| We speak of many
beautiful things [polla kala] and many good things [polla
agatha],
And Beauty itself [auto to kalon] and Goodness itself [auto agathon], and so with all the things which we then classed as many – we now class them again according to a single Idea of each, which is one, and which we in each case call ‘that which is’... Some things we speak of as "seen", but not "understood" [noēsthai]. Ideas are understood [noēton] but not seen. (507b) S. [Suppose someone] does not believe that there is a ‘Beautiful Itself’ [auto to kalon] or any Idea representing Beauty itself, which remains always the same in all respects, but who [only] believes that many beautiful things exist... who would not allow anyone to say that the Beautiful is one, and likewise with Rightness (dikaiosyn‘).
[I would] say to [such a person]: "Of all those many ‘beautiful things,’ is there one which not also [sometimes] appear ugly? "And is there one of those ‘right things’ which will not also [sometimes] appear not right?... G: Inevitably ‘beautiful things’ will appear ugly under certain circumstances, and so with other things [like rightness].
S: What about the many things that are double? Are they any less ‘half’ than ‘double’? So with things big and small, light and heavy – does any predicate we apply to them apply to them any more than its opposite? G: No... Each of these things partakes of both opposites. S: Is then each of the many things, more than it is not, that which anyone might call it?... |
Plato connects the distinction between abstract Ideas and concrete impressions with the distinction between different kinds of knowledge. He uses a group of related Greek words – nous, noesis, noetos, ennoia, gnosko, gn Çsis – to designate the superior way of knowing Goodness by means of abstract Ideas. He uses a different group of Greek words to designate knowledge that relies on concrete objects or concrete images – aisth‘sis, "sense impressions," horaton "visible (to the eyes)", doxa "opinions, impressions."
The purpose of Socratic inquiry is to formulate concepts that one can consistently follow. If one uses them as a guide, they will always lead one to doing what is Good if one uses them. This is why one needs a concept of "what is right" for example, that will always be the same in its rightness – following it would never lead one to doing something obviously "not right."
Earlier in the Republic Socrates discussed whether one can take "give to each what is his" as a definition of "rightness." He brings up a counterexample: A man once gave his weapons to a friend for safekeeping. Subsequently, the man went insane, and has now come asking his friend to return the weapons. This counter-example makes it obvious that "giving to each what is his" is not a rule one can consistently follow and always be right. What appears to be a "something right" (by this literal definition) will also appear obviously "not right," in some circumstances. Fifty cents is double the value of a quarter, but half the value of a dollar. So it appears that the same concrete fifty cents exemplifies the concept "half" no less than it exemplifies the concept "double." It is in this sense that many concrete objects "partake of opposite" concepts.
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We have now discovered, it seems, that the many conventional impressions of the majority about Beauty and the other things are rolling around between unreality [m‘ Çn] and reality [Çn]...
[These] would have to be spoken of as "what people have impressions about" [doxazein] but not "what one knows'' [gignoskein, related to gnosis] S: As for those who contemplate many beautiful things but do not see Beauty itself and are incapable of following another who leads them to it, who see many right things [polla dikaia] but not Rightness itself [auto to dikaion], and so everything – these people, we shall say, have impressions about [doxazein] everything but have no Knowledge of those things they have impressions about... And those who in each case contemplate the things themselves which are always in every way the same? Don’t these have Knowledge [gnÇsis], not impressions [doxai]?... Shall we then say that these love and welcome the objects of Knowledge, as the others do the objects one has impressions about?... These latter are the ones who love and contemplate beautiful sounds and colors and such things, but they would not allow that Beauty itself [auto to kalon] exits? We shall then not be out of line if we call them lovers of impressions [philo-doxos] rather than lovers of wisdom [philo-sophos] |
If by "real Beauty," we mean a concept of Beauty that is a consistent guide to what is truly beautiful in all circumstances, then no concrete image, and literal-minded definition will do. The same concrete beautiful face that will under some circumstances appear ugly does not give us grasp of "real Beauty." It is in this sense that images of concrete beautiful objects can be said to "roll around between unreality and pure reality." For most people today, the word "reality" refers mainly to concrete material objects. In this sense a concrete object like a face is "more real" than an abstract concept like "beauty." I don’t think we should take Plato to be saying that the abstract concept Beauty is "more real" in our ordinary sense of "real." His ultimate point is to change our concept of the "reality" that we should be most concerned with. The abstract concept Beauty is more solid as a guide to living a beautiful life, and this is the sense in which it is "more real" than concrete beautiful objects.
Doxa here designates inferior knowledge through concrete impressions, as opposed to superior knowing [gignoskein] through abstractions. Ideas are things that "are always in every way the same." Statements like this are commonly understood today as a claim that there is a single set of Platonic Ideas that are "timeless truths" valid for all cultures for all time. But this ignores the context here. Plato is not addressing modern problems of diversity and multiculturalism. He is addressing the personal problem of devising concepts that an individual can rely on as a consistent guide to what will always and everywhere lead one to true Goodness.
Plato connects his point to the Greek term philo-sophos, literally "lover of wisdom," equating this with love of Ideas, contrasted with "love of [concrete] impressions." (I believe philo-doxos is a word Plato made up to make this point.) |
Practice Gaining Skill in Abstract Thinking
Republic Chapter 7 (523a)
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Socrates: [Let us] distinguish the studies which lead in the direction of noesis Among our concrete sense perception [aisth ‘sesis] there are some that do not call upon Noesis to examine them because the decision of our perception is sufficient, while others certainly summon the help of Noesis to examine them because the concrete sensation [aisth‘sis] does not achieve a result that makes sense...They do not call for help [from no ‘sis]...if they do not at the same time give a contrary perception [aisth‘sin] I describe those that do as calling for help whenever the sense perception does not point to one thing rather than its opposite, whether its object be far or near.Here, we say, are three fingers, the smallest, the second, and the middle finger... Each of them equally appears to be a finger, and in this respect it makes no difference whether it is seen to be at the end or in the middle, whether it is white or black, thick or thin, and all that sort of thing. In all this the soul [psyche] of the masses is not compelled to ask no ‘sis what a finger is, for the sense of sight does not indicate to it that the finger is also the opposite of a finger.. |
Certain mental exercises develop those mental skills necessary to understanding true Goodness. These mental exercises need to focus on certain issues that require abstract thought, because in Plato’s view Goodness can be grasped in its pure and precise form only be means of abstract Ideas divorced from concrete images. He uses the term no ‘sis (sometimes translated "mind" or "intellect") to refer to the capacity of the human mind to deal with abstractions. In this passage no‘sis is contrasted with aisth‘sis, knowledge through the senses
He first gives an example of something that does not require abstract thought – the concrete perception of a "finger." The image of a finger remains the same image no matter what context you put it in. So understanding what a finger is does not require abstract thought, does not call on Nous. Thinking about fingers is an example of what would not develop the skills necessary to understanding true Goodness. |
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And what about their bigness or smallness? Does [the sense of] sight have sufficient perception of them, and does it make no difference to it whether the finger is in the middle or at one end? Or their thickness and thinness, their hardness or softness, in the case of the sense of touch? |
"Bigness" however is different from "finger," in that it is as we say a "relative" concept. This shows in the fact that the same concrete finger can be called "big" or "small," depending on what it is being compared with. A person’s ring finger is "big" in relation to the little finger, but "small" in relation to her middle finger. Consequently, one cannot understand the concept "bigness" by keeping in mind some concrete object. "Big" is in this sense an abstract concept that cannot be grasped the senses, but only by no ‘sis. This very easy example should be kept in mind to avoid thinking of "abstract concepts" as all being very exotic and difficult to understand.
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[In some] cases the soul [psyche] is puzzled as to what some perception [aisth ‘sis] means by hard, if it says that the same thing is also soft. And so with the perception of the light and the heavy, the soul is puzzled as to what is the meaning of the light and the heavy if sense perception indicates that what is light is also heavy, and what is heavy, light.G: Yes...these indications are strange to the soul, and need investigation. S: It is likely then...that in these cases the soul will call upon... no ‘sis, to examine whether each of the things announced to it is one, or two...The sense of sight sees big and small not as separate but as mixed together. So in order to clarify this, no ‘sis is compelled to see big and small not as mixed together but as separate, the opposite way from sight.And it is from some such circumstances that it first occurs to us to ask "What is the nature of bigness, and again of smallness?'' And so we call [abstractions like bigness] "what is understood" [no ‘ton] and [we call concrete things] "what is [visibly] seen" [horaton].Well then, to which of these two classes do ‘number’ and ‘singleness’ [to hen] seem to belong?... Reason it out from what was said before. If singleness in and by itself, is adequately seen or perceived by any other sense, then, as I was saying in the case of the fingers, it would not draw one toward reality [ousia]. If, however, something contrary to it is always seen at the same time, it would stand in need of a judge. The soul would then be at a loss, search for an answer, stir up understanding [ennoia] within itself, and ask what is the nature of singleness in itself [auto to hen]. So inquiry into singleness [peri to hen math ‘sis] would be one of the kinds that lead [the soul] and turns it toward the contemplation of reality (t‘n tou ontos thean). |
Plato pictures the bodily senses as conveying contradictory information to the soul (psych ‘), puzzling the soul. The sense of sight sees bigness and smallness as "mixed together" in the same finger. When the sense of sight tells the soul that the same concrete finger has opposite qualities of both "bigness" and "smallness," this puzzle stirs Nous into activity, because it takes Nous to solve the puzzle, by separating the concepts "big" and "small" from any concrete objects like fingers, and understanding them as abstractions.
Hen is the Greek word for the number "one." To hen "one-ness" or "singleness," is like to kalos "beautifulness."
Ousia has the same root as Çn, the ordinary Greek word for "being," and is usually translated in this passage as "reality." But it can also be translated "essence," or "substance." Since singleness is an abstraction, one can only grasp its reality/being/essence/substance by no‘sis, not by sense impressions.
In the last sentence, "reality" translates ontos, another form of Çn. It should again be clear that this does not refer to what we call "reality" – the world of concrete objects – but to the reality or essence of abstract ideas like "singleness." |