Modern Western Individualism

As a Basis for Political Theory

From Leviathan, by Thomas Hobbes (1651)

From The Second Treatise on Government, by John Locke (1689)

From Waiting for the Dawn, by the Confucian Huang Tsung-hsi (1663) (for contrast)

One of the best ways of understanding what is distinctive about Confucianism is to contrast it with some leading modern Western ideas, particularly that set of ideas surrounding AWestern individualism@. This is also an interesting area of comparison because individualism itself is often criticized today among Western thinkers themselves, particularly those grouped under the general name ACommunitarians@ (those who emphasize community rather than individuality).

The first two readings here are classic statements of some basic principles of Western individualism by three English philosophers, dating from about 1650-1860. The third reading 1.3 gives a Confucian account of the origins of society and government, included here for comparison to the comparable account given in the writings of the roughly contemporary English philosophers Hobbes and Locke.

From Leviathan, by Thomas Hobbes

 

The English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Hobbes is perhaps the earliest thoroughly Amodern@ Western political philosopher. This excerpt from his book Leviathan reflects two basic modern-Western assumptions that contrast sharply with classical Confucian ideas:

(1) one cannot simply take for granted the state as an existing institution; one has to begin from scratch, imagine a time when the state did not yet exist, and construct a thoroughly rational foundation for it; a political system is not legitimate unless it has a thoroughly rational foundation.

(2) the starting point for social and political theory is the perfectly free individual, not involved in any community, pursuing his or her own individual self-interest, according to Anatural law@ as Hobbes conceives of it; because each is competing with others to gain what he/she can, the primary, Anatural@ state of mankind is a state of Awar of all against all@; society and the state are secondary, Aartificial@ creations of these free self-interested individuals; one shows the rational foundation of society and the state by showing why it is that these free individuals, acting rationally in their own self-interests, would naturally decide to give up part of their freedom to form a social group and establish a political authority.

Chapter 14: Of the First and Second Natural Laws, and of Contracts

The RIGHT OF NATURE...is the liberty each man has, to use his own power as he himself wants for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own judgment and reason, he shall conceive to be the best means to do this.

By LIBERTY, is understood... the absence of external impediments, which... may... take away part of a man's power to do what he wants...

A LAW OF NATURE... is a precept, or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that, which is destructive of his life, or takes away the means of preserving the same; and to omit that, by which he thinks it may be best preserved...

And because the condition of man... is a condition of war of every one against every one; in which case every one is governed by his own reason; and there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life against his enemies; it follows, that in such a condition, every man has a right to every thing; even to one another's body. And therefore, as long as this natural right of every man to every thing endures, there can be no security to any man, (however strong or wise he may be,) of living out the time, which nature ordinarily allows men to live. And consequently it is a precept, or general rule of reason, that every man, ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it, and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of war...

From this fundamental law of nature, by which men are commanded to endeavour peace, is derived this second law; that a man be willing, when others are so too... to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself...

Right is laid aside... by transferring it to another. And... when a man has... granted away his right; then is he said to be OBLIGED, or BOUND, not to hinder those, to whom such right is granted...

Whenever a man transfers his right, or renounces it; it is either, in consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself; or for some other good he hopes for thereby. For it is a voluntary act: and of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some good to himself. And therefore there be some rights, which no man can be understood by any words, or other signs, to have abandoned, or transferred. As first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them, that assault him by force, to take away his life; because he cannot be understood to gain thereby any good to himself. The same may be said of wounds, and chains, and imprisonment... because there is no benefit [he might gain from this.

The motive, and end for which this renouncing and transferring of right is introduced, is nothing else but the security of a man's person, in his life, and in the means of so preserving life, as not to be weary of it. And therefore if a man by words, or other signs, seem to despoil himself of the end, for which those signs were intended; he is not to be understood as if he meant it, or that it was his will; but that he was ignorant of how such words and actions were to be interpreted.

 

From The Second Treatise on Government by John Locke.

 

John Locke (1632-1704), living in the next generation after Hobbes, clearly shares most of Hobbes= general assumptions described above, and uses the same strategy for laying rational foundation for the state. Locke=s writings greatly influenced the framers of the American Constitution 100 years later.

 

Of the State of Nature.

4. To understand political Power right, and derive it from its Original [basis], we must consider, what State all Men are naturally in, and that is, a State of perfect Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the Will of any other Man.

A State also of Equality, wherein all the Power and Jurisdiction is Reciprocal, no one having more than another... Creatures of the same species and rank... should also be equal one amongst another without Subordination or Subjection...

6. But though this be a State of Liberty, yet it is not a State of licence [freedom to do wrong]; though Man in that State have an uncontrollable Liberty, to dispose of his Person or Possessions, yet he has not Liberty to destroy himself, or... any Creature in his Possession, except where some nobler Use than its bare Preservation calls for it. The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one: And Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions....

19... Men living together according to Reason, without a common superior on Earth, with Authority to judge between them, is properly the State of Nature. But force, or a declared design of Force upon the Person of another, where there is no common Superior on Earth to appeal to for Relief, is the State of War.

And 'tis the want of such an Appeal [to a common Superior] that gives a Man the right of War even against an Aggressor... Thus a Thief... I may kill, when he sets on me to rob me but of my Horse or Coat; because the Law, which was made for my Preservation, where it cannot interpose to secure my Life from present Force... permits me my own Defence... a Liberty to kill the Aggressor, because the Aggressor allows not time to appeal to our common Judge...

Lack of a common Judge with Authority, puts all Men in a state of Nature: Force without Right, upon a Man's Person, makes a state of War...

21. To avoid this State of War ... is one great reason of Men's putting themselves into Society, and quitting the State of Nature....

 

123. If Man in the state of Nature be so free, as has been said; if he be absolute Lord of his own Person and Possessions, equal to the greatest and subject to no Body, why will he part with his Freedom? Why will he give up this Empire, and subject himself to the Dominion and Control of any other Power?

To which 'tis obvious to answer, that though in the state of Nature he hath such a Right, yet the Enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the Invasion of others. For all being Kings as much as he, every Man his Equal and the greater Part no strict Observers of Equity and Justice, the enjoyment of the Property he has in this State, is very unsafe, very unsecure. This makes him willing to quit this Condition, which however free, is full of Fears and continual Dangers: And 'tis not without Reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to join in Society with others, who are already united, or have a Mind to unite, for the mutual Preservation of their Lives, Liberties and Estates, which I call by the general Name, Property.

124. The great and chief end therefore, of Men's uniting into Commonwealths, and putting themselves under Government, is the Preservation of their Property [note that, according to Locke=s definition Aproperty@ includes Alife and liberty@]. To which in the state of Nature there are many things lacking.

First, there is a lack of an established, settled, known Law, received and allowed by common Consent to be the Standard of right and wrong, and the common Measure to decide all Controversies between them. For though the Law of Nature be plain and intelligible to all rational Creatures; yet Men being biased by their Interest, as well as ignorant for want of Study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a Law binding to them in the application of it to their particular Cases.

125. Secondly, In the state of Nature there is lacking a known and indifferent [impartial] Judge, with Authority to determine all Differences according to the established Law. For every one in that State being both Judge and Executioner of the Law of Nature, Men being partial to themselves, Passion and Revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much Heat, in their own Cases; as well as Negligence, and unconcernedness, to make them too remiss in others....

126. Thirdly, In the state of Nature there is often lacking a Power to back and support the Sentence when right, and to give it due Execution. They who by any Injustice offended, will seldom fail, where they are able, by Force to make good their Injustice; such Resistance many times makes the Punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive, to those who attempt it.

127. Thus Mankind, notwithstanding all the Privileges of the state of Nature, being but in an ill Condition, while they remain in it, are quickly driven into Society. Hence it comes to pass, that we seldom find any number of Men live any time together in this State. The Inconveniencies that they are therein exposed to, by the irregular, and uncertain exercise of the Power every Man has of punishing the transgressions of others, make them take Sanctuary under the established Laws of Government, and therein seek the preservation of their Property. 'Tis this makes them so willingly give up every one his single Power of punishing, to be exercised by such alone, as shall be appointed to it, amongst them; and by such Rules as the Community, or those authorized by them to that purpose, shall agree on. And in this we have the original right and rise of both the Legislative and Executive Power, as well as of the governments, and Societies themselves.