|E3: PROP. 11. Whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of activity in our body, the idea thereof increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of thought in our mind.|
|Proof.--This proposition is evident from E2P7 or from E2P14.|
|Referenced in: E3P12,- E3P34,- E3P57,- E3P59,- E4P41,- E4P42|
| E3: PROP. 11, Note.
--Thus we see, that the mind
can undergo many changes, and can pass
sometimes to a state of greater
sometimes to a state of lesser
states of transition explain to us the
of pleasure and
therefore in the following propositions
I shall signify a passive
state wherein the
mind passes to a greater
By pain I shall
signify a passive
state wherein the mind
passes to a lesser perfection.
reference to the body and mind together I shall call
(titillatio) or merriment
pain in the same
relation I shall call
But we must bear in mind, that stimulation and suffering are attributed to man, when one part of his nature is more affected than the rest, merriment and melancholy, when all parts are alike affected.
What I mean by desire I have explained in the note E3P9N of this part; beyond these three I recognize no other primary emotion; I will show as I proceed, that all other emotions arise from these three. But, before I go further, I should like here to explain at greater length E3P10 of this part, in order that we may clearly understand how one idea is contrary to another.
In the note E2P17CN we showed that the idea, which constitutes the essence of mind, involves the existence of body, so long as the body itself exists. Again, it follows from what we pointed out in the E2P8C [E2P8CN], that the present existence of our mind depends solely on the fact, that the mind involves the actual existence of the body. Lastly, we showed (E2P17, E2P18, and E2P18N) that the power of the mind, whereby it imagines and remembers things, also depends on the fact, that it involves the actual existence of the body.
Whence it follows, that the present existence of the mind and its power of imagining are removed, as soon as the mind ceases to affirm the present existence of the body. Now the cause, why the mind ceases to affirm this existence of the body, cannot be the mind itself (E3P4), nor again the fact that the body ceases to exist. For (by E2P6) the cause, why the mind affirms the existence of the body, is not that the body began to exist; therefore, for the same reason, it does not cease to affirm the existence of the body, because the body ceases to exist; but (E2P17) [E2P8] this result follows from another idea, which excludes the present existence of our body and, consequently of our mind, and which is therefore contrary to the idea constituting the essence of our mind.
|Referenced in: E3P15,- E3P15C,- E3P19,- E3P20,- E3P21,- E3P23,- E3P34,- E3P35,- E3P37,- E3P38,- E3P53,- E3P55,- E3P55C2,- E3P56,- E3P57,- E3P59,- E3DOE3,- E3DOE4,- E4P8,- E4P18,- E4P29,- E4P30,- E4P41,- E4P42,- E4P43,- E4P44,- E4P51|
|E3: PROP. 12. The mind, as far as it can, endeavours to conceive those things, which increase or help the power of activity in the body.|
|Proof.--So long as the human body is affected in a mode, which involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will regard that external body as present (E2P17), and consequently (E2P7), so long as the human mind regards an external body as present, that is (E2P17CN), conceives it, the human body is affected in a mode, which involves the nature of the said external body; thus so long as the mind conceives things, which increase or help the power of activity in our body, the body is affected in modes which increase or help its power of activity (E3POST1) ; consequently (E3P11) the mind's power of thinking is for that period increased or helped. Thus (E3P6 E3P9) the mind, as far as it can, endeavours to imagine such things. Q.E.D|
|Referenced in: E3P13,- E3P15C,- E3P19,- E3P25,- E3P28,- E3P33,- E3P42,- E3P52N,- E4P60|
|E3: PROP. 13. When the mind conceives things which diminish or hinder the body's power of activity, it endeavours, as far as possible, to remember things which exclude the existence of the first-named things.|
|Proof.--So long as the mind conceives anything of the kind alluded to, the power of the mind and body is diminished or constrained (cf. E3P12 Proof); nevertheless it will continue to conceive it, until the mind conceives something else, which excludes the present existence thereof (E2P17); that is (as I have just shown), the power of the mind and of the body is diminished, or constrained, until the mind conceives something else, which excludes the existence of the former thing conceived: therefore the mind (E3P9), as far as it can, will endeavour to conceive or remember the latter. Q.E.D.|
|Referenced in: E3P20,- E3P23,- E3P25,- E3P27C3,- E3P28,- E3DOE29|
|E3: PROP. 13, Corollary.--Hence it follows, that the mind shrinks from conceiving those things, which diminish or constrain the power of itself and of the body.|
|Referenced in: E3P15C,- E3P38|
|E3: PROP. 13 Corollary, Note. --From what has been said we may clearly understand the nature of Love and Hate. Love is nothing else but pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause: Hate is nothing else but pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause. We further see, that he who loves necessarily endeavours to have, and to keep present to him, the object of his love; while he who hates endeavours to remove and destroy the object of his hatred. But I will treat of these matters at more length hereafter.|
|Referenced in: E3P15C,- E3P17,- E3P19,- E3P20,- E3P22,- E3P28,- E3P29,- E3P30N,- E3P33,- E3P34,- E3P35,- E3P38,- E3P39,- E3P40,- E3P44,- E3P45,- E3P48,- E3P49,- E3P55C2,- E3DOE7,- E4P57|
|E3: PROP. 14. If the mind has once been affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected by one of the two, be also affected by the other.|
|Proof.--If the human body has once been affected by two bodies at once, whenever afterwards the mind conceives one of them, it will straightway remember the other also (E2P18). But the mind's conceptions indicate rather the emotions of our body than the nature of external bodies (E2P16C2); therefore, if the body, and consequently the mind (E3D3) has been once affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected by one of the two, be also affected by the other.|
|Referenced in: E3P15C,- E3P16|
|E3: PROP. 15. Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure, pain, or desire.|
|Proof.--Let it be granted that the mind is simultaneously affected by two emotions, of which one neither increases nor diminishes its power of activity, and the other does either increase or diminish the said power (E3POST1). From the foregoing proposition it is evident that, whenever the mind is afterwards affected by the former, through its true cause, which (by hypothesis) neither increases nor diminishes its power of action, it will be at the same time affected by the latter, which does increase or diminish its power of activity, that is (E3P11N) it will be affected with pleasure or pain. Thus the former of the two emotions will, not through itself, but accidentally, be the cause of pleasure or pain. In the same way also it can be easily shown, that a thing may be accidentally the cause of desire. Q.E.D.|
|Referenced in: E3P16,- E3P36,- E3P50,- E3P52N|
|E3: PROP. 15, Corollary.--Simply from the fact that we have regarded a thing with the emotion of pleasure or pain, though that thing be not the efficient cause of the emotion, we can either love or hate it.|
|Proof.--For from this fact alone it arises (E3P14), that the mind afterwards conceiving the said thing is affected with the emotion of pleasure or pain, that is (E3P11N), according as the power of the mind and body may be increased or diminished, etc.; and consequently (E3P12), according as the mind may desire or shrink from the conception of it (E3P13C), in other words (E3P13CN), according as it may love or hate the same. Q.E.D.|
|Referenced in: E3P16,- E3P35,- E3P35N,- E3P41,- E3P50N,- E3P52N|
|E3: PROP. 15 Corollary, Note. --Hence we understand how it may happen, that we love or hate a thing without any cause for our emotion being known to us; merely, as the phrase is, from sympathy or antipathy. We should refer to the same category those objects, which affect us pleasurably or painfully, simply because they resemble other objects which affect us in the same way. This I will show in the next Prop E3P16. I am aware that certain authors, who were the first to introduce these terms "sympathy" and "antipathy," wished to signify thereby some occult qualities in things; nevertheless I think we may be permitted to use the same terms to indicate known or manifest qualities.|
|Referenced in: E3DOE9|
|E3: PROP. 16. Simply from the fact that we conceive, that a given object has some point of resemblance with another object which is wont to affect the mind pleasurably or painfully, although the point of resemblance be not the efficient cause of the said emotions, we shall still regard the first-named object with love or hate.|
|Proof.--The point of resemblance was in the object (by hypothesis), when we regarded it with pleasure or pain, thus (E3P14), when the mind is affected by the image thereof, it will straightway be affected by one or the other emotion, and consequently the thing, which we perceive to have the same point of resemblance, will be accidentally (E3P15) a cause of pleasure or pain. Thus (by the foregoing Corollary E3P15C), although the point in which the two objects resemble one another be not the efficient cause of the emotion, we shall still regard the first-named object with love or hate. Q.E.D.|
|Referenced in: E3P17,- E3P41,- E3P46,- E4P34|
|E3: PROP. 17. If we conceive that a thing, which is wont to affect us painfully, has any point of resemblance with another thing which is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we shall hate the first-named thing, and at the same time we shall love it.|
|Proof.--The given thing is (by hypothesis) in itself a cause of pain, and (E3P13CN), in so far as we imagine it with this emotion, we shall hate it: further, inasmuch as we conceive that it has some point of resemblance to something else, which is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we shall with an equally strong impulse of pleasure love it (E3P16); thus we shall both hate and love the same thing. Q.E.D.|
|Referenced in: E3P17N|
| E3: PROP. 17, Note.
--This disposition of the mind,
which arises from two contrary
emotions, is called
it stands to the emotions
in the same
doubt does to the
do not differ one from the other, except as greater differs from less.
But we must bear in mind that I have deduced this vacillation from causes, which give rise through themselves to one of the emotions, and to the other accidentally. I have done this, in order that they might be more easily deduced from what went before; but I do not deny that vacillation of the disposition generally arises from an object, which is the efficient cause of both emotions. The human body is composed (E2POST1) of a variety of individual parts of different nature, and may therefore (E2P13Ab1) be affected in a variety of different ways by one and the same body; and contrariwise, as one and the same thing can be affected in many ways, it can also in many different ways affect one and the same part of the body. Hence we can easily conceive, that one and the same object may be the cause of many and conflicting emotions.
|Referenced in: E3P31|
|E3: PROP. 18. A man is as much affected pleasurably or painfully by the image of a thing past or future as by the image of a thing present.|
|Proof.--So long as a man is affected by the image of anything, he will regard that thing as present, even though it be non-existent (E2P17 and E2P17C), he will not conceive it as past or future, except in so far as its image is joined to the image of time past of future (E2P44C1N). Wherefore the image of a thing, regarded in itself alone, is identical, whether it be referred to time past, time future, or time present; that is (E2P16C2), the disposition or emotion of the body is identical, whether the image be of a thing past, future, or present. Thus the emotion of pleasure or pain is the same, whether the image be of a thing past or future. Q.E.D.|
|Referenced in: E3DOE15,- E4P9N,- E4P12|
|E3: PROP. 18, Note 1. --I call a thing past or future, according as we either have been or shall be affected thereby. For instance, according as we have seen it, or are about to see it, according as it has recreated us, or will recreate us, according as it has harmed us, or will harm us. For, as we thus conceive it, we affirm its existence; that is, the body is affected by no emotion which excludes the existence of the thing, and therefore (E2P17) the body is affected by the image of the thing, in the same way as if the thing were actually present. However, as it generally happens that those, who have had many experiences, vacillate, so long as they regard a thing as future or past, and are usually in doubt about its issue (E2P44C1N); it follows that the emotions which arise from similar images of things are not so constant, but are generally disturbed by the images of other things, until men become assured of the issue.|
|Referenced in: E3DOE15,- E4D6|
|E3: PROP. 18, Note 2. --From what has just been said, we understand what is meant by the terms Hope, Fear, Confidence, Despair, Joy, and Disappointment [Conscientiae morsus--thus rendered by Mr. Pollock.]. Hope is nothing else but an inconstant pleasure, arising from the image of something future or past, whereof we do not yet know the issue. Fear, on the other hand, is an inconstant pain also arising from the image of something concerning which we are in doubt. If the element of doubt be removed from these emotions, hope becomes Confidence and fear becomes Despair. In other words, Pleasure or Pain arising from the image of something concerning which we have hoped or feared. Again, Joy is Pleasure arising from the image of something past whereof we doubted the issue. Disappointment is the Pain opposed to Joy.|
|Referenced in: E3P50,- E3P50N,- E3DOE13,- E4D6|