MULTICULTURALISM AND MORAL EDUCATION

The early and middle 1990s saw an outpouring of public and sometimes scholarly concern about the rise of multiculturalism in American colleges and universities. The furor has died down somewhat since then. But many observers of higher education still do not view the rise of multiculturalism as a favorable development for moral education. They see an increasingly diverse range of ethnic, cultural, and racial groups populating our universities as challenging or threatening common values. It was easier to teach values, it is sometimes thought, when student populations were more homogeneous.

Part of what is going on here is what Thomas Scanlon has called "fear of relativism." It is thought that these different cultural, ethnic, and racial groups have distinct sets of values, that no one of these groups has a privileged valuational stance, and that therefore we are faced with an inability of members of one cultural group to criticize or assess the beliefs and practices of one another.

In a larger sense, however, moral education and multiculturalism have developed without making much contact with one another. I want to remedy that disconnect by exploring ways that multiculturalism can be a source of common values rather than a threat to them. But first it must be noted that one source of the fear of relativism is quite misplaced. It is quite misleading to think of the groups composing contemporary pluralism in universities as all possessing a distinct set of comprehensive values, much less as actually defined by those values. The idea that the
are is connected with the common practice of referring to all of these groups as “cultural” groups; of course, the common term “multiculturalism” encourages this. But many of the groups in question are not helpfully thought of as cultural at all.

What defines, for example, African Americans, Asian Americans, Korean Americans, Haitian Americans, Latinos, Chicanos, whites, blacks, and Italian Americans is that each constitutes an important social identity shared with other members of the group in question. (Leave aside for the moment what makes these identities important, and how that is dependent on context.) These are the sorts of identities and affiliations students mean when they think of diversity or multiculturalism. They think of their campus as “diverse” to the extent that a broad range of such groups is present.

Some of these—“Latino,” “Asian American”—are pan-ethnic identities. As Eric Liu points out so beautifully in his book The Accidental Asian, the ethnic groups that comprise these pan-ethnic identities (Korean, Vietnamese, and Chinese American for instance, among those composing Asian Americans) may have distinct cultures, but the pan-ethnic group itself does not. There is barely something usefully called “Asian American culture” or “Latino culture.” Liu says there is more to the latter; at least all Latinos have some relation to the Spanish language (leaving Brazilians aside for the moment), whereas Asian Americans do not even have that. But this linguistic/cultural commonality is thin indeed; not only do many, probably most, “Latinos” not speak Spanish but many do not think they need to or should or that Spanish is important to their identity as Latinos, as that is roughly defined as persons whose ancestry lies in (Spanish-speaking) Latin America.

Though cultureless, these pan-ethnic identities can be very personally important to particular individuals. Indeed, in some cases, a “Latino” identity can be more important than a “Salvadoran” one, an “Asian American” identity than a “Korean American” one, even though the former are cultural and the latter not. The student of Salvadoran or Korean American ancestry may feel that she has received very little in the way of a distinct ethnoculture in her home, neighborhood, or other institutions of her upbringing. Perhaps she lived a fairly assimilated existence, in the sense of growing up in a cultural milieu of some group other than her ethnic group—among suburban whites or urban blacks, for example. Or, in
another direction, perhaps she grew up in such a culturally pluralistic milieu, surrounded by people from many different ethnocultures, that she has difficulty identifying with one of them exclusively. She might think of herself as a cultural cosmopolitan.

College is one of the prime settings in which pan-ethnic identities come to have a purchase on young people. It is a familiar phenomenon for students from assimilated backgrounds to find a strong community in fellow pan-ethnics. (This is, of course, not to deny that others, and sometimes even these same individuals, find community within an ethnic group on campus.) The differences between Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese, Korean ancestry may seem less significant, largely because they are not strong cultural differences for these students, than the commonality as "Asian American." Such an identity has little to do with culture, and little to do with values. (In part because "culture" discourse is the lingua franca for talking about social identities and is often required for garnering a kind of official status and recognition in universities, these pan-ethnic identities are sometimes referred to by their members as "cultures" or cultural groups.)

Racial identities, such as black and white, should also not be conflated with culture, although, like pan-ethnic ones, they can be very important to students, and help to define what most people think of as "diversity." "Black," for example, is an identity that signifies a history of discrimination and stigmatization, a historical memory and identity arising from that history, and, often but by no means always, a sign of current disadvantage and sometimes prejudice and unequal treatment. No doubt there are also some cultural differences between American blacks and American whites. Ironically, however, because African Americans have had a cultural impact on mainstream American popular culture out of proportion to their numbers, the actual cultural differences between whites and blacks are much diminished, especially among younger people. Moreover, even where there is a cultural divide, it does not necessarily signify a substantial divide in values. Jennifer Hochschild and other survey researchers have found little in the way of differences in fundamental values between American whites and blacks; differences arise primarily in perceptions of the extent of racial discrimination and overall fairness in various social and institutional domains rather than about values.4

The cultural divide between blacks and whites is much smaller, one might say, than the identity divide. Increasingly, moreover, "black" is be-
coming an internally complex identity. As blacks from various parts of the world immigrate to the United States, the definitional link between “African American” and “black” weakens, and it becomes less clear which characteristics to associate with the broader category “black.” The ways in which Dominicans, Puerto Ricans, Africans of various nations, Brazilians, and Caribbean blacks are (when they are, or are taken to be) “black” are multifarious. The larger point is that race and racial identities are defined by experience, social position, and history, rather than culture or values. Even less cultural are other social identities important on college campuses often regarded as part of the “multicultural,” such as those defined by gender and sexual orientation.

Thus the actual content of the identities that make up the increasing pluralism on our college campuses often has little to do with real cultural differences, and where it does, those differences do not necessarily have much to do with differences in the sorts of values that would raise worries about moral relativism. Yet such identity differences do raise moral challenges other than that of relativism. But these challenges can enrich the possibilities for moral education on college campuses, rather than detracting from them.

*Moral Values in the University*  
Let me turn, then, to campus diversity as a source of common values and a resource for moral education. When we think of moral education, we most naturally think of individual students coming to understand, internalize, and commit themselves to certain basic values, which then become part of their character or sensibility—like respect, courage, justice, compassion, and thoughtfulness. But when the individuals are also part of a distinct institution, such as a university, and of the community and communities composing that institution, it would behoove us to look also at ways that values can be embodied in institutions as well as in individuals. Through policies, practices (official and unofficial), and explicit stances, institutions can also manifest certain values—as, for example, when the president of a university publicly condemns behavior on the part of some students that shows disrespect and disregard for the community at large, or for the community within which the university is located.

One more preliminary: For our purposes, we can distinguish three venues in which values in a college community can be taught, expressed,
inculcated, and encouraged—the curriculum, classroom interaction, and extracurricular activity. A good deal of the opposition to multiculturalism in the early and middle 1990s focused on the curriculum (see note 1), where attempts to include non-Western cultures and the experiences of persons of color within Western societies, and especially the United States, were criticized. The moral dimension of this criticism was not always brought to the fore; often the criticism was that these newer curricular developments were not academically or intellectually worthy. Nevertheless, there were some important value underpinnings to the criticism. One was the fear of relativism mentioned above. A related one was the dislodging of “Western values” from the center of the curriculum. It was felt, at least implicitly and often explicitly, that Western values—for example liberty, democracy, equality—were superior to those of other civilizations, and that they should be taught to students as such. (I am not examining this view, only reporting it.)

The response by defenders of multiculturalism to the criticism did not always foreground morality either, in part because the influential, postmodern version of multiculturalism did not readily admit of forthright moral commitments. But I will not pursue further the purely curricular dimensions of moral education in relation to multiculturalism, as this vast topic goes beyond the scope of this essay. Let me just make some brief comments. The appropriate basis for deciding the validity of curricular proposals must remain intellectual rather than moral. Whether an American history course should or should not contain more material than it currently does about Hispanics or African Americans, the basis for deciding this must lie in whether doing so gives a truer picture of the period or themes to be covered in the course. Although such decisions might have moral implications—giving more students an appreciation of a stigmatized or marginalized group, for example—those considerations should not drive the curricular decision. To foreground these moral implications would be to court a violation of the intellectual integrity for which the university must be committed as a condition of any other of its value commitments. Putting the moral before the intellectual might, for example, lead an instructor teaching about the transatlantic slave trade to withhold or downplay the role of Africans in selling (other) Africans to the European slave traders, on the grounds that white or other students might
take from the unit the thought that since Africans were involved, white people should not be so concerned for their historical responsibility for slavery. It is not that the latter moral stance is not troubling; indeed, it is. The problem is that the moral should not trump the intellectual when it comes to curricular choices. If an instructor is concerned about a moral falsehood she is worried her students might take away from her class, she might give thought to how to discuss the issue in question so as to minimize that likelihood; after all, knowing the African role in the slave trade should not diminish the moral responsibility of Europeans, even if it sometimes has that effect in some students' minds. Discussing that issue explicitly would serve the end of moral education without detracting from the intellectual integrity of what is being taught. (Indeed, it can be argued that bringing such a moral discussion into the unit on the slave trade would deepen intellectual understanding.)

I would want to distinguish this purely curricular dimension of college courses from classroom interaction, an important source of learning as well. While classroom interaction usually revolves around the curriculum, it is nevertheless useful to look at classroom interaction as a distinct source or venue of moral education in its own right, distinct from the curriculum and also from various extracurricular activities and venues such as residential programming and interaction, student organizations, university events, and so on.

The category of "moral values" is not necessarily a clearly defined one. In one direction, it shades into academic or intellectual values. For example, if a student learns to engage respectfully with other students in a classroom setting, in such a way that the student in question is able to learn from the other students, and they from her, this is on the one hand an academic value. But it is also a moral value—being respectful of others, especially of others with whom one is bound up in a common enterprise. In another direction, moral values shade into civic ones. The basis for distinguishing them is perhaps even less clear, but it might be helpful to think of civic values as those relating specifically to participation in and engagement with the polity, or, rather, various polities. For example, while respect for individual other persons might be more naturally thought of as a moral value, responsibility toward a community, such as the local community within which one's college is located, is a civic one. But I do not
think anything of normative importance rides on this distinction, and it is also perfectly natural to think of civic values as a subset of moral ones, rather than as a different type of value.

Without attempting to be comprehensive, we can distinguish three distinct families of values that bear specifically on ethnic, cultural, racial, national (or national origin), and religious diversity on a college campus. (These are the kinds of groups I will have in mind when I refer generally to "identity groups.") These value families are pluralism, equality, and community. All are what I will call "diversity-related" values. They do not all involve valuing that diversity itself; only certain forms of "pluralism" do that. But they are values whose character involves a response to (these forms of) diversity. Each of these general categories of value contains several distinct values within it.

PLURALISM: TOLERANCE, ACKNOWLEDGMENT, AND APPRECIATION

Let us look first at pluralism—that is, values connected with the mere existence of diversity. One such value is tolerance. One wants members of different groups to tolerate or be tolerant of members of others. Intolerance would be a serious disvalue in a college community and is generally and rightly regarded as a character flaw in an individual. Examples might include Christians or Jews being intolerant of Muslims, whites of blacks, blacks of Latinos, or a religious group of homosexuals. As we can see, intolerance can operate within a category—members of one religion being intolerant of another—or across groups—members of a religion or a race being intolerant of a sexual-orientation group.

The virtue of tolerance is a complex one, because there are certain things which a moral person should not countenance and for which she is not regarded as "intolerant" for doing so (for example physical violence); because the virtue seems importantly context-dependent (it is appropriate to tolerate hate speech in certain contexts but not others); and because it has been thought that holding certain beliefs commits one to regarding those who lack such beliefs as wrong and not worthy of toleration (certain religious beliefs may seem to imply that holders of alternative beliefs must be wrong and not worthy of respect or toleration).8 But for our purposes we can define toleration as treating in a civil manner persons of whom one disapproves for reasons related to race, ethnicity, culture, or religion.

While a college community characterized by widespread intolerance
would be insupportable, at the same time, the good of tolerance seems morally limited in that particular context. If many students merely tolerated each other—disapproving of others’ race, culture, or religion but treating each other in a civil manner—this would be a grim situation. One wants to set the bar concerning students’ way of dealing with their diversity at a higher level than that. Tolerance is a necessary but far from sufficient pluralism virtue in a college community. And so we can arrive at a second pluralism-related virtue, which one might call “acknowledgment.” Acknowledgment is a type of respect, but one directed toward the other in light of her specific identity that differs from one’s own (that is, the identity that is tolerated in the virtue of tolerance). A Muslim does not merely want to be tolerated by a fellow student who is a Christian, but (also) acknowledged—respected in light of her being a Muslim. (If the Christian respected the Muslim as a fellow human being, this would not be the right kind of respect. I am using “acknowledgment” to mark the identity-focus of the kind of respect I have in mind.)

Often (not always), students wish their identities to be acknowledged in the wider community, for example by fellow students, teachers, perhaps administrators. Black students generally wish their black identity to be acknowledged by others. They do not want to be treated in a manner that implies that their black identity is of no significance to them. To be treated in such a way may seem to them to constitute a lack of respect for who they are. The achieving of acknowledgment is far from automatic or simple. It involves recognizing what the identity in question means to that specific individual and then having a kind of regard for that individual in that light. So there is a cognitive element to the value, but the respect goes beyond merely recognizing that being a Muslim is important to Joan or that being black is important to Ahmad to a positive respect for Joan or Ahmad in light of those identities.

However, not all students of a given identity wish that identity to be acknowledged. This may be so for several reasons. The identity may not be important to the individual—“Sure I’m Italian American [Muslim, Jewish] but it doesn’t really mean much [anything] to me.” Or the identity might be important, but the individual does not need, or perhaps want, it acknowledged in the particular context in question. For example, someone at a college that has no specific religious identity might be quite religious but think of that identity as irrelevant to her relationship to the college.
community and to what she wants to get out of college. Then she will not particularly want it acknowledged by others. (This is not to say, of course, that such a person would want to be disrespected in light of the identity in question; and that might well hold as well for someone who was not very invested in the identity. Desiring a positive acknowledgment goes a good bit beyond desiring the absence of a negative one.)

I mention the religious case here, because there seems to have been a shift in recent years in the degree to which college students attending nonreligious colleges wish their religion to be acknowledged; or, to put it another way, to see their religion as an important part of their public identities within their colleges. There are probably several distinct reasons for this, but one of them is a more general sense that identities that are important to students personally should be publicly acknowledged identities. Racial and ethnic identities have held such a place for several decades now, indeed, as long as colleges have become open to racial groups who were formerly excluded. Sexual orientation, although somewhat outside the scope of this chapter, is nevertheless interesting in this connection, since some students very much want their sexual orientation to be acknowledged by others, while others very much do not.

It is worth recognizing that in this sense the desire for acknowledgment by others is subject to historical and situational change and variation and is not simply “natural” or a human given, as it is sometimes treated. Some students might come to desire such identity acknowledgment only because others do. They feel unacknowledged only because other students, or other groups, are garnering acknowledgment and they are not; otherwise, they might well not care, or not care very much. Also, there are asymmetries in acknowledgment. There is reason to acknowledge a black or Asian identity that is absent for whites. In general, there is a reason to acknowledge a “minority group” that there is not for a majority. Where whites are in the minority, acknowledgment applies to them in a different way than in the more frequent settings where they are a majority. In addition, as mentioned earlier, such a desire for acknowledgment of a particular component of one’s identity is dependent as well on individual factors.

These contingencies, however, do not detract from acknowledgment’s being a genuine value. When someone reasonably desires acknowledgment of an aspect of her identity in a particular public context, such as
college, rendering that acknowledgment is a genuine value. It is so, in part, because respect is owed to every human individual, simply qua human being; and, as Charles Taylor has compellingly argued, when a certain (morally acceptable) social identity is central to an individual’s personal identity, respect for that identity is required by the respect for the individual. Its status as a general human value does not mean, however, that acknowledgment as I have defined it is not a distinctive diversity-related value. It is so because proffering respect across various social divides such as race and religion poses distinctive moral challenges that are not present in more homogeneous settings. To put the point simply, if I (who am neither black nor Muslim) am to respect Joan in light of her black or her Muslim identity, I must ensure that I have rid myself of the prejudices and stereotypes that, in my society, often stand in the way of that respect being granted.

Colleges have a role in fostering the value of acknowledgment in their students. It is not sufficient if members of a college community respect each other in spite of their differing identities. They must be aware of those identities as important to their fellow students (when they are important) and know enough about those identities to understand why they would be important and meaningful to their fellow students. Colleges can help attain that goal through the curriculum, classroom interaction, and extracurricular activities. When nonblack students learn more about blacks, their experiences, institutions, accomplishments, and histories, acknowledgment of black identity in the black students on campus is a natural result. It is not, of course, an inevitable result, since nonblack students may hold prejudices and stereotypes concerning blacks that survive learning more about blacks through academic study.

It is not necessary, or appropriate, for instructors to require, or even encourage, students to avow a certain identity, for example, as black, Muslim, or gay. However, classroom instructors can also foster acknowledgment through the way classroom discussions about identity-related (race, religion, or culture) matters are managed—fostering a climate of trust and respect that may allow students to reveal a component of their identity to the class in the course of a discussion when they feel that the identity is relevant. Instructors should also be aware of the ways that conversations on issues of race, religion, and culture manifest acknowledgment or its absence. A colleague related to me an exchange in which a
student who identified as a Christian said that she disapproved of homosexuality but that she did not think ill of homosexual persons; she "hated the sin but loved the sinner." This student knew that there were gay students in the class and she genuinely wished to accord them acknowledgment; she thought that her stance toward homosexuals manifested such acknowledgment. However, at least one gay student in the class was very offended by the Christian student's remark and said so to the instructor (outside of class). The instructor found a way to bring the issue to the class as a whole; the Christian student was genuinely shocked that her stance was not experienced as respectful by the gay student, and she wanted to talk further about the issue. The instructor in this situation recognized her responsibility to the moral education of her students, of all of them, in finding ways of helping them show appropriate acknowledgment of one another in light of their identity differences and to discuss the complexities of doing so.

So far, I have described two distinct values related to pluralism in a college—that is, related to the coexistence of distinct identity groups of various kinds. Those values are tolerance and acknowledgment. There is a third, one that goes beyond acknowledgment. Acknowledgment requires that the student recognize the value and meaning that the identity in question has to the other student. But it does not require her to value that identity herself—to appreciate it. That is, it does not require her to believe that it is a good thing for her as a member of that college community that black and Muslim persons are present in that community. Acknowledgment involves the thought "Identity X is meaningful to you and I acknowledge this in my respect for you." But this attitude is entirely consistent with indifference to whether persons of identity X are present in one's community or not. Yet, ideally I think we would want members of a college community to appreciate and welcome the presence of others of other identity groups. "I am pleased that persons of identity X are part of my community." This expresses appreciation.

Again, instructors have an important role in utilizing classroom interaction to foster appreciation, as they do acknowledgment and tolerance. They can be aware of the ways that members of different racial groups often have trouble "hearing" one another. White students are often defensive, taking observations by students of color as direct personal criticisms. Black and Latino students are sometimes too quick to render moral judg-
ment on white students, not hearing a genuine desire to learn, or be in-
formed. And the divide is not only between whites and nonwhites. There
are barriers specific to each racial pairing. The more general point is that
instructors can help their students to recognize these obstacles to their
appreciating one another, can encourage sympathetic listening, can ask
students simply to repeat what a student from another group has just said,
can create an atmosphere of trust and openness in class that encourages
students both to speak their minds and also to listen open-mindedly and
appreciatively, can gently but pointedly help students identify prejudices
and stereotypes and question them, and so on.

The Supreme Court's decision on affirmative action handed down in
2003 in the simultaneously heard cases Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v.
Bollinger helps to illuminate the difference between acknowledgment and
appreciation and why both are important values for a college commu-
nity.12 The majority opinion argues that having a diversity of ethnoracial
groups on a campus is a legitimate goal for a college to seek and to use its
admissions policies to foster. (Thus racial preferences are permissible.)
The majority's argument for this view is not entirely consistent, but one
part of it involves the idea that racial diversity is likely to provide a greater
diversity of perspectives than its absence, and that this diversity of per-
spectives is of educational benefit to each member of the educational
community.

There are some familiar problems with justifying racial diversity on the
grounds of "perspectives" diversity (sometimes called "viewpoint" diver-
sity, although these are not exactly the same thing).13 I will return to these
problems in a moment. What I want to focus on here is what the majority's
argument implies about the stance that members of the college commu-
nity should take toward members of the groups that benefit from the
affirmative action program.14 It implies that the student should recognize
that her own education is being enhanced by the presence of members of
these groups. It is a short step from there to an appreciation of individual
persons from those groups. Of course, it is also possible to view these
fellow students in a purely instrumental way, without any regard for them
as individual persons; one might think "It is really interesting hearing
Joan's Muslim point of view on U.S. foreign policy" and view Joan solely as
an instrument to one's enhanced education. Nothing in the Supreme
Court decision would argue against this; the decision does not prescribe
moral attitudes. However, it is reasonable to see the "diversity rationale" given by the Court as suggesting a moral attitude of appreciation toward students in regard to social identities that contribute in some way to enhancing the shared life of the college and themselves individually.

Pluralism values flourish only in contexts of diversity. Where there is no diversity, it is impossible to have tolerance, acknowledgment, and appreciation. Of course there is still a large difference between the fact of pluralism—the mere existence of diverse identity groups—and the values related to pluralism. It is no virtue simply to have multiple groups at a college. They must be appropriately valued.

**EQUALITY: INCLUSION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE**

A second family of values concerns equality. Equality differs from pluralism. Pluralism (the value, not the fact) places a value on difference, or the particular differences in question; or (as in the case of tolerance) it derives value from an engagement with difference, even if the difference itself is not valued. Equality also recognizes difference. But the goal of equality is to ensure that all are treated equally, independent of those group differences. Equality values are about ensuring that group differences do not stand in the way of equal treatment.

There are several distinct kinds of equality values. One is "inclusion," a sense of belonging—a sense that one's group belongs, and feels that it belongs, at the college, and that the college "belongs to" them. Some groups and individuals take such inclusion for granted. Others, generally groups that have been historically underrepresented or absent from these institutions, do not. My own university, the University of Massachusetts at Boston, for example, is currently an all-commuter campus, with many older and returning students; it has about a 40 percent minority population, the highest of any four-year institution in New England. There is a fairly large contingent of working-class black and Latino students from the immediate area, who might not feel comfortable or included in many other institutions. A number of years ago the administration sought to build dormitories to attract a more traditional-age college student looking for a more traditional college experience; GPA and SAT admissions criteria have also been raised slightly. These initiatives led some black and Latino students to feel that they were no longer as welcomed at the university as
they had formerly felt. They felt that the university "belonged to" them less than they formerly thought it did.15

As a value, inclusion operates most clearly at the institutional rather than individual level. That is, it is a responsibility of the institution to create a sense of inclusion for all, and specifically for groups who might be less prone to feel included, either for historical reasons or because they constitute a small minority on the campus. Some forms of such institutional inclusion are uncontroversial and obvious. Any university can recognize that in our current political climate, Muslim students might have reason to be concerned that they are not fully welcomed into their college communities. The college can address their concerns by having speakers and holding colloquia aimed at informing the larger community about Islam and its history, Muslim life and culture in various countries, and so on. (This is in addition to curriculum concerning these issues.) In addition to their educational benefits for the community as a whole, such events help the Muslim members of the community to feel that the larger community, or at least the official institution, is interested in them and welcomes them.

Helping members of a specific group to feel included raises familiar problems regarding whether to provide specific group-targeted attention or whether to ignore the differences and treat members of the group no differently from anyone else. If one is welcoming toward all groups equally, won't the minority groups experience this as welcoming of them? And if they see themselves singled out, even for a "positive" attention, mightn't this make them feel overconspicuous and not "really" part of things?16

One form that this inclusion dilemma takes is whether the college should provide separate spaces and programs for members of minority racial or religious groups. Such separate treatment can be seen as a necessary stepping stone on the way to full inclusion; a supportive and comfortable space for members of minority groups to better enable them to become full participants in the larger community. Some opponents of such programs dispute the empirical claims made on their behalf. They say that the separate programs have the effect of separating the minority students from the larger community, perhaps by making it too comfortable for them to remain in their separate spaces. But these two opposing views presumably have the same goal—inclusion of the group in the larger community.
Although inclusion is primarily an institutional value, it has an individual form as well. Individual students can be sensitive to the ways that particular persons, especially members of minority groups, may be indirectly excluded or discouraged from feeling fully part of the larger group. They may extend themselves to those members, bringing them into the larger group. (These “inclusive” individuals include not only members of the majority group but members of minority groups who themselves have already achieved inclusion, as it were.) This “inclusiveness” is, or involves, certain moral sensitivities—recognizing when others are; or are in danger of being, excluded; caring enough about these others’ situation; having good judgment about how to negotiate the sensitive terrain of inclusion and exclusion, bringing people in in tactful ways. Sometimes the value of “inclusion” can involve a more public action. For example, if there is an expression of hatred or exclusion toward a group or member of a group qua member of a group, it might be good to demonstrate publicly against that expression and to show a public solidarity with the group targeted. This same value of inclusion can be expressed individually but more privately—for example, by showing appropriate, non-patronizing solicitousness toward members of the targeted groups who are known personally to oneself.

As I have understood inclusion, it is localized to one’s own community; it is about being committed to the equal inclusion of all who warrant such inclusion in one’s own community. In this respect, it is a “diversity”-related value that is analogous to academic integrity, civility, respect, and other such values regularly thought to be core values of an academic community. So inclusion is not the only equality value, since equality is also a more general value.

Indeed, one might think that equality as a general substantive value should be taught as part of a college education—in a category that might also include other political and personal values such as democracy, liberty, courage, justice, integrity, compassion, reflectiveness. (Some of these are individual virtues, some not. That distinction is not pertinent to this part of my argument.) On the one hand, equality has some claim to being a core American civic value; on the other, there is great divergence in conceptions of equality that lay claim to that status. For example, some see purely as a matter of equality in formal civic and political standing—a right to vote or to legal representation—others think some material conditions of equality are implied, such as health care or education up through certain
grades. A slightly different formulation of the controversy is between those who see equality as equality of opportunity and others who think some equality of condition is required.

Given this indeterminacy, it would be logical to teach these very controversies as part of an understanding of equality as a core American value. But I want to look at equality as related to higher education in a different way, and that is in light of affirmative action. We have discussed the "pluralism" dimension of affirmative action, and its relation to pluralism values, especially acknowledgment. However, as has often been noted by critics of affirmative action, if colleges were looking for the kind of diversity of perspective and opinion that seems most pertinent to academic learning, their admissions policies would try to ensure a diversity of political and religious views and would not rely so centrally on race, an admittedly imperfect proxy for such diversity. They would seek to ensure a "critical mass" of libertarians, conservatives, liberals, socialists, republicans, and so on.17

Such considerations have led many to suggest that the true normative foundations for educational affirmative action do not lie in, or lie solely in, "diversity" but bear some relation to social justice. Specifically, affirmative action is meant both to compensate for past and present social discrimination against blacks and women and to aim to create greater equality in the future through education. This rationale for affirmative action was used by four of the Supreme Court justices in the 1978 Bakke case.18 It is arguable that this rationale lives on in the way most universities that practice affirmative action understand it. But it would be understandable that the "official line" on affirmative action given to the public is "diversity" rather than "justice," since a majority in the Bakke case upheld the diversity rationale but rejected the justice rationale. Moreover, the University of Michigan affirmative action cases in 2003 reaffirmed the diversity rationale while continuing to reject the justice rationale, which in any case had been considerably weakened by intervening Supreme Court cases.19

Without pursuing the legal and political context of educational affirmative action further, let us assume that both pluralism (of many forms, including racial) and racial justice are sound normative underpinnings of affirmative action as currently practiced by many selective universities. Focusing on the latter, this could be taken to imply that racial justice, or racial equality, becomes more than a general social/political value: it
becomes a core institutional one as well. From the point of view of the individual student, it thus becomes closer to academic integrity and inclusion than democracy and courage. What would this imply for moral education? It would mean that students should be instructed in the racial-justice rationale for affirmative action and encouraged to adopt racial justice as a value of their own. Presumably such instruction would take both curricular and noncurricular forms—discussions in residences, campus speakers, and so on. Of course, as with any politically charged value (that is, virtually any political value at all), there will be great differences of opinion, and it would be unrealistic to think that a college could produce 100 percent of its students signing on to affirmative action. Nevertheless, if many colleges are indeed committed to some degree to racial justice and see affirmative action as fostering that goal, making that fact and that argument a part of their moral education programs would be a reasonable and salutary endeavor.

To take one example of this, suppose one follows Elizabeth Anderson's argument that the main goal of affirmative action is integration. In her view, a white student may be personally enriched by a friendship with a black student; she may also benefit later in her enhanced ability to deal with a racially diverse group of coworkers. What the affirmative action rationale encourages is that students see these personal benefits as part of what it will take to create a racially integrated equal society. The white student is encouraged to recognize how blacks, or nonwhites in general, have been harmed by their exclusion from various domains of life, and that their ability to flourish as equals in society requires them to be able to interact comfortably with whites, and other nonwhite groups. So the white student is helped to recognize that for the sake of equality, her personal benefit from affirmative action has to be complemented by the reciprocal benefit of other students of color. Without that happening, the white student is not working within the spirit of the justice rationale of the affirmative action program.

COMMUNITY

Community is a third moral value. Community is a sense of bond among the members of an institution, involving trust, mutual concern, reciprocity, and cooperation in the shared educational enterprise. The idea of community requires and presupposes both inclusion and acknowledgment and
appreciation. It requires inclusion, because the sense of community must embrace all its members. If any are left out, the community is deficient in that respect. Sense of community also requires acknowledgment and appreciation, because it requires a sense of respect among the members of the community; a recognition of those identity differences that are important to its individual members and a recognition of the value of those identity differences to the community as a whole.

The general value of community is like equality, and unlike pluralism, in not requiring identity differences for its value. What makes a sense of community a good thing is the trust and cooperation in the service of shared and worthy aims that raises the institution to a richer sort of human relationship among its members. This does not depend on identity diversity.

Indeed, some have argued that this sense of community is actually harmed by identity acknowledgment in the context of diversity and by the larger currents of multiculturalism. If students are concerned only about acknowledgment of their differences, how will they feel connected to students across those differences? I hope to have suggested ways that acknowledgment of difference can work in favor of rather than against community. Acknowledgment and appreciation are not the validating of retreat into comfort communities built around ethnicity and religion but are rather a reaching out beyond those communities to connect, through respect and empathy, with those in other groups. A case for such retreat can be made, as mentioned earlier, based on more distinctly educational goals. It can be argued that minority groups of various kinds will be likely to garner more support and feel more able to devote themselves to their studies, if they are provided with subcommunities of their own identity group and support from the larger institution for those subcommunities (in programmatic and residential forms). While this form would fall within an institutional "acknowledgment" of the identity in question, it would contravene the individual level of that value, which, as mentioned, requires reaching beyond, respecting, acknowledging, and appreciating those not in one's subcommunity. But even more strongly, such a form of institutional acknowledgment can be detrimental to the value of community that embraces the entire college community. It does so by threatening to discourage identifying across differences with other students and recognizing that one is bound up with others in a common enterprise, while drawing on and valuing one's identity differences.
Although community presupposes acknowledgment and appreciation, and also the equality-based value of inclusion, the full value of community transcends them. The idea of community requires a more encompassing trust, concern, and sense of shared bond than appreciation provides. Appreciating involves seeing the student from a different race or religion as providing a benefit to oneself through her presence in the community. But it does not require what we want from a community, and a sense of community—a sense of being bound up together and together dedicated to the valued aims of the institution. Appreciation would not necessarily lead a student to join with someone from another identity group to plan a colloquium with differing voices on some issue of current importance to the campus or to the larger society—although it may well remove some obstacles to such projects. Only a sense of community provides this wider sense of connection among the members of the institutional community. Inclusion and appreciation provide a foundation for that sense of community, which then must be built.

Some have seen diversity or multiculturalism as a threat to common values and moral education in higher education. I have argued that diversity of ethnicity, race, and religion, at least, is an important source of values pertinent to moral education at that level—values that could not easily or even possibly be taught in their absence. Without claiming comprehensiveness, I have distinguished three such families of values—pluralism, equality, and community—each of which contains various distinguishable subvalues. All three of these families of values involve the development of empathy, moral sensitivity, and moral imagination, a moral awareness of social and cultural stereotypes and distancing mechanisms that are likely to distort a sympathetic perception of the other, and so on. Although in some sense each of these values is a general one that does not depend on a diversity context, their “diversity forms” present distinctive moral challenges and characteristics that render them not merely an application of general values such as respect and equality.

Notes

1. Many of the key documents in the public furor over multiculturalism are brought together in two collections—Aufderheide, ed., Beyond PC, and Ber­man, Debating P.C. Some of the influential books are: Schlesinger, The Disunit­ing of America; Atlas, The Battle of the Books; Bromwich, Politics by Other
Means; D’Souza, Illiberal Education; Kimball, Tenured Radicals; Gitlin, The Twilight of Common Dreams.

2. Scanlon, “Fear of Relativism.”

3. The notion of “assimilation” has traditionally been understood as a conformity to the dominant culture of a nation, and an abandoning of an ethnoculture distinct from it (together with an acceptance by the dominant group of the group in question); but in recent sociological work on immigrant acculturation, it is recognized that an immigrant group can assimilate to a nondominant subculture, one distinct from either the original ethnoculture or the dominant culture. See essays in Foner and Frederickson, eds., Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity in the United States, especially Jaynes, “Immigration and the Social Construction of Otherness.”

4. Hochschild, Facing Up to the American Dream.

5. On cultural and other differences among American blacks, see Waters, Black Identities. On an attempt to articulate a distinct black identity in a trans-U.S. context, see Gilroy, The Black Atlantic.

6. A nuanced and balanced treatment of the “canon wars” in their curricular and political education dimensions is given by J. Peter Euben in Corrupting Youth.

7. Since curricular learning takes place largely through the medium of classroom interaction, it is striking that some defenders of curricular moral education pay very little attention to classroom interaction as a source of moral education. See, for example, Michael Walzer’s defense of moral education in “Moral Education and Democratic Citizenship,” as well as Calvert, “Political Education and the Modern University: A Prologue,” in Calvert, To Restore American Democracy.

8. See Heyd, ed., Toleration, for a good collection exploring these and other complexities of toleration.

9. The distinction between virtues of treating others as human beings independent of their social identities, and treating them appropriately in light of these identities is explored, in the case of race, in my “Racial Virtues.”

10. Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition.” Taylor goes on to imply, misleadingly, that cultural identities are always important to individuals. More precisely, what he argues is that social identities are part of individuals’ personal identities; but the only sustained example he gives of such social identities is a cultural one. His argument is thus reasonably taken as implying that he thinks cultural identities are important to all individuals, which they aren’t.

11. I owe to Richard Weissbourd an emphasis on the idea, and terminology, of “appreciation.”

13. The majority opinion is very clear that race is only a very imperfect proxy for perspective.

14. I am not examining what attitude "nonaffirmative action admits" should take toward "affirmative action admits," but only what attitude members of all groups (include members of those groups themselves) should take toward the blacks, Native Americans, and Latinos as a group on one's campus, without distinction as to whether some particular members would have been admitted in the absence of an affirmative action program. It is only their membership in that group, not whether they would have been so admitted, that is pertinent here.

15. I am reporting the feelings of the black and Latino students, to indicate what is involved in inclusion. I am not saying that complex policy decisions such as whether to build dormitories should be dictated solely by the feelings and views of one group of students.

16. The problem of equal vs. special treatment for marginalized groups is excellently treated in Minow, *Making All the Difference*. Minow calls this "the dilemma of difference."

17. Fullinwider and Lichtenberg, *Leveling the Playing Field*, provide an excellent account of this criticism of the diversity rationale (167-69).

18. *Regents of the University of California v. Bakke*, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). The process by which groups other than African Americans—Hispanics, Asians, blacks of other recent origins (Caribbean, African)—came to be included within the scope of affirmative action when they were not initially is a historically and morally complex matter. It is explored in Skrentny, *The Ironies of Affirmative Action* and *The Minority Rights Revolution*; and in Graham, *Collision Course*.

19. The only "racial justice" rationale that continued to be upheld in the University of Michigan cases was that an institution was permitted to use present affirmative action to remedy the effects of its own past discrimination. What it could not do—but what four justices had upheld in the Bakke case—was to remedy "societal" discrimination in general. (See Fullinwider and Lichtenberg, *Leveling the Playing Field*, chaps. 9 and 10.) In an important article on affirmative action, Elizabeth Anderson argues that the diversity rationale makes no sense within constitutional jurisprudence, and that the true purpose of affirmative action is what she calls "integration," that is, the integrating of blacks on a condition of equality with whites in all domains in society. She distinguishes such integration/equality from a purely compensatory argument, which she thinks does not justify affirmative action; but both are justice-based arguments (Anderson, "Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny"). Anderson's or other justice rationales mean that religion, which seems to me particularly
central to pluralism concerns, is absent in affirmative action rationales, as it is indeed in most affirmative action programs.

20. This is not to deny that ethnicity-based communities can realize moral goods as well. For an argument to that effect, see Blum, “Ethnicity, Identity, and Community.”