Socrates... was the first to call philosophy down from the heavens and locate her in cities, and even introduced it into homes, and made [people] search about life and customs, and about things good and bad." (Tusculan Disputations, 5.4.10-11, by Cicero 106-43-b.c.)
Socratic Platonism is distinctive in that it is able to start from the very ordinary everyday perceptions of non-philosophers (such as Socrates met on the streets of Athens), and use this as a basis for arriving at a very otherworldly worldview.
Socratic/Platonic reasoning is a particular method of critical reasoning.
Your first graded paper must show that you understand this method well enough to
practice it, focusing on a virtue of your choice.
The First Part of this essay describes the four basic principles underlying this reasoning method,
which you need to understand to do this paper intelligently.
The Second Part explains in detail some of the most
common mistakes to be avoided in Socratic discussion.
*****
Part One: Four Principles
The ultimate goal is to create a virtue-concept that an individual could use
to mold her character on in long-term self-cultivation, being assured that each
step in such molding would make her a more admirable person.
Previous essays -- What is a Virtue? and Socratic Thoughts on Honesty --
describe in detail what a virtue is, giving some examples.
Socratic reasoning is individualist, in the sense that it
assumes an individual who is doing this reasoning for her own purposes, to
create virtue-concepts to mold her own character on. It is not important that
anyone else agree to the particular definitions she arrives at. The goal is not
to bring everyone to universal agreement on the choice of virtues to cultivate,
or on the definition of particular virtues.
The ultimate basis is personal perceptions of what is
admirable and not admirable in very clear concrete cases. Each individual should
be confident that she can recognize what is admirable and not admirable when she
sees it in very clear concrete cases.
A "very clear" concrete case is a story which is not
doubt-provoking, not a dilemma, not a case in which reasonable persons can
disagree as to what is admirable and not-admirable. Socrates' story about an
insane person wanting his weapons returned to him is such a "very clear"
concrete case, in that both he and his conversation-partners regard it as
perfectly obvious that the weapons should not be returned. Dilemmas and
doubt-provoking stories are useless in Socratic discussion.
Socratic reasoning is what philosophers call "inductive" reasoning.
(Already Aristotle, Plato's pupil, characterized Socratic reasoning as
"inductive" see his Metaphysics 13.4, 1078B 22-23). Inductive
reasoning is making generalizations from observations in specific concrete
cases. Isaac Newton was using inductive reasoning when he derived the general
law of gravity from many specific concrete observations about falling apples,
the movement of the planets, and so on.
Inductive reasoning is contrasted with deductive reasoning, deducing particular conclusions from some general principle. Deductive reasoning assumes we can be certain about general abstract principles. Euclidean geometry is built on deductive reasoning, since it starts from general abstract axioms assumed to be self-evident, such as "The shortest distance between two points is a straight line." Utilitarian moral philosophy is also based on deductive reasoning. It is all based on a single general principle: "Morally good actions are actions that will produce the greatest good for the greatest number of people." It uses this principle as a basis for deciding what is good or not good to do in particular circumstances.
Inductive Socratic reasoning assumes instead that we can be more
certain about our perceptions of what is admirable and not admirable in clear
concrete cases than we can ever be about general principles. As in all
inductive reasoning, when some general principle conflicts with a specific
concrete observation (a "counterexample"), this is assumed to show a weakness in
the general principle, which needs revising in the light of the concrete
perception. (Click here for a more
extended description of the difference between inductive Socratic reasoning and
deductive utilitarian reasoning.)
Socratic reasoning consists in mentally moving from perceptions of specific,
concrete, externally visible behavior, to the formulation of virtue-concepts
that are more general and abstract, describing internal/invisible character
traits.
Virtue-concepts are more general than specific behavior, in that the same virtue
such as "kindness" can manifest itself in many different specific behaviors.
Virtue-concepts describe things that, unlike visible external
conduct, are internal and not directly visible. A kind person will act kindly
when the situation calls for it, but the kind action is not the essence of the
virtue of kindness, only its external manifestation. For example, on the one
hand, a person can imitate the actions of a kind person without really having
the habitual motivations and attitudes that constitute kindness as a character
trait. And on the other hand, a kind person does not cease being a kind person
if she is temporarily paralyzed or stranded on a desert island with no
opportunities to show her kindness in action.
The third and fourth principles are applications of principles 1 and 2.
In Plato's Republic, Polemarchos initially thinks that the general principle "return to
each what belongs to him" is a definition of "right-mindedness." But when he
reflects on Socrates' counterexample story about the man gone insane, he
realizes that his personal perception in this concrete case conflicts with his
belief in this general principle.
Socratic reasoning requires a willingness to be extremely
self-critical, to go out of one's way to think up counterexamples that reveal
conflicts and problems within one's own thought. This can be difficult, because
it requires individuals to go against the normal human desire to make up stories
that confirm and illustrate general principles they think they believe in, and
think of stories that undermine these beliefs instead.
Whenever a person uncovers a conflict between her general
beliefs and her perceptions in very clear concrete cases, she should trust her
perception in the concrete case, and regard the conflict as showing a weakness
in the general principles she thought she believed in. This is the nature of
inductive reasoning. (In the physical sciences, when objective data contradicts
an established general scientific principle, this requires revision in the
general principle -- this is the source of progress in the sciences.)
In Socratic reasoning, a counterexample doesn't show that
some given general idea or principle is completely wrong, only that it is
ambiguous. Every counterexample shows a particular ambiguity, which can be
remedied by a particular clarification of the general idea or principle.
Socrates presents to Laches some counterexamples to Laches' definition of
courage as "standing at one's post and not running away." This eventually leads
Laches to clarify his general concept of courage, "courage is a certain tenacity
of soul." That is, "standing at one's post and not running away" is not
completely wrong -- in many cases such behavior is a manifestation of genuine
courage. It is just ambiguous, in that such behavior would manifest foolish
stubbornness rather than admirable courage if the plan is pretended withdrawal
followed by ambush. "Tenacity of soul" is not ambiguous in this particular way.
One can notice also that "tenacity of soul" constitutes a
move from concrete visible behavior toward describing an internal
character-trait not directly visible in itself.
We can know that some given virtue-concept is perfect in its
goodness (= a "Platonic Form") if it can withstand all attempts to find
weaknesses in it through Socratic questioning-by-counterexample.
One key result of applying this principle: Everything
concrete and visible, including rules prescribing specific concrete behavior,
will represent a changing mixture of good and not good. How can we know this in
the case of concrete rules? A cynical politician or a terrorist can follow
whatever rules you might prescribe to her, for bad purposes. Plato's doctrine
that the essence of goodness, that remains good in all circumstances, can only
be described in "abstract" concepts -- this is not a dogmatic assertion
appealing to blind belief. It is the logical result of thoroughgoing application
of Socratic questioning-by-counterexample.
Inductive Socratic reasoning can also use concrete examples of positively
admirable
external behavior, in order to make generalizations about internal character
traits that constitute the essence of a virtue.
For example, Socrates points out that "courage" is not only
characteristic of soldiers. A discussion of courage should discuss also "those
who are courageous in the face of dangers at sea, in the face of sickness and
poverty, in or politics, or those who are courageous not only against pain or
fear, but show strength in contending against desires and pleasures." This
invites a person discussing courage to think of or make up stories of people
acting in an obviously admirable way in these situations also. In other words,
the single internal virtue, "courage" can manifest itself in many different ways
in many different circumstances. A person who wants to cultivate courage as a
personality trait must not just try to imitate the externally visible behavior
of particular persons, but must cultivate certain internal attitudes and skills
that would lead her to spontaneously act courageously in a courageous way in
many different circumstances. There is no way of anticipating ahead of time all
the circumstances that might require courage, and defining courage by
prescribing what courageous conduct would consist in in each of these
circumstances.
So again, Socratic reasoning consists in moving from
concrete, specific, externally visible behavior, to more general descriptions of
internal character-traits that are not directly visible, and which might
manifest themselves in very different ways in different circumstances. Laches
move from "stand at your post and not run away" to "tenacity of soul"
illustrates this kind of move, from specific concrete behavior appropriate to
Greek foot soldiers, to a very general description of an invisible
character-trait that might manifest itself in many different ways in different
circumstances not related to soldiers in battle.
That is, a perfect Platonic virtue-Form is necessarily "abstract" -- separated
from anything specific and concrete -- in two senses:
(1) It refers to internal and invisible character-traits
(motives, attitudes, skills, etc.), in contrast to concrete/visible external
conduct and rules prescribing such conduct
(2) It is general, able to manifest itself in many different
concrete behaviors.
Concrete-mindedness, a kind of thinking that can only focus on what is
concretely visualizable, and a lack of skill in thinking in more "abstract"
terms, is the main psychological obstacle that needs to be overcome in order to
be able to do Socratic reasoning well.
Another facet of this fourth principle will be more relevant in the treatment of early Buddhism and early Christianity, not so relevant to beginning practice of Socratic reasoning about virtues. That is, one result of Socratic reasoning is:
A- Concrete examples and easy-to-understand concepts of goodness are our only
direct source of knowledge of virtue. They are most readily accessible to
understanding, but also imperfect in their ability to represent something only
and always admirable.
B-Platonic Forms are pure and precise representations of what
is only and always admirable, but they are hardest to grasp, and least readily
accessible to understanding. We only come to know them by using concrete
examples and familiar concepts as starting points. The way we come to know them
is by generalization from, and refinement of, our perceptions of concrete
admirable examples.
Plato expresses this point in the image of a ladder. In the case of
courage, for example, concrete examples of admirably courageous actions lie at
the bottom of the ladder, are easiest to understand, and are the
indispensable source of all our knowledge of courage. But rules for how to
act courageously in concrete circumstances can never capture the essence of
admirable courage. The perfect essence of admirable courage - the Platonic
Form of courage lying at the top of Plato's Ladder -- is much more difficult for
human understanding to grasp. A person trying to understand the perfect
essence of admirable courage cannot begin by leaping to the top of the ladder,
but must start at the bottom with concrete examples.
Another analogy: Pure silver exists in silver ore, but it exists there in an
impure way, mixed with other things. We get pure silver by starting with impure
silver ore and refining it to extract the pure silver from the rest of the
materials in the ore. In the same way, it can be said that pure goodness exists
in our perceptions of goodness in concrete cases. But no particular concrete
case represents something purely, only and always admirable. Platonic reasoning
is a process of mentally extracting pure and perfectly refined concepts of
goodness from these imperfect concrete representations.
I will call this "The Principle of Analogy" because it was the basis for the Medieval doctrine of Analogy explaining how knowledge of God is possible. E.g. Perfect divine love is difficult to understand because it is unlike imperfect human love. But it is also something like, or "analogous to" imperfect human love. So examples of imperfect human love can serve as the "bottom rungs" on Plato's ladder, giving us the first steps on the mental ascent to understanding perfect divine love.
It can also be called the principle of "Participation" because it is connected to Plato's ideas that concrete/imperfect reality "participates in" the perfect Forms.
Later chapters on Buddhism will focus on the Buddhist claim that Nibbana
(Nirvana) is the supreme good in human life, and treat this as a claim that
Nibbana is something like a Platonic Form, something perfect in its goodness.
Like all perfect Platonic Forms it is very difficult to understand in itself.
But if it represents something perfect in its goodness, it must be the
perfection of admirable human qualities more easily understood in their less
perfect forms. I will argue, for example, that we can begin understanding
Nibbana by thinking of it as something like the perfection of more familiar
virtues like self-confidence and flexibility -- it is something like ("analogous
to") ordinary self-confidence and flexibility, but with their imperfections
removed.
******
Most mistakes and weaknesses in student Socratic-discussion
papers result from failure to thoroughly understand and apply the above four
principles. Very often, these mistakes are made because students are trying to
practice modes of moral reasoning that are more familiar to them, but very
different from S/P reasoning (e.g. they are used to discussing controversial
moral dilemmas, useless in Socratic reasoning).
Here are some main examples of such mistakes and weaknesses:
#1- The tendency to focus on a concrete individual, listing
many different virtues this person needs in order to be an admirable person.
Socratic reasoning must instead focus on one virtue at a time, trying to
describe the kind of goodness unique and specific to this particular virtue.
This is why it is important to be careful in the selection of a topic for your
paper. "Being trustworthy," "being noble," "being a good parent" all require
many different virtues, and so are not suitable topics.
#2- Mistakes resulting from a failure to understand the
function of counterexample-stories, to uncover an ambiguity in some ordinarily
positive word or phrase. Some examples:
2a. Sometimes students just tell a story, labeling it as a
counterexample, without saying what it is a counterexample to. A
story is not a counterexample unless it shows an ambiguity in some particular
word or phrase, so it is important always to precede a counterexample by naming
the word or phrase that some story is supposed to be a counterexample to.
2b. Confusing a Counterexample with an Opposite Example: When
discussing the phrase, "Tell the truth," giving as a counterexample a story
about a person who is not admirable because she is not truthful. This is not a
"counterexample" but an "opposite example." It does not show an ambiguity in the
phrase "tell the truth," because it doesn't show anyone telling the truth at
all. A counterexample only shows an ambiguity in "tell the truth" if it
describes a case in which a person does tell the truth but is not admirable
(e.g. spreading truthful but malicious gossip).
2c. Using doubt-provoking, controversial stories. When
discussing the phrase, "Tell the truth," giving as a counterexample a story like
"I saw Mary's husband cheating on her. I'm unsure whether I ought to tell her
the truth about this or not, there seem to be good reasons for telling the truth
and not telling the truth." This dilemma-story leads to a discussion about
whether to tell the truth on this occasion or not. This is irrelevant to the
goals of Socratic discussion. It focuses on a concrete problem about external
behavior in a concrete situation, and will not contribute to formulating a
concept of the internal virtue of truthfulness that a person can use for
long-term character-formation.
2d. When discussing the phrase, "Tell the truth," giving as a
counterexample a story like, "Susan is truthful to her friends but not to her
mother." A true counterexample needs to illustrate a case of "telling the truth"
that is not admirable, but in this story there is no such illustration. In this
story, Susan shows admirable truthfulness toward her friends, and entirely lacks
truthfulness when it comes to her mother.
2e. Worrying about what other people might think. E.g "I
think Liz's conduct in this story is not admirable, but perhaps Liz thinks it's
admirable." It doesn't matter what Liz thinks. This is only an
exploration of your own perceptions and beliefs.
#3. Mistakes or weaknesses regarding the Clarifications of
W that should follow
Counterexamples.
3a. Sometimes students omit this step entirely. They stop at giving a counterexample
showing an ambiguity in a word or phrase, failing to try to remedy this
ambiguity by clarifying and redefining the meaning of the word or phrase, giving
it a meaning that avoids this ambiguity. No positive progress can be made in
this way.
3b. Often students respond to a counterexample by saying what
the person in the story should have done instead of what they actually did that
made them not-admirable, or trying to formulate a rule saying what should always
be done. This manifests the concrete-mindedness that is important to overcome to
achieve the Platonist goal of formulating a concept of an internal/invisible
personality trait that can serve as a model for a person to model herself on in
long-term self-cultivation.
3c. Often students respond to a counterexample by adding
another virtue that the person in the story needs to be a more admirable person.
For example, suppose in a discussion of generosity, the author gives as a
counterexample: "Jane was so generous she gave away all her money and
clothes and as a result became deathly ill." Then as a clarification, the author
says, "Admirable generosity needs to be coupled with a concern for
self-preservation." "Concern for self-preservation" is possibly a
description of something admirable, but it is not unambiguous -- seems possible
to have a kind of "concern for self-preservation" that is not admirable.
So rather than clearing up an ambiguity of the virtue "generosity," we have just
added another ambiguous concept that needs its own discussion. Is the
concept "concern for self-preservation" the came concept as the concept
"generosity"? How would we tell? Suppose you began discussing "concern for
self-preservation" as an admirable personality trait (a "virtue").
If you could you do so in such a way that it would lead back into clarifying
something about the virtue of generosity, then you could make a case that
self-preservation is somehow an important component of the virtue "generosity."
If, however, in discussing "concern for self-preservation" you found yourself in
a completely different line of inquiry, this is a sign that "concern for
self-preservation" and "generosity" are two different virtues. You've
avoided resolving ambiguities and problems about how to define generosity at its
best by naming another virtue that also presents more problems and ambiguities.
A concrete person of course needs both generosity and
concern for self-preservation in order to be an admirable person.
Concrete generous behavior frequently needs also to express a
care for self-preservation (as in Jane's case above). When you try to
Clarify by adding more virtues, this is generally a sign of concrete-mindedness
-- the fact that you are addressing concrete people and concrete behavior,
rather than trying to formulate an abstract concept of a single virtue.
3d. Often students respond to a counterexample by saying what
a person should not do, or what should be absent. For example,
after the counterexample story, "Sophie told her teacher the truth about her
classmates' misbehavior only in order to gain the teachers' favor," a person
might try to clarify, "There should be no ulterior motive in genuine
truthfulness." This says that "ulterior motive" should be absent. But a person
cannot become a more admirable person only by lacking something. It seems easier
to describe absences than to describe positive motives motivating admirable
truthfulness. But this is what is necessary if we are to formulate a positive
description of a character-trait that a person can use for long-term
self-cultivation.
#4. Focusing on only one or two concepts connected with your virtue, or repeating
the same point over and over. The remedy for this is to spend some time
expanding your associations with your virtue before you begin the process of
Counterexamples and Clarifications of W. (This is Section One of the structure
for this paper.)
#5. Failing to raise difficult problems, or
sticking to already-familiar concepts in resolving these problems.
Socratic questioning-by-counterexample is supposed to be a method of raising unsuspected problems in commonly accepted ideas, and in your own ideas about virtues, problems not easily resolved. Resolving such problems usually requires going beyond already familiar concepts easily named, and creatively articulating personal insights and perceptions that are more difficult to put into words. You can make things easy for yourself by posing counterexamples that do not raise any difficult issues requiring further thought, or by sticking to already-familiar concepts in resolving these problems -- doing the mechanics correctly but without thinking very deeply, making any progress, or learning anything from this exercise.
One way students often avoid this difficult aspect of Socratic reasoning manifests itself is in the conclusion to a paper. Discussing romantic love, for example, someone will conclude by just giving a list of familiar concepts "romantic love consists in trust, and intimacy, and passion, and sharing, and honesty, and chemistry, and...." This is just a list of ideas assumed to be familiar. It doesn't require much critical thinking or creative articulation to come up with such a list. It's relatively easy.
This is why I ask for a conclusion to your paper that prioritizes, organizes, and unifies your description of your virtue.
In relation to romantic love, "prioritizing" would mean that you give some thought to deciding which among the above list of concepts is more central to romantic love and which are less central. "Unifying" means that you try to formulate a single concept that is the "essence" of romantic love (a single concept might require many words to describe). "Organizing" means describing how the various concepts associated with your virtue are related to each other around this single essence.
Usually, prioritizing, unifying, and organizing forces you to think more deeply about your virtue, going beyond just listing already familiar words, articulating things that are more difficult to articulate.
If it's easy, it's not Socratic Reasoning.