As the previous essay stated, for Buddhists the term Atta has
a meaning but no reference. The present essay explains how it got the
specific meaning that this term has -- very different from the meaning of "self"
or "soul" in English -- by explaining its positive use among some Hindu thinkers
contemporary with Buddhism.
Let me begin with a rough analogy: for some people the term "ghost"
also has a meaning but no reference. Consider the case of someone who
might conduct research to investigate whether "ghosts" really exist. To conduct
such investigation, a person would have to make some assumptions about what the
word "ghost" means, what a ghost would be if there were one, what would
qualify some experience as genuinely "seeing a real ghost." Suppose someone
investigates very many cases of persons claiming to have "seen a real ghost,"
and finds that in each case there was no real ghost involved. She concludes:
Every claimed case of "seeing a ghost" should rather be described as
experiencing something that was "not-a-ghost." Every supposed "ghost" someone
claims to have seen was instead really a "non-ghost." The word "ghost" has a
meaning, but there is no existing entity to which this word refers. Her
conclusion: The word "ghost" has a meaning but no reference.
This ghost-analogy is helpful in the present context because
it also makes clear that talk about ghosts, and calling something not-a-ghost,
only makes sense if there are some people who think that ghosts do exist, that
the word "ghost" does refer to some really existing entity. If no
one thought
that ghosts exist, there would be no point in dealing with the question of
whether they exist or not, or denying that they exist.
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I bring up this ghost analogy because it helps answer a
puzzle about Pali Canon assertions about An-atta: If there is nothing that
qualifies as Atta, nothing to which the word refers, why even bring it
up? The statement that "all supposed 'ghosts' seen were actually 'not-ghosts'"
only makes sense if there are some people who thought they were seeing real ghosts. The
statement "all Conditions are not-Atta," only makes sense if there are some
other people who think that at least some Conditions do qualify as atta.
This brings us deeper into the cultural and religious context
of early Buddhism in ancient India. That is, there is in fact evidence that some
other people in ancient India (a) used the term Atta in the same sense and in
the same context that early Buddhists use it, and (b) asserted that there is one
thing a person can directly become aware of that does qualify as Atta. This
evidence is found in a writing probably composed within a few centuries of the
Pali Canon's composition. It is called the Bhagavad Gita, termed
by one writer as the earliest synthesis of beliefs regarded as classical beliefs
in what became mainstream Hinduism. (Hinduism is a kind of parent-religion
of Buddhism, in a sense similar to the way that Judaism is a kind of
parent-religion to Christianity. In both cases the parent-religion
[Hinduism and Judaism] continued after the derived religion [Buddhism and
Christianity] broke away and became separate.)
The Gita, written in the Sanskrit language rather than
the Pali language,
uses the Sanskrit term Atman, equivalent to the Pali Atta. Otherwise, it is
clear that the term Atman in the Gita has the same meaning that the term
Atta
has in the Pali Canon, and occurs in the context of discourse driven by the same
concerns. Its main concern also is the problem that deep dependence on some
particular changeable objects or conditions in the world make a person
vulnerable to deep disturbance and distress because of this changeability. It
assumes an audience in search of deeply satisfying peace beyond the threat of
disturbing change -- a quest that can be fulfilled by discovering within "A Self
satisfied in the Self alone," as the Gita puts it.
This is not at all easy. The main concern of the Gita is not
to assert that such a Self or Atman exists, but to explain how a person can
directly experience her Atman, a very particular experience associated with
intense "bliss" achievable in deep meditation. Direct experience of the Atman
would enable a person to identify with the Atman so experienced, and so undergo
a fundamental transformation in her way of being in the world. She would cease
to depend for satisfaction, meaning, or self-esteem on any changeable conditions
in the external world, but would have all her essential yearnings satisfied by
identification with an internally experienced Atman, which is something beyond
all change.
The main points here are:
1-In ancient India, thought about Atman is primarily an
affair for meditators. Discourse about Atman is primarily discourse concerning
the goals of meditation, and how to interpret experiences a person might have at
meditation. The Gita and the Pali Canon agree on the general goal of meditation
practices -- to free a person from deep dependence on changeable conditions in
the world, which makes a person subject to being deeply threatened by change.
2-The Gita holds that there is one particular
experience a person very skilled at meditation can have, which is the experience
of something that gives one a source of deep satisfaction ("bliss"), beyond the
threat of disturbing change. "Atman" is in the Gita a technical term, a name for
what it is that meditators might possibly experience.
The main point of the Gita's Atman doctrine is to make a
division between all other things one might directly experience which are
changeable, and this one thing a meditator can directly experience, which is not
changeable. Direct experience of this Atman at meditation is a precondition for
identifying with it, relating to the world henceforth as a completely
independent Atman, rather than as a person whose identity is dependent on some
changeable condition in the world.
3-The Five Khandhas in Buddhism constitute an exhaustive list
of all things a person could directly experience, even at deep meditation -- all
possible perceptual objects a person might be tempted to Cling to and identify
with. From a Buddhist point of view, Hindus make the mistake of thinking that
there is one perceptual object, able to be directly experienced in deep
meditation, that is not changeable, which one could therefore safely Cling to
and identify with as one's True Self, or Atman. Buddhists think there is no such
perceptual object.
This is the explanation of the puzzle as to why Buddhists use
the term Atta, when they think that there is nothing to which it refers.
Buddhist discourse on this subject depends entirely on a contrast: Other
contemporary meditators insist that some one perceptual object they experience
at meditation is unchangeable, and so can properly be called Atman. The directly
contrasting Buddhist view can be expressed in directly contrasting language.
Instead of regarding one perceptual object as Atman/Atta, one should regard
all
perceptual objects, even those experienced in deepest meditation, "not-Atman"
(an-Atman, an-Atta). Just as our ghost-researcher concluded that each claimed
case of "seeing a ghost" was instead "seeing something not-a-ghost," "seeing a
non-ghost," Buddhists claim that contemporary meditators claiming to have
experienced Atman, were in fact experiencing something "not-Atman."
Again we have to keep in mind the practical intent of this.
It is not a theory about what exists or does not exist. It assumes that whatever
a person experiences does actually exist -- the blissful experience experienced
by meditators in the Bhagavad Gita is the experience of some existing internal
Condition (belonging to the Condition-Khandha). The question is rather whether this
Condition is something to which
the word Atman properly refers. And to call something Atman is not to have a
theory about it, but to become so identified with it that one would suffer a
deeply distressing identity-crisis if this condition changed, and became an
internal condition one is no longer able to experience. The passage quoted earlier explains this main practical point quite clearly. To
paraphrase it to fit the present context:
[A meditator] comes to regard a particular Condition [the Blissful feeling he experiences at meditation] as Atta/Atman. As he lives obsessed by this notion, that [blissful] Condition of his changes and alters. With the change and alteration of that [blissful] Condition, there arise in him sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair..." (Samyutta Nikaya, p. 854)
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What is the practical upshot of this?
From the Buddhist point of view, the main problem with the
positive Atman doctrine of others is that it connects Atman with a particular
kind of experience or particular feeling-state that can be contrasted with other
particular experiences or feeling-states. This generates a deep and inflexible
dependency on the ability to have this experience or maintain this particular
feeling state, and a deep and inflexible aversion to experiences or
feeling-states that are its opposites.
For example, a meditator might during one particular week be
able to experience a state of deep calm at meditation, a calmness she is able to
maintain in her daily life. She identifies with this feeling of deep calm,
thinking "this is my real self." Achieving and maintaining this sense of calm
becomes a principle source of self-esteem and satisfaction in life. The
following week, however, she is unable to achieve or maintain this feeling of
calmness, but experiences its opposite: inner turmoil and upsetness. But the
fact that her whole identity had gotten wrapped up in her ability to achieve and
maintain deep calmness, gives this feeling of upsetness a great deal of extra
power to be very deeply upsetting. In addition to the ordinary discomfort of
being upset, this feeling affects her much more deeply because she had become so
dependent for self-esteem on her ability to be calm, not-upset. She is not only
upset, but is also very deeply upset about being upset, because being upset
constitutes a kind of identity crisis, a threat to her previously established
identity as a person who is calm and does not get upset.
This point can be expressed in the Pali Canon simile of "two
darts," given in the Samyutta-Nikaya IV. 36, 6 (6). (Bodhi p. 1264). The simile
has to do with a soldier in a battle, being struck first by one dart, then
afterwards being struck by a second dart. The simile says that a good Buddhist
would get struck by the first dart, but not the second.
The application in the present case:
- Everyone gets hit by one dart, undergoing at times
unpleasant feelings such as feelings of being upset. Buddhists also have such
feelings -- it is impossible to avoid them, and it is a mistake to Cling to
opposite pleasant feelings like calmness, since all Feelings (calmness and
upsetness alike) are changeable and impermanent.
- What is avoidable is getting hit by the second dart,
being deeply upset about being upset, a second and deeper layer of upsetness due
to the fact that one is Clinging to and has become identified with the opposite
feeling of calmness. This is a problem to which meditators are especially
susceptible, since they are most prone to becoming identified with, and
especially proud of, certain special achievements they achieve at meditation.
Another way of saying this: Suppose my wife leaves me for
another, and I find myself taken over by feelings of intense jealousy. If I were
further along in liberating myself from deep dependencies, I might not be
feeling this degree of intense jealousy. If I am a Buddhist I might possibly
look on this as a reason to be additionally upset about being jealous. Not only
is jealousy an unpleasant feeling in itself, but it is additionally upsetting
because it seems contrary to my self-image and identity as "a good Buddhist."
But this is to allow myself to be hit by "the second dart."
The fact is that at present my feelings of jealousy
constitute one of those Conditions in the world that are beyond my control. In
this situation, the best way to make progress toward full liberation is not to
give way to my upsetness about being jealous, and try to repress feelings of
jealousy and try to have those opposite feelings that I think I would have if I
had been further along in the Buddhist path. The place to start working toward
the Buddhist goal is not the feelings of jealousy, but my "aversion" toward
these particular feelings, which are just the flip side of Clinging to some
opposite feelings. The best way to make progress toward real liberation in this
circumstances is to work on accepting the Condition of being jealous.
This is the radical implication of the doctrine that
"everything belonging to the Khandhas is an-atta," taken to its logical
conclusion. Achieving the liberation of Nibbana is not a matter of having some
particular "positive feelings" (such as calmness) and not having other "negative
feelings" (such as jealousy). Nibbana is rather the ability to take a particular
attitude toward all possible Conditions and feelings, an attitude that can be
described as "I can handle it." I can handle my wife leaving me for another. I
can also handle the feelings of jealousy that come over me when she does this.
Nibbana has no opposites among particular Feelings or
Conditions, and so is compatible with all Conditions and feeling-states
whatsoever.
******
One important upshot of all this is that Buddhist thought
provides no basis for denigrating the external material/social world in favor of
an internal spiritual world. Seen in the context of contemporary Hinduism, the
practical point of the Khandha doctrine is that there is no reason to turn away
from the external material-social world, toward an internal spiritual realm,
because changeability is the real problem, and every Condition one could
experience internally (even in deepest meditation) is as changeable as the
changing Conditions in the external world.
Thus, unlike the kind of Hinduism presented in the Bhagavad
Gita, no religious value is placed on certain special experiences people have
who engage in prolonged meditation exercises. Buddhist thought avoids setting
aside certain specific areas of human life -- specific experiences or particular
enduring feeling-states -- as being "otherworldly," and of special religious
value, in contrast to the rest of life which just counts as insignificant and
"worldly."
The question is not what in particular occupies my attention
as an object of awareness -- whether this be caring for children, making a
profit in business, or having particular experiences at meditation. The question
is the attitude I take toward all particular things I might be aware of or
engaged with -- not what I am engaged in, but how I am engaged with it. The
point is to avoid becoming identified with and deeply dependent on some
particular connection I have with some particular Condition of the internal or
external world that I am engaged with.
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The present essay's contextual interpretation of the an-atta doctrine can be summed up in the form of an imaginary story, a progress from being a "householder," to being a Samana-meditator devoted to the ideals expressed in the Bhagavad Gita, to conversion to the Buddhist An-Atta doctrine.
1. Start with an imaginary "householder." This person is however an alienated idealist, dissatisfied with ordinary family and community life, which motivates him to "go forth from home into homelessness."
Retrospectively, from the point of view of the committed Buddhist, we can analyze his dissatisfaction in this way: What he really wants is to establish a worthwhile identity for himself, an identity whose Goodness would be in itself a source of satisfaction. But this desire tends to be outward-directed. He looks for other things outside himself to give him a sense of self-worth - - his possessions, approval from his friends, his occupation, his status in his community, and so on.
But all these things are constantly changing. To construct the Good identity that would satisfy him, he needs to be able to remain a single unified self that achieves depth by remaining constant over time. When he defines his identity in relation to external changing circumstances this means that his life is relatively fragmented, pulled to and fro by changing circumstances, without the opportunity to "find himself" as we say, to develop a personal center that has a constancy and depth to it.
2. In the next stage, this person goes forth from home into (literal) homeless seclusion. He turns away from the external world and becomes intensely introspective. He develops skill in a certain kind of concentrative meditation, learning to concentrate his mind, preventing it from being pulled to and fro by changing objects drawing attention to themselves. He experiences some periods of intense satisfaction in just being, when he withdraws his attention from all external objects. This stage is well represented by the ideal meditator described in the Bhagavad Gita.
But the quest for a single, unified, constant, deeply satisfying Good Identity places a great burden and high expectations on such meditative experiences. Giving up trying to find his Good Identity in relation the external social world makes him more desperate to find his identity in relation to something experienced internally in introspective meditation.
The Buddhist passage quoted earlier, about the person "obsessed with the notion 'I am this Feeling'" and who suffers "sorrow, lamentation... despair" when this Feeling changes" is a Buddhist caricature of a Gita devotee searching desperately for some kind of feeling he could experience at mediation worthy of being called Atta - something he could identify with that would put him beyond the reach of deeply disturbing change. The extremely high expectations this person places on such Feelings or Conditions is responsible for the "lamentation and despair" he experiences when they prove changeable and unreliable (e.g. when he cannot achieve at meditation today the Feeling or Mental Condition of bliss he experienced yesterday).
Formerly, as a householder, this person tried to establish a worthwhile identity for himself by seeking external signs confirming his sense of self-worth. He left home when he realized the changeable and unreliable character of all external signs. Now he realizes that all internal perceptual objects he might rely on are also changeable and unreliable. Some Buddhist writings call this "true seclusion," using "seclusion" to refer not to the external life-style of a samana, but to his inner psychological independence (metaphorical, psychological "seclusion") even from internal perceptual objects.
This is the key point of the Buddhist critique of other contemporary Hindus who felt that a kind of internal mystical experience (union with an exalted Atman or "True Self") constituted the fulfillment of their quest.
3. Full realization of the Buddhist ideal comes about when the above person, having discovered the changeability of all perceptual objects, ceases to try to find his identity among any perceptual objects, even the most subtle and exalted internal "spiritual" objects. This is what it means that he "turns away" from everything changeable. That is, he continues to be physically connected to his body, he continues to feel feelings, and so on. It is just that he does not feel psychologically invested in or identified with any of these things, so a change in them does not deeply disturb him.
This does not constitute a mere repression or giving up of his quest for a single, constant, deeply satisfying worthwhile identity. It constitutes rather the final fulfillment of this quest. In the ideal case, his disconnection from all changeable perceptual objects makes him a person who can find deep satisfaction in just being - - i.e. satisfaction in the Goodness of his own being - - not needing any particular connection to any particular perceptual objects to find this satisfaction.
This is a "dialectical" interpretation of the relation of Hinduism and Buddhism, using Hegel's sense of "dialectical." That is, picturing the Buddhist an-atta doctrine as a continuation of the Hindu quest, a fulfillment of the underlying motivation for this quest, helps define the content of the an-atta doctrine itself. We get a clearer picture of the particular underlying existential concern involved by studying ancient Hindu writings like the Bhagavad Gita, clearer than we would get by studying Buddhist writings alone.
Specifically this background enables us to understand more clearly an experiential connection between a certain non-attachment to perceptual objects, on the one hand, and a sense of deep satisfaction in one's own being, on the other. This in turn enables us to associate some positive content with the Buddhist an-atta doctrine, and so provide a basis for understanding why "regarding everything as an-atta" could plausibly be regarded positively as the Supreme Good in human life.
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Final Note: To avoid confusion, it is important to note that
(a) the Bhagavad Gita is important in Hinduism, but it is not the whole of Hinduism, which has had a long and varied history, and
(b) discussions above characterize the Atman-teaching of the Bhagavad Gita as probably seen by Buddhist critics.
One should not assume that all Hindu thinkers or meditators throughout the ages have had the same understanding of Atman described above, nor even that it adequately characterizes the main point of the author(s) of the Bhagavad Gita.