C 8 II: Dating: October 1929

[p. 1] The inborn instinct as an intentionality which belongs to the original essence-structure of psychic being. Each animal species has that which belongs to it; however the instinctual equipment is not only distinguished in accordance with species, but instincts are also individually differentiated, are characterized in the fulfillment, e.g. in sexual love, as directly related in unique fashion to this individual.

The instinct-intentionality of the monads belongs to their mundane being and life; their fulfillment is mundanely directed. (Of course, if we are to think of Leibniz, it is first to be asked whether it is not the case that each monad life is world-constituting, and in the totality of its life, whether thus the beginning and end of animal life has only the significance of Leibnizian involution and evolution; out of the temporary being of the living monad as something micro-organic, an animal monad develops, out of the animal monad a human monad; in its individuality it continues to preserve itself, only in such a way that no unity of "consciousness" extends through the continuity - whereby the problem would be how it is conceivable without breach of individuality.

Let us consider the intuitively accessible sphere of animal existence. We could say: it also appears with the ontogenetic development in the older level formations of instincts (or instincts also have their germ, their self-elaboration in typical forms). Regarded from the outside, we have the tendencies of biological development in their "developmental levels," in their level-styles of childhood, puberty, maturity, [p. 2] old age etc. And then we have the biophysical tendencies of typical development, of nature-historical style.

Regarded from within: an intentionally motivated development of a "person;" with awakening, self-elaboration in the midst of self-operation [Sichausgestalten unter Sichauswirken] from instincts of personal, of psychic ontogenesis and phylogenesis in one, we have concrete animal ontogenesis and phylogenesis, in accordance with the species various forms of sexuality and reproduction or of ontogenetic self-preservation style, of renewal, of growth... Each is thereby concerned with and consciously directed to partially itself, partially to the others, partially to its living community, to its humanity or animality. The child wants to become like "bigger, more developed and capable" children, then adult women and men, and at the "height of life," it is desired always to remain on the heights, to remain as free as possible of "threatening" old age,; normally no one wants death (but to that belongs great problems!!); the mother with her maternal instincts "lives in the child," she is in her way directed toward its development, toward its becoming. She wants with respect to it a normal development toward its maturity. The man is directed with his sexual instinct to the woman, the woman to the man, thereby both to establishing a family...

The animal monad lives in a community, in an animal community in a constituted world-temporality. Of course, past and future companions are not in the waking conscious field, as in the distinguished case of human monads - but nevertheless in the instinct field, so to speak. In the present, the higher animal has its companions in the typicality of levels of development, with birth and death (with limitations).

The human being has a time horizon of the past with past human beings, and of the future with future ones, wherein each has his life time, and the life times exist differently in the total time. In accordance with various possible modes of spiritual manifestation, past others belong to spiritual history, others which were not included memorially in the perceptual sphere of the history-disclosing I.

A transcendental history corresponds to natural human history. In their primordially immanent temporal being, the monads are related to one another in the form of transcendental manifestation and the common world-constitution, finding themselves in historical human contexts. To objective time, transcendentally observed there corresponds for the monad totality a form of static and genetic world-constitution, thus their being for-and-with-one-another in progressively developing accessibility. Every human being enters as "human being being born," in the community of world-constitution, and exits with human death. Community of world-constitution means that each of the participating monads in the humanly existing world, participate in human life in the world, that each is present in the world in objective-real fashion as human soul with human psychic life, of course in unity with human body [p. 4]. On the other hand, every monad has its outer mundane life before being born, wauch nach ihm [?], if my limit analysis is correct.

If we accept here the bold Leibniz-Brentano interpretation, then every monad in all its life would be world constituting and world participating. Birth and death would be something relative in this function, perhaps similar to the "birth" and "death" of a unity of one form of worldhood transformed into another, and is founded in the ultimate unities of social group-personalities, precisely those of individual human beings. One and the same monad would thus be an extension reaching through many, one monad functioning in plant organism, and perhaps as unity of the plant, constituted further as animal and human I, through the unity of its life itself in the monad community, which thus belongs in its transcendental temporality to each individual time of individual monads, always one and the same world constituted with the same objective time.

...

[p. 5] Departure 1) from the present world, mine, this human world and that of the human community made accessible from me, personal human world, and that which emerges from its step-by-step differentiating transformation as egoic animal world -; the same departure from the history of nature, in which nature is accessible as world of externality, from psychophysical nature, which indicates to me the correspondence of externality and intentional inwardness. In the disclosing of causality, there awaken self-disclosing apperceptions of psychophysical parallels. The total organic life as life in the psychic sense.

Community of human beings in me, which as human are constituted on primordial grounds and therewith the first personal world, and that concerning all truth in itself, in its horizon. The human being is the bearer of truth. Construction of organisms from monads - do we come then to ultimate psychophysical unities, to ultimate organisms?

2) Synthesis of all monadic surrounding worlds in their various deep levels, according to the analogy of synthesis of human surrounding worlds into the objective world. All have consciousness [p. 6] of various levels of the same world, and are thereby consciously related to one another, communalized in the widest sense. All have their instinctual lives as living in specific communities with their species-companions and with their defensive instincts with respect to other species (which however is still not sufficient). Forms of relatedness to one another of an inner type, in which the monads, articulated with respect to the form of spatio-temporality according to near and far, are variously synchronized with one another and stand in intentional relationship.

3) Each monad has its immanent temporality, and in it exists a beginning as beginning of the entering-into-relation to other monads in the mundanification of objective time. This is at the same time a form of the coexistence (in the widest sense) of monads, of communalization. The monads enters as new actor in world time and finally exits again. It thus did not exist earlier and does not exist subsequently, if being and nonbeing are precisely real-temporal being.

The "beginning" is, in the immanence of the monad, a limit of its mundane-temporal self-constitution. A "pre-" beginning - does that have a meaning, can it have one? Limit of self-constitution is limit of the developmental formation of the child, of the whole human being in the world. One could say that that is no beginning of being, but precisely that of a mundane development and of being in the world, and therefore that the coexistence of monads reaches further than worldhood; thus one could attempt to interpret it so. Being of monads is being-in-and-for-itself in a never beginning and never ending self-constitution [p. 7] in immanent temporality. A special form of this constitution, which has a beginning and an end, is the mundanizing constitution, in which the monads constitutively experienced as mundane realities enter into relation with others. The monads individually have their immanent temporality and their immanent being, the monads together have an intermonadic temporality, a form of coexistence, which is their world time in the scope of world constitution as "realized" monads, which however in monadic translation back is transcendental time, form of transcendental-subjective coexistence... The totality of all monads is what it is in a universal causality, which is an intentional and teleological causality in and for itself of existing monads; they are nevertheless equally for one another in order to be dependent on one another in being for one another.

...Animals are intentional modifications of humans and as such indirectly experienced with respect to their psychic factors, thus also as animals and not as material bodies. The animal surrounding world is, with respect to the way in which it is experienced in animal fashion, an intentional modification of the human. Animals of the same species further have community among one another in a sense directly analogous to us human beings.

But still another mediateness is important. Organisms build themselves from organisms. We come to elementary, simple organisms, occurring as such also in the form of living for themselves. "Higher" organic formations as organic individuals with their own organic properties and achievements are thus founded unities; they are not only heaps of organisms and connections of such, somehow merely bound with one another, but they exist in such connections in such a way that the whole is an organic individual.

We must now establish the corresponding situation for the psychic side: there is a lowest psychic being and therefore lowest monads, and there is such a transcendental "connectedness" in such spatio-temporal nexus, that the souls of higher level are founded, and transcendentally spatio-temporally, that monads of higher level are founded in such of lower level. [p. 10] And so perhaps in many-sided foundation, which makes possible always "higher" monads. These foundings are transcendental causalities, and the higher being means higher, and in different ways higher intentional achievements (meaning- and being-constitution).

We accept that to each cell of my living body there corresponds a monad, in such a way that, as long as it is biophysically living, it would also be psychic, psychically living in the world. That means, it would be psychophysical like an animal in the world, it would have its surrounding world consciously, which is its subjective aspect of "the" world, thus I would be in community with each cellular soul just as with animal souls. Since I can live as human being in the world only while my organic body lives and therein each cell, or rather the cellular system lives of course under cellular change, so would my psychic being also be founded in this soul system and in the preservation of its system-form.

Here now it is extraordinarily important to become clear about this causality; it would seem to be correct, in conformity with my older conviction, that coexistence of monads is only possible by virtue of a constituted world, and so then it would in general have to be established that monads in the plural without that of the common world constitution must already signify causality of monads, must precisely be causally dependent upon one another.

But that does not mean that there must be the constitution of an immediate reciprocal understanding. When corporeal, organic-cellular monads exist, then they lead [p. 11] to a very mediate analogization. With the higher animals it is easier to comprehend the intentional modification as an intuitive transformation; it is already different with the more primitive levels of the animal world. A general analogical apperception is merely the index for the entirely indeterminate horizon of more precise determinations, which must be clarified in gradually descending fashion in the order of successive stages of the animal world.

The nexus of monads: what the one constitutes in itself (it would also exist in lower levels), must also be present for the others, their lives are thus reciprocally dependent upon and mutually determined by one another.

...

[p. 13]... The monads are transcendental substances, related to their transcendental temporality of internal states [Zustandszeitlichkeit], to their lives. But only the specific "life," the self-mundanifying, reveals personal unity as developing itself from passivity or from activity, from unfreedom or from freedom - if not every monad has many different kinds of species life, whereby still the Leibnizian concept of a transcendental "development" in "psychic transmutation" would have to be considered. Each monad exists individually as monad and is indestructable, whether it begins to live self-objectifying in animal form in the connection of a universal monadic causality or whether its life ends and it is now dead, it is also as dead soul a monad in its own being. We indeed posit the limit of awakening, although only as limit, necessarily as preceding life, a life in which nothing "passes," in [p. 14] which no development takes place. Development is animal-psychic development, the only one which is actually experienceable and directly knowable. However, the knower is a human being and not an animal, and the essential necessity of the knowability of being, as also of the absolute monadic being, leads to a causality of monads, in which they are not only world constituting in general, but a human world "in the course of time."

One must however again get free of this generality and inquire into the structure of the world in accordance with its concrete essential necessities and in accordance with the essential necessities of generative development, of spiritual history, of the history of nature, and in accordance with that which is in it, when precisely human spiritual history for a world and for a monad totality in the form of transcendental time shall be possible with the awakening of human knowledge, revealed in special monadic essential necessities.