1686

CORRESPONDENCE WITH ARNAULD

by G W Leibniz

I: Leibniz to Count Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels

1/11 Feb., 1686.

Being at a place lately for several days with nothing to do, I wrote out a short discourse on Metaphysics on which I should be very glad to have the opinion of Mons. Arnaud. *001 For the questions in regard to grace, in regard to the relations of God with created beings, in regard to the nature of miracles, the cause of sin, the origin of evil, the immortality of the soul, ideas, etc., are discussed in a way which seems to offer new points of approach fitted to clear up some great difficulties. I enclose herewith a summary of the articles which it contains, as I have not had time to make a clean copy of the whole.

I therefore beg Your Serene Highness to send him this summary, requesting him to look it over and give his judgment upon it. For, as he excels equally in Theology and in Philosophy, in erudition and in power of thought, I know of no one who is better fitted to give an opinion upon it. I am very desirous to have a critic as careful, as enlightened and as open to reason as is Monsieur Arnaud, being myself also a person the most disposed in the world to submit to reasoning.

Perhaps Mons. Arnaud will not find this outline wholly unworthy of his consideration, especially since he has been somewhat occupied in the examination of these matters. If he finds obscurities I will explain myself sincerely and frankly, and if he finds me worthy indeed of his instruction I shall try to behave in such a way that he shall find no cause for being dissatisfied on that point. I beg Your Serene Highness to enclose this with the summary which I am sending and to forward them both to Mons. Arnaud.

Summary of the Discourse on Metaphysics

1. Concerning the divine perfection and that God does everything in the most desirable way.

2. Against those who hold that there is in the works of God no goodness, or that the principles of goodness and beauty are arbitrary.

3. Against those who think that God might have made things better than he has.

4. That love for God demands on our part complete satisfaction with and acquiescence in that which he has done.

5. In what the principles of the perfection of the divine conduct consist and that the simplicity of the means counterbalances the richness of the effects.

6. That God does nothing which is not orderly and that it is not even possible to conceive of events which are not regular.

7. That miracles conform to the general order although they go against the subordinate regulations; concerning that which God desires or permits and concerning general and particular intentions.

8. In order to distinguish between the activities of God and the activities of created things, we must explain the conception of an individual substance.

9. That every individual substance expresses the whole universe in its own manner, and that in its full concept is included all its experiences together with all the attendant circumstances and the whole sequence of exterior events.

10. That the belief in substantial forms has a certain basis in fact but that these forms effect no changes in the phenomena and must not be employed for the explanation of particular events.

11. That the opinions of the theologians and of the so-called scholastic philosophers are not to be wholly despised.

12. That the conception of the extension of a body is in a way imaginary and does not constitute the substance of the body.

13. As the individual concept of each person includes once for all everything which can ever happen to him, in it can be seen a priori the evidences or the reasons for the reality of each event and why one happened sooner than the other. But these events, however certain, are nevertheless contingent being based on the free choice of God and of his creatures. It is true that their choices always have their reasons but they incline to the choices under no compulsion of necessity.

14. God produces different substances according to the different views which he has of the world and by the intervention of God the appropriate nature of each substance brings it about that what happens to one corresponds to what happens to all the others without, however, their acting upon one another directly.