3P59), in other words, from a pleasure which cannot be excessive (E4P61), and not from pain; wherefore this desire springs from the knowledge of good, not of evil (E4P8); hence under the guidance of reason we seek good directly and only by implication shun evil. Q.E.D.

Referenced in: E4P65,- E4P65C,- E4P67,- E5P10N

E4: PROP. 63 Corollary, Note. --This Corollary may be illustrated by the example of a sick and a healthy man. The sick man through fear of death eats what he naturally shrinks from, but the healthy man takes pleasure in his food, and thus gets a better enjoyment out of life, than if he were in fear of death, and desired directly to avoid it. So a judge, who condemns a criminal to death, not from hatred or anger but from love of the public well-being, is guided solely by reason.

E4: PROP. 64. The knowledge of evil is an inadequate knowledge.

Proof.--The knowledge of evil (E4P8) is pain, in so far as we are conscious thereof. Now pain is the transition to a lesser perfection (Def. of the Emotions, E3DOE3) and therefore cannot be understood through man's nature (E3P6 and E3P7); therefore it is a passive state (E3D2) which (E3P3) depends on inadequate ideas; consequently the knowledge thereof (E2P29), namely, the knowledge of evil, is inadequate. Q.E.D.

E4: PROP. 65. Under the guidance of reason we should pursue the greater of two goods and the lesser of two evils.

Proof.--A good which prevents our enjoyment of a greater good is in reality an evil; for we apply the terms good and bad to things, in so far as we compare them one with another (see preface to this Part E4PREF); therefore, evil is in reality a lesser good; hence [by E4P63C] under the guidance of reason we seek or pursue only the greater good and the lesser evil. Q.E.D.

Referenced in: E4P66,- E4P66C

E4: PROP. 65, Corollary.--We may, under the guidance of reason, pursue the lesser evil as though it were the greater good, and we may shun the lesser good, which would be the cause of the greater evil.

For the evil, which is here called the lesser, is really good, and the lesser good is really evil, wherefore [by E4P63C] we may seek the former and shun the latter. Q.E.D.

Referenced in: E4P66C

E4: PROP. 66. We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present, and we may seek a lesser evil in the present in preference to a greater evil in the future.

Proof.--If the mind could have an adequate knowledge of things future, it would be affected towards what is future in the same way as towards what is present (E4P62); wherefore, looking merely to reason, as in this proposition we are assumed to do, there is no difference, whether the greater good or evil be assumed as present, or assumed as future; hence (E4P65) we may seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present, etc. Q.E.D.

Referenced in: E4P66C

E4: PROP. 66, Corollary.--We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a lesser evil in the present, because it is the cause of a greater good in the future, and we may shun a lesser good in the present, because it is the cause of a greater evil in the future.

This Corollary is related to the foregoing Proposition E4P66 as the Corollary E4P65C is related to the said E4P65.

E4: PROP. 66 Corollary, Note. --If these statements be compared with what we have pointed out concerning the strength of the emotions in this Part up to E4P18, we shall readily see the difference between a man, who is led solely by emotion or opinion, and a man, who is led by reason. The former, whether he will or no, performs actions whereof he is utterly ignorant; the latter is his own master and only performs such actions, as he knows are of primary importance in life, and therefore chiefly desires; wherefore I call the former a slave, and the latter a free man,
concerning whose disposition and manner of life it will be well to make a few observations.

Referenced in: E4P73

E4: PROP. 67. A free man thinks of death least of all things; and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life.

Proof.--A free man is one who lives under the guidance of reason, who is not led by fear (E4P63), but who directly desires that which is good (E4P63C), in other words (E4P24), who strives to act, to live, and to preserve his being on the basis of seeking his own true advantage; wherefore such an one thinks of nothing less than of death, but his wisdom is a meditation of life. Q.E.D.

E4: PROP. 68. If men were born free, they would, so long as they remained free, form no conception of good and evil.

Proof.--I call free him who is led solely by reason; he, therefore, who is born free, and who remains free, has only adequate ideas; therefore (E4P64C) he has no conception of evil, or consequently (good and evil being correlative) of good. Q.E.D.

E4: PROP. 68, Note. --It is evident, from E4P4, that the hypothesis of this Proposition is false and inconceivable, except in so far as we look solely to the nature of man, or rather to God; not in so far as the latter is infinite, but only in so far as he is the cause of man's existence.
This, and other matters which we have already proved, seem to have been signified by Moses in the history of the first man. For in that narrative no other power of God is conceived, save that whereby he created man, that is the power wherewith he provided solely for man's advantage; it is stated that God forbade man, being free, to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and that, as soon as man should have eaten of it, he would straightway fear death rather than desire to live. Further, it is written that when man had found a wife, who was in entire harmony with his nature, he knew that there could be nothing in nature which could be more useful to him; but that after he believed the beasts to be like himself, he straightway began to imitate their emotions (E3P27), and to lose his freedom; this freedom was afterwards recovered by the patriarchs, led by the spirit of Christ; that is, by the idea of God, whereon alone it depends, that man may be free, and desire for others the good which he desires for himself, as we have shown above (E4P37).

E4: PROP. 69. The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great, when it declines dangers, as when it overcomes them.

Proof.-- Emotion can only be checked or removed by an emotion contrary to itself, and possessing more power in restraining emotion (E4P7). But blind daring and fear are emotions, which can be conceived as equally great (E4P5 and E4P3): hence, no less virtue or firmness is required in checking daring than in checking fear (E3P59N); in other words (Def. of the Emotions, E3DOE40 and E3DOE41), the free man shows as much virtue, when he declines dangers, as when he strives to overcome them. Q.E.D.

E4: PROP. 70. The free man, who lives among the ignorant, strives, as far as he can, to avoid receiving favours from them.

Proof.--Everyone judges what is good according to his disposition (E3P39N); wherefore an ignorant man, who has conferred a benefit on another, puts his own estimate upon it, and, if it appears to be estimated less highly by the receiver, will feel pain (E3P42). But the free man only desires to join other men to him in friendship (E4P37), not repaying their benefits with others reckoned as of like value, but guiding himself and others by the free decision of reason, and doing only such things as he knows to be of primary importance. Therefore the free man, lest he should become hateful to the ignorant, or follow their desires rather than reason, will endeavour, as far as he can, to avoid receiving their favours.

E4: PROP. 70, Note. --I say, as far as he can. For though men be ignorant, yet are they men, and in cases of necessity could afford us human aid, the most excellent of all things: therefore it is often necessary to accept favours from them, and consequently to repay such favours in kind;
we must, therefore, exercise caution in declining favours, lest we should have the appearance of despising those who bestow them, or of being, from avaricious motives, unwilling to requite them, and so give ground for offence by the very fact of striving to avoid it. Thus, in declining favours, we must look to the requirements of utility and courtesy.

Referenced in: E4APND18

E4: PROP. 71. Only free men are thoroughly grateful one to another.

Proof.--Only free men are thoroughly useful one to another, and associated among themselves by the closest necessity of friendship (E4P35 and E4P35C1), only such men endeavour, with mutual zeal of love, to confer benefits on each other (E4P37), and, therefore [by E3DOE34], only they are thoroughly grateful one to another. Q.E.D.

E4: PROP. 71, Note. --The goodwill,which men who are led by blind desire have for one another, is generally a bargaining or enticement, rather than pure goodwill.
Moreover, ingratitude is not an emotion. Yet it is base, inasmuch as it generally shows, that a man is affected by excessive hatred, anger, pride, avarice, etc. He who, by reason of his folly, knows not how to return benefits, is not ungrateful, much less he who is not gained over by the gifts of a courtesan to serve her lust, or by a thief to conceal his thefts, or by any similar persons. Contrariwise, such an one shows a constant mind, inasmuch as he cannot by any gifts be corrupted, to his own or the general hurt.

Referenced in: E4APND18

E4: PROP. 72. The free man never acts fraudently, but always in good faith.

Proof.--If it be asked: What should a man's conduct be in a case where he could by breaking faith free himself from the danger of present death? Would not his plan of self-preservation completely persuade him to deceive [by E4P24]? this may be answered by pointing out that, if reason persuaded him to act thus, it would persuade all men to act in a similar manner, in which case reason would persuade men not to agree in good faith to unite their forces, or to have laws in common, that is, not to have any general laws, which is absurd [by E4P31C].

E4: PROP. 73. The man, who is guided by reason, is more free in a State, where he lives under a general system of law, than in solitude, where he is independent.

Proof.--The man, who is guided by reason, does not obey through fear (E4P63): but, in so far as he endeavours to preserve his being according to the dictates of reason, that is (E4P66CN), in so far as he endeavours to live in freedom, he desires to order his life according to the general good (E4P37), and, consequently (as we showed in E4P37N2), to live according to the laws of his country. Therefore the free man, in order to enjoy greater freedom, desires to possess the general rights of citizenship. Q.E.D.

E4: PROP. 73, Note. --These and similar observations, which we have made on man's true freedom, may be referred to strength, that is, to courage and nobility of character (E3P59N). I do not think it worth while to prove separately all the properties of strength; much less need I show, that he that is strong hates no man, is angry with no man, envies no man, is indignant with no man, despises no man, and least of all things is proud. These propositions, and all that relate to the true way of life and religion, are easily proved from E4P37 and E4P46; namely, that hatred should be overcome with love, and that every man should desire for others the good which he seeks for himself.
We may also repeat what we drew attention to in the note E4P50N, and in other places; namely, that the strong man has ever first in his thoughts, that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature; so that whatsoever he deems to be hurtful and evil, and whatsoever, accordingly, seems to him impious, horrible, unjust, and base, assumes that appearance owing to his own disordered, fragmentary, and confused view of the universe. Wherefore he strives before all things to conceive things as they really are, and to remove the hindrances to true knowledge, such as are hatred, anger, envy, derision, pride, and similar emotions, which I have mentioned above.
Thus he endeavours, as we said before, as far as in him lies, to do good, and to go on his way rejoicing. How far human virtue is capable of attaining to such a condition, and what its powers may be, I will prove in the following Part.

Referenced in: E4APND15

Ethics Part 4, Of Human Bondage, or the Strength of the Emotions
Propositions 63-73

P63- P64- P65- P66- P67- P68- P69- P70- P71- P72- P73

Ethics Part 4, Of Human Bondage, or the Strength of the Emotions Propositions 63-73

P63- P64- P65- P66- P67- P68- P69- P70- P71- P72- P73

Ethics Part 4, Of Human Bondage, or the Strength of the Emotions
Propositions 63-73