I. Recent history of Canadian liberalism [NOTE: “liberalism” here means democracy, rule of law, majoritarian institutions, protections of minority and individual rights. Both conservatives and liberals in the American political sense are “liberals” in this philosophical sense Taylor means.]

   A. 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights
      1. List of individual rights (freedom of speech, etc.)
      2. General principle of equal treatment/non-discrimination

   B. Quebec province’s attempt to protect its distinctive French-speaking culture through legislation based on idea of Quebec as “distinct Society” within Canada, requiring special recognition.

      Examples: French-speaking parents and immigrants must send children to French Schools; businesses must be conducted in French; commercial signs must be in French.

      (Canadian Supreme Court ruled against Quebec on last item—said could compel signs to be in French but not forbid them from being in other languages also)

II. Two forms of liberalism

   A. 56-58: “American” model: Uniform rights to individuals, not groups. General principle of equal treatment/non-discrimination. Social and political order should try to remain neutral between different “conceptions of the good,” not favoring any over others (based on Kantian emphasis on individual autonomy)

   B. 58-59: “Canadian” model (sensitive to Quebec’s concerns)
      1. Certain collective goals on the part of subgroups of the nation, especially cultural survival (“survivance”), are legitimate and are legally enforced [compare Parekh]
      2. To support such goals, certain laws must not be uniform but must apply differently in different contexts, especially to those whose survival is at stake
      3. Draw distinction between fundamental individual liberties which can not be abridged and must apply equally to everyone (e.g. right to free speech, freedom of religion, fair trial) and other less fundamental individual liberties and privileges (e.g. which language your business sign must be in) which may be abridged, but only to foster the legitimate collective goals, such as (present and future) cultural survival
      4. 58: implications of survivance as a political principle

III. The limits of liberal neutrality [of both American and Canadian kinds, Taylor implies]

   A. 62: If a culture violates fundamental rights (e.g. Satanic Verses case), it is not protected by this form of liberalism

   B. 63: Yet this may seem disturbing, since it raises the issue of Western imposition of its culture on others, which was the very complaint behind multiculturalism in the first place. (Since Western societies are now multicultural, can’t just say “This is how we do things here.”)

IV. Recognition and multiculturalism (again)

   A. 64: From cultural survival (in Quebec situation) to recognition. Recognition as an unacknowledged factor in Quebec and other situations

   B. 65: Fanon and the struggle for a changed self-image

   C. Education as a site for struggles for recognition and self-image
      1. 65: Giving all students an understanding of different cultures
and genders

2. 65: Correcting internalized demeaning picture of group
(Taylor seems to see 2 as a “recognitional” concern, and 1 as something else, perhaps expanding the student’s mind, and as less significant.)

D. Premise of equal respect to all cultures: the “presumption” (66: “human cultures that have animated whole societies over some considerable stretch of time have something important to say to all human beings.”)

1. 66-67: the presumption as a starting hypothesis with which to approach study of any culture
2. validity of the presumption in relation to any specific culture must be demonstrated in actual study of that culture
3. 67: seeing value of very different culture requires “fusion of horizons”
4. 68: the presumption seems required by norm of equal respect
5. 68: a stronger demand is sometimes made: that we give equal respect to cultures independent of, and before, knowing anything about them
6. 68-69: makes sense to demand the presumption but not the actual positive judgment
7. 70: Neo-Nietzschean theories that undermine any possibility of valid or objective judgment of value across different cultures, yet demand affirmation of another culture
8. Such a judgment on demand cannot be an act of genuine respect. It actually involves contempt for the intelligence of the person or group to which the judgment of worth is being made, though pretending to be respectful.
9. this demand is “homogenizing” because it assumes our Eurocentric standards are the appropriate lens for assessing non-Western cultures. A respectful judgment must issue from a fusion of horizons.
10. Critique of “Bellow” (remember, we do not know that he said this)
   (a) assumes that to be valuable, a culture has to take a form that we can recognize as valuable from within our own standards.
   (b) assumes the Zulus have not yet made any worthy contributions
11. 72: basis of the presumption: “It is reasonable to suppose that cultures that have provided the horizon of meaning for large numbers of human beings, of diverse characters and temperaments, over a long period of time—that have, in other words, articulated their sense of the good, the hold, the admirable—are almost certain to have something that deserves our admiration and respect, even if it is accompanied by much that we have to abhor and respect.”