In Plato's time, many doubts were being raised concerning conventional ideas
of morality, potentially bringing about a general skepticism of moral goodness
in general.
From the point of view of the radical skeptic, thoroughgoing, open-eyed
intellectual honesty would logically lead to disillusionment, freeing a person
from the idea that there is any such thing as goodness, any difference between a
good life and a bad life, a meaningful life or a wasted life. Skeptics charged
that people who stubbornly resisted this conclusion were either:
- narrow-minded, uneducated, thoughtless people to whom
doubts have never occurred,
- stubborn conservatives attached to traditional morality
because of the security this offered, or
- gullible people who allow others to use morality as a means
of controlling them.
In many dialogues, Plato's Socrates obviously exhibits the
kind of radical questioning of ordinary moral norms that was leading others to
blanket skepticism. Plato's "Socratic" dialogues typically end inconclusively.
Socrates' conversation partners feel the ground underneath them shaken, their
former moral certainties undermined with nothing left to replace them. Their
discomfort causes them to give up.
This, Plato says, is where they went wrong -- not that they
began questioning, but that they gave up
too early. Radical questioning is indeed necessary to uncover the inadequacy of
people's normal ideas of moral goodness, to "know that one does not know" what
true goodness is. Otherwise one will have no incentive to inquire further and
develop truly sound moral ideals.
Plato's criticism of blanket skepticism is not that it
questions some things that should not be questioned. His remedy is not to draw
limits, saying that there are some things that are sacred, not to be questioned.
His charge against skepticism is not that it questions too much, but that it
stops too soon and too thoughtlessly. It is like a person whose frustration with
trying to understand what gravity is, leads her to conclude that gravity does
not exist.
Socratic questioning requires not only taking seriously
objections that happen to arise, but going out of one's way to creatively
construct objections, putting one's ideas to the most severe tests one can
devise. Plato's Socrates is not someone who places some ideas off limits to
questioning because they shake the confidence and security he has in already
settled notions.
But Platonist thought (in this critical reconstruction) shows
that, if one pursues this fundamental questioning in a completely thoroughgoing
way, and pursues very systematically the conclusions to which it leads, it will
lead to a very positive otherworldly, moral idealism, rather than to blanket
skepticism.
****
The kind of systematic reasoning involved here has a certain
structure to it. The following is an attempt to outline a critical
reconstruction of the main theoretical bases for this structured reasoning.
The first idea necessary for this critical reconstruction concerns the ultimate
goal of moral reasoning. It is important here to keep clearly in mind that the
goal is to formulate definitions of internal virtues that an individual can use
for purposes of molding her own character, and for self-evaluation. What must be
shown about any such virtue-concept is that it represents something always and
only admirable, to guarantee that any progress made toward approximating this
concept in one's character will assuredly make one a more admirable person. This
goal is very different from common goals today, such as: Deciding on rules for
how to behave, deciding on moral "first principles" from which one can deduce
practical conclusions, reaching universal agreement on moral norms, and so on.
("Utilitarian" and "Deontological" ethics -- the two dominant schools of
Enlightenment philosophy -- are both dominated by these kinds of concerns.)
The second important idea concerns the ultimate
basis for
moral reasoning. The basis in this case consists in personal perceptions of what
is admirable and not admirable in the concrete cases where this is very clear,
not problematic, not doubtful, not a mixture of admirable and not-admirable, not
a dilemma.
All moral questioning must have some ultimate basis that is
not questioned. Even the most fundamental questions have no force unless the
questions rest on a solid basis that can be taken for granted, not questioned.
Personal perceptions in clear cases form such a basis for Socratic questioning.
What then is the key problem to be addressed in this kind of reasoning? The
problem is this: I can be confident in my perceptions of what is admirable and
not admirable in clear concrete cases. What is difficult is to articulate in a
very precise way exactly what it is that I admire.
Consider the following fictional story: Elsa, a champion
skier, suffers a severe accident which would cause most people to give up
skiing. She doesn't give up, but courageously perseveres in a very disciplined
program of physical therapy for several years, and eventually comes back to win
the Giant Slalom in the World Olympics. I greatly admire Elsa's story when I
read it. But precisely what do I admire about Elsa? I might say, "I admire her
because she came back to win the Olympics."
But if "winning the Olympics" precisely describes what I
admire, then it should be true that I admire everyone who wins the Olympics, no
matter how they do it, or under what circumstances. Next I read a story about
Terry, who wins by using various devious means to eliminate her main competitors
(hires thugs to break their legs, slips drugs into their drinks so they fail
drug tests, etc.) I thought I admired Elsa "because she won the Olympics," but I
don't admire Terry who "won the Olympics."
The Terry story is a "counterexample" to my belief that what
I admired about Elsa is that she "won the Olympics." This doesn't show that I
was wrong to admire Elsa. If the fictional Elsa story shows someone clearly and
unmistakably, undoubtedly admirable, I should be confident that there was
something there to admire. What the Terry story shows I was wrong about, is the
way I articulated what I admire about Elsa. I might then go back to the Elsa
story and consider more carefully how to articulate in a more precise way what I
admire about her. This might lead me then to think of the virtues exhibited in
the story, perseverance, courage, ambition, self-discipline, and so on. What I
really admire is not that she won, but all the admirable personality traits she
exhibited in overcoming her difficulties. This would lead me down the road of
Socratic reasoning described in the previous essay, "How
to conduct a Socratic Discussion."
How would this further the ultimate goal of Socratic/Platonic
reasoning? The goal is to give me criteria to use for self-evaluation. What
should be the basis for my self-esteem and sense of self-worth?
My initial response to the Elsa story might be that I too want to win the
Olympics. Not only do I want to win, but my identity and self-esteem becomes
wrapped up in the image of myself as successful Olympic skier. I'm proud of
myself when I win, but suffer great loss of self-esteem and become severely
depressed, suffering an "identity crisis," when I lose.
More careful articulation of what exactly I admired in the
Elsa story would have saved me from this problem. Not only is "winning the
Olympics" a less psychologically reliable basis than internal virtue in the long
run. Socratic reasoning shows that it is also an unsound basis from a rational
point of view. Even if I continue to win, to base my sense of self-worth on
winning is to base it on something that is not really a valid basis for
self-esteem. I can know this, not because some other authority declares it. I
would know this if I am intellectually honest and willing to subject my beliefs
on this matter to questioning in the light of my own perceptions.
The point made in these stories involving winning in sports can be made in
stories about other things that people often take as sources of self-esteem:
Wealth, physical beauty, reputation, privileges, success, living up to
conventional social standards of conduct, and so on. In each case, it is easy to
make up counterexamples showing that a person can have any of these external
"appearances" of virtue without being a truly admirable person. It's not that
these things are "bad" in themselves, or that it is wrong to strive for them, or
that they never accompany true goodness as signs of something genuinely
admirable. It's just that intellectual honesty shown in systematic and
fundamental questioning can show that these are not valid grounds for
self-esteem, bad norms to take for purposes of self-evaluation.
*****
Following this introduction, the theoretical basis for
Socratic/Platonic reasoning can be explained in terms of four basic principles:
#1. The goal of this reasoning is to formulate
virtue-concepts, as pure and perfect as possible, that I as an individual can
use for purposes of self-molding and self-evaluation, being assured that any
step I make toward realizing them in my character is always makes me a more
admirable person.
#2. The ultimate basis of this reasoning is personal perceptions of what
is admirable and not admirable in very clear and unproblematic concrete cases
described in fictional stories.
#3. The negative use of clear concrete fictional stories as
"counterexamples," uncovering a weakness in some given proposed definition of a
particular virtue, and remedying these weaknesses to gradually formulate
virtue-concepts more and more immune from questioning-by-counterexamples.
#4. The positive use of fictional concrete stories exhibiting truly
admirable instances of some particular virtue, as a basis from which to mentally
extract abstract perfect ideas of a particular virtue.
S/P reasoning is "inductive," meaning that clear perceptions in
concrete cases are regarded as the most reliable basis for moral reasoning, and
any general principle must sustain itself in the light of such perceptions, by
showing that it is consistent with all such perceptions. By contrast:
Utilitarian and Deontological moral philosophy rely on deductive models
of moral reasoning, assuming that general principles are the most
reliable basis for moral reasoning -- we should not rely on personal perceptions
in particular cases, but judge what is good/not-good in particular cases by
applying the general principles. Appendix I
tries to further clarify these principles of Socratic/Platonic reasoning by
contrasting its aims and methods with those underlying Utilitarian philosophy.
******
Earlier essays have explained in some detail the most essential goal that
Socratic/Platonic reasoning needs to try to achieve: To provide a rational
foundation for individual Platonist otherworldliness centered on perfect
virtue-concepts, "Platonic Forms." Some important features to keep in mind are:
A-In this critical reconstruction, both the goal and the
reasoning processes are "individualist," in the sense that this is a process by
which an individual can formulate virtue-ideals to mold her own character on.
Play the part of a person interested in molding your own character, to become a
different and better person than you presently are, for its own sake.
Socratic/Platonic reasoning is not a good method for arriving at moral ideals
that everyone can agree upon, or moral ideals to serve as a basis for reform of
society as a whole. It should be possible for any individual to adopt Platonism
as a way of life for herself in any society, assuming no change at all in anyone
else or the society around her.
B-Critical reconstruction of Platonism today needs to
explicitly incorporate an open pluralism concerning the number of virtues there
might be. There is no rational way of limiting the number of virtues there might
be, or of demonstrating that some particular definition of a particular virtue
is the only correct one, all others being necessarily incorrect. This is another
reason why it cannot be the goal of this reasoning to arrive at universal
agreement concerning the one and only way of becoming an admirable human being,
or leading a great life.
C-The goal of this kind of reasoning should be to formulate a
clear and specific concept of a virtue which you as an individual could use as a
model to model your own character on. A virtue is something internal and not directly
visible from the outside. It is an enduring part of a person's personality that
spontaneously comes into play and manifests itself in admirable behavior when
the situation calls for it, but which is present even when it is not being
manifested externally. A virtue needs to be described in terms of such things as
habitual motivations, fundamental attitudes, skills, habitual priorities for
attention and concern.
By contrast, here are some things that should not be
conceived of as the main goal of Socratic/Platonic reasoning:
- It does not aim to give a person rules for how to behave.
(Socratic questioning shows that the essence of what makes a person admirable
cannot consist in exact observance of any particular rule.)
- It does not yield moral "first principles" from which to
deduce practical conclusions for behavior (such as Kant's "treat others as ends
never as means").
- It cannot resolve all moral dilemmas. Life presents us with
many cases in which the claims of one virtue conflict with the claims of
another. For example, loyalty to a friend might conflict with honesty in
testifying against the friend in court. Socratic reasoning can help define the
virtues loyalty-at-its-best and honesty-at-its-best. It cannot determine ahead
of time whether loyalty should take precedence over honesty on all occasions, or
vice versa.
- It cannot decide minimal rules for moral conduct in social
interactions, prescribing what it is that people have a right to expect from
each other.
Socratic/Platonic reasoning might help in achieving some of the goals eliminated
above. It might for example bring several people more in accord with each other
in their concept of love or courage. For present purposes, the important points
are:
1-Failure to achieve other desired goals such as agreement should
not be allowed to lead to skepticism of the method itself.
2-The desire to achieve certain other goals should not be
allowed to interfere with Socratic methodological principles. For example,
desire to reach agreement with others should not be allowed to interfere with
the individualist "midwife" principle of Socratic reasoning, so that it leads a
person to argue with others rather than stick to articulation and critical
examination of her own beliefs.
*****
This reasoning method does assume that we have a reliable source of moral
knowledge. The most reliable source of moral knowledge is personal perceptions
of what is admirable and not-admirable illustrated in clear and unproblematic
fictional stories.
Real life, of course, presents us with many situations in
which it is not clear what is the admirable thing to do. But if you want to, it
is possible to make up stories and add enough details to the story to make it
very clear that some course of action is either clearly admirable or clearly not
admirable. Since the purpose of such stories is not to judge individuals but to
provide material for reflection on abstract virtue concepts, it is better to
make up fictional stories, to avoid the problem of uncertainty when it comes to
the motives or thinking of actual individuals.
Personal perceptions might at first appear too "subjective"
to provide a reliable source of moral knowledge. Such an objection seems to rely
implicitly on contrast with the "hard data" relied on in the modern physical
sciences, and also assumes that agreement should be the goal of reasoning. The
present critical reconstruction relies here on the concept of "soft
objectivity." That is, perceptions of what is admirable and not admirable do not
have the same degree of hard objectivity as data relied on in the physical
sciences. But this does not mean that they are "subjective" in the sense that
they are completely arbitrary. "Admirable," is a term like the terms "funny,"
"beautiful," or "interesting." The perception of a joke as "funny" is a
"subjective" perception in the sense that only human beings (not machines or
computers) can perceive the funniness of jokes. Nevertheless, either I perceive
a joke to be funny or I do not -- if I do not, I cannot make myself perceive it
to be funny just by arbitrarily willing to perceive it so. The same is true of
"admirable" and "not admirable" illustrated in the conduct of characters in
clear and unproblematic fictional stories.
This is important because Socratic self-questioning depends
on uncovering gaps between a my own beliefs on the one hand, and my own actual
perceptions in concrete cases, on the other. If Polemarchos could simply and
arbitrarily will himself to perceive returning weapons to an insane person as
something right and admirable, he would have no difficulty in upholding his
announced principle that "rightness consists in returning to each what is his."
It is only because he perceives returning weapons to an insane man to be
"not right" that he is led to question the principle he at first thought he
believed in.
Despite the doubts professional philosophers today express in
their professional writings, this kind of soft objectivity is something most
people (including philosophers) take for granted in the everyday conduct of
life. Among all the doubts people have about morality in general, few people
doubt their perception that pedophile priests are not admirable, or that it is
not admirable to kill another person in a struggle over tennis shoes. (I
don't mean to dismiss the doubts of professional philosophers today -- problems
brought about largely by modern developments in the physical and cultural
sciences, and thus not addressed by Plato. I address the very fundamental
and very difficult philosophical problems involved in the fourth section of a
book in progress. See especially
the essay "Why this is not relativism?")
Regarding perceptions in clear cases as the most reliable source of moral
knowledge, makes Socratic reasoning an "empirical" discipline resembling the
physical sciences. It is only that the soft objectivity of personal perceptions
of admirable/not-admirable takes the place of the hard data gathered today and
quantified by scientific instruments. Otherwise, Socratic reasoning resembles
research in the physical sciences, in that there also empirical data also takes
precedence over theoretical principles. If new, secure data is found that
contradicts some established theory, the general assumption is that the theory
is faulty, and needs to be revised in the light of the new data. Similarly,
Socratic reasoning assumes that, if my perceptions in some very clear case
conflicts with some moral belief I have, this shows a defect in my belief, which
needs to be revised in the light of the new perception.
It is in the nature of all empirical disciplines that theory
can never be known to be completely finished. Theory in the physical sciences
can never be certainly known to be completely finished, because we never know
what new data might turn up that contradict our present theory, showing that the
theory needs to be revised. Similarly, I can never know with certainty that some
particular virtue-concept I have arrived at is final and will never need
revising, because I can never be certain that further counterexamples will not
show up, uncovering some unsuspected difficulty necessitating further revisions.
As in the physical sciences, I can know that I am making progress, that some
concept of courage I have now is closer to being a Platonic Form than concepts I
had before engaging in the criticizing and refining process. I can never know
certainly that there is no more progress to be made.
*****
It would be possible, of course, to make up only fictional stories that
confirm my present beliefs. This would indeed make Socratic reasoning
"subjective" in the sense of arbitrary. I could arbitrarily decide what to
believe, and arbitrarily make up only those stories which support these moral
beliefs.
This is why an essential part of intellectual honesty in
Socratic reasoning is to deliberately set out to make up stories that conflict
with and undermine beliefs that I might at first take for granted as obvious. Moral ideals are
sound to the extent that they can withstand any doubts raised against them. I
can only be confident in the soundness of my moral ideals if I have seriously
tried to subject them to the most strenuous tests I can devise. (This is the
same principle that obtains in the physical sciences. Experiments designed to
confirm some established theory is dishonest research. The only way to know
whether a theory is truly sound is to make up experiments that put the theory to
the most severe tests one can devise. A sound theory is a theory that can
survive the most severe tests.) Socratic reasoning can thus be regarded as a
systematic acceleration of a process that happens more slowly and haphazardly in
life, which we call "learning from experience" -- when life-experiences cause us
to question and revise our formerly held notions.
It is still important to hold to the individualist "midwife"
principle of Socratic reasoning. No individual needs to answer objections made
by others who are arguing with her, unless she herself agrees to these
objections. Ultimately, Socratic questioning has to be a process of uncovering
conflicts and contradictions within a given individual's own moral beliefs and
moral perceptions.
******
What prevents unrestricted Socratic questioning from
resulting in blanket moral skepticism?
Return here to the method of Socratic questioning, by
"counterexample." What exactly do counterexamples show?
For instance: When thinking about the virtue of honesty, I
might be tempted to define the virtue of honesty as the habit of "telling the
truth." If "telling the truth" precisely describes the essence of what makes
honesty admirable, it would be true that everyone telling any truths under any
circumstances would be admirable. But here is a fictional counterexample showing
someone "telling truths" but not being admirable: Jane gets up in a church
service and recites baseball statistics, "telling many truths" about baseball
players and baseball history.
This does not show that the phrase "telling the truth" is completely wrong, that
it never expresses anything admirable at all. What it shows is ambiguity. The
phrase "tell the truth" is capable of referring to something very admirable
(taking the blame for something I did rather than passing it on to another), but
also capable of referring to something not admirable (Jane telling truths about
baseball at a church service).
Further, every counterexample reveals a particular and
specific ambiguity, which can be remedied by a specific clarification and
refinement. The specific problem uncovered in the Jane story is that "tell the
truth" can refer to telling truths that are irrelevant to the situation at hand.
Reflecting on the specific problem suggests a specific clarification: The virtue
of honesty consists in the habit of "telling truths relevant to the situation."
This improved definition is of course susceptible of further questioning by
counterexample: Jane tells a murderer a relevant truth about the whereabouts of
his intended victim. But this counterexample also shows a particular and
specific ambiguity in the phrase "telling relevant truths," and can be remedied
by another specific clarifying refinement.
This is the main point:
"Ambiguity" is capable of degrees. A definition of a
virtue can be more ambiguous or less ambiguous with respect to
goodness. The goal of Socratic questioning by counterexample is to
systematically uncover specific ambiguities in accepted ideas, one at a time,
and remedying each ambiguity by a specific refinement. As in the case of
theoretical physics, a person can be sure that they are making progress, that
the virtue-concepts resulting from this process are less ambiguous and more
precise than the concepts one started from. One can never be certain one has
reached an end of the process, that there are no more ambiguities to be
uncovered. But one can be confident that every ambiguity that is uncovered in
the future will be a specific ambiguity that can be remedied by a specific
clarifying refinement.
******
Anyone who has tried this, even for a short time, realizes
that it is amazingly difficult to formulate a virtue-concept that will withstand
Socratic questioning by counterexample. But two things can be said that will
speed up the process: :
First, after a little experience and reflection, it will
become evident that there are some kinds of clarifying refinements guaranteed
not to work in the long run. The main example here is that we can know ahead of
time that the essence of what makes a particular virtue admirable can never
consist in the habit of following some particular rule for how to behave.
The fundamental problem with this is that, no matter how good
or complex the rule is, a cynical person could follow the rule for bad reasons.
A terrorist could follow the rule in order to appear virtuous, to gain people's
confidence, so she could eventually blow them up. A cynical politician could
hire a virtue-consultant to follow her around and tell her how to appear
virtuous, go to acting school to appear sincere -- all for the purpose of
getting elected so she could enrich herself at public expense. Any good rule can
be followed for bad reasons.
This is a universal counterexample, showing that all rules for external behavior
will be ambiguous. We can know ahead of time that going down this road -- trying
to make up more and more sophisticated rules for what to do -- leads nowhere.
True goodness must always consist in something internal to a person, what
motivates the person do act the way she does.
So in making up clarifying refinements, much more rapid
progress can be made by keeping one's mind focusing on the goal described in
principle #1: Describing internal habits of mind, priorities for attention and
concern, motivations, fundamental attitudes, skills, etc.
The second way in which this process can be speeded up can be
put in terms of the old adage, "The best defense is a good offense."
Remember that the basic problem, suggested in the "midwife" image, is the
problem of precise articulation. Socratic reasoning assumes that individuals
already have in themselves some kind of knowledge of the various virtues. The
problem is only that the knowledge they have is vague and confused. Familiar and
easy-to-understand concepts (shaped largely by social usage describing how
people appear externally to each other) prove also to be very inexact and
ambiguous when it comes to pure goodness. The real task necessary to achieve the
goal of Socratic/Platonic reasoning is the task of exact articulation. If I
could right away articulate in a completely exact and precise way my sense of
what makes honesty admirable, this would right away be a concept capable of
withstanding Socratic questioning by counterexample. The best defense against
Socratic questioning is a good offense.
This points also to the creative element in this kind
of reasoning. We can speak of "discovering" the essence of what makes honesty
admirable. But this is not like discovering a new insect species in the
rainforest. In this latter case the insects are already out there fully formed
-- it is only a matter of getting in the right place at the right time to see
them. The essence of honesty, by contrast, is not something lying around to be
discovered, but the product of creative articulation. Properly speaking, a
person does not discover a correct definition of honesty's essence. She creates
a definition, and then discovers it to be a good definition by its ability to
withstand Socratic questioning by counterexample. (Again, this is not unlike
theoretical physics. It took great creative effort on Newton's part to formulate
a "law of gravity." He created the mathematical formula, which was discovered to
be a true formula so long as no observed events contradicted it.)
******
This fourth principle has to do with the positive relation between concrete examples and abstract Platonic Forms. It can be stated in two parts:
A- Concrete examples and easy-to-understand concepts of goodness are our only
direct source of knowledge of virtue. They are most readily accessible to
understanding, but also imperfect in their ability to represent something only
and always admirable.
B-Platonic Forms are pure and precise representations of what
is only and always admirable, but they are hardest to grasp, and least readily
accessible to understanding. We only come to know them by using concrete
examples and familiar concepts as starting points. The way we come to know them
is by generalization from, and refinement of, our perceptions of concrete
admirable examples.
Some analogies will help here:
- Pure silver exists in silver ore, but it exists there in an
impure way, mixed with other things. We get pure silver by starting with impure
silver ore and refining it to extract the pure silver from the rest of the
materials in the ore. In the same way, it can be said that pure goodness exists
in our perceptions of goodness in concrete cases. But no particular concrete
case represents something purely, only and always admirable. Platonic reasoning
is a process of mentally extracting pure and perfectly refined concepts of
goodness from these imperfect concrete representations.
- Suppose I want to make rose perfume, "rose essence." The
fragrance I want exists in rose bushes, but it exists there in a diluted form
mixed with many other things. Distilling rose essence requires somehow isolating
just that liquid in the rose that contains the fragrance, separating it from
everything else in rose bushes, and distilling it down so that it has this
fragrance in its most pure and concentrated form. Then I would have rose-scent
in its most intense form, more intense than it actually occurs in roses.
In the same way, the Platonic Form of Courage, a Platonic
"essence" of Courage, exists in our perceptions of particular concrete visible
examples of courage -- a soldier standing at his post, a fireman saving someone
from a burning building. But no particular visible example of courage represents
something only and always admirable. We come to know the Platonic Form of
courage by mentally extracting a pure concept of courage from such concrete
examples. (This point is drawn from some key passages on the Forms in
Plato's Republic Books 5-7, as explained in a
separate essay giving a detailed
commentary on these passages.
This point can be put in another way by thinking again of
precise "articulation." As an example, in Plato's dialogue Laches, Socrates asks
the Athenian general Laches "What is courage?" Laches answers, "It is standing
at one's post and not running away." Socrates poses some counterexamples, for
instance a case in which an army's strategy is to fake withdrawal for the sake
of an ambush. In this case "standing at one's post" would not represent
admirable courage. This shows that the phrase "standing at one's post" does not
represent something only and always admirable.
But Laches was not completely wrong when he started by
reaching into his memory for a concrete visual image of a courageous person.
Concrete examples of courageous actions are our only source of knowledge of the
virtue of courage. Laches' problem was a problem of inadequate articulation. He
was right to admire soldiers he had seen standing bravely at their posts. It's
just that "standing at their posts" did not articulate in a very precise way
what it is that he actually admired. If it did, then he would admire everyone
who stands at their post under any circumstances, which he really does not.
In Plato's language, "standing at one's post" represents the
external "appearance" of courage, not its inner and invisible "essence." This
essence of courage lies buried somewhere in his perception of visible courageous
actions. Verbalizing this essence would mean articulating in a very clear and
precise way what it is that he actually did admire. Later in the dialogue,
Laches actually makes some progress in this more precise articulation when he
revises his definition and says "courage is a certain tenacity of soul." Under
further Socratic questioning, this proves to be not fully satisfactory, but it
is a step in the right direction. "Tenacity of soul" clearly remedies the
weakness and ambiguity that earlier counterexamples had revealed in the phrase
"standing at one's post." One can also note that "tenacity of soul" articulates
something more internal, invisible, and abstract than "standing at one's post."
Using the concept of "articulating" to clarify this aspect of
Socratic/Platonic reasoning highlights its creative character. Coming to know
the Platonic Form of some particular virtue is not a matter of surveying
already-clear, familiar, ready-made concepts and words, and just hitting on the
right one. It means trying to find creative ways of articulating something very
difficult to articulate. Paradoxically, a Platonic Form is something one already
knows, but is most difficult to know. That is, it is paradoxically something one
already knows, and something most difficult to know -- i.e. something one
already knows intuitively in a vague and confused way, but something very
difficult to articulate in a very clear and precise way.
Plato's favorite way of representing this relation between
concrete perceptions and abstract Platonic Forms is to say that concrete reality
"participates in" the abstract Forms. A courageous action on the part of a
particular soldier is not itself the pure Platonic Form of Courage, but this
concrete courageous action "participates in" the Platonic Form of Courage.
A concrete example of courage gives us access to knowledge of
pure and perfect Courage, because it "participates in" this pure and perfect
Courage. But participation also explains how the ideal Platonist as an
individual concretely existing in this world relates to the transcendent
otherworldly Platonic Forms. She never expects to concretely realize the full
perfection of the Platonic Forms in her own being, but tries to approximate or
"participate in" them as much as she can in her inevitably imperfect concrete
individual existence. In my terms, when she considers who-I-am for purposes of
self-evaluation, she does not measure herself in terms of any prescriptions for
external behavior, but in terms of how well she approximates the pure and
perfect virtue-Forms she has come to know through Socratic/Platonic reasoning.
*****
In Plato's writing, this idea of the positive relation
between imperfect concrete reality and perfect Platonic Forms is well
represented in the image of a mental "ladder" in Plato's Symposium. Here is the
relevant passage:
[To learn about beauty, one should] start when young by pursuing beautiful
bodies. First... he will love one beautiful body... then he must realize that
the beauty attached to one body is kin to [the beauty] attached to another body,
so if it is necessary to pursue beauty in Form, it is great folly not to regard
as one the Beauty found in all bodies. Realizing this he must make himself a
lover of all beautiful bodies...
After this he must realize that the beauty in souls is of much more value than
the beauty in the body, [so that] if there is a soul with a little bloom [of
beauty] beginning in it, he will love and care for it...
Contemplating [many specific] beautiful things rightly and in due order... he
will suddenly have revealed to him something wonderful...
This [the Form of Beauty] is something always-being, not
coming into being and perishing, not increasing and decreasing... It is not
partly beautiful and partly shameful, nor now [beautiful] now-not [beautiful],
nor in some respects beautiful and in some respects shameful... Nor will the
beautiful appear to him as a face, or hands, nor any other part of the body...
nor something existing in something else... but always being something
single-formed having its own being with itself in itself... All other beautiful
things participate in this, in such a manner that, while these other things come
into being and perish, this thing becomes neither greater nor lesser...
Beginning from those beautiful things, always ascending
upward for the sake of The Beautiful, like someone using the steps of a ladder,
from one to two, and from two to all beautiful bodies, and from beautiful bodies
to beautiful institutions, and from institutions to beautiful learnings, and
from beautiful learnings... to that learning which is none other than the
learning concerning The Beautiful...
What would you think if it happened to someone to see The
Beautiful, exact, pure, unmixed... [What if] he were able to see unique Divine
Beauty? Does it seem to you a trifling life for a man to lead, looking ‘over
there,' contemplating it the way it should be [contemplated]?...
Seeing The Beautiful through what is visible, [he will] bring
forth not images of virtue [aręte], since he is in touch not with images [of
virtue] but with true [virtue]... When he has brought forth and reared true
virtue he is destined to become God-pleasing.
(Note that whereas the English word "beauty" has strong associations with
visual beauty, the Greek word Plato uses is kalos, which also has a
broader meaning of "fine," "noble," or "refined." This is why Plato can refer to
"beautiful laws and institutions," and also regard "beauty" (to kalon)
as a personal "virtue" (arete).)
This idea of the relation between concrete but imperfect
examples, and perfect but abstract Ideas, formed the basis for a later
Judeo-Christian and Islamic traditions concerning the possibility of knowing
God, known as the doctrine of "Analogy." For example, God's love is thought to
be completely perfect, unlike the imperfect love we are familiar with in human
life. But the imperfect love easily accessible to human understanding is
analogous to God's perfect love, and so we can come to understand God's perfect
qualities by using imperfect human examples as starting points, then imagining
what these qualities would be at their most perfect. This is a way of climbing a
mental ladder from imperfect concrete reality to perfect transcendent reality.
I will call this fourth principle "The Principle of Analogy
and Participation," or "Plato's Ladder," and will make extensive use of this
idea in subsequent treatment of early Buddhist and early Christian ideas.
Click here
for a more extensive discussion of the principle of analogy and its role in
medieval theology and philosophy (from the online Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy).
******
The theoretical principles behind Socratic/Platonic reasoning
can be summed up as follows:
1- Our perceptions of the concrete, visible, familiar world
around us are ultimately the only basis for moral knowledge, and so constitute
an indispensable starting point for knowledge of perfect Platonic Forms ("bottom
rungs" on Plato's ladder).
"Perceptions of concrete visible reality" here
consist in personal perceptions of concretely visualizable human behavior in the
case of clear concrete stories. We only acquire knowledge of admirable courage,
for example, by being exposed to visualizable concrete behavior exhibiting
admirably courageous behavior. The "knowledge that is in us," does not consist
in "innate ideas" that can be known through introspection or "pure
reason" considered apart from actual experiences in the concrete world. It consists in the
ability to recognize admirable courage, honesty, love, etc. when we see it.
2- The intellectual mistake people commonly make is to stick
with images of concrete visible reality when they try to define moral ideals as
bases for self-evaluation. Because of concrete-mindedness, they remain on the
bottom rungs of Plato's ladder, refusing to try to climb higher mentally, to
more perfect virtue-concepts at the top of the ladder. Concrete reality,
whatever can be represented in concrete, visualizable imagery, and all concepts
simple and easy to understand, are inevitably imperfect, not worthy of
unreserved commitment and loyalty.
This negative aspect of concrete reality (more exactly of
concrete-mindedness), is represented in Plato's Parable of the Cave.
Concrete-minded people are confined to a cave, seeing only shadows cast by
realities in the Real World outside the cave. The "Real World" is the world of
Platonic Forms, cave-shadows are visible reality that imperfectly participate in
the Forms but are not the perfect Forms themselves.
3- As to living one's life, an individual person cannot
expect to actually and fully become perfect as the Forms are perfect. All
concretely existing individuals, and all concrete human life and conduct, belong
to the imperfect world "here below." It would be a mistake to try to live in the
other world of perfect Forms. But it's also a mistake to take the concrete
visible achievements, or the concrete norms of society, as an evaluative context
for defining one's moral identity, allowing one's self-esteem to depend on
these. Perfect Forms are alone deserving of unreserved loyalty and commitment,
and alone deserve to be taken as norms for self-evaluation and for defining
one's moral identity. The ideal Platonist keeps her mental eyes fixed on the
perfect Forms and tries to make her life "participate" in the Forms as much as
possible.
One way of making clear the purpose and method of
Socratic reasoning is to contrast it with a type of moral thinking called
"utilitarianism." The British philosophers Jeremy Bentham and James Mill are
generally thought to be the modern pioneers developing and popularizing this
point of view.
Utilitarianism is the view that what makes behavior morally
good is that it promotes the greatest good for the greatest number of people.
Here are some major contrasts in the aims and methods of utilitarian philosophical thinking.
#1. "Utilitarian" thinking judges everything by its usefulness. A is of value only because it is useful for producing B. But this can't go on forever. A is useful because it produces B, B is useful because it produces C, C is useful for producing D, ......) Ultimately A is only really valuable if there is something that the end product of this whole chain, valued for its own sake, not because is useful for something else. Jeremy Bentham proposed that the end of the chain should be "happiness" more or less defined as the greatest pleasure and the absence of pain.
Platonism assumes that each individual virtue is something admirable and valuable in its own right. A person is a good person if she has good and admirable habitual motivations. The motivations need to be good in themselves. There is no other reason to be good. Actions doing good things for other people that are motivated by motives other than admirable motives, do not make that person genuinely admirable as a person. (When a politician donates money to cure AIDS just to get votes, good is done, but the goodness is not in the politician.)
#2. Utilitarianism is primarily concerned with social and political
questions: What rules should we teach to people to produce the best kind of
society? What should be the ultimate aim of political institutions and laws that
will be enforced on all? What kind of rules would I like other people to follow,
to make them most pleasant for me to be with? What should I do, to do my part to
make life most pleasant for other people? What do all people already want,
so we can reasonably expect them all to agree to?
The concern motivating S/P reasoning is the concern for
fundamental life-questions, addressed on an individual level.
It assumes an idealistic individual who wants to life not just an OK life, but a
great life. What is it that is going to make my life a great life? What for me
will make the difference between a great life, a mediocre life, and a wasted
life? At the end of my life, what will I want to look back on as what it is that
I can be most proud of, what will have made my life a great life? What do I want
on my tombstone?
A person engaged in S/P reasoning must play the part of
someone who thinks that her own admirable character -- the kind of person
she is, with particular "virtues" she has -- is the thing that she can be most
proud of. A "virtue" consists in the habitual motives, attitudes, skills,
priorities for concern and attention that make up a person's character. A virtue
spontaneously manifests itself in admirable behavior when the situation calls
for it.
A virtue-concept is something you yourself would want to use
for self-evaluation (not evaluating others.) What can you be justly
proud of? Which of your feelings of worthlessness or meaninglessness are
justified, and which are not? Using a virtue-concept for self-evaluation is
different, for example, from letting things beyond your control serve as the
basis for your sense of self-worth and meaning in life. For example, habitual
concern to promote the good of all might be a virtue-concept I could use for
self-evaluation. It doesn't seem good to feel I am worthless and my life is
meaningless if I try hard but fail to actually benefit many people
because of circumstances beyond my control.
#3. Utilitarian reasoning is a kind of "deductive" reasoning. Deductive
moral reasoning assumes that general moral principles are what we can be most
sure about. General moral principles define the nature of moral goodness, so
whatever is in accord with the general principles are good by definition.
Utilitarianism tries to establish a single moral
principle by which to define moral goodness: "Moral goodness consists in
promoting the greatest good for the greatest number." Once accepted, moral
reasoning just consists in deducing particular conclusions from this general
principle -- i.e. showing what conduct would be prescribed by this principle in
any particular situation one wants to consider. If personal perceptions in
particular cases conflict with what the general principle says, the personal
perceptions must be mistaken.
S/P reasoning by contrast is a kind of "inductive"
reasoning. Inductive moral reasoning assumes that personal moral perceptions in
specific cases are what we can be most sure about. General
principles, or general virtue-concepts, are only trustworthy to the extent that
they are generalizations from -- generalizations based on
-- such perceptions in specific concrete cases. If some new perception occurs in
a very clear case ("counterexample") which conflicts with some general principle
previously arrived at, the presumption should be that this shows a weakness and
imperfection in the general principle (not that the perception is mistaken
because it conflicts with the general principle.) General principles and
general concepts are always what are to be put in question in the light
of counterexample-stories.
One way that utilitarian philosophy can become an obstacle to doing Socratic reasoning well, is if "corrective clarifications" are done always and only under the guidance of one utilitarian principle. This guarantees ahead of time that everything will always lead back to showing what practical conclusions follow from taking the general utilitarian principle as the unquestioned premise of an argument. It will never question the general principle itself.
#4. Taken completely seriously, utilitarianism is Absolutist. It proposes a
single principle as the one and only definition of
moral goodness. Cast in virtue-terms, it says that concern to promote the
greatest good for the greatest number is the only virtue there is,
the only character-trait that can make a person an admirable person
leading an admirable life. Other so-called virtues are only admirable insofar as
they promote the greatest good for the greatest number.
The "inductive" character of S/P reasoning necessarily
results instead in a virtue-pluralism. S/P reasoning is ultimately based
on personal perceptions of what is admirable and not-admirable in the case of
clear concrete stories. Since there are so many possible stories illustrating so
many admirable character-traits, it is impossible to limit ahead of time the
number of virtues there might be, or to exclude some possible virtue
someone admires, on the grounds that it falls outside some general principle one
has decided on as the single definition of what a virtue is.
#5. Utilitarianism assumes that the basic principle that should determine all ethics is something that philosophers can arrive at and then teach to everyone. The utilitarian principle itself is not difficult to understand -- everyone should be able to understand it. The difficult part that needs philosophical expertise is proving that this is the proper principle for all ethics.
S/P reasoning is the opposite. Plato says in his Seventh Letter that it is impossible for one person to arrive at definitions of moral virtues and then teach it to others. Everyone who wants to understand true virtue needs to actually do the reasoning herself. (This is one reason Plato assumed that only very idealistic individuals would do this.)
*********
First, an habitual concern to promote the greatest good
for the greatest number is one possible virtue, one possible admirable
character-trait. Treatment of this as a virtue would need to focus on the
central Platonist question:
That kind of concern to promote the greatest good that is
admirable, what is the essence of what makes it admirable?
This question implicitly recognizes that there might be some kinds of
"concern to promote the greatest good" that is not admirable (e.g. to impress my
girlfriend; or I obey all Martian commands, and a Martian told me to do this.)
One goal has to be to distinguish the best kinds of motivations for this
concern, with the less good motivations.
The essence of this concern as a virtue can't consist in a
set of rules for what such a person does, external behavior perceivable from the
outside. It must consist in something internal and invisible, such as motives,
attitudes, skills, priorities for attention and concern. So a Socratic
discussion of this virtue would have to focus ultimately on answering questions
like:
-- What is the best kind of motivation that motivates this kind of concern?
-- What skills does a person need to cultivate to improve the quality of her
concern to promote the greatest good?
Secondly, one could consider that Utilitarianism and Platonism are not in direct conflict, because they address different questions, and serve different purposes. For example: A person could be a utilitarian for social and political purposes, holding that "promote the greatest good of the greatest number" is the best basis for political institutions and laws to be passed. The same person could be a Platonist on a more personal and individual basis, concerned about her own internal transformation, becoming a different and better person inside, with better habitual internal motivations, skills, and attitudes. Most likely such a person would regard "concern for the greatest good of all" as just one among many virtues she would want to cultivate -- along with other virtues that she might cultivate just for personal fulfillment for its own sake (such as being a creative artist, being a great lover, love for wild nature, and so on).
"Absolutist" utilitarianism would necessarily exclude all
supposed virtues that are not social-virtues, virtues not directly beneficial to
other people, or not cultivated only because they are beneficial to
others. The early Buddhist spirituality we will be studying next focuses
entirely on such non-social virtues.
In this connection, students who want to pursue the history
of utilitarian philosophy further might want to consider the case of John Stuart
Mill (1806-1873). James Mill, the father of John Stuart Mill, was a prominent
and pioneer Utilitarian philosopher, and raised his son according to this
philosophy. He did produce a son who was a prodigy of learning and dedication to
political reform on the basis of his father's utilitarian philosophy. But
this philosophy gave no place to emotion. John Stuart Mill had a nervous
breakdown when he was twenty. As he wrote in his Autobiography, this
happened partly as a result of the following thought that occurred to him:
"Suppose that... all the changes in institutions and opinions which you are looking forward to could be affected at this very instant, would this be a great joy and happiness to you? And an irrepressible self-consciousness answered 'No!" At this my heart sank within me: the whole foundation on which my life was constructed fell down." (quoted in Richard Reeves, John Stuart Mill, Victorian Firebrand London: Atlantic Books 2007, p. 62)
Following this episode, John Stuart discovered the poet William Wordsworth, and the importance of things like emotion, poetry, nature, and romantic love, which were excluded from his father's thought. He also spoke a great deal of the importance of "self-cultivation," cultivating one's own inner life for its own sake. He did not give up entirely on utilitarianism, but broadened the concept of what constitutes "the greatest good of all." Whereas Jeremy Bentham and James Mill tended to define "the greatest good" as the greatest pleasure for all, John Stuart Mill broadened the concept of "the greatest good" to include virtue itself. For example, he came to think that designing a society on this broadened utilitarian principle meant producing a social environment most conducive to the development of virtue on the part of all citizens -- the virtue of "personal autonomy" (thinking and deciding for oneself) being the primary virtue that he valued most, and valued for its own sake, not only because of further "useful" benefits produced by it.
(Nicholas Capaldi, John Stuart Mill: A biography. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 2007, emphasizes Mill's interest in self-cultivation.)