This essay explains more fully the passage in the Republic Book 5, where Plato presents his key concepts related to the Forms.
A full understanding of this passage requires some initial common on a connected passage that occurs in Book 7. This latter passage from Book 7 centers on what are at first sight some trivial observations about long and short fingers. But this passage is important in the present context because, when brought together with other passages in Book 5, it suggests a way in which Platonic Forms resolve problems connected to contradictions brought to light in Socratic inquiry.
In the passage in Book 7, Plato asks us to consider a person looking at three fingers on a hand, the little finger, the ring finger, and the middle finger. Is the ring finger short or long? Answer: It is short in relation to the middle finger, but long in relation to the little finger.
Plato analyzes this observation about the short-and-long finger in a very odd way. He imagines the sense of sight reporting to the mind contradictory things about the same single finger. It reports the single finger to be both long and short, confusing the mind. The sense of sight itself is unable to resolve this contradiction, but there is another mental capacity noēsis, mental understanding, which is able to resolve the contradiction. Noesis can do this because it has the ability to understand concepts which are not tied to any concrete material objects.
As Plato pictures it the mind is confused because the sense of sight sees "finger," "long," and "short" all mixed together as though they were one thing. Only noēsis, as purely mental understanding, is able to resolve this contradiction, because, unlike sight, it is able to mentally separate the two contradictory concepts "long" and "short" from each other and from the concrete finger.
In Plato's words
[In the case of the ring finger] the sense of sight sees "long" and "short," but not as separate, but as mixed together [in one finger]. So in order to clarify this, mental understanding [noēsis] is compelled to see "long" and "short" not as mixed together but as separate, the opposite way from sight.
And it is from some such circumstances that it first occurs to us to ask, "What is ‘the long', and again of ‘the short'?'' And so we call these [latter] things "mentally understood" (noeton) and the other things "visibly seen" (horaton.)
Some among our sensory perceptions [aisthesis] do not call upon noēsis to examine them... Others certainly summon the help of no sis to examine them because aisthesis/sense-perception produces nothing sound. They do not call for help...if they do not at the same time signal contradictory perceptions [enantian aisthesis]; I describe those that do as calling for help whenever the sense perception does not point to one thing rather than its opposite.
In these cases we need to call upon... noēsis, to examine whether each of the things announced to it is one or two...
These comments about long and short fingers are very odd and implausible in themselves. (Who is ever actually puzzled by this supposed problem?) They are important because of the way they connect to the contradictions uncovered in Socratic inquiry, and what they suggest about Platonic Forms as a way of resolving these contradictions.
In fact, as detailed at length in a previous essay, the human habit of representing goodness by means of concrete visible images does generate contradictions which are a frequent source of moral confusion. For example, if I try to represent "rightness" by means of the visible image of one person returning property to its owner, then Plato's story of the weapons-owner gone insane will be a source of some confusion. Here it is plausible to say that I will see the same action "giving to each what is his" as being both right (on some occasions) and not-right (on other occasions).
In a different passage in Book 5, Plato himself connects the observations about the long/short contradiction in the case of fingers, and the right/not-right contradiction in other cases.
He says in one passage (479b)
What about the many things that are "double"? Are they any less "half" than "double"? So with things "long" and "short", - - can these things be said of them [any more than] the opposite?...
No... Each of these things partakes of both opposites.
In the immediately preceding passage (479a) he uses the same ideas to describe contradictions that arise in relation to virtue-concepts:
Is there any one of the many "beautiful" things that will not appear "shameful"? or any one of the many "right" things that will not [appear] "not-right"? Or any one of the many "holy" [things that will] not [appear] "unholy"?...
Here also Plato uses the same imagery of contradictory forms somehow getting "mixed together" in single concrete things or images:
Since "the beautiful" is the opposite of "the shameful," they are two... Since they are two, each is one. And in respect to "the right" and "the not-right," "the good" and "the bad," and all the Forms... each is one, but because of mingling with bodies and actions and each other, each appears everywhere under many appearances.
The Form of Beauty, mentally understood (by noesis) as something separate from concrete bodies and concrete actions, is something single containing no contradictions within itself. But when we perceive beautiful bodies and beautiful actions, we are not perceiving this single Form as single, but as mingled with other Forms, sometimes with opposite Forms. This mixing with other Forms is what makes the single Form "Beauty" make itself visibly manifest to us in so many different and diverse ways.
Taken together, these passages from Book 7 and Book 5 are important in the present context because they suggest the kind of connection between Socratic inquiry and Platonic Forms detailed in previous essays, which is central to the present critical interpretation of Plato. I would make these connections more clear and explicit in the following ways:
First, these passage invite us to see Platonic Forms as embedded in our perceptions of concrete visible behavior. In the dialogue Laches, the Athenian General Laches was stirred to admiration by the sight of a soldier bravely standing at his post and not running away. Visual perceptions or images of this kind are the ultimate basis for our knowledge of courage and the other virtues. This is the crucial positive function that sense-perceptions have as bases for our knowledge of Platonic Forms.
Secondly, perceptions of visible behavior are also, however, sources of confusion, an obstacle to our knowledge of the true virtue, if we take visualizable images as precise representations of true virtue, only and always good. This negative aspect of sense-perceptions is what is brought out by contradictions uncovered in Socratic inquiry. Under Socratic questioning, Laches becomes confused when he sees that the same action, "standing at one's post and not running away" can actually represent contradictory things, admirable courage and non-admirable stupidity (when the strategy was to fake retreat to prepare for ambush). Arguments in the previous essay gave many reasons why we can expect this to be always the case so long as our concepts of goodness are closely connected to images of visible human behavior or visible results of human behavior.
Thirdly, such contradictions can be resolved if a person is able to mentally separate the concept courage from all connection to any image of visible behavior or visible results of behavior. This is why separation from anything visible to the senses is a key characteristic of Platonic Forms, as virtue-concepts representing what is always and only good and admirable.
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The discussion so far has focused on the character of Platonic Forms as "separated" concepts, concepts separated from connection to any concrete visualizable images. Later philosophers called these "abstract" or "general" concepts, comparable for example to general concepts like "yellow" that refer to many different yellow objects, or to abstract mathematical concepts like "two" that refer to many different pairs of objects. (Remarkably, Plato uses no Greek words comparable to terms now in use, such as the words "concrete," "abstract," "general," or "concept." He generally speaks more concretely of "the beautiful" [to kalon], or "beautifuls" [ta kala, beautiful things or beautiful behaviors]. He seems to stand at a transition point between very concrete thinking and abstract thought that become commonplace among later philosophers.)
The above discussion prepares for a reading of a key passage in the Republic Book 5. Statements in this passage are very often quoted in discussions of Plato's "theory of Forms," but this passage is also important in the present context because it shows Plato connecting his theory of Forms to the practice of Socratic inquiry.
474B announces the aim of this long discourse (474B-480A), which is to give Plato's definition of what he means by the term "philosopher."
The passage quoted here begins (475D) by contrasting true philosophers with some people who go around to towns and villages to all the Dionysiac festivals, which were in Greece at the time occasions for theatrical performances and partying (Dionysos was the Greek god of wine and dance). Plato calls these "lovers of sights" (philo-theamones) and "lovers of sounds," whom he contrasts with true philo-sophoi, "lovers of wisdom" who "love the sight of the truth."
In what follows, it is important to remember these lovers of theater and partying as concrete examples of what Plato refers to several times as "sight-lovers," or "lovers of sights and sounds and colors." If we think of these theater-goers as people who Plato claims have doxa rather than true Knowledge [episteme] about beauty, this makes implausible the common translation of doxa as "opinion." It is important to remember this overall context in the main discussion, which I give here with some comments:
| Plato’s text Since "the beautiful" is the opposite of "the shameful," they are two... Since they are two, each is one. And in respect to "the right" and "the not-right," "the good" and "the bad," and all the Forms... each is one, but because of mingling with bodies and actions and each other, each appears everywhere under many appearances. I make a distinction like this: I set apart... the sight-lovers and lovers of skill and action, and separate them from those whom our talk concerns, who alone are rightly called lovers of wisdom [philo-sophous]. The lovers of sound and sights delight in beautiful tones and colors and shapes, and everything that artful skill creates out of these, but their thought is unable to see and take delight in the nature of the Beautiful Itself. [Those are] few who are able to approach Beauty Itself, and see it by itself. [So we have one kind of person] who attends to beautiful actions, but does not attend to the Beautiful Itself, nor is able to follow when someone tries to guide him to the knowledge of it. [And then there is the person who is] the opposite of these: someone who recognizes the Beautiful Itself, and is able to see both it and what participates in it, and does not mistake what participates in it for it itself, nor mistake it itself for what participates in it. |
My comments This entire passage should be understood as the retrospective view of Plato’s ideal philosopher who has already been troubled by the kinds of contradictions uncovered through Socratic discussion, and has already realized how these problems can be resolved by mentally separating Platonic virtue-Forms from concrete examples of virtue. The theater-going "sight-lovers" will see a great many diverse beautiful scenes. Plato’s philosopher, whose mind is fixed on the pure Forms, will see each scene as made up of a mixture of relatively unchanging pure Forms - - apparent diversity is due to diverse mixings of the same forms. (Note that here Plato seems to envisage Forms of badness as well as of goodness.) This paragraph illustrates one of Plato’s main terms to describe the relation between the Forms and concrete actions: Concrete actions "participate in" the Forms.
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| 479a [Suppose there is] a person who does not think there is the Beautiful Itself, or any Idea of Beauty Itself always remaining the same, but who attends to many beautiful things - - the sight-lover, I mean, who cannot endure to hear anybody say that the beautiful is one and the just one, and so of other things. Is there any one of these many beautiful things that will not appear shameful? And of the right things, that will not seem not- right? And of the holy things, that will not seem unholy? And again, do the many double things appear any the less halves than doubles? And likewise of the long and the short things, the light and the heavy things - - can these things be said of them [any more than] the opposite?... |
The description of an Idea of
Beauty "always remaining the same" provides one of the main bases for the
metaphysical interpretation of Plato. Taken literally in a modern context,
this is easily understood to mean that there is one and only one true
definition of Beauty transcending all cultural diversity and all historical
change. But Plato makes no mention here of problems having to do with cultural diversity and historical change. First he mentions "sight-lovers," which evokes the very different context of those who enjoy beautiful theatrical scenes. Then he refers to contradictions that occur when one tries to define "rightness" and other virtues in concrete terms, which evokes the context of Socratic inquiry aimed at uncovering these contradictions. Socratic inquiry shows that, when concretely defined, the same action ("giving to each what is his") will sometimes be right and sometimes not right. Only the Form "Rightness," separated from everything concrete, will remain "always the same" in its ability to represent something truly good and admirable. Such Forms will also provide a unified focus for moral commitment, bringing unity to the individual philosopher’s moral life amid the diversity encountered in life’s circumstances. |
| So in regard to each of these
many things: "Is" it more than it "is- not" whatever one might say it is?
It is like those who pun on double meanings at banquets, or the children's riddle about the eunuch and his hitting the bat - - what they say he hit it with and as it sat on what. These things too are double-meaninged, and it is impossible to conceive firmly any one of them to "be" or "not-be," or both, or neither.
[There is not] a better place to put them than that midway between being [ousia] and not being [me einai]. For we shall surely not discover a darker region than not-being [me on], that something should "not be" still more, nor a brighter region than being [on], that something should "be" still more. We would seem to have found, then, that the many conventions of the many people about the beautiful and other things are tumbled about in the mid-region between what "is-not" and what exactly "is." Anything of this kind... must be called "what one has impressions about" [doxaston] not what is Known [gnoston], the wanderer between being caught by this in-between [mental] capacity [i.e. doxa].
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"Is it more than it
is not whatever one might say it is." This clearly assumes the
predicative sense of "is." The question is not "Does it exist
always?" but "Is it always the kind of thing we say it is?" This predicative sense is reinforced by the comparison to puns, and to an apparently familiar children’s riddle, which Storey (p. 530-31) gives as follows: A man not a man Seeing and not seeing A bird not a bird Sitting on a limb not a limb Hit at it and did not hit it With a stone not a stone. The riddle’s answer: A half-blind eunuch saw (a man not a man, seeing did not see) a bat (a bird not a bird) perching on a reed (a branch not a branch) threw at it a pumice stone and missed (hit and did not hit it with a stone not a stone). In the context of the above statements, we have a clear and plausible sense for "midway between being and not-being." A bat is not something that is halfway between existing and not existing, but something that can be thought of as somewhere between being a bird and not-being a bird. In the same way trying to define rightness as "giving to each what is his," yields a definition that can be said to be between being right and not-being right. The idea of something being "between existing and not-existing" not only makes no sense in itself, but goes against indications in the context here. |
| Those who see many beautiful
things, but do not see The Beautiful... and see many right things but not
The Right, and everything like this - - we should say they "have
impressions" [doxazein] about everything, but do not Know what they have
impressions about. What about those who see each of those things, the things that always are the same? [We should] say they "Know," not that they "have impressions" [doxazein"].
[We should] say that those who take delight in and love those things about which there is Knowledge, the others [take delight in and love those things] about which there are "impressions" [doxa]... These love and give their attention to beautiful sounds and colors and similar things, but cannot bear the Beautiful as something that "is". [We should] call them "lovers of impressions" [philo-doxous] rather than "lovers of wisdom" [philo-sophous]... Those who delight in the "being" of each thing [hekaston to on] should be called "lovers of wisdom" [philo-sophous] not "lovers of impressions" [philo-doxous]. |
Most other
commentators translate doxa as "opinion," accentuating the idea of
subjectivity and uncertainty. I think this is a mistake. First, the discussions above suggest that Plato thinks of "giving to each what is his" is something visible to the senses (aisthesis), which is the source of contradictions, and these contradictions can only be resolved by formulating a concept of Rightness separated from anything visualizable. This is why I think the noun doxa, and the corresponding verb doxazein are best understood to refer to perceptions of the external manifestations of Rightness visible to the senses. This understanding relies on the connection between doxa and dokein, "to seem" which Plato draws attention to in several other Republic passages. Secondly, Plato brings up here again the example of the theater-going party people who "love beautiful sights and sounds and colors" - - in other words, who love what sensory impressions (aisthesis) tell them about beauty. Clearly Plato’s main point about these "sight-lovers" is not that they have only uncertain subjective personal "opinions" about what they see, but that they allow their minds to be carried away by the powerful impression that beautiful sights and sounds make on their senses. This prevents them from knowing the pure "being" of beauty, that which alone is "always the same," i.e. is always and only beautiful. At the end of this passage Plato makes use of all that he has said to give his derivation of the word "philo-sopher." Philein in Greek is "to love" while sophos means "wise." For Plato, only those who love and take delight in the pure being of Goodness are "wise." Others who do not really love the being of Goodness but only its external "seemings," are not philo-sophos but philo-doxai.
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