An-atta, regarding all things as "not self"

This essay concerns the initially rather puzzling early Buddhist doctrine of an-atta, which is generally translated as "not-self" or "without self" (an=not, atta=self). 

But this translation is very misleading for most people, who read it as a theory about whether a "self" exists, or what a human "self" is or is not.  This is especially misleading when the English word "self" is taken to mean the exact equivalent of the Pali word Atta.  For example, here is a definition of "self" in a recent encyclopedia of philosophy:

The term 'self' is often used interchangeably with the word 'person'... Thus a self is conceived to be a subject of consciousness, a being capable of thought and experience and able to engage in deliberative action... A self is a being that is able to entertain first-person thoughts. A first-person thought is one whose apt expression in language requires the use of the first-person pronoun "I." (E. J. Lowe. article "Self" in The Oxford Guide to Philosophy. Ed. Ted Honderich. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Pr. 1995.  p. 860.)

Some other associations with the English word "self":

-- A self is some underlying reality that stays the same amid changing life experiences -- I at age 70 am the same "self" that I was when I was two years old.

-- To be a self is to be a person.  Unlike machines and inanimate objects like stones, personal selves are agents responsible for their actions.  If a stone falls on me I do not blame the stone.  If I person's fist lands on my face, I do blame the person.

-- Persons also have accomplishments that they can be proud of -- a mountain pushed up by molten lava beneath the earth is not something proud of its achievements.  The architects and laborers who built the pyramids were proud of their achievements.

It would be a serious mistake to imagine that early Buddhist teaching meant to deny that a "self" exists in any of the above senses.

To summarize ahead of time some main points explained below:

 (1) The early Buddhist an-atta doctrine does not challenge the ordinary non-specialist individual's sense of "being a self." So far as the Pali Canon is concerned, you are and remain pretty much whatever kind of being you already think you are: A person capable of free choices, responsible for your choices; a self with an identity separate from other selves; a single center of consciousness persisting through time; and so on. These are assumptions assumed by almost everyone in ordinary life and ordinary discourse (questioned only by specialist philosophers and psychologists), and they are left unquestioned in the Pali Canon as well.
    (2) Outside the context of meditation, the practical point of the an-atta doctrine is better expressed by translating an-atta as "not-me," as in "my stereo set is not me" -- if someone steals or wrecks my stereo set, if I regarded my stereo set as not-me, I would not feel this as a personal attack on me. If Kisa Gotami had been able to regard her son as "not-me" she would have been able to accept his death and move on with her life. A good Buddhist would be able to feel "my wealth and possessions are not me," "my reputation is not me," my bodily appearance is not me," and so on.
    (3) The more radical implications of the an-atta doctrine apply only to meditators in the specific context of ancient India. Other non-Buddhists in contemporary India attribute special religious significance to specific and highly unusual, ecstatic and blissful experiences achievable in advanced meditation. These experiences are held to be experiences of a particular entity called Atta (Atman in the Sanskrit language), which exists beyond change, and is identical with the highest, eternally existing Supreme Being, Brahman. In this context, the main practical point of the Buddhist An-Atta doctrine is to refuse to attribute special religious significance to any particular meditative experience. No matter what exalted spiritual experiences a person is able to attain even in deepest meditation, every specific object or condition a person is able to experience belongs to the world of the changeable khandhas. Nothing one can directly become aware of, externally or internally, qualifies as being an unchanging Atta/Atman, connected to a Supreme Being. Absolutely everything that a meditator could experience should be regarded as An-Atta, "not-Atta" instead.

Interpreted in the way described in (2) and (3) above, the an-atta teaching is basically the same as the teaching about becoming a non-abiding Vinnana, treated in a previous essay.  That is, the an-atta teaching does not teach a theory to the effect "I am a non-self," but rather describes an attitude "I" should take toward whatever I perceive: I should regard everything I do or could perceive as an-atta. 

*******

We are, and remain, whatever kind of beings we think we are, whatever one might think or imagine a "self" to be.  The goal of Buddhism can be better expressed in English by saying that it is to

become a self able to regard all other things as not-myself

i.e. able to be a person ("self" in English) actually able to feel all changeable perceptual objects as "not me," meaning: not essential to my sense of self-esteem.  The ability to regard all things as an-atta is the same ability as the ability to be a Viññana not "residing in" any changeable perceptual object.

The goal of Buddhism is not to "become an-atta,"  or "achieve non-self," but to become a self able to regard everything else (all changeable perceptual objects) as an-atta, not essential to my sense of self-esteem.

Memorize this and keep repeating it to yourself.  This will eliminate 90% of confusions surrounding the an-atta doctrine.

******

Pragmatically speaking, the an-atta doctrine recommends a certain attitude a person ought to try to take toward everything she perceives, an attitude that can be described as "regarding everything as a not-self." This attitude can be defined by contrast with the opposite attitude, an attitude of "identifying with" something one perceives, or "becoming invested" in it -- in the sense that a man might become identified with or invested in some plan or project, and regard any criticism of this plan as a personal affront to himself.

This is evident in the argument usually used: What is the reason that a person should regard everything she perceives as an-atta? The argument goes like this:

(1) Everything a person might perceive is subject to change beyond that person's control.

(2) Whatever is subject to change beyond a person's control is a source of dukkha, distress.

(3) "It is not right" to consider something impermanent and dukkha-causing as atta, "self." Everything impermanent should be regarded as an-atta instead.

(4) The ability to regard everything one perceives as an-atta would constitute "liberation," making a person "free." She has "done what had to be done" in life, i.e achieved Nibbana, the supreme good in human life. "Regarding everything as non-self" is one way of defining Nibbana.

This is easily recognizable as the same argument used in the passage about the "non-abiding Viññana" discussed in a previous essay. That is, to regard something as atta is to not only to have a theory about it. To regard something as atta is to relate to it it as something able to satisfy one's Thirst and Cling to it as a reliable source of meaning in life beyond the threat of deeply disturbing change. The mistake in considering something atta is the mistake of expecting ongoing sameness in something actually liable to unpredictable change, and which will thus frustrate one's expectations. This is the reason why one should regard everything as an-atta instead.

The goal of Buddhism is not to "become an-atta," a "non-self," but to become a self able to regard everything else (all changeable perceptual objects) as an-atta, not essential to my sense of self-esteem.

*****

*****

The an-atta doctrine is most often expressed in relation to the five khandhas described in the previous chapter. That is, the Pali Canon typically does not say "There is no self," or "Atta does not exist." It addresses an audience of human persons, enumerates the five khandhas, and urges these persons to regard and treat everything belonging to these five khandhas as an-atta, "not me."

Here is a good sample passage:

‘Body is an-atta.

If body were atta

body would not be subject to disease,

and it would be possible

in the case of body to command:

"Let my body be like so, let not my body be like so."

But because body is an-atta,

therefore body is subject to disease,

and it is not possible to command:

"Let my body be like so, let not my body be like so.

The statement, "If X were atta, it would not be subject to disease," defines the contextual meaning of the term atta, and gives it a meaning similar to the meaning it has in the Bhagavad Gita,  very different from the meaning of the word "self" in English. One should not call something atta if it is subject to any kind of disease or discomfort. Similarly one should not call something atta unless it is under one's complete control. The reason and background for these statements is explained in the above discussion of the Gita: To call something atta is to identify with and Cling to it, with the expectation that an identity so formulated will give one a source of deeply satisfying peace beyond the threat of changes beyond one's control. To identify with anything beyond one's control is to subject oneself to impersonal forces beyond one's control.

Feelings are an-atta...

Perceptions are an-atta...

Conditions are an-atta...

Consciousness is an-atta.

If feelings... perceptions...

conditions.. consciousness

were atta,

[then none of these] would be subject to disease,

and it would be possible... to command

"Let my feelings be like so...

Let my perceptions be like so...

Let my mental conditions be like so...

Let my consciousness be like so..."

But because [all of these] are an-atta

[they are all] subject to disease

and it is not possible to command:

"Let my feelings be like so...

Let my perceptions be like so...

Let my conditions be like so...

Let my consciousness be like so..."

The text lists the other four khandhas, repeating about each what was said about the first khandha, Body, concluding that because everything belonging to any of the khandhas is subject to unpleasant changes ("disease") beyond one's control, nothing belonging to the khandhas qualifies as atta.

(It seems that the issue of control is actually more important than the issue of impermanence.  For example, things I did in the past are very permanent, since there is no way of undoing them.  But it is obvious also that their very permanence is a source of useless distress (dukkha), useless and unproductive emotional energy wasted over resisting being in the situation that I am now in due to my past mistakes which I deeply regret, but now have no control over.  "Learning from one's mistakes" is a productive way of reacting, but many of us waste a lot of energy on just regret and desire to change the past which cannot now be changed.  One can no longer command "let my past be like so, or not be like so."  The point about the impermanence of things is really that, in the future, things might happen beyond my control, my power to make them happen or prevent them from happening.)

One can note that "consciousness," viññana, is listed in the above passage as the fifth khandha -- unlike in the passage quoted in the previous essay, which spoke of consciousness as a pure "I" in its relation to to the other four khandhas, which "I" can choose to "abide in" or "not abide in."  When Vinnana is listed as the fifth of the Khandhas, it refers to consciousness exercised through one of the six senses.  The Pali Canon recognizes the usual five senses (sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch), plus a fifth (mano)  an internal sense by which a person becomes aware of such things as thoughts and feelings.  Eye-consciousness, for example, is liable to change beyond one's control and "disease," because it is dependent on the condition of one's physical eyes, which might become near-sighted, far-sighted, or suffer various degrees of blindness.

This is because viññana can exist in two states, an "unarisen" state unconnected to any perceptual object, as well as an activated state connected to some perceptual object through one of six sense-channels. In this latter state it is a "conditioned" consciousness subject to change when the perceptual object changes.

What think you think, monks,

Is Body stable, or subject to growth, decay, and death?

—‘Subject to growth, decay, and death, Lord.'

But is that which is subject to growth, decay, and death painful or pleasant?

—‘Painful, Lord.'

Everything belonging to any of the khandhas undergoes a process of coming into existence, developing, and gradually passing away (metaphorically "growth, decay, and death"). This brings up the constant Buddhist association of change with what is painful. It is of course not true that everyone experiences all change is painful. This makes sense again only if we assume an audience completely devoted to a quest for something permanent to identify with that will place them completely beyond the threat of deeply disturbing change undermining this identity. Only then will change be intrinsically associated with (mental) pain.

‘Is it right to consider what is subject to growth, decay, and death,

what is painful and impermanent, as "Mine", "I", "Myself" [atta]?'

-‘Certainly not, Lord.'

"Is it right" to consider any particular impermanent/painful thing as atta. This makes it clear that the issue is whether some specific changeable reality deserves to be called atta. This does not deny the existence of anything one might perceive. It just says that it is not right to give the name atta to anything one perceives, with the implication that to call something atta is to Cling to it with an expectation of permanence.

‘What do you think --

Are body feelings... perceptions,

mental conditions... or consciousness,

stable, or subject to growth, decay, and death?

—‘Certainly not [stable], Lord.'

Therefore body... feelings... perceptions...

mental conditions... and consciousness,

past, future, or present, subjective or objective,

earthly or ethereal,

low or exalted, near or far,

are to be perceived by him

who clearly and rightly understands as:

"This body is not mine, is not I.

I am without Self (anatta)."

"This feeling is not mine, is not I,

I am without self"

Etc.

Understanding this, the noble disciple turns away from body, from feelings,

from perceptions, from conditions,

from consciousness.

Being thus detached,

he is free from Craving and Clinging

being free from Craving and Clinging

he is liberated

and he experiences the freedom of liberation.

For he knows that the holy life has reached its culmination,

what he set out to accomplish is accomplished,

he is free.

In the context, "turn away" from feelings clearly does not mean "have no feelings." It means "refrain from identifying with" any particular feeling, or define one's identity in relation to any particular feeling.

Does this idealized liberated person still exist as a being with a personal identity? Clearly he still does. He has an identity as a person liberated from any deep psychological dependency on anything changeable beyond his control, for whom such liberation is a great personal achievement.

This is the most highly admirable achievement, the perfect culmination of a holy life.

This passage pictures a meditator as a personal subject facing a choice about whether to identify with, or not identify with, anything belonging to body, feelings, perceptions, conditions, or object-consciousness. Things that it might choose to call Atta are not identical with this personal subject, but are "objects" perceived by this subject, which this subject is invited to consider separate from its own being. In other words, all the candidates for Atta must be capable of being perceptual objects, which one can choose to identify with or not identify with.

This practical context is important to keep in mind, because it counters the tendency to regard the anatta doctrine as a theoretical doctrine, an answer to the theoretical question about whether a particular entity called a "self" exists or does not exist.

For example, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant thought that a self exists, but we never directly perceive it. We indirectly infer its existence from the fact that my successive experiences all seem to belong to the same "me." Suppose Kant is right. Would this invalidate the Buddhist anatta doctrine? On the present view, it would not. ‘Self' in Kant's sense would not qualify as atta in the Buddhist sense, because if it is never a direct object of perception, a person could never choose to identify with it or not identify with it.

The anatta idea is ultimately practical advice relevant to the project of constructing a certain identity for oneself. It is part of meditation-instruction originally intended for samana-meditators, telling them how to relate to feelings and states of consciousness they might experience at meditation.

The goal of Buddhism is not to "become an-atta," a "non-self," but to become a self able to regard everything else (all changeable perceptual objects) as an-atta, not essential to my sense of self-esteem.

*****

A second implication of this passage is also one easily overlooked. That is, it might at first seem that the Buddhist ideal is a state of feelingless-ness, a blank mental state devoid of any feelings, thoughts, or mental activity of any kind. The context suggests something quite different. If the person envisioned here is a person seeking for something to identify with, then "turn away" from Feelings does not mean "have no feelings." It means: Resist the temptation to identify with some particular Feeling. Leave feelings to be whatever they are. Let feelings change however they want to change. Disconnect one's identity from any particular one of the changing Feelings.

A desire for feelinglessness would constitute, in Buddhist language, an "aversion" for some particular feelings, which is just as much an obstacle to the Buddhist ideal as "Clinging to" some particular feelings.

This point is made more clear in a simile of "two darts" used by another Sutta (Samyutta-Nikaya IV. 36, 6 (6). Bodhi p. 1264). The simile has to do with a soldier in a battle, being struck first by one dart, then afterwards being struck by a second dart. Similarly, when most people experience an unpleasant feeling (one dart), they also experience an aversion for this feeling (second dart). A good Buddhist might still sometimes experience an unpleasant feeling, but would have no deep aversion for this feeling, would feel herself being struck by only one dart (the unpleasant feeling), not two darts (the unpleasant feeling plus distress over having the unpleasant feeling).

*****

All this makes sense if we think in terms of a "perceiving subject" in contrast to "objects perceived." Human beings have the ability to be aware of things. A person can be aware of external things like rocks and houses. A person can also be aware of internal things like ideas, feelings, moods, or mystical experiences. A person can even be aware of blankness of mind, and in this sense blankness of mind can be a "perceptual object." In any given act of perception, there is always a perceiving subject which is not at the moment being perceived. A perceiving subject is like a camera which never appears in the pictures it takes.

Think of the five Khandhas as an attempt to give an exhaustive list of all possible perceptual objects, external or internal. The passage above is addressed to a human subject perceiving various perceptual objects, external or internal, and being tempted to identify with some particular object perceived, or to construct a worthwhile identity in relation to one of these perceptual objects. The an-atta passage quoted above urges this subject to resist this temptation, to remain a non-identified subject, a subject whose sense of self-worth and meaning in life is not tied to any particular perceptual object, even the most exalted and blissful "spiritual" experience, or even with a completely blank mind.

One might want to ask, "What is this perceiving subject?" Isn't this a "soul" or a "self"? One might think that a person is not really a person unless there is some specific entity, some specific part of her being, which makes her a person, and differentiates her from a machine. Doesn't Buddhist teaching have to acknowledge such an entity?

Buddhist thought can avoid this dilemma by just assuming with ordinary commonsense that persons are persons and not machines, but asserting that there is no necessity of positing any particular entity or particular part of their beings that makes them persons. The person as perceiving subject is not one more entity existing alongside hands and feet and head and heart and liver. A person is just a bodily being which has the ability to be aware, with a "personal" kind of awareness. Buddhist teachings assume throughout that they are being addressed to such persons who are aware of these teachings, aware of perceptual objects, and who have a personal choice how to relate to these teachings and perceptual objects. They only refrain from saying that, among all the various parts of one's being, or among all perceptions one might have, there is one single part or perception distinguished from all other parts or perceptions, and deserving privileged treatment as "Self." Every part of a person's being is personal.

The goal of Buddhism is not to "become an-atta," a "non-self," but to become a self able to regard everything else (all changeable perceptual objects) as an-atta, not essential to my sense of self-esteem.

*****

The present essay's contextual interpretation of the an-atta doctrine can be summed up in the form of an imaginary story, a progress from being a "householder," to being a samana-meditator devoted to the ideals expressed in the Bhagavad Gita, to conversion to the Buddhist an-atta doctrine.

1. Start with an imaginary "householder." This person is however an alienated idealist, dissatisfied with ordinary family and community life, which motivates him to "go forth from home into homelessness."

Retrospectively, from the point of view of the committed Buddhist, we can analyze his dissatisfaction in this way: What he really wants is to establish a worthwhile identity for himself, an identity whose Goodness would be in itself a source of satisfaction. But this desire tends to be outward-directed. He looks for other things outside himself to give him a sense of self-worth - - his possessions, approval from his friends, his occupation, his status in his community, and so on.

But all these things are constantly changing. To construct the Good identity that would satisfy him, he needs to be able to remain a single unified self that achieves depth by remaining constant over time. When he defines his identity in relation to external changing circumstances this means that his life is relatively fragmented, pulled to and fro by changing circumstances, without the opportunity to "find himself" as we say, to develop a personal center that has a constancy and depth to it.

2. In the next stage, this person goes forth from home into homeless seclusion. He turns away from the external world and becomes intensely introspective. He develops skill in a certain kind of concentrative meditation, learning to concentrate his mind, preventing it from being pulled to and fro by changing objects drawing attention to themselves. He experiences some periods of intense satisfaction in just being, when he withdraws his attention from all external objects. This stage is well represented by the ideal yogin described in the Bhagavad Gita.

But the quest for a single, unified, constant, deeply satisfying Good identity places a great burden and high expectations on such meditative experiences. Giving up trying to find his Good identity in relation the external social world makes him more desperate to find his identity in relation to something experienced internally in introspective meditation.

The following quote from a Pali Sutta gives the Buddhist account (probably a caricature) of the state of such a person and the problems he encounters.

An unskilled person... regards [something belonging to the khandha] "Feeling" as Atta... He lives obsessed by the notion: ‘I am [this] Feeling' ... As he lives obsessed by this notion, that Feeling of his changes and alters. With the change and alteration of Feeling, there arise in him sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair... He regards [something belonging to the khandha] "Conditions" as Self. He lives obsessed by this notion, that Condition of his changes and alters. With the change and alteration of that Condition, there arise in him sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair..." (S p. 854)

Who would be "obsessed by the notion ‘I am this Feeling,'" and be filled with "lamentation and despair" when the Feeling changes? This exaggerated language makes sense if we imagine it as a Buddhist caricature of a Gita devotee searching desperately for some kind of feeling he could experience at mediation worthy of being called Atta - something he could identify with that would put him beyond the reach of deeply disturbing change. The extremely high expectations this person places on such Feelings or Conditions is responsible for the "lamentation and despair" he experiences when they prove changeable and unreliable (e.g. when he cannot achieve at meditation today the Feeling or Mental Condition of bliss he experienced yesterday).

Formerly, as a householder, this person tried to establish a worthwhile identity for himself by seeking external signs confirming his sense of self-worth. He left home when he realized the changeable and unreliable character of all external signs. Now he realizes that all internal perceptual objects he might rely on are also changeable and unreliable. Some Buddhist writings call this "true seclusion," using "seclusion" to refer not to the external life-style of a samana, but to his inner psychological independence even from internal perceptual objects.

This is the key point of the Buddhist critique of other contemporary Hindus who felt that a kind of internal mystical experience (union with an exalted "True Self") constituted the fulfillment of their quest.

3. Full realization of the Buddhist ideal comes about when this person, having discovered the changeability of all perceptual objects, ceases to try to find his identity among any perceptual objects, even the most subtle and exalted internal "spiritual" objects. This is what it means that he "turns away" from everything changeable. That is, he continues to be physically connected to his body, he continues to feel feelings, and so on. It is just that he does not feel psychologically invested in or identified with any of these things, so a change in them does not deeply disturb him.

This does not constitute a mere repression or giving up of his quest for a single, constant, deeply satisfying worthwhile identity. It constitutes rather the final fulfillment of this quest. In the ideal case, his disconnection from all changeable perceptual objects makes him a person who can find deep satisfaction in just being - - i.e. satisfaction in the Goodness of his own being - - not needing any particular connection to any particular perceptual objects to find this satisfaction.

This is a "dialectical" interpretation of the relation of Hinduism and Buddhism, using Hegel's sense of "dialectical." That is, picturing the Buddhist an-atta doctrine as a continuation of the Hindu quest, a fulfillment of the underlying motivation for this quest, helps define the content of the an-atta doctrine itself. We get a clearer picture of the particular underlying existential concern involved by studying ancient Hindu writings like the Bhagavad Gita, clearer than we would get by studying Buddhist writings alone. Specifically this background enables us to understand more clearly an experiential connection between a certain non-attachment to perceptual objects, on the one hand, and a sense of deep satisfaction in one's own being, on the other. This in turn enables us to associate some positive content with the Buddhist an-atta doctrine, and so to begin to understand why "regarding everything as an-atta" could plausibly be regarded as the supreme good in human life.

The goal of Buddhism is not to "become an-atta," a "non-self," but to become a self able to regard everything else (all changeable perceptual objects) as an-atta, not essential to my sense of self-esteem.

Appendix: More Pali Canon Passages on An-atta

Shankara (c. 800 a.d) is credited with being the chief originator of the Advaita Vedanta tradition in Hinduism.  For a brief discussion of debates about Shankara's relation to Buddhism see http://www.swaveda.com/articles.php?action=show&id=50

To a great degree, understanding the an-atta doctrine is a matter of learning how Buddhists use the words atta and anatta.  Part of knowing the meaning that a word has for some community is knowing how that word is used.  How are atta and anatta used, and not used, in sentences in the Pali Canon?  Regarding sentences that use these words, what questions are these sentences trying to answer? 

Some ways these words are not used:

The Pali Canon avoids using the word atta in any positive sense.  Statements never describe something that the word atta refers to.  Statements using the word atta do not try to answer the question: What is atta?  The Pali Canon never speaks of "finding my true atta," (unlike normal English, in which we do speak of "finding my true self.")  Sentences using the word atta invariably speak of what does not qualify as atta.  The most common way of doing this is listing the five khandhas, and then asserting that nothing belonging to the five khandhas (i.e. no perceptual object) qualifies as atta.

The Pali Canon does not use the word an-atta by itself as a description of the Buddhist goal.  It doesn't say, "Become an-atta" or "achieve an-atta."  The Buddhist goal is described rather as the "freedom" or "liberation" that occurs when a person is able to regard everything belonging to the khandhas as an-atta.  Anatta is not used to describe some state or characteristic of an ideal Buddhist herself.  It describes the way an ideal Buddhist perceives other things that she perceives (e.g. she perceives her body or her calm feeling to be an-atta).

Pali Canon sentences presenting Buddhist teachings about atta and an-atta are not trying to answer the question, "Does atta exist?"  These statements are not statements about what exists or does not exist, but how to regard all those things that one perceives to exist (healthy body, calm feelings, etc.), what attitude to take toward them.

To regard everything belonging to the khandhas as an-atta is the same as becoming a non-abiding Vinnana.  If you want some positive description of  the Buddhist goal, what kind of person to become, "become a non-abiding Vinnana" is probably the closest they come to such a positive description.

This understanding requires giving the word atta what is for us an unusual meaning. "Self" in English seems pretty much synonymous with "person." But there is no suggestion that a person coming to regard everything as an-atta becomes a non-person. We would probably say that such a person remains a "self," in the ordinary English sense of that word.

Why did Buddhists express themselves in this way, using the word atta "self" in this unique way?

This is probably best explained by considering another aspect of the context of early Buddhism: The positive use of the term Atman "Self" in some Hindu writings from ancient India roughly contemporary with Buddhism. These writings are written in a language called Sanskrit, a different dialect of the same language used in the Pali Canon. Atman in the Sanskrit dialect is the equivalent of Atta in the Pali language. Here I will rely on a Hindu writing called the Bhagavad Gita, which stems from roughly the same period as the Pali Canon. 

(I'm restricting my comments to the teaching of the Bhagavad Gita, which, while it has become the most popular Hindu scripture today, certainly does not represent all of Hinduism, which has been interpreted in many different ways in its long and varied history in India.  It's not even completely clear that what Buddhists object to in the Bhagavad Gita's teaching regarding Atman is the only possible interpretation of the Bhagavad Gita itself on this subject.  It often happens that people in one tradition who criticize another tradition create a kind of caricature of that tradition in order to cast it in a negative light.  You would not trust a Democrat to give you a good account of what Republicans hold.  See below for a note concerning controversies concerning Advaita Vedanta, one Hindu tradition which some say is close to Buddhist teaching on this subject.)

What is noteworthy in this connection is that Atman is a technical term in the Gita with a unique meaning, the same unique meaning that Atta has in the Pali Canon. That is, the Pali Canon assumes that something would qualify as Atta if it would provide a permanently reliable internal source of deepest meaning in life, a source beyond the threat of deeply disturbing change. The an-atta doctrine simply denies that anything one could perceive actually has this character. A doctrine precisely opposite to this, but using Atman in the same sense, occurs in the Gita. Nothing a person ordinarily perceives has this permanently reliable character. But the Gita describes certain introspective meditation practices which it says could, with sufficient practice, lead one to experience something within oneself which would be a permanently reliable source of exalted spiritual bliss. A person having such an experience is said to be experiencing her true Atman. This is not only an extremely pleasant experience, but puts one in touch with the very highest Being, Brahman. A central doctrine prevalent in Hindu thought at the time is that Atman is Brahman. A person experiencing and identifying with her Atman is also merging with Brahman -- becoming a Supreme Being, "becoming God" to speak in Western theistic language.

Click here for some passages from the Bhagavad Gita illustrating these ideas about the Atman.

All this obviously gives the word Atman a meaning different from the English word "self." This is a unique meaning which also happens to be very similar to the implied meaning of atta in early Buddhist writings. Buddhists agree that if a person could experience something having exactly these same characteristics as the Gita's Atman, this is what would qualify it to be rightly called atta, and rightly identified with or Clung to as one's True Self. The Pali Canon agrees with the Gita on the use of the word Atman/Atta. If there were something of this kind it would deserve the name Atta, and it would be right to identify with it as one's True Self.. It's just that there isn't anything of this kind.

(By comparison: Everyone agrees on what a dragon would be if there were one -- a large fire-breathing animal. It's just that some people, although they would recognize a dragon if they saw one, are convinced they will never actually see one. Theists and a-theists agree about what a "God" would be if there is one. Theists think there is one, while a-theists think there isn't one. In the same way, the Pali Canon agrees with the Gita about what an atman/atta would be if there is one. Buddhist are just convinced that there is nothing that qualifies as atta. One could call the Gita's author an atta-ist, whereas the Pali Canon was written by an-atta-ists.  To put this in more philosophical language, for Buddhists, the word atta has a meaning but no reference.  "Reference" denotes the object or reality that a word refers to.  I do not believe that dragons actually exist, so the word "dragon" has no reference, there is no existing object to which this word refers.  The word "dragon" does however have a meaning which I understand -- when shown a picture of a dragon, I know that what is shown in the picture qualifies as a dragon.  So for me the word "dragon" has a meaning but no reference.  The same with the word "atta" for Buddhists -- it has a meaning, in the sense that there are definite qualifications for calling something atta.  But the word atta has no reference, there are no existing objects that qualify, so there are no existing objects or realities to which this word "refers.")

The goal of Buddhism is not to "become an-atta," a "non-self," but to become a self able to regard everything else (all changeable perceptual objects) as an-atta, not essential to my sense of self-esteem.

*****

What's the pragmatic point, beyond the use of words? I suggest it is this:

The Hinduism of the Gita tends toward a kind of introspective mysticism. Trying to fulfill one's quest for a meaningful life through connection with the ever-changing material and social world outside, inevitably makes a person vulnerable to deep existential crises -- in making this point the Gita is in perfect accord with the Pali Canon. But the Gita tends to picture something in the internal mental world as a positive alternative the disturbing changes of the external world: Turn away from the changing external world, and turn toward some unchanging reality you can experience within yourself. "Mystical experiences," thought of as direct experience of Atman/Brahman, the highest being, provides the solution to the problem of finding a permanently reliable source of deep meaning in life, which a person cannot find in the material and social world outside.

The main pragmatic intent of the early Buddhist an-atta doctrine is to reject introspective mysticism. It's basic point is: There is nothing a person can experience within herself, even in deepest meditation, that is fundamentally different from anything she might experience in the external social world. Everything "inside" is just as changeable as everything "outside." There is no reason to stop attending to things and affairs in the external world, and give absolute priority to things perceptible in an internal world. One's primary goal should be a long-term transformation of one's basic attitudes, reducing or eliminating the tendency to search for meaning in some particular connection to any perceptual object, internal or external, and then attend to the world out there in this purified state of mind.

"Perceptual object" here needs to be understood in a radical sense, to refer to anything which a person can be aware of. Anything a person can be aware of is an "object of perception." This includes external objects like trees and rocks and houses. It also includes internal things a person might perceive, such as feelings, thoughts, images, moods, calmness, peacefulness, anger, distress, subtle mental states, blankness of mind, and spiritual bliss. The Buddhist doctrine is that, since all of these, and all perceptual objects of any kind, are subject to change beyond one's control, one should not Cling to any of them or identify with any of them, but regard all of them as "not-self," not-me, not-essential-to-me, not an essential basis for one's sense of self-worth or meaning in life.

The goal of Buddhism is not to "become an-atta," a "non-self," but to become a self able to regard everything else (all changeable perceptual objects) as an-atta, not essential to my sense of self-esteem.