A common objection to Plato was stated by one student by saying,
"The whole
idea of a 'pure' idea is that it is the same for everyone. Not everyone's ideas
can be the same, though, because of different backgrounds."
The idea that critical reasoning must be aimed at discovering
universal truths, "the same for everyone,"
-is very common,
-is commonly associated with Plato, and
-is a common reason for rejecting Platonism today.
Isaiah Berlin, an early advocate of cultural pluralism, also assumes that accepting cultural diversity is incompatible with the version of the "Platonic ideal" he learned from his professors at Oxford University in the early 1900's. He says of these professors ".... all these views had in common.. a Platonic ideal: in the first place, that, as in the sciences, all genuine questions must have one true answer and one only, all the rest being necessarily errors." [Isaiah Berlin "The Idea of Pluralism" in The Truth about the Truth: De-confusing and Re-constructing the Postmodern World ed. Walter Truett Anderson. New York: Putnam Penguin. 1995, p. 48.]
The present critical reconstruction saves Platonism from this
modern fate by proposing instead a "critical-pluralist Platonism."
-"Critical" means that not every virtue-concept qualifies as
a Platonic Form. To qualify as a Platonic Form, a virtue-concept must be able to
withstand Socratic questioning. Anyone who tries this knows that it is quite
difficult to formulate a virtue-concept that will withstand Socratic
questioning. Most familiar concepts in common use cannot.
-"Pluralist" means that there might be an indefinite number
of virtue-concepts that can withstand Socratic questioning, and so qualify as
Platonic Forms. It is possible that there is an indefinite plurality of valid
virtue-forms. Platonists from different cultural backgrounds, speaking different
languages, will indeed most likely arrive at completely different conclusions as
the result of Socratic reasoning. (Plato himself never actually gives a
definition of any particular Form.)
There are potentially thousands of virtue-Forms more perfect in their
goodness than the imperfect virtue-concepts people usually use for
self-evaluation and to model their characters on. So there is no need for
everyone to agree on their choice of which perfect virtue-concepts to
adopt for these purposes.
*****
Critical-pluralism stands midway between a belief in
transcultural Absolutes, on the one hand, and skeptical/nihilist relativism on
the other hand.
Believing in Absolute moral truths means believing that there
is a relatively small number of moral norms that are the only ones by which
human life should be evaluated always and everywhere. Associating Platonism with
Absolute truths would mean committing oneself to belief in a single Platonist
Heaven inhabited by a single set of Platonic Forms, stretching eternally over
all cultures for all time. Anyone anywhere getting her head into this Heaven
would see exactly the same set of Platonic Forms. This belief is connected
to an understanding of "transcendence" that takes it to mean "transcending
cultural particularity." Absolutes are transcultural Absolutes.
Neither Plato nor anyone else has come up with rational
evidence supporting belief in such transcultural Absolutes. The main argument
for belief in Absolutes today is that skeptical relativism is the only
alternative, and that relativism is obviously a bad belief. In its skeptical and
nihilist forms, "relativism" is the view that all moral norms are ultimately due
either to cultural conditioning or to arbitrary personal choice, so there is no
rational way of distinguishing well-founded norms from norms that have no
foundation. There are no moral beliefs that are better than any other
moral beliefs.
Relativism is the view that there are no right answers and no wrong answers to the question, "What does it mean to be a morally admirable person?" Critical pluralism is the view that there is no single right answer to this question. There might be many right answers, but a probably even greater number of wrong answers (answers that S/P reasoning can show to be wrong). Because most people tend to answer this by describing what an admirable person does, and because Socratic questioning shows that no description of externally visible conduct is a precise description of something only and always admirable, most answers people give are to a large extent "wrong answers," and it is quite difficult to come up with an answer that is completely and precisely right.
******
Plato himself does not describe his position as "critical pluralism." This is a feature of the present critical reconstruction of Plato's thought, committed to fashioning an interpretation of Plato's Form theory that can be supported by Socratic reasoning.
Let me repeat here a discussion of a short passage from Richard Robinson's essay on Socratic
reasoning, which states clearly why it is that Socratic reasoning cannot yield
knowledge of universal moral Absolutes. At the same time, Robinson's comments
reflect the common view that this is a grave defect, because (he mistakenly
thinks) the only alternative to belief in Absolutes is
"arbitrary" relativism.
Calling Socratic inquiry by its Greek name elenchos
(Latinized as elenchus) Robinson says the following:
The Socratic elenchus is a very personal affair... If
the ulterior end of the elenchus is to be attained, it is essential that
the answerer himself be convinced, and quite indifferent whether anyone else
is...
Whereas in law-courts you have to convince a third party, namely the judges, in
the Socratic elenchus you have to convince your opponent himself. Hence the
witnesses who are so effective at trials are useless here. The only true witness
and authority is the answerer himself; and if he does not admit the fact, it is
irrelevant how many others do. The result depends not on a majority of votes,
but on the single vote of the answerer...
The whole essence of the elenchus lies in making visible to the answerer
the link between certain of his actual beliefs and the contradictory of his
present thesis. ("Elenchus" by Richard Robinson, in The Philosophy of Socrates,
ed. G. Vlastos. NY: Doubleday. 1971, p. 88)
Robinson's next argues that this "individualist" principle of Socratic reasoning renders it useless and ineffective in what must be taken as the prime goal of all moral reasoning, establishing universal Absolute Truths, doing for moral philosophy what Newton did for physics -- in Robinson's words, contributing to "the universal march of science."
By addressing itself always to this person here and now, elenchus takes on particularity and accidentalness, which are defects. In this respect it is inferior to the impersonal and universal rational march of a science axiomatized according to Aristotle's prescription. Plato might urge, however, that elenchus is the means by which the irrational and accidental individual is brought to the appreciation of universal science, brought out of his individual arbitrariness into the common world of reason. [ibid. p. 89]
Robinson I think is quite correct about the limited capabilities of any mode of moral reasoning based only on the moral perceptions of a single individual. It cannot contribute to the universal march of science. But when he declares Socratic reasoning to be "defective" when measured by this standard, he is assuming that this must be the prime goal of all moral reasoning. His reason for this assumption is not hard to guess: He thinks that the only alternative to a belief in universal Absolutes constituting a universal moral science" is skeptical relativism, leaving each individual with what he describes as her own "irrational" and "arbitrary" beliefs.
The pluralist Platonism developed here acknowledges and fully accepts the limited goals reasoning must set itself if it relies only on the moral perceptions of a single individual. Such a method is completely inadequate for proving that some single set of virtue-definitions constitute the only valid definitions valid for all people for all time. The natural result is more likely to be an indefinite plurality of answers to virtue-questions, all arrived at by individuals engaged in such self-critical self-exploration.
But critical-pluralist Platonism disputes Robinson's assumption that relativism -- irrational and arbitrary moral beliefs -- is the only alternative to a belief in a single set of Absolute Eternal truths about moral ideals. Saying this ignores the fact that, with a little work and sincere self-questioning, it is fairly easy for an individual to discover contradictions within her own moral beliefs and perceptions, but quite difficult to resolve those contradictions. It is not a matter of merely "arbitrarily" deciding to pin the label "perfectly Good" on some particular concept one happens to like, or that other people in one's own culture declare to be perfectly Good.
Robinson seems to imagine that Plato himself managed to extend Socratic elenchus in such a way as to bring the "irrational and accidental individual... out of his individual arbitrariness into the common world of reason." But he does not specify, and it is difficult to find a reasoning method in Plato capable of doing this. Plato does say in one place (Phaedo 73-76) that the most perfect way of grasping the Forms would be by "reason alone, without the senses." But this comment is part of a description of the state of an immortal soul separated from the body after death -- hardly a basis for a reasoning method a person could employ in this life for formulating virtue-concepts to model her character on!
Ignoring this context, some philosophers have nevertheless taken comments like this in Plato to refer to what they call a priori truths, truths known by "pure reason" prior to and independent of investigation of concrete facts. Assertions known to be true a priori must be completely self-evident, so no one who knows the meaning of the assertion could doubt its truth. Mathematical truths like 2 + 2 = 4 generally serve as prime examples of a priori truths. No one who knows what "2" "4" "+" and "=" mean could doubt the assertion that 2+2=4. (I don't have go go around counting objects to know that 2+2 will always equal 4.) Could Plato have possibly claimed that some particular definition of courage could be known to be the only true definition because it is self-evident? On the face of it, this seems completely implausible -- how could some definition of perfect Courage be known to be true in the same way that mathematical truths are known to be true? And we never find an argument in Plato about virtue-Forms even remotely resembling an argument about self-evident truths.
Kant showed himself very aware (as perhaps Robinson is not) that Plato has no such argument that could support any claims about Platonic Forms as self-evident truths. But Kant still willfully insists that Plato must have been claiming that the Forms are concepts known by "pure understanding" (i.e. self-evident independent of concrete experience and perceptions). His conclusion: Plato (the founding pioneer of rational Western philosophy) had no rational arguments whatsoever to support the centerpiece of his philosophy. Plato was like a dove foolishly trying to fly higher by flying where there is no air to impede his flight, unaware that there would also be no air to support his flight.
The light dove, piercing in her easy fight the air and
perceiving its resistance, imagines that flight would be easier still in empty
space. It was thus that Plato left the world of sense, as opposing so many
hindrances to our understanding, and ventured beyond on the wings of his ideas
into the empty space of pure understanding. He did not perceive that he was
making no progress by these endeavors, because he had no resistance as a fulcrum
on which to rest or to apply his powers, in order to cause the understanding to
advance.
It is indeed a very common fate of human reason first of all to finish its
speculative edifice as soon as possible, and then only to enquire whether the
foundation be sure. Then all sorts of excuses are made in order to assure us as
to its solidity, or to decline altogether such a late and dangerous inquiry. (I.
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason. tr. Max Mueller. New York: Doubleday. 1966, p.
6.)
As argued in another essay commenting on Platonic texts, Plato's writings do provide a basis for a different kind of reasoning method, not based on self-evident truths, but on concrete human experience. For example, the ultimate basis for knowledge of the perfect Form of Courage consists in perceptions of admirably courageous visible behavior, like a soldier bravely standing at his post. Knowledge of the abstract Form of Courage is derived from such concrete perceptions by a process of abstraction and refinement.
Since concrete experiences are so varied, and since the experiences of individuals are so shaped by very diverse cultural conditioning and cultural environments, pluralist Platonism is the natural result of such an experience-based ("empirical") method of moral reasoning. Critical-pluralist Platonism is based on the fact that culturally conditioned individuals do not have complete and arbitrary control over their moral perceptions. Being the culturally conditioned person that I am, I either perceive returning weapons to an insane person to be admirable, or to be not-admirable. If I want to, I can tell the difference between arbitrarily labeling it "admirable," and actually perceiving it to be admirable. This is why it is possible for a person's actual perceptions to be in conflict with their own moral beliefs. As Robinson points out quite correctly, uncovering such conflicts is the heart of Socratic rational criticism of moral beliefs, which functions to undermine an individual's confidence in her moral beliefs, and stimulate her to formulate more refined moral ideals that would be in accord with all of her actual moral perceptions in concrete cases.
There are potentially thousands of virtue-Forms more perfect in their
goodness than the imperfect virtue-concepts people usually use for
self-evaluation and to model their characters on. So there is no need for
everyone to agree on their choice of which perfect virtue-concepts to
adopt for these purposes.
*****
Today with our appreciation and acceptance of cultural
diversity, we have more reason than ever to think that different individuals
practicing Socratic reasoning will arrive at different conclusions. But to avoid
relativism, it is important to understand the sources of this likely diversity
of outcomes, what this is due to, and what it is not due to.
First, this diversity should not be due to the fact
that different societies teach their members different moral principles and
different rules for behavior. Good Socratic inquiry asks individuals to actively
seek out cases in which their own perceptions of what is admirable and
not-admirable conflicts with any general concepts, principles, or rules their society
teaches them about how to behave, and use these perceptions as a basis for criticizing the
principles and rules of their own society.
One general result of Socratic reasoning is to show that no rule for concrete visible behavior can be a precise description of something only and always admirable. Only abstract concepts describing internal invisible admirable mental habits can ever be pure and precise descriptions of something only and always admirable. The fact that different cultures have different rules for what kind of "killing" is permissible, probably just means that all these rules are more or less mistaken if one takes them as precise and invariable criteria for differentiating admirable individuals from non-admirable individuals.
(Of course every individual's perceptions will be to some degree shaped by socialization and cultural conditioning; this is necessary to become fully human. But there still remain conflicts and contradictions, as is demonstrated by the common occurrence of people raised in a given culture becoming severe critics of this culture [Nietzsche did not have to completely rid himself of German cultural conditioning to become a severe critic of the German culture of his time]. A culture gives individuals words and concepts that provide the raw material to work on, raw material that still needs much refinement through Socratic inquiry.)
Secondly, this diversity should not be due to the fact
that individuals subjectively and arbitrarily choose to believe whatever they want to believe, or
make whatever judgments they want to make about individual cases. Good Socratic
inquiry requires rigorous self-criticism, asking each individual to actively
seek out cases in which her own actual perceptions of what is admirable and not
admirable conflicts with her own beliefs, or judgments she would like to make. Upon reflection, we can see that individuals do not really
freely and arbitrarily decide what will appear admirable to them and what will
not. Finding something “admirable” is like finding something “funny.” If someone
tells a joke, I either find it funny or I don’t. If everyone else laughs at the
joke, I might want to perceive its funniness, but I can’t find it funny just
because I want to. The fact that a person cannot really willfully control her
perceptions of what is admirable and not admirable is the reason why such
perceptions serve as a basis for self-criticism, a basis for critical
examination of beliefs and convictions.
Thirdly, this diversity will probably also not be due to
different perceptions different individuals have when faced with the same
concrete story. Good Socratic inquiry asks individuals to use only stories that
are simple, uncomplicated, and relatively non-controversial. If Carlos from
Guatemala makes up a relatively non-controversial story, one in which it is
fairly obvious what is admirable and not admirable, most likely the perceptions
of Natasha from Russia will not strongly conflict with Carlos'. (E.g. both
Carlos and Natasha will probably agree that it is not right to return weapons to
an insane person.)
But there are two other factors which will allow and even
promote a potentially infinite amount of diversity:
#1. The vast amount of possible virtue-concepts, represented
for example by the immense diversity of virtue-words available in different
languages, and
#2. The potentially infinite variety of stories individuals
might make up as material for reflection.
Socratic inquiry needs to take some one particular
virtue-concept as a starting point and focus for discussion, but it provides no
rational means of deciding which virtue-concepts one should start with or
focus on. It needs to be based on personal perceptions in the case of relatively
clear and unproblematic stories, but it provides no rational method for what
kind of stories to make up.
If we define a Platonic Form procedurally, as whatever can
sustain itself in the face of Socratic Inquiry, these two sources of diversity
imply that there is a potentially infinite number of Platonic Forms, because
there is no rational way of knowing ahead of time that one has discovered all
the concepts that can meet this test, that there are no more that can meet this
test.
At the same time, this does not imply that just anything qualifies as a Platonic
Form, or reduce the great difficulty involved in formulating a virtue-concept
that can actually withstand Socratic criticism.
Suppose Carlos a Platonist in Guatemala works long and hard
at constructing a good chain of Socratic reasoning, focused on some Spanish
virtue-word. This eventually leads to the discovery of some particular Platonic
Form that can withstand further Socratic criticism. He develops for Natasha the
Russian Platonist, a written work leading her through all the steps leading up
to this Platonic Form he has discovered. Suppose Natasha follows his reasoning
carefully, and after trying very hard finds that she herself cannot think of any
counterexamples showing weaknesses in the concept he comes up with. So she
agrees that what Carlos has come up with is indeed very close to being a
Platonic Form. This need have no effect at all on how she leads her life,
because it may be that she has already arrived at some entirely different set of
universally valid Platonic Forms of her own which she prefers to live by.
In other words, the problem for those who believe in
transcultural Absolutes is not that there are no universal truths about true
virtue, but that there are too many of them. If some virtue-concept is able to
withstand Socratic questioning by means of counterexamples, it is Absolutely and
universally true that this concept represents something always and only
admirable. This is true for all people everywhere. It's just that it cannot be
rationally shown to be necessary for all individuals everywhere to include this
virtue-concept as one of the ideals or norms they use for self-evaluation,
because there are so many other universally-true concepts of true virtue to
choose from.
By comparison: How many valid sources of energy are there? It
has always been universally true that animal muscle, wind-power, water-power,
steam engines, internal combustion engines, and nuclear energy are valid sources
of energy, plus possible other sources we have not yet discovered or been able
to utilize. This has nothing to do with the question about which of these
energy sources a given person or society must use.
There are potentially thousands of virtue-Forms more perfect in their goodness than the imperfect virtue-concepts people usually use for self-evaluation and to model their characters on. So there is no need for everyone to agree on their choice of which perfect virtue-concepts to adopt for these purposes.
*****
How many virtues are there?
Here is a possible list of
different clusters of virtues, using words and phrases commonly used today to
describe people we admire:
responsible, loyal, diligent, disciplined, orderly
altruistic, caring, thoughtful, polite, courteous, gracious,
kind, compassionate, empathic, sympathetic,
understanding, tolerant, non-judgmental, affable, friendly,
gentle
creative, spontaneous, in touch with feelings, natural,
genuine, open, sincere,
unique, being oneself, authenticity, proud, self-confident,
independent, self-assertive, self-aware, unpretentious, down-to-earth
respectful, obedient, law-abiding, cooperative, modest,
humble
ambitious, energetic, serious, driven, hard-working, tough,
inner strength, self-assertive, brave, willing to take risks
optimistic, looking on the bright side, cheerful, sense of
humor
sensual, enjoys life, loves nature, cares for the planet,
capable of great intimacy and deep friendship, appreciates art and music, savoir
faire, self-actualized, devoted to self-fulfillment
pure, calm, self-possessed, chaste, unmaterialistic,
otherworldly
integrity, intellectual honesty, rational autonomy,
willingness to question, truth-seeking
wise, experienced, thoughtful, intelligent, prudent,
cautious, careful, broad knowledge
balanced, moderate, sober
This list, limited to a small selection of what can easily be expressed in the vocabulary of standard English, is already pretty long. It would certainly expand greatly if we included the virtue-vocabularies available in many other languages. It includes many ideas that were not familiar to people in Medieval Europe, and people in the future may discover ways of being an admirable person as yet unknown to us.
There are potentially thousands of virtue-Forms more perfect in their goodness than the imperfect virtue-concepts people usually use for self-evaluation and to model their characters on. So there is no need for everyone to agree on their choice of which perfect virtue-concepts to adopt for these purposes.
******
In the Republic, Plato treats four main virtues which eventually became the "Four Cardinal Virtues" in Medieval Christianity, taught in traditional Catholic catechisms as "Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, and Temperance." Consider these under their Greek names:
- Sophia, "Wisdom," which for Plato consists mainly in knowledge of the Forms. For Medieval Christians, this was given the Latin translation Prudentia, "Prudence," which of course has a meaning much different from knowledge of Platonic Forms, different also from the English word "wisdom."
- Dikaiosynē, translated in Latin Justitia, in English "Justice." But in modern English, "justice" generally refers to a state of affairs in society, not a personality trait of an individual. As a personality trait, dikaiosyne consists in "being a just person" the habit of "doing the right thing" in each circumstance. "Uprightness" is perhaps the closest word we have in English.
- Andreia, translated as Fortitudo in Latin, "courage" in English. In Greek andreia derives from the word for "man, male" so literally means "manliness," easily implying that women can only have andreia if they become more like men. Latin fortitudo comes from fortis, "strong" an association that would probably lead Latin discussion of fortitudo in a somewhat different direction from an English discussion of "courage."
- Sophrosynē, translated as Temperantia in Latin, "temperance" in English. This is the most difficult of the four words to find a good English equivalent for. "Temperance" is clearly not a good equivalent. A. E. Taylor spends a whole page trying to explain the meaning of sophrosynē in Greek (quoted more fully in an Appendix below). In his explanations he lists the following associations: sane, wholesome; the opposite of being presumptuous; balanced, the opposite of a narrow-minded fanatic; the opposite of reckless; humility, humanity, mercy, having pity on others; modest, respectful of authority; easy and natural self-restraint. These associations are not specific to Plato -- Taylor gathered them from the use of this word in ancient Greek literature generally.
Imagine an ancient Greek who conducts a Socratic discussion of sophrosynē, telling stories based on her associations with sophrosynē and trying to articulate her sense of the meaning of this word. Then imagine Cicero conducting a Socratic discussion of the Latin word temperantia, and a modern American discussing the term "temperance." It's obviously not very likely that they will end up with the same "Platonic Form."
Plato himself offers no rational proof that these are the four most important virtues belonging at the top of everyone's list, or even necessarily belonging anywhere on everyone's list.
*****
Plato does not explicitly say that these four virtues belong at the top of everyone's list for all time. He does not explicitly address this problem in these terms. Certainly he does not seriously try to develop any rational proof that this or any other small set of virtues is the only valid set for all people everywhere.
But imagine the following hypothetical scenario. Suppose Plato himself comes back from the grave. He tells us that it was indeed essential to his worldview to believe that there is one and only one correct definition of the four virtues of sophia, dikaiosynē, andreia, and sophrosynē, and that these definitions are transcultural Absolutes, the most important focus for moral commitment for everyone everywhere for all time, the only valid answer to the questions "What does it mean to be virtuous?". Suppose he says that, after reading modern arguments against the possibility of such moral Absolutes, and realizing he has no rational answer to these criticisms, he has decided that this belief was mistaken. Since he personally regarded this belief as essential, this has caused him to lose faith in his entire way of thinking and in the otherworldly Platonist way of life. He has returned from the grave to tell us not to to take Platonism seriously, since it is based on a mistaken belief.
I would answer this hypothetical Plato by making a distinction between what is "essential" and what is "foundational."
A truth can be "foundational" in two senses:
(1) It can be historically and motivationally foundational. If Plato's belief in the Absoluteness of these four virtues was historically and motivationally foundational for Plato's otherworldliness, this would mean that he first found proof of their Absoluteness, and then this served as motivation for him to develop his otherworldly worldview. Plato's writings give no indication that he even tried to inquire seriously into this specific issue, or tried to seriously to find proofs of the kind needed to support such a belief. (At a minimum, such proof would require surveying many other possibilities, which Plato does not do.)
(2) It can be substantively foundational. If the Absoluteness of these four virtues were substantively foundational for Platonism, this would mean that the validity of Plato's otherworldliness is logically dependent on it being actually true that these four constitute such Absolutes. Arguments in the essays above have shown that this is not the case. Platonic otherworldliness depends on there being some virtue-definitions that are transcendent in their Goodness as defined earlier, not on there being some small set deserving to be placed above all others for everyone everywhere.
Even though Plato personally might have thought it essential to believe in these four virtues as eternal moral Absolutes, this belief was not foundational in either of the two senses. If Plato came back to tell us to reject Platonism because it lacks the foundation it needs in Absolute truths, we would would have to tell him he is mistaken, and save Platonism from Plato.
There are potentially thousands of virtue-Forms more perfect in their goodness than the imperfect virtue-concepts people usually use for self-evaluation and to model their characters on. So there is no need for everyone to agree on their choice of which perfect virtue-concepts to adopt for these purposes.
(Excerpt from
A.E. Taylor. Plato: The Man and His Work. London: Methuen. 1937. p. 47-48.)
It is easier to indicate from the usage of the language [in early Greek
literature, not in Plato] what this moral
excellence [sophrosynē ] is, than to find any one name for it in our modern
English. In literature we find sophrosynē spoken of chiefly in the
following connexions.
... The word means literally the possession of a "sane" or "wholesome" mind ;
sophrosynē is thus contrasted with the "folly" ' of the man who "forgets
himself " in the hour of success and prosperity, and " presumes on " his
advantages of wealth or power, pushes them to the full extreme in his dealings
with the less fortunate.
Or it may equally be contrasted with the "unbalanced" conduct
of the fanatic who has only one idea in his head, can only see one side of a
situation and is blind to all the others. In this sense, as the virtue opposed
to the pride of the man who forgets that the gods can cast him down as low as
they have raised him high, the recklessness of the successful man who forgets
that he may himself come to be as much at the mercy of another as others are now
at his, the pitilessness of the fanatic who can only see one side to every
question, sophrosynē covers very much of what we call humility, humanity,
mercy.
Again, the word is a name for the kind of conduct thought becoming specially in
the young towards elders, soldiers towards their superior officer, citizens
towards their magistrates. In this sense it means proper modesty and even covers
such minor matters as a becoming outward deportment in speech and gesture.
In still a third sense, it is the characteristic of the man
who knows how to hold his imperious bodily appetites, " the desire for meat and
drink and the passion of sex," in easy and graceful control, as contrasted with
the man who offends us by unseemly and untimely greed of these appetitive
enjoyments. In this aspect, sophrosynē is what in good English is still
called " temperance," if we take care to remember that it is part of the virtue
itself that it is not the imperfect self- restraint of the man who holds himself
in check ungracefully and with difficulty, but the easy and natural
self-restraint of the man who enjoys being " temperate."
If it does not seem an affectation to use such a phrase, we
may say that sophrosynē is the spirit of the "disciplined" life. It is
not, as Hume insinuates, a "monkish" virtue, except in the sense that you
certainly cannot be a good monk without it. Neither, as Hume forgot, can you be
a good soldier, and that is why in the Laws Plato throws sophrosynē
and valour together, and insists that the former is the major and the harder
part of the lesson every good "fighting man" has to master. [Taylor's
reference to Hume is to Hume's
Inquiry into the Principles of Morals, Section IX. Part I.]