Plato belongs to what philosopher Karl Jaspers called "the axial age" of world history. Christians regard the coming of Jesus as a key axis or "turning point" in world history. Jaspers wanted to replace this with a broader conception relating to many other cultures. He proposed a period beginning roughly 800 B.C. which marked a "turning point" in several different cultures. This is the age in which Confucianism and Taoism arose in China; classical Hinduism and Buddhism arose in India; Socrates and Plato pioneered Western philosophy in Greece; the Jewish prophetic movement and Christianity arose in Israel, and Mohammed founded Islam in present-day Saudi Arabia. These movements all represented important turning points in the histories of these various regions, laying the foundations for classical civilization in all of them, lasting down to today. It is noteworthy that all the worlds classical "scriptures" were written during this period.
This course only deals with three axial movements, those associated with
Plato, Buddha, and Jesus, respectively. For present purposes, the most
important common elements in axial movements is their "otherworldly"
orientation.
Plato's thought serves two purposes in this course:
- First, he is an example of a kind of otherworldliness
characteristic of all axial movements.
- Secondly, his writings provide a basis for a completely
rational approach to otherworldliness, in the form of "Socratic reasoning."
After learning some elements of Platonism, and learning to practice Socratic
reasoning in the first unit of this course, we will apply this method of
critical reasoning to the earliest teachings associated with Buddhism and
Christianity.
******
Plato has left a fairly voluminous body of writings -- the
first philosopher in the Greek world to do so. Characters in Plato's dialogues
express opinions on a very wide variety of subjects. For purposes of this course
we will focus only on a few central themes, in an interpretation resulting from
a method that I will call "critical reconstruction," also to be applied to the
teachings of early Buddhism and early Christianity.
The nature of critical reconstruction will be explained later
in this essay. First I want to sketch briefly the main elements of Plato's
thought relevant to the purposes of this course.
The two most central elements are:
(1) Plato's focus on arētē, normally translated as "virtue"
in English.
(2) A particular model of "Socratic" reasoning about
arētē/virtue.
******
Arētē (αρήτή)
is a central concept in Plato's thought. Arētē is commonly translated "virtue"
but arētē in Greek has different connotations than the English word "virtue."
Arētē should be seen in the context of intensely competitive Greek society. In
this context, it is better translated as "outstanding excellence."
Arētē could refer to the outstanding achievements of military
men. It could refer to outstanding athletic abilities demonstrated by
individuals in the original Greek "Olympic games." Stories of miraculous
wonder-working were called "aretologies." Achieving great wealth could be looked
on as a sign of a person's arētē. When outstanding statesmanship in people like
Pericles became important in Greek politics, outstanding abilities in this field
were described by the word arētē.
Socrates and Plato want to use the word arētē in a narrower
sense, referring to admirable character-traits like courage and
right-mindedness, closer to what we would call "virtues." But it is important to
see this in the context of their desire to channel the competitive spirit of
young Athenians in this more moral direction. Morally admirable character-traits
constitute the "health of the soul," and Socrates urges young men not to compete
so much for more wealth, social status, bodily beauty, and athletic ability, but
to "care for their souls that they might become their best." "Best" here is
aristai in Greek, the same word that gives us "aristo-cracy."
Plato's thought as reconstructed here is a kind of moral
thinking, but this focus on arētē makes the entire goal of Platonist thought
different from goals suggested by the word "morality" and even by the word
"virtue" today.
First, concern for arētē in Plato is above all an
individualist concern, as contrasted with the social concerns that predominate
in modern associations with "morality." Concern for arētē is a concern of an
idealistic individual to make herself the best she can be. Being courageous or
loving or right-minded is something an ideal Platonist would want for its own
sake, just to perfect her own being, not because it brings her social
advantages, or because it benefits others or contributes to society.
Concern for arētē in Plato is individualist also in the sense
that developing arētē is assumed to be something any individual can do
independent of any change at all in anyone else or in society at large. Unlike
modern thought about morality or "virtue," Platonist thought about arētē/virtue
is not part of an attempt to legislate for, reform, or even give advice to, the
general populace in society at large. In his Seventh Letter, Plato explicitly
states that defining arētē/virtue is something each individual must do for
herself -- it is not something one person can teach to another. He never
imagined that the majority of people in his society would become interested in
this project.
Finally, the end product aimed at by Platonist moral thought
is not rules determining right and wrong behavior, but paradigms (paradeigma is
Plato's word) of morally excellent character-traits to model one's own character
on. Of course, admirable internal character-traits will manifest themselves in
admirable external behavior. But for Plato, external behavior visible to others
constitutes the "appearances" of arētē/virtue, not its essential "being." A
person who develops right-mindedness as a character-trait will of course act
rightly when the situation calls for it. But the reverse is not true -- just
imitating the external behavior of a right-minded person does not guarantee that
I possess or am developing the character-trait (the virtue/arētē) of
right-mindedness. I can be acting rightly merely in order to gain a reputation,
win an election, and so on. Right-mindedness as an arētē/virtue has to do with
admirable internal motivations that will or have become an habitual part of my
personality.
The virtue-paradigms that Platonist moral thought focuses on
are more commonly referred to in his writings by the term "Form" (eide or idea).
Plato's thought about virtue-Forms is the central focus of the present critical
reconstruction of Platonist thought. Besides being a description of a virtue,
the main characteristic of a Platonic Form is that it is perfect in its
goodness. The Platonic Form of courage is the virtue of courage at its very
best. The Platonic Form of love is love at its very best.
The reason for formulating perfect virtue-paradigms is not because the ideal
Platonist wants to actually become perfect. Forms are not goals to be achieved,
but ideals to "participate in" as Plato puts it.
Forms as perfect virtue-paradigms can be compared to what are
sometimes called "role models." If I am an aspiring classical-guitar player, I
do not want to listen to and imitate beginners like myself. I want to listen to
and try to imitate the very best classical-guitar players. This is not
necessarily because I expect to actually ever play this well. It is because in
imitating the very best, I can be more assured that the closer I come to
resembling this musician, the better will be the quality of my playing.
Imitating a mediocre player who plays with many imperfections might mean
imitating these imperfections.
Similarly, if I wanted to develop the virtue of courage in
myself, I would not want to choose a model to imitate whose courage has many
imperfections. I would want a model of courage to imitate which has as few
imperfections as possible -- which is as close to Perfect Courage as possible --
because then I can be assured that the closer I come to resembling this model
the higher will be the quality of the courage I am developing. A Platonic Form
is a measure to measure myself by, and for an idealistic Platonist "the
imperfect is not the measure of anything," as Plato puts it (ateles oudenos
metron).
The desire for perfect paradigms to model oneself on is one
of the main reasons for the focus on formulating abstract concepts of virtue
rather than trying to find an actual perfect person to imitate. Actual persons
tend to be changing mixtures of some things good and admirable, some things not
so admirable. I can be in complete charge of the virtue-concepts that I create,
and make them as perfect as possible.
Perfect virtue-Forms are the focus of Plato's
"otherworldliness." That is, Plato's reasoning about virtue brought him to the
conclusion that the whole of concrete reality -- including concrete people,
concrete institutions, rules for concrete behavior -- is a changing mixture of
good and not good. Nothing in this concrete world deserves our unreserved and
unchanging admiration and commitment. A Platonic virtue-Form is so deserving
because its main characteristic is that it is perfect in its goodness. This is
the basis for Plato's characterizing the Forms as "divine" (theios) -- i.e. for
the ideal Platonist, perfect virtue-Forms replace the imperfect gods and
goddesses of Greek popular religion. This constitutes Plato's
"otherworldliness."
The following excerpt from Plato's dialogue Theaetetus best describes this
otherworldliness. It concerns the perfect Platonic Form of "right-minded-ness"
(dikaiosyne).
In the divine there is no shadow of unrightness, only the
perfection of rightness. And nothing is more like the divine than any one of us
who becomes as right-minded as possible. 176c
Evils can never be done away with [in this world]... they [do
not] have any place in the divine world, but they must needs haunt this region
of our mortal nature. That is why we should make all speed to take flight from
this world to the other, and that means becoming like the divine so far as we
can, and that again is to become right-minded with the help of Wisdom. 176a
That is:
The concrete visible social world around us, including the
conventional moral norms of this society, is inevitably imperfect at best.
The contrasting moral perfection of the Forms, understood by
Platonist philosophical "wisdom," makes them worthy of being thought of as a
"divine" world, taking "divine" to represent what has ultimate moral authority,
what deserves our unconditional commitment. A good Platonist mentally shifts her
attention and her loyalties from this imperfect world to the perfect "divine"
world of the Forms. Note that "taking flight from this world to the other" is
not to be taken literally here as a kind of soul-travel. It means rather
"becoming like the divine so far as we can" in this world, "to become
right-minded (dikaios)" by developing right-mindedness as an internal "virtue,"
using as a guide a concept of rightness (dikaiosyne) that is as perfect as we
can make it.
How can I know that some given virtue-concept is perfect or not? How can I
detect and remedy imperfections in some given virtue-concept? This is the task
of Socratic reasoning, as reconstructed in the section to follow.
*******
Passages in several of Plato's dialogues exhibit a kind of reasoning that he
attributes to his teacher Socrates. The present critical reconstruction of
Platonist thought derives from these passages a model of reasoning that in turn
provides a rational basis for knowledge of Platonic virtue-Forms. "Socratic"
reasoning thus provides the second major element in this reconstructed
Platonism.
There are two essential elements in this reasoning method:
First, pose a definition of some particular virtue, and then
question this definition by means of a counterexample.
Secondly, remedy the problem revealed in this counterexample
by reformulating the definition so as to avoid this problem.
These two elements are illustrated in a passage in the
dialogue Laches, a conversation between Socrates and an Athenian General called
Laches.
Socrates asks the Athenian general Laches, "What is courage (andreia)?"
Laches says, "If someone is willing to face the enemy troops,
remaining at his post, and not run away, you may be sure he is courageous." (ei
tis etheloi en te taxei menon amenesthai tous polemious kai me pheugoi, eu isthi
hoti andreios eie. 191c).
Socrates then poses some "counterexamples," that is, stories
in which various kinds of "running away" are part of a military tactics. For
example, cavalry on horseback do not "stand at their post and face the enemy"
but dash back and forth. At the battle of Platea the Spartans first broke ranks
in the face of marching Persians (not "standing at their posts"), then when the
Persians too broke ranks to pursue them, turned and attacked them from all sides
and won a great victory. Socrates asks Laches if he thinks that failing to
"stand at one's post" in these cases demonstrated lack of courage. Laches says
they do not.
The stories that Socrates tells uncover an unsuspected contradiction in Laches'
thought, which Socrates interprets as an inadequacy in his definition. If
"standing at your post and not running away" is a general definition of the
essence of courage, this would mean that anyone who fails to do this must lack
courage. It would mean that any soldier who does stand at his post would be
exhibiting courage, even if he is a member of mounted cavalry, or if the
commander has ordered troops to break ranks and pretend to flee.
But Laches himself thinks there are many concrete cases in
which this is not true. Laches' own perceptions in concrete cases contradict his
own attempt at a general definition of courage. "Standing at your post" is very
imperfect as a description of a virtue-paradigm, because a person cannot develop
more and more perfect courage by adhering more and more closely to this
description. To paraphrase a statement Plato makes about a different virtue, to
act according to this rule "would sometimes mean acting courageously, sometimes
it would mean not acting courageously."
Laches' own perceptions in the concrete cases Socrates
describes conflict with the general definition he himself proposed. Socratic
reasoning assumes that, in any such conflict, a person should trust his
perceptions in the concrete cases (provided they are very clear concrete cases
of the kind Socrates poses here). An individual should regard contradictions of
this kind as a sign of some inadequacy in his general definition of the virtue.
This part of Socratic reasoning is what I mean by the phrase
"questioning by counterexample." Questioning by counterexample is the first
element in Socratic reasoning. A person engaged in Socratic reasoning must be
willing to go out of her way to think up counterexample-stories that question
her favorite concepts of what courage or some other virtue consists in. A
Platonic Form -- a virtue-paradigm perfect in its goodness -- can be defined as
a virtue-concept that will withstand the most severe questioning by
counterexample.
Questioning by counterexample is the negative, critical part
of Socratic reasoning. But making progress toward the creation of a Platonic
Form of courage requires a second, positive step. That is, every counterexample
reveals a particular weakness in a proposed definition, and every particular
weakness can be remedied by a particular reformulation of the definition.
Later in the dialogue, after reflecting on several more cases of courage, Laches
proposes such a reformulation of his thinking, saying that he now thinks courage
consists in a certain "tenacity of soul." In the dialogue, Socrates brings up
several more counterexamples to this new definition, showing that it is still
not completely adequate. But for present purposes, this should not obscure the
fact that "tenacity of soul" is a clear improvement over "standing at your post
and not running away."
One can also note the connection of this definition with the
remarks made earlier on the nature of arētē/virtue as an internal
character-trait. "Stand at your post and not running away" is a rule for
behavior that a person can try to observe on the spot, without any long-term
effort at developing courage as a character-trait. "Tenacity of soul" is more
obviously a character-trait itself. A person who initially lacked this trait
could over a long period of time develop his own character in this direction so
as to become a different person than he now is, a person who would spontaneously
act courageously when the situation calls for it without having to think about
rules for conduct such as "stand at your post and do not run," and who would
intuitively know when such a rule applies and does not apply.
Two things should be noted about "questioning by
counterexample" that distinguish Socratic reasoning from much moral reasoning
today.
First, "counterexamples" must not be in themselves
controversial cases, cases in which it seems uncertain what is right and not
right, admirable or not admirable, in the situation pictured. Counterexamples
should be uninteresting in themselves, not providing an occasion for moral
debate as to what is right and not right. Their purpose is not to provide
occasions for such debate, but solely to show some inadequacy in a definition
proposed. Note that neither Socrates nor Laches regard it as doubtful that
normal cavalry maneuvers (not "standing at their place") constitute a failure of
courage on the part of the horsemen involved. It is an open-and-shut case, as
all counterexamples employed in Socratic reasoning should be.
Secondly, note that Socratic reasoning is not an argument
between two people, in which one person is obliged to take into consideration
the other person's different opinions. It is strictly a critical exploration of
conflicts within a single individual's own beliefs and perceptions. Socrates is
the one who brings up the counterexample-stories in this case, but these
counterexamples would count for nothing if Laches disagreed with Socrates about
how to assess and evaluate the conduct of soldiers in these stories. This is in
accord with the image of Socrates as "midwife" presented in Plato's Theaetetus.
There, Socrates says he has no knowledge to put into people, he only helps
individuals to deliver their own intellectual babies. He first helps Laches
verbally articulate his own moral insights, and then helps Laches critically
examine the words he has used in articulating these insights -- critically
examining them in the light of further insights Laches himself has, not
criticizing them in the light of opposing views that belong to Socrates, not to
Laches.
These two features of Socratic reasoning make this reasoning
quite different from the kinds of reasoning people today (including professional
philosophers) are more used to. A person who wants to put on the Platonist hat
and understand this kind of reasoning must make a deliberate attempt to get rid
of the common assumptions:
(1) that moral dilemmas, cases in which there are good
arguments to be made on both sides, are an important focus of moral reasoning,
and
(2) that a person engaged in moral reasoning must take into
account the views of other people who might disagree with her, and show her
ability to defend her point of view against their objections.
********
This critical reconstruction of Platonism emphasizes its
"individualist" character, both in its reasoning methods and in its ultimate
aims. It is individualist in its reasoning methods in that it consists in
self-critical self-exploration by a single individual, finding words to
articulate her own moral insights beliefs, and critically examining her moral
thought by reflecting on contradictions within her own thought. It is
individualist in its aims in that its aim is to develop virtue-concepts that
this same individual might use for long-term character formation, answering to
her desire to make herself the best person she can be, according to her own
critically developed ideas as to what "me-at-my-best" might consist in.
One of the most important results of this individualist
principle is that this dissociates a critically reconstructed Platonism from all
attempts to establish a single set of Eternal Truths in the realm of ethics,
valid for all people everywhere for all time -- so-called "transcultural
Absolutes" because they transcend the particularity of each individual culture.
By contrast, adhering to the Socratic "midwife" principle,
this means allowing each individual in each culture or subculture find words and
concepts that articulate her own moral perceptions and insights, and critically
evaluate these in the light of other perceptions and insights of this same
person. It is vaguely possible, of course, that if every individual in the
world, past and present, did this, they would all arrive at exactly the same set
of definitions of the same set of virtues. But there many reasons to think that
this is extremely unlikely. There are just too many words in too many languages
describing concepts different cultures use to describe moral excellence. There
are too many possible stories a person could make up or choose to use as
counterexamples, each choice leading a virtue-discussion in a different
direction.
The true result of adhering to the individualist character of
Socratic and Platonist reasoning would not be a belief in universal and timeless
Absolutes, but Critical Pluralism.
- "Pluralism" allows for the possibility that there exists a
possibly indefinite plurality of virtue-concepts, and an indefinite number of
valid Platonic Forms corresponding to each.
- "Critical" means that not just any virtue-concept qualifies
as a Platonic Form, and there exists a rational method for distinguishing those
that do and those that do not. A Platonic Form is a virtue-concept that can
withstand all Socratic questioning-by-counterexample. Anyone who tries to
formulate such a virtue concept, seriously testing each proposal by trying to
think up counterexamples, will very quickly realize how difficult this is.
Practically all virtue-concepts in common usage will fail this test.
To illustrate the implications of this critical pluralism
more concretely: Suppose Carlos, a Platonist from Guatemala, takes ten
virtue-concepts from his culture, and is able to formulate a definition of each
that he knows is perfect because it can sustain itself in the face of Socratic
questioning. Natasha, a Platonist from Russia takes an entirely different set of
ten virtue-concepts from her culture, and is able to formulate a definition of
each that she knows is perfect because it can sustain itself in the face of
Socratic questioning.
If they talk to each other, Natasha recognizes that it is
"universally true" that Carlos' virtue-concepts are perfect in their goodness.
It's just that this is universally true of her ten virtues also, so that there
is no reason she needs to model herself on his ten virtues rather than hers ten
virtues.
In other words, the problem is not that there are no
universal truths, but that there are too many such universal truths to make any
one small set of such truths to be the single valid choice of everyone
everywhere who wants to be virtuous.
The essential point here in relation to transcultural Absolutes, is that
"perfect in its goodness" is completely different from "universally obligatory."
Carlos can know that his virtue-concepts are perfect in their goodness -- so
suitable for him to model himself on -- without having to assert that they
obligatory for Natasha to model herself on these same virtue-concepts. It is
possible that there are an indefinite number of perfect virtue-concepts, an
indefinite number of Platonic Forms. This idea of many universal truths about
virtues preserves what is essential to the function that Forms play in the lives
of individual Platonists, while dropping the problematic assertion that Platonic
Forms constitute Absolute Universal truths -- that there can only be one small
set of true virtues, and only one correct definition of each. It allows for the
fact that there might be an indefinite number of virtues, and several good
Platonist ways of defining each.
*********
The immediately preceding section of this essay argues that critical
pluralism is the logical result of connecting Socratic reasoning to Plato's Form
theory -- that is, defining a Platonic Form as a virtue-paradigm that can
withstand Socratic reasoning. This is a good example illustrating the project of
"critical reconstruction" which will be central to the treatment of early
Buddhism and early Christianity in essays to follow.
Critical reconstruction can be contrasted with a more common
approach to Plato-interpretation. The more common approach focuses on the
question "What did Plato believe about the Forms?" The most common opinion today
among scholars is that Plato believed the Forms to be eternal, timeless and
universal truths -- transcultural Absolutes -- valid for all people everywhere
in all cultures for all time. According to this view, Plato wanted to assert
that anyone from any culture anywhere who gets her head into the "divine" realm
where the Forms reside would see exactly the same set of Forms.
Taken seriously, this lends itself to standardization,
denying the validity of unique individuality, diversity in cultures, and
historical change. In its most extreme form it would mean that there is only one
truly admirable character-type, characterized by one set of virtues arranged in
a certain order of priority. Everyone everywhere who wants to be an admirable
("virtuous") person must strive to mold herself on this one character-type,
which also can and should be used as the one and only measuring stick for
measuring every individual everywhere. This would conflict with the pluralism
described above, saying I effect that there could not be two genuine Platonists,
Carlos and Natasha, modeling their characters on entirely different sets of
Platonic Forms.
What did Plato himself believe on this subject? I think the best answer is that
he did not directly address this question at all. I argue in a separate essay
that the passages in Plato's Republic commonly appealed to as assertions of
Plato's belief in the Forms as transcultural Absolutes should be interpreted
quite differently if we pay close attention to Plato's wording and the total
context of these passages. On the other hand, I recognize that it is also not
reasonable to hold that Plato himself explicitly espoused the critical pluralism
described above.
But critical reconstruction does not focus on the question
"What did Plato believe about the Forms?" It tries instead to understand
whatever good reasons Plato may have had for his Form theory, and construct a
version of the Form theory that can be rationally supported by these good
reasons. Roll back the claims made about the Forms to whatever we can recognize
as capable of being rationally supported by reasoning methods also found in
Plato. Specifically,
- Can we construct a version of Plato's Form theory that can
be rationally supported by Socratic reasoning
- Can we construct a version of Socratic reasoning capable of
supporting some version of Plato's Form theory.
A critical-pluralist Form-theory is one of the main results
of this strategy. If a Platonic Form is any virtue-concept that can withstand
Socratic questioning-by-counterexample, the logical result is the view that
-- Not just any virtue-concept qualifies as a Platonic Form,
but
-- There is no way of limiting ahead of time the number of
virtue-concepts that might qualify.
By analogy, consider the equation X + Y = 100. Not just any
values of X and Y will be correct (5 + 2 is clearly incorrect). But if fractions
are allowed there is no way of limiting ahead of time the number of values that
will be correct (5 + 95, 95 ½ + 4 ½, etc.)
Consider Plato's writings as a large and sprawling building.
On careful investigation today, some parts of this building can be seen to have
a solid foundation, and some do not. Some parts of Plato's Form theory scholars
have derived from Plato's writings have a solid rational foundation and some do
not. The more usual approach takes a maximalist and all-or-nothing approach to
this question: Interpret the Form theory so that it makes the strongest possible
claims (e.g. that Forms are transcultural Absolutes), and if this claim cannot
be supported, then the entire edifice of Platonism collapses. This in fact
describes the modern fate of Platonism -- because no one today thinks that
Plato's writings provide rational support Plato's alleged belief in
transcultural Absolutes.
Critical reconstruction takes a different approach. Examine
carefully which aspects of Plato's Form theory can be shown to have a solid
rational foundation, and which do not. The aspects of this theory that have no
solid foundation we should let fall, but not bring the whole building down with
them. Specifically, we should drop the claim that the Forms are actually
existing entities representing transcultural Absolutes. We should retain the
personal challenge they represent for individuals -- the possibility of
formulating "otherworldly" virtue-ideals for themselves that they themselves can
rationally know to be perfect in their goodness.