Unconscious and Disguised Emotions

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DISCUSSION

UNCONSCIOUS AND DISGUISED EMOTIONS

In Michael Fox's detailed and provocative discussion\(^1\) of my "Unconscious Emotions,"\(^2\) it is claimed that the "dispositional" analysis of unconscious emotional states that I offer will prove adequate in only "one kind of case" (and here, according to Fox, descriptions of unconscious affects must have either a "highly figurative" or "very different" sense), and that in the vast majority of cases a dispositional construction is strictly inappropriate because "the emotion" is experienced but intentionally and self-deceivingly misconstrued or disguised by the subject. While some of Fox's points are well taken, I want to argue that his alternative nondispositional thesis may raise more problems than it solves, and that his general strategy is vitiated because it is grounded in the highly questionable Cartesian-like proposition that it is, in the end, meaningless or inappropriate to ascribe emotional states in the absence of feelings, impossible, for example, to say of someone that he is afraid even though he does not feel afraid.

In the original paper I began by putting forth a (nonpsychoanalytic) case which I took to be relatively uncontroversial, but which strikes Fox as profoundly puzzling. The essential nature of our disagreement will become clear, I think, if we take a look at the sort of situation I had in mind:

When walking through the woods I come across a rattlesnake, and as soon as I see it I turn and run. I might truthfully report that I felt nothing, that I "had no time to feel anything," until after I stopped running. Yet, surely, it could be said that I ran because I was afraid. The object of fear is, in a perfectly straightforward way, the snake, and it is from fear of it that I run, even though, while running, I do not feel afraid. (p. 182)

I conclude from this that although the "experiential" aspect of the emotional state is not present, it could nonetheless be perfectly legitimate to say that I was afraid as soon as I saw the snake. This, it seems to me, is a quite natural description of the case, a fitting explanation of the action. If I recognized the situation for what it was, my response, however "instantaneous," is an action to be explained in psychological-intentional terms. My purposeful, rational

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reaction is to be explained, I would suggest, by saying that I ran
because I was afraid, that I ran out of fear.

According to Fox, however, it remains "unclear why we should
choose to say that he ran from fear, rather than that he became
afraid upon recalling the incident—i.e., that it was his reflection upon
the encounter, rather than the actual encounter itself, that made him
experience fear." (p. 158) Of course one could move in this direction,
but that will not achieve anything unless the sort of description he
suggests is to be preferred over mine no matter how I draw out the
case. Fox could say that I ran not out of fear, but simply because I
did not want to be bitten, simply because I wanted to avoid a danger-
ous situation, etc. But this will not accomplish what he wishes to
accomplish, for all that needs to be done is to build the case in such
a way that the resistances to cutting the allegedly logical connection
between being afraid and feeling afraid are shown to be no more
than that—mere resistance, mere philosophical prejudice. If I am
said to run with widened eyes, flailing arms, etc., it seems merely
pertinacious to refuse to say that I ran out of fear, that my being
afraid was the reason for or cause of my running. My behavior, my
subsequent feeling of fear and (as we are, of course, free to add) my
physiological state can all be characterized in such a way as to
weight the matter in favor of saying that, from the moment I spied
the snake, I was afraid. And let me add that we are not dealing here,
as Fox seems to think, with the question of "overriding" first-person
reports. The case should not be taken in terms of a subject-observer
controversy. No one is claiming that the agent is wrong about his
psychological state, that what he reports "incorrigibly" is subject to
correction. He reports that he does not, for a time, feel afraid; if he
also claims that for that reason it cannot be said that he is afraid,
he is drawing a (questionable) inference, making a philosophical
point; he is not reporting from a "privileged" point of view what he

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3 There seems to be some confusion about how emotion states of this sort explain
actions. Fox implies that my suggested explanation of the case under discussion would
fail to explain since "it scarcely seems reasonable to claim that a feeling at time \(t_j\) is
the cause or motivating factor of someone's behavior at an earlier time, \(t_i\)." (p. 157).
It does not follow from what I say that I am committed to any such absurd view.
What is meant is that the fear state sans feeling is the cause or motive. I do not say
that the subsequent feeling must occur in order that the state be correctly construed
as a fear state, and so, as I gather he reasons, become explanatory. I explicitly deny
(p. 185) that the eventual occurrence of the feeling is a necessary condition for saying
that the subject is afraid. Behind Fox's remarks is, no doubt, the pervasive assumption
that it must be meaningless or otherwise logically improper to say that a person can
be in an emotional state without experiencing the emotion.
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observes to be the case. The question of what to say, of how to describe the case can well be as much a matter of consideration or decision on my part as it is on the part of those observing my fear behavior, and I am not suggesting, as Fox thinks I am, that we can “afford to ignore or minimize what the subject under observation says about himself.” (p. 158) In the present case this issue is essentially beside the point.

Let us now turn attention to the psychoanalytic cases and to Fox's thesis that “unconscious emotion” is almost always meant to refer to situations in which the affect is experienced (and so not really unconscious) but self-deceivingly disguised. Fox says that ascriptions of emotional states to others cannot intelligibly be dispositional. For the subject in question must be experiencing something, or it is inappropriate, if not meaningless, to say that he is now in the emotional state ascribed, since being in it entails experiencing it. If he is in such a state, (even if he fails to represent it correctly to himself as such) this is a present state and not a disposition. (p. 160)

This raises an important claim, viz., that much of the talk about “unconscious emotion” in psychoanalytic contexts is to be construed in such a way as to involve not the assertion that phenomenological features of the emotion state are absent (repressed), but rather that some felt qualities are present but defensively (and intentionally) misperceived and disguised. If this thesis is modestly put forward, it is probably both significant and valid; I do not think, however, that Fox can use it as a way of showing that a dispositional analysis is either misguided or severely limited in its applicability.

The question that Fox raises here is whether a realization that something or other is the object or source of the feeling changes the feeling either qualitatively or in intensity. In psychoanalytic cases . . . it is unclear whether the patient's feelings change in kind, or just become more plainly (and undeceivingly) defined by him—and also more intense as a result—when once he realizes their proper object or source. (p. 159)

In accord with his thesis, Fox opts for the latter and cites a passage from Freud as support:

... it may happen that an affect or an emotion is perceived, but misconstrued. By the repression of its proper presentation it is forced to become connected with another idea, and is now interpreted by consciousness as the expression of this other idea. If we restore the true connection, we call the original affect 'unconscious,' although the affect was never unconscious but its ideational presentation had undergone repression. (“The Unconscious,” (1915) Collected Papers, Vol. IV, p. 110.)

This will not add much to Fox's argument, however, for all that Freud is pointing out here is that one use of “unconscious emotion” has to do with cases of this sort; cases where “the affect” is, in some sense to be regarded as “the same” even though the connection of the
emotion to its real source has been lost to consciousness. But this
does not lend much weight to the view that Freud is to be interpreted
as endorsing a nondispositional thesis; in the very same paragraph
Freud says that the true aim of repression is to suppress the develop-
ment (the conscious experiencing) of affect and that "In every in-
stance where repression has succeeded in inhibiting such develop-
ment we apply the term "unconscious" to those affects that are re-
stored when we undo the work of repression. So it cannot be denied
that the use of the terms in question is logical . . ."5 ("The Uncon-
scious," pp. 110-111)

So I think that Freud, contrary to what Fox wants to believe,
supports a dispositional interpretation of unconscious emotion. Also,
Fox's hopeful remarks about desirability of construing psychoana-
lytic cases (or at least the vast majority of such cases) as involving
"quantitative" but not "qualitative" change of the patient's feelings
cannot, I think, be adequately supported.

Let us try to shed some light on the issues that arise here by
discussing separately three different sorts of "neurotic" defenses.

Case 1. In hysterical conversions (hysterical blindness, hysteri-
cal paralysis, for example) it is typical that the subject feel very little
distress. He displays, as it is called, the belle indifférence of hysterics.
As the theory has it, the hysterically blind person "chooses" to be
blind because it resolves an unconscious conflict over seeing what is
"forbidden." If the patient is blind, he no longer need be distressed,
for now he is not only unable to see what would arouse a potentially
overwhelming sense of guilt,—he cannot see anything and so cannot,
as it were, be sensibly accused by others or by himself of wanting to
satisfy his forbidden impulse. At the same time, he imposes a punish-
ment upon himself, he evens the score by his own hand and so, by
self-imposed retribution, expiates the sin. In such a case as this, Fox
has no choice but to grant that a dispositional analysis is appropri-
ate. He objects, however, that "a highly figurative sense—or at least

4 Phobias would often be illustrative of this kind of case. In Freud's study of "Little
III, pp. 149-289), the subject has "replaced" his "real" fear—a fear of his father—with
a substitute fear—a fear of horses. It might be said that the experienced element is
"the same" in that it is fear, it is fear of a living thing, it is fear of a living thing
perceived as big, powerful, dangerous, etc. Cases of this variety are, I believe, the
hardest to deal with. Some of the problems with such cases are discussed below.

5 Freud means by "logical" that his dispositional analysis sketched here enables
him to deny that his commitment to the notion of "unconscious emotions" entails a
commitment to the obviously contradictory notion of "unfelt feeling."
very different sense—must be attached to ascriptions of unconscious emotions" with respect not only to "conversions" but also with regard to "any other psychoanalytic interpretation where the alleged "unconscious emotion" is not experienced as some present emotional state . . ." (p. 169)

There is no point to calling such ascriptions "highly figurative," and I do not see what could be gained by regarding them as involving a "very different sense." It cannot be said that the meaning of emotion words undergoes a change; the most that one could say is that the "psychoanalytic" use extends their scope of application. But even this apparently modest proposal tends to mislead, for people long before Freud were perfectly comfortable with the practice of ascribing beliefs and emotional attitudes to others despite their sincere (though self-deceived) disavowals. Accordingly, Freud felt no need to stipulate "new" meanings when talking about unconscious belief, guilt, love, anxiety, etc. Fox's argument for the alleged oddity of such ascriptions in the present variety of case is not of any help. He says that it would be "peculiar . . . to tell a patient who has allegedly converted anger into a headache, 'What you really feel is anger.'" (p. 169, his emphasis) This would not only be peculiar, it would be false; the subject, by hypothesis, does not feel angry. Fox's way of putting it reveals that he is assuming the point at issue; again he is assuming that an emotional state must essentially be a felt state. What the psychoanalyst may have evidence for saying (and may say without, I submit, violating the rules of meaningfulness) is that such a person is angry and that "he" (his unconscious ego) has, by employing unconscious but nonetheless intentional defensive maneuvers, "converted" a "dangerous" emotion into a "safer" and self-punishing

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6 Philosophers have often found the entire question of unconscious defensive behavior hopelessly puzzling or paradoxical. The source of this attitude is that they insist on taking the agent as equivalent to a conscious or Cartesian ego. The resulting view of agency does violence not only to psychoanalytical explanations, but also does more serious harm by artificially narrowing the scope of human action and hence imposing unnatural and counterintuitive limitations on the conception of moral responsibility. To put it bluntly, neurotic action is action despite its being "motivated" by unconscious wishes, and neurotics are, for the most part, morally responsible for what they do neurotically. Generally speaking, we ascribe responsibility to them and they accept responsibility for what they do. Freud insists that psychoanalysis, correctly understood, implies such a view: "The physician will leave it to the jurist to construct a responsibility that is artificially limited to the metapsychological ego. It is notorious that the greatest difficulties are encountered by attempts to derive from such a construction any practical consequences not in contradiction to human feelings." ("Moral Responsibility for Dreams" (1925), Collected Papers, Vol. V, p. 157.)
mode of expression. The hysterical symptom is then (in part) explained in terms of its being caused by the suppressed anger; the resultant state makes sense because it is proper to regard the individual as angry even though he does not experience such a felt quality. Similarly, the hysterically blind person's extraordinarily severe "resolution" of his problem makes sense only if he is taken to be anxious, deeply distressed, despite the fact that his state is now essentially distress-free. As with the nonpsychoanalytic case discussed earlier, it seems that this is by no means a peculiar way of talking. Additionally, as long as we get away from the habit of construing the psychological subject as a conscious ego, we are not forced into the position of thinking that the ascription of unconscious emotions must be taken as involving no more than "explanatory conveniences," or that unconscious affects are mere "hypothetical constructs." That view, I think, does commit us to peculiar and unprofitable ways of talking, for then we should have to say that the hyster is not really anxious, but nonetheless blames himself and keeps himself blind because he is, as it were, anxious. Since the hyster acts in ways which betray anxiety, and since his defenses can (rather easily) be broken down so that he comes to feel anxiety in predictable ways, we should conclude that hysteries are distressed people; and we should insist, for the reasons just given, that to say so is not to say something that is either paradoxical or different in sense from normal ways of talking.

Case 2. The defensive maneuver of reaction-formation provides us with an especially interesting kind of case for our purposes. In such cases, the agent experiences an emotion which, though critically relevant to the ascription of an unconscious affective state, does not lend itself at all comfortably to the sort of interpretation that Fox prefers. Consider the familiar case of sibling rivalry. A four-year old girl responds to the birth of a brother with evident jealousy and hostility. Since she finds that such behavior meets with strong parental disapproval, she becomes, after a short period of time, extremely affectionate and protective. Her newfound mothering attitude is reinforced and the pattern becomes well established. Her behavior, however, betrays, at least to the perceptive observer, an occasional but unmistakable tone of hostility. She is, let it be said, still quite jealous although there is every indication that her feelings toward the child are almost entirely positive. It is possible, although, given the brevity of the account by no means necessary, to regard her emphatic change as the sign of an unconscious reaction-formation.
She did not set out to replace jealousy with affection; rather, she at most found herself developing a new and generally opposite set of feelings. Love and concern have "replaced" jealousy and hostility. The question is, how can we intelligibly regard her experiential state as "misrepresented," how can we say of this case that the emotion is felt but not carefully or accurately discriminated? Since she does not feel hostility or hatred there seems to be no relevant felt quality which would enable us to get the nondispositional thesis off the ground. The circumstances here are very different from a case used by Fox to support the nondispositional or experiential theory:

\[\ldots a \text{ } \text{a person who does not realize that his overreaction to a given situation displays jealousy is not conscious of being jealous; but } \text{"[t]his does not mean that he does not feel the emotion that we call jealousy . . . " (p. 167)\text{}}\]

I am not sure that even in this situation we can say, at least without reservation, that the feeling of jealousy is present though unrecognized, but this sort of plea will surely not work in such cases where one experienced emotion is replaced by its opposite. Only a dispositional interpretation can make sense out of the ascription of "unconscious hostility" to the little girl. I think we are forced to say something along the following lines: "She is still jealous, still hostile, but those feelings have been repressed. We can see the behavioral expression of such a negative attitude upon occasion, and quite clearly when she is playing with her doll family, but we cannot say that she is self-deceivingly misconstruing the feelings that she does have. They are causally relevant but phenomenologically irrelevant. Her hostile feelings are effectively repressed and therefore unfelt; they are not felt but disguised."

Case 3. The "Little Hans" case would seem to be of just the right sort to lend itself to Fox's experiential interpretation. "The fear," it is said, is not repressed but simply "attached" to the wrong "object."

No one, as far as I know, objects to construing some aspects of some cases according to Fox's preference, but there are difficulties even in cases which seem quite agreeable to talk about unconscious emotions as presently experienced but misinterpreted feeling. Fox's remarks about the Little Hans case imply that there really are no serious hurdles in the way of the nondisposition account, but there are good reasons for doubting that this is really so. He says that "the emotion is, ex hypothesi, experienced and correctly represented

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7 Fox is citing John Macmurray, The Boundaries of Science: A Study of Psychology (London: Faber and Faber, 1939), pp. 243-44 (Fox's emphasis).
by the patient himself . . .” (p. 168) But what is “the emotion” and what does it mean to say that “it” is “correctly represented” by the patient? Hans does experience fear, and he knows that that is what he feels when he encounters horses. But is the experienced affect really the same kind of experience that he would come to have if the “true connections” are reestablished as the repressions are undone? Was the “true feeling” really “there” (though misrepresented) all the time, or at least at those times when he was experiencing fear of horses? It would seem that the phenomenological character of the fear changes in all sorts of ways so as to involve “qualitative” change (and not just “quantitative” changes in “intensity”) as Fox would have it. Beliefs, attitudes, tones of feelings that were deeply repressed come to him for the first time; their appearance to consciousness makes him experience things in a quite different way. That is why psychoanalytic psychotherapy that is really successful is marked by insights that are so very striking (sometimes overwhelmingly striking) to the patient. If, on the other hand, of course, the patient is generally inclined to say that what he feels now (upon gaining insight) is somehow really what he felt all along (“I think I really knew at the time that it was my father and not my department chairman that I hated”), then there is less reason to talk of repression and more reason to talk of disguised or unarticulated affect. But such talk cannot be taken to serve as grounds for replacing Freud’s model of repression and his conception of unconscious emotion. There are, without doubt, degrees of repression, but the closer we get to the “merely unarticulated feeling” end of the continuum, the less reason there is for talking about unconscious affect at all. If a person simply fails to “spell out” to himself that he feels depressed until he realizes that the tragic events reported on the morning news have colored his thoughts and feelings throughout the day (p. 159), he is not unconscious of his feeling in the Freudian sense at all. What Freud was interested in was the operation of repression, the very purpose of which is to keep the agent from feeling painful motions. If the repression is successful, or even partially successful in this respect, then it is necessary to talk about unconscious affect and to understand the matter dispositionally. But this does not mean that

8 Fox thinks that a dispositional analysis makes it a requirement that if we are to say that the unconscious emotional state ascribed is a justified ascription, then the patient’s avowals must bear this out. His objection to this alleged consequence takes the following form: “. . . even if the agent never acknowledges and avows the emotion which is allegedly operative in his behavior, we would still be entitled to maintain that
we cannot, when circumstances suggest, also talk about merely disguised feelings. What I do object to is the conclusion that unless "the feeling" is experienced, is "there" to be experienced (whatever this may turn out to mean) we are, when we ascribe unconscious emotions to people, either talking nonsense or, at best, somehow speaking peculiarly. An adequate conceptualization of Freudian insights can only be delayed, I think, if we persist in imposing upon ourselves unjustifiably conservative theories of meaningfulness.

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the description of his behavior given with reference to the allegedly unconscious emotion is accurate—provided of course, that we have very strong evidence and a sufficiently large body of generalizations drawn from similar cases in the past to fall back upon. On Mullane's dispositional account, however, this would be impossible." (p. 165) Of course this would be a most undesirable view to be burdened with, but a dispositional thesis does not entail it. What a dispositional view asserts is not that we cannot have good grounds for ascribing an unconscious emotion to a person unless that person makes the appropriate avowals; what is asserted is that the validational process in general is crucially dependent upon avowals. The connection, then, between feeling an emotion and being in that emotional state is "logical" in this sense, but in this sense only. To say that any given patient would avow the (correctly ascribed) unconscious emotion if the repression is lifted follows from the logic of psychoanalytic explanation; it is not "empirically" falsifiable and it does not commit us to saying that each correct ascription of unconscious affect depends upon an avowal.
DISCUSSION

UNCONSCIOUS EMOTIONS:
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR MULLANE

Professor Mullane argues, in his "Unconscious and Disguised Emotions," that my nondispositional construal of the ascription of unconscious emotions in psychoanalysis arises from a mistaken, "Cartesian" view, according to which it is meaningless to say that, e.g., *P is afraid* though he does not *feel* afraid. He then charges me (by implication) with holding an "unjustifiably conservative theor[y] of meaningfulness" (p. 411). It comes as a surprise to see my position so characterized, since I hold that Freud's ascription of unconscious mental events and processes, though in some sense continuous with similar ascriptions found in everyday life (even well before his time) *does* involve conceptual innovations, which we must be prepared to allow on the strength of the evidence he accumulated, and in order to treat neurotic symptoms. But it is often maintained — even by those prepared to allow this much—that in order to "save" Freud from falling into conceptual absurdity at certain points, and to insure that psychoanalysis has an adequate operational foundation, such ascriptions must be rendered dispositionally. In "On Unconscious Emotions," I tried to show that this is not so, and that we do a disservice to psychoanalysts by pushing this kind of analysis, for the reason that as therapists they must hold that their patients are at least partially responsible for bringing about and/or maintaining their own distressing conditions by (among other things) harboring certain feelings in relation to certain people, events, or situations, and refusing to be "self-disclosing." I submit, since it designates

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3 The terminology is borrowed from Herbert Fingarette's *Self-Deception* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969).
behavioral and physiological manifestations, but no experiential dimension, notwithstanding the fact that in almost all cases (hysterical conversion being a notable exception) P is obviously distressed or anxious, and sometimes acutely so.

Now what about the claim that P cannot be afraid unless he feels afraid? My puzzlement over this arose from Mullane's discussion of the "relatively uncontroversial" nonpsychoanalytic case of running away from a snake without feeling afraid at the time one is running, in his original article; for there, he says both: (a) "ordinarily part of what we mean by saying that I am afraid is that eventually, I actually experience feelings of fear" and: (b) "the occurrence of the feeling is not a necessary condition for saying that one is afraid or anxious" in the given kind of case. But surely (a) and (b) cannot both be true. However this question is to be resolved (and I do not think it has been resolved by Mullane's further remarks on the subject), psychoanalytic cases are of a very different sort, as we both agree. But what Mullane does not seem to appreciate is the great extent of this difference. For when an interpretation of P's behavior is given which involves reference to an unconscious emotion, then P's ultimate avowal that he has harbored such feelings all along, or that his behavior in certain situations has been motivated by such feelings all along, is crucial to the whole therapeutic procedure (speaking now both of cure and — contra Mullane — of validating individual interpretations).

Mullane misstates my position when he describes it as "Fox's thesis that 'unconscious emotion' is almost always meant to refer to situations in which the affect is experienced (and so not really unconscious) but self-deceivingly disguised" (p. 405; Mullane's italics). What I wish to argue is precisely that what is meant by "unconscious emotion" is an affect which is both experienced and "disguised" (i.e., self-deceivingly misrepresented by P to himself). Only by overlooking altogether the patient's willful complicity in his own self-deception, and by asserting quite dogmatically that experienced affect is "not really unconscious," can Mullane argue later on, in his example of reaction-formation, that "hostile feelings are effectively repressed and therefore unfelt; they are not felt but disguised" (p. 409). In this rendering, where is the conflict of emotions about which psychoanalysts spend so much time talking? While successful repres-

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5 Ibid., note 7.
6 What does Mullane mean by "disguised" feelings? Here, they are repressed and unconscious; but later, he opposes repressed feelings to "disguised or unarticulated affect" (p. 410), and again, to "merely disguised feelings" (p. 411).
sion is consciously distress-free, Freud was under no illusion that this was the subject of his investigations: If a repression does not succeed in preventing feelings of unpleasure or anxiety from arising, we may say that it has failed, even though it may have achieved its purpose as far as the ideational portion is concerned. Repressions that have failed will of course have more claim on our interest than any that may have been successful; for the latter will for the most part escape our attention. Thus it would seem that when he talks of repression as a clinically observed phenomenon, Freud is referring to "failed" repression (primarily), which allows affects into consciousness. When it is appropriate to label these as emotions, I should want to say that they appear to P's conscious awareness in a (deliberately) misrepresented form.

Mullane concedes that "Fox's thesis" (stated above), if "modestly put forward," is "probably both significant and valid" (p. 405); but he also denies that it is incompatible with the dispositional account he offers. Now Mullane is correct to emphasize (as I failed to do) that the undoing of repression and the consequent abreaction (e.g., in the "Little Hans"-phobia type of case) involves a significant and even dramatic qualitative (and not just quantitative) change in P's consciousness. But it does not follow that P necessarily experiences a qualitatively different feeling, even though we might want to say that the overall "structure" of his conscious state has altered. I suggest that only a careful phenomenological analysis of P's experience of abreaction could be expected to settle this issue.

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8 This explains why I said that in the case of hysterical conversion, a very different sense of "unconscious emotion" must be in use, since, ex hypothesi, the emotion has been "transformed" into a physiological incapacity. Mullane tries to have his cake and eat it, too, when he speaks of a hysterical symptom's "being caused by the suppressed anger" (p. 408; my italics). This would, of course, make the anger preconsciously in Freud's terms, and therefore, subject to immediate introspective awareness.