Systemic and Individual Racism, Racialization and Antiracist Education: A Reply to Garcia, Silliman and Levinson
Lawrence Blum
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Systemic and individual racism, racialization and antiracist education
A reply to Garcia, Silliman and Levinson

Lawrence Blum
University of Massachusetts, Boston, USA

Abstract
I take up Silliman’s challenge to explore the ‘moral logic’ of ‘structural racism’ largely absent in my book, I’m Not a Racist, But . . . I criticize and build on Glenn Loury’s account of the normative assessment of racial inequality by examining three factors generating such disparities in educational achievement – stereotyping, performance-based generalizing, and a preschool skills gap. What is morally troubling about the resultant achievement gap is partly dependent on and partly independent of the moral assessment of the individual racial wrongs involved (or not) in these processes, a result in the spirit of Garcia’s individual focus but not his anti-consequentialism. Responding to Levinson, I suggest forms of antiracist educational practice built around the rejection of ‘race’ as a scientifically valid classification together with the retention of racial domination, and resistance to it, as historically significant forces (captured in the notion of ‘racialization’).

Keywords antiracist education, racial disparity, racialization, racism, structural racism

Introduction
I am grateful to Matthew Silliman, Jorge Garcia and Meira Levinson for their thoughtful critical reflections on my book, I’m Not a Racist, But . . . (INRB) (Theory and Research in Education, Vol. 1(3) October, 2003: 267–313). The three authors raise many more issues than I can deal with here. I will focus the bulk of my remarks on two issues that bear particularly on issues of race in educational contexts. The first is the relation between individual and societal dimensions of race-related ills, an issue raised most prominently by
Silliman, but also touched on in Garcia’s remarks. The second, raised by Levinson, is the implication for antiracist education of my argument about the unreality of race and the language of ‘racialized groups’ suggested to replace race talk.

INDIVIDUAL AND SYSTEMIC RACISM

Matt Silliman is correct to say that my book pays a good deal more attention to individual than to social or systemic forms of race-related ill or wrong. He notes that this differential attention is not meant to imply differential importance. Systemic racial injustices are of grave concern and I nowhere imply that issues of moral character in the racial domain should be seen as more important than social inequities. I argue that practices, societies and institutions, as well as persons, motives and beliefs, can be racist. I do not think Silliman is correct when he says that my aspiration to preserve a meaning for ‘racism’ that will stave off overuse relies on confining racism to individual bigotry or inferiorization. Rather, it was my intention to help prevent that term’s overuse by tying its use tightly to contexts of the inferiorization of racial groups (as well as to racial antipathy); such inferiorizing – treating a racial group as if it were inferior – can be engaged in, sustained and perpetuated by institutions and social systems and practices, as well as by individuals. My account very much allows for the important insight that Silliman foregrounds – that racial injustice and inferiorization at a society-wide level may be perpetuated and sustained by individuals operating in institutional contexts who in no way intend this unjust outcome. Schools are a particularly striking venue for this insight. Most teachers harbor no ill-will toward Black and Latino students and do not wish to be ‘part of the problem’ – the continuing gap in school performance between Whites (and many Asian-American groups) and Blacks and Latinos. Yet these teachers function in institutions which, taken as a whole system of education, reproduce this very result.

Though I do allow for forms of systemic racial injustice, Silliman is onto something important when he says that I do not explore the ‘moral logic’ of what he calls ‘structural racism’. This lacuna afflicts much writing on racial issues, which tends to focus on either individual or societal racial ills, but not to explore the moral links between them. (Part of the reason for this neglect, I argue in INRB, is a general failure to confront head on the moral character of racial ills in general.) Silliman is also correct to connect my failure to accord more attention to a moral exploration of systemic racial inequities to my apparently regarding ‘racial injustice’ as distinct from ‘racism’ For this view carries the implication that racial injustice is a less morally serious racial ill than those properly designated as ‘racism’. I wish to take this opportunity to take
up Silliman’s challenge. I like his notion of ‘moral logic’, because the notion of ‘institutional racism’ does carry a very definite moral valence; it suggests something very wrong and unjust, but that wrongness is not derivable from the individual intentions of the functionaries of the institutions in questions. At the same time, seldom is this moral valence subject to moral scrutiny. I hope here only to indicate some of the parameters that such an investigation will have to take into account.

In doing so, I want to bring Garcia into the picture. Garcia does not talk specifically about the social face of racial ills – racial injustice or structural or systemic racism. But he takes up my argument in Chapter 2, that racial wrongs perpetrated against vulnerable and subordinate groups generally cause more harm than racial wrongs perpetrated against other groups. For this reason, racial wrongs against Blacks generally cause more harm than the same sort of racial wrong against Whites, although I caution (and Garcia emphasizes) that this generalization has many exceptions. Garcia rightly emphasizes that the actual effects of an action can not by themselves bear on the morality of the agent in performing the action, but only the effects that the agent could reasonably have foreseen.

I could have made clearer in the book the implications of this consequence-based moral asymmetry for issues of moral responsibility in the racial arena – for example, that White people have a responsibility to be aware of the history and current state of racial inequality that renders Blacks, in the main, more vulnerable to harm by actions that demean and stigmatize them as inferior. As a result, Whites who commit such actions are blameworthy for consequences of their actions that they should foresee, whether they actually do or not. Conversations about race familiar to all of us teaching at high school or college levels reveal that many White students appear unaware of this history or its bearing on current racial realities. For example, the members of a college fraternity who hold a mock slave auction should recognize the demeaning power of such an event, though they may be sincere in saying that they did not do so; and this failure reflects on them morally. Many White students appear to believe that serious racial inequality no longer exists. They are in a position to know better and it is our responsibility as educators to do our best to correct this ignorance. This is not an easy matter; obstacles to it lie not only in mere lack of awareness of continuing patterns of inequality in life chances, but in investment in ideologies of individualism and race-blindness that make it difficult for many White students to see realities that lie before them. (Levinson mentions other obstacles as well, discussed below, such as a deep psychic bias toward upholding the status quo.) Silliman also insightfully notes that the widespread rejection of racial bigotry and of ideologies of racial inferiority – positive developments in their own
right – can unfortunately contribute further to masking the continuing legacies of racial oppression and discrimination.

So Garcia argues and I agree, that consequences can be relevant to the morality of an agent’s action only in the mode of the reasonably foreseen. But Garcia seems to go further to imply that states of affairs can be of moral concern only insofar as they reflect morally on those who bring them about or at least on those who fail adequately to respond to them. That is, Garcia seems to say, states of affairs are morally significant only insofar as they reflect on the viciousness of agents. Consequences of actions can bear on vice insofar as ‘my being insensitive to your suffering a greater rather than a lesser harm is one way of me being more vicious to you’, Garcia says (Garcia, 2003: 290). However, this could not be the case unless your suffering this level of harm is, in its own right, a bad thing and unless it is morally appropriate for me to be concerned about it. Some states of affairs – e.g. human misery – are bad and we recognize them to be so independent of knowing how they are brought about. It is this prior recognition of bad states of affairs that enables us to attribute vice to someone who does not respond appropriately to them.

Garcia’s view would not allow what Silliman’s notion of ‘structural racism’ implies, that some race-related states of affairs are bad in themselves – that, for example, Black students have unacceptably low rates of school performance, or that the neighborhood environment of many urban Blacks and Latinos is destructive. It is only if we can recognize these moral ills that we can morally assess various potential agents’ forms of responsibility for or response to those states of affairs.

Though I agree with Silliman rather than Garcia on this matter, I think Silliman’s account of the relationship between individual and structural racism is misleading. He wrongly implies that I claim that the only form of individual racism is ‘willful, deliberate racist intentions of actual individuals’ (Silliman, 2003: 310). In INRB, I mention several forms of individual racism that do not involve such intentions – for example, racial ignorance or racial insensitivity, leading to racially deleterious action, and racial prejudice or other untoward racial attitudes that the individual fails to recognize that she possesses. Many individuals who participate in social processes leading to unjust racial inequities hold blameworthy racial attitudes, even though they do not intentionally cause racial ills – such as the well-meaning teachers mentioned above whose low expectations of Black students reproduce racial inequality. Although Silliman is correct to imply that structural inequities may be perpetrated or enabled by unintentionally racially problematic action, he is not correct to imply that such action always lacks individual blameworthiness.
What, then, can we say about the moral logic of structural racism? Let me assume that, for our purposes, structural racism refers to large-scale racial disparities, together with the processes that lead to these inequities. The first question to ask is how we know when such a racial disparity is unjust, or, more broadly, morally unacceptable, or, even more broadly, morally troubling. Surprisingly, the literature on this question is quite sparse. In social science contexts, racial disparities—for example, with respect to income, wealth, levels of education, health, occupational status—are often cited with the implicit assumption that they are at least morally troubling if not plainly unjust. But are they?

My main point in this discussion is to suggest the need for race theorists to address this question. Here I can only suggest some relevant desiderata. These seem to me to fall within four categories—the character of the wrong or injustice involved in the disparity; the moral character of the processes leading to the disparity; the character and type of ethnroracial groups being compared; and the domain of the disparity.

Regarding the character of the wrong involved in the disparity, one can distinguish four quite distinct reasons for moral concern, corresponding to four different standards for unacceptable inequality. First, it would not be the disparity in itself that was morally troubling but rather a tacit standard of minimal acceptability (e.g. of health, education, or income) below which the lower ranked group falls. Second, there may be an implication that nothing less than absolute parity is morally acceptable, so any racial disparity would be morally unacceptable. The third is that while absolute parity between the racial groups in question is not morally required, the actual gap in question is unacceptably large. Such a judgment must be operating with some implicit standard of acceptable and unacceptable disparities, but for the case at hand, that standard need not be very precise; the moral intuition might simply be that the gap in the case at hand (in health, education, income and so on) is larger than acceptable. A fourth operative standard might be absolute parity, but only among those at the same wealth or income level; that is, the two groups should have the same educational opportunities, health outcomes, housing options and so on, holding socioeconomic status constant. On this fourth standard, even though Blacks may be below the White average in wealth or income, the operative standard of justice would be racial disparities that operate independent of such class differences.

A second desideratum is the moral character of the processes issuing in the disparity. This will be discussed in greater detail below. At this point, let me
simply note that disparities that are a result of direct racial discrimination are generally taken to be more morally objectionable than disparities produced by (some) other causes, such as cultural differences between the ethnoracial groups in question.

A third desideratum concerns the relevant ethnoracial groups, disparities between which are thought to constitute matters of moral concern. On some measures of educational attainment, for example, Asian-Americans outperform Whites. For example, Asian-Americans score ten points higher on average on the SATs; when those racial groups at the same income level are compared, the gap increases significantly (Hacker, 2003: 167). The gap is also significantly greater if only certain Asian subgroups are considered – Chinese-Americans, Japanese-Americans and Indian-Americans.) But this gap does not seem to be morally troubling. The average gap between Hispanic and Black test-takers is 79 points (Hacker, 2003: 167), but this difference is seldom taken to be morally troubling. The morally troubling gaps in social indicators are generally taken to be those between Whites on one side and Blacks, Native Americans and Latino/Hispanics (or at least certain subgroups of the latter) on the other. So it does not seem to be all racial or ethnoracial disparity as such that is troubling, but only disparities among certain paired groups. The moral basis for these intuitions needs to be explored.

A fourth desideratum is the domain of the disparity. Certain domains seem to pull more for a strict equality standard (as contrasted with a ‘less than acceptable minimum’ or a ‘too great inequality’ standard). For example a case can be made that there should be no appreciable differences in health care or high school graduation rate among ethnoracial groups; whereas some degree of difference in attainment of PhDs would be morally acceptable.

GLEN LOURY’S VIEW OF RACIAL INEQUALITY

Glenn Loury has devoted the most sustained attention to the normative issues relating to racial inequality of anyone of whom I am aware (Loury 2002). Loury’s view is quite complex and I can not do its subtlety adequate justice here. But certain strands can be brought to the fore as a useful reference point for the general matter of the moral logic of racial inequality. Loury argues that there is a morally significant gap between Blacks and Whites in the USA with respect to many important socioeconomic indicators; he calls this a gap in ‘developmental opportunity.’ Loury argues that in the past ‘discrimination in contract’ (‘the unequal treatment of otherwise like persons on the basis of race in the execution of formal transactions – the buying and selling of goods and services for instance, or interactions, with organized bureaucracies, public and private’, Loury, 2002: 95) was the primary cause of these disparities, but that
this is no longer so. Still, he argues, these current disparities are morally troubling because they are a product of past injustice. (Loury generally eschews ‘unjust’ for the current inequities.) ‘Past racial injustice is relevant in establishing a general presumption against indifference to present racial inequality’ (Loury, 2002: 126). However, it is impossible for us to know the precise causal impact of past injustice on present inequality. (This impossibility is termed an ‘epistemological fog’.)

Thus Loury establishes a reason for focusing specifically on the Black/White comparison (although the general form of his argument would certainly apply to Native Americans as well and perhaps in some respects to Mexican Americans, although the immigrant status of any group tends to place it outside Loury’s scheme.) And he provides both a ground for moral concern about current disparity (namely, its causal relation to past injustice) and a characterization of the appropriate form of that moral concern — that we not be indifferent to the disparity, that promoting greater equality between Whites and Blacks is a morally legitimate political aim.

Let us notice, however, some issues in the moral logic of structural racism that Loury does not address. He does not differentiate domains of inequality; the vague notion of ‘developmental opportunity’, though implying occupational attainment, is left to gesture at broader inequities without exploring the moral character of the distinctions among them. Of the four standards of wrong connected to racial inequity, Loury opts for the least normatively elaborated – the ‘too much inequality’ standard. His view that we do not know the exact causal impact of past injustice on current inequality could be taken as a basis for rejecting a ‘total equality’ standard; the reasoning could be that since we can not be certain that the entire gap in developmental opportunity is due to the legacy of slavery and segregation, we have no basis for setting full equality as the appropriate normative standard. Loury does not, however, explicitly make such an argument. Nor is the ‘acceptable minimum’ standard discussed.

Still, Loury’s case that disparities in major social indicators between Blacks and Whites are morally troubling because these are linked to past injustices is an important step forward in dealing with the moral logic of structural racism. Remember, however, that that moral logic must take into account the processes by which current inequality is generated, in addition to the disparities themselves. Despite the epistemological fog, Loury does recognize at least three distinct relevant processes. The first is discrimination in contract, mentioned above, which Loury regards as unequivocally unjust (Loury, 2002: 99). The second is ‘discrimination in contact’, which involves racial preferences in the informal, private spheres of life, such as choice of friends, neighbors, social associates. Loury argues, essentially, that there is nothing morally amiss about such racial preferences in their own right; they are morally worrying only
because they constitute part of the mechanism that sustains past injustices in present disparities. It is their effects that are troubling and Loury argues that those effects can be ameliorated through race-sensitive, race-egalitarian policies. The third process Loury calls 'stigma,' a negative valuing of Black people and Blackness in American society. Loury is less clear how stigma is meant to operate as an injustice-producing process, but he at least seems to mean that the stigmatizing of Blacks contributes to Whites reconciling themselves to the unacceptable inferior status of Blacks.

THE PROCESSES OF RACIAL DISPARITY IN EDUCATION: A MORAL ANALYSIS

Loury’s discussion of the proximal processes generating inequality is suggestive and I will extend it by focusing on racial disparity in education. (Silliman briefly mentions the criminal justice system as a venue of structural racism, but the education system seems a more pertinent focus in the context of this journal.) In particular, I will examine the significant gap between Blacks and Whites in performance on standardized tests. Although this gap has narrowed since 1970, ‘the typical American Black still scores below 75 percent of American Whites on most standardized tests’ (Jencks and Phillips, 1998: 1). Moreover, there is unquestionably a more general, significant Black/White educational achievement gap. Test scores, like earnings, provide a clear standard for measuring inequality and a good deal of research has gone into explaining the racial gap in test scores. Furthermore, test scores do bear a distinct relationship to college grades, skill acquisition and earnings, and are thus a proxy for other significant forms of social inequality, that I imagine Silliman would regard as exemplifying structural racism.

In their canonical collection on this issue from 1998, The Black-White Test Score Gap, Christopher Jencks and Meredith Phillips and their contributors suggest many different explanatory factors – parents’ education, a skills gap (including vocabulary) entering school, wealth, teacher qualification, teachers’ expectations of students, students’ perception that their efforts in school will result in good jobs down the road, cultural stereotypes of racial minority students and others. Subsequent research has suggested other factors – time spent watching television, parents’ role in monitoring homework, number of books in the home (Lee, 2002; Winerip, 2003). These various factors operate at different levels; parents’ education might affect their ability or confidence in monitoring their children’s homework. So they do not all constitute fully distinct causal factors. It is, nevertheless, very likely that this racial gap is a product of a large number of disparate and interrelated factors. The above list, though no doubt still incomplete, should help protect against the tendency to
look for simple explanations of complex but morally troubling phenomena (a
simplification encouraged, I believe, by the expression ‘institutional racism’ and
perhaps Silliman’s ‘structural racism’ as well).

In addition, we appropriately make moral distinctions among these myriad
factors. If so, the moral logic of ‘systemic or structural racism’ must take
account of the moral meaning of proximal causes of disparity and somehow
integrate this within the moral meaning of the broader context of the present
legacy of historical racial oppression, as articulated by Loury.

To illustrate this task, I will concentrate on two among the several factors
cited – teachers’ expectations and the pre-school skills gap.\textsuperscript{17} Let us focus on
the hypothesis that the latter disparity is, in turn, to some significant extent
due to the difference in the degree to which White and Black parents read to,
ask questions of, and respond to questions of, their children (Test Score Gap,
43).\textsuperscript{18} I make no assumption about the causal significance of either of these
factors on the overall test-score gap, in relation either to one another or to the
full range of factors. That teacher expectations are part of the cause in no way
precludes differences in parental verbal interaction with children from also
being a non-negligible factor, and vice versa.

Comparing the two factors from a moral point of view, it is plausible to
think it wrong for teachers to possess race-differentiated expectations of
children; they should expect as much from their Black as their White students.
If they have lower expectations of their Black students, we think of this as an
injustice to the Black students. But the same cannot be said for the difference
in parental verbal interaction. We do not think that Black children are being
wronged by their parents, or treated unjustly, if on the average there is less
verbal interaction, resulting in a vocabulary disparity in kindergarten that puts
Black children at an early disadvantage in school. Similarly, differential teacher
expectation can be regarded as a kind of unjust discrimination against Black
children by an ‘agency’ external to the Black community; but failure to read
to their children as much as White parents do to their children can not be
similarly regarded as a form of racial discrimination against Black children by
an external agent.

Thus, apart from any issues about the appropriate standards for assessing dis-
parities (see above) in this particular educational domain, in order to know
how or in what way the test-score gap is unjust, or otherwise morally wrong
or troubling, we must also know something about its sources, beyond the fact
that it almost certainly bears some relationship to the history of racial slavery
and segregation. For example, suppose the entry-level vocabulary gap – or the
gap in parental reading to children – were the \textit{major} explanatory factor in the
test score gap; this would render the resultant test-score disparity \textit{less}
unjust than if race-based differential teacher expectations were.
Moreover, teacher expectations require further morally informed scrutiny. Ronald Ferguson distinguishes two possible bases for teachers’ expectations of students. One is racial stereotyping; the teachers expect less of Black students because they carry social stereotypes that Black students are intellectually inferior or do not work as hard (as Whites). A second is that teachers assess students’ prior performance relatively accurately and their expectations for future performance of students is determined by (their assessment of) that prior performance. In this second case, the teachers expect the same future performance from those Black students and White students who have performed equally well at prior stages (Ferguson, 1998). But where the Black students have, on average, performed less well in the past, these teachers will then form race-differentiated future expectations of the two groups.

Again, I think we should make a moral distinction between these two forms of race-related expectations. A difference in expectation originating in racial stereotyping is morally worse than one originating in expectations grounded in the teachers’ own accurate perceptions. Silliman might reply that what counts morally is the racial disparity in expectations, not the reasons for it. For Black students might be equally harmed by low expectations grounded in prior performance and those grounded in racial stereotyping. This is precisely the view I have been questioning. In comparing parental reading practices and teacher expectations, we morally distinguished these two factors in the resultant skills gap. This suggests that in fact results (i.e. the gap itself) are not the only pertinent desideratum, morally speaking. And I suggest that we hold on to this perspective when looking at the two different forms of race differential in teacher expectations (stereotypes and prior performance). Moral distinctions need to be made regarding both.

The processes leading to racial disparity matter morally in two different ways. First, they matter from the point of view of individual blameworthiness and responsibility for whatever injustice is involved in the process generating the disparity. Teachers are more blameworthy for racial stereotyping than for race-differentiated expectations grounded in prior performance; and they are not blameworthy at all for parental reading practices. I take this to be an important insight of Garcia’s comments and from his published work more generally – that attempts to bypass the role of individuals in racial wrongs and injustices in favor of results alone are ill-conceived.

But beyond the matter of individual blameworthiness, these moral judgments also affect, to some degree, what we think is wrong with the resultant racial disparities themselves. Keep in mind that the mere existence of a racial disparity does not tell us what exactly, if anything, is wrong with it. I
mentioned above several distinct dimensions and forms of assessing racial disparities. The source of a racial disparity is yet a further desideratum in assessing its wrongness. Let us imagine, for example, that the teachers in a school consistently treat their Black students with contempt and derogation, leading those students to disengage from putting forth their best efforts. We would regard the resultant disparity in performance quite differently from one (again, oversimplifying to make a point) resulting entirely from Black students simply putting in fewer hours on their homework and thus not doing as well as the White students. A racial differential in time spent on homework, while undoubtedly unfortunate, involves less of a clear injustice than does teacher contempt.

We must recognize the moral significance of disparity-generating processes as a desideratum apart from, yet bearing on the moral status of, the disparities themselves. Loury, while very much emphasizing the morally troubling character of the disparities, nevertheless comes close to acknowledging that inequities due to (the process of) straightforward racial discrimination (what he calls ‘discrimination in contract’) are more unambiguously unjust than those resulting from discrimination in contact. ‘But while discrimination in contact may not be as unambiguously objectionable on moral grounds as is discrimination in contract, its real-world consequences can be just as debilitating for a racially stigmatized group.’ (Loury, 2002: 99). A symposium in *Teachers College Record* from 2003 is instructive in this regard. The symposium of four articles is introduced under the title, ‘Measuring Racial Disparities and Discrimination in Elementary and Secondary Education’ (Dabady, 2003). The articles all engage with the distinction between disparity and discrimination, generally recognizing that the latter is often quite difficult to discern (apart from some fairly complex conceptual issues involved in identifying it), the former much less so; and that disparities may be caused by factors other than discrimination. As an example of the latter, one of the articles cites students and their parents choosing to have the student placed in a lower track, even though this is likely to result in lesser achievement on the student’s part (Mikelson, 2003: 1057).

Apart from the illegality of certain forms of discrimination, the articles do not explicitly state why it is important to differentiate discrimination-caused disparity from other disparities. Yet one suspects that there must be a tacit recognition that ‘discrimination’ represents a morally significant category in a way that ‘disparity’ does not. One of the articles seems particularly driven by this recognition in that the author is at pains to argue that it is generally very difficult to disaggregate discrimination-caused from other-caused disparities, thus implying that all disparities warrant the moral taint of discrimination (Mikelson, 2003).

So assessment of the role of individuals is morally important not only to
understand their responsibility for unfortunate racial disparities, but also because that assessment holds implications for the wrongness of the disparities themselves. But the latter insight must be integrated with, rather than displace, Loury’s point that most Black/White racial disparities are morally troubling because they are in some way a product and legacy of prior oppression and injustice, such as slavery and segregation. This is why it is not appropriate to look only at proximal causes when judging disparities to be of moral concern. The larger historical picture and the local processes must be brought into relationship with one another—not so much causally, for the epistemological fog may make this impossible, but morally.22 I have suggested various desiderata required for effecting that integration—standards for morally assessing racial inequality, the ethnoracial groups involved, the domain of disparity and the processes leading to disparity. My main argument, however, has been the more minimal one that analysts of racial disparities have failed to see the necessity of addressing these normative issues and that future research should do so.

Racialization and Education about Race and Racism

In INRB, I argue, following currently conventional scientific wisdom, that races, as that term is generally understood in ordinary discourse, do not exist. The groups standardly referred to by means of racial terminology—‘White’ ‘Black’ ‘Asian’ (which has come to be understood as a racial term)—do not possess the characteristics attributed (generally implicitly) to races. These include (I argue in the book) an implication of a fundamental, inherent likeness among members of a racial group and a significant difference from members of other groups; the possession of inherent psychological characteristics that differ in important ways among races (‘inherentism’, in my terminology); an implication (attenuated in contemporary racial discourse but still present) of hierarchy among racial groups. Genetic science does not support belief in the existence of such characteristics and such differences. Many, though by no means all, writers on race accept this position, which has come to be called the ‘no race’ view.

Among ‘no race’ adherents, a few take the further step of advocating the jettisoning of racial terminology, in official contexts as well as in ordinary speech. I do not take this view myself. I argue that the groups we refer to as ‘Black’, ‘White’ and so on, are genuine, socially significant, intergenerational groups that have come to be so through a process of ‘racialization’. That is, the persons called ‘Blacks’ have been treated and viewed as if they did constitute a race and this fact has given that group distinctive historical and social
experiences and a distinctive group identity. That group identity can survive a jettisoning of belief in races; the identity can be grounded solely in the historical and social experiences, historical memory and so on, of the group. (I argue in the book that members of most racial groups have not, however, revisioned their understanding of their racial identity in light of the ‘no race’ view, but continue to regard themselves as actual races, though not in a consistent or unqualified fashion.) Proposals to jettison racial terminology entirely – for example, by substituting ethnic designations such as ‘African-American’ for ‘Black’, ‘Korean-American’, ‘Vietnamese-American’ and so on, for ‘Asian’, or Italian-American and Polish-American for ‘White’ – risk masking the racialization of these groups, the way that racism and other racial ills have shaped the character and current situation of those groups.

Levinson takes issue with my account of racialization with respect to its educational implications. She wants to know, first, how one would operationalize my recommended shift from thinking of groups (including one’s own group) as races, to racialized groups, especially in educational contexts. And, second, whether doing so would have much value in the struggle against racism, racial discrimination and other racial ills. Levinson is certainly correct to say that I do not address the first issue in more than a cursory fashion in the book, in a suggestion that the Federal Census Bureau be a vehicle of scientific and political education around the meaning of the racial and ethnic categories used on the Census.

These two issues are important, yet are insufficiently addressed, in recent literature criticizing the notion of race while aspiring fully to acknowledge the operation of racism and other race-related ills. Unless it makes some difference to the ways we actually think about those racialized groups, the insight that there are no races will be doing no work. Yet we do not want that work to have the effect of denying the operations of racial discrimination, racial animus and the legacy of past systems of racial oppression. In effect, some writers on race who think of themselves as adherents of the no race position end up reimporting all of the common associations with the idea of race mentioned above, except perhaps a distinct biological substratum for racial differences, under the oft-repeated view that ‘race is socially but not biologically real’. At best, these authors give no guidance to which associations with ‘race’ are to be jettisoned and which retained.

Let me summarize briefly what I take my book to have suggested about how adopting the no race position might bear on racial inequality. Doing so should provide mild support for racial egalitarianism since it would do away with a strong underpinning of the idea that some races are superior to others (an implication that has been substantially weakened, I argued, since the heyday of racial thinking in the 19th century, but is still present). It would also weaken
some of the support for, or at least countenancing of, social segregation, in undermining the felt idea that people of different racial groups are importantly different from one another in a way that implies that it is appropriate that they keep separate from one another. (Since segregation, for example in housing and education, is one important source of racial inequality, weakened emotional support for segregation would have a further mild effect in the direction of racial equality.) Since race thinking promotes both horizontal and vertical distancing between those thought of racially, ridding ourselves of racial thinking should weaken both these destructive forms of human interaction and interrelationship.

Of course I recognize and emphasize in my book, that because our history and social institutions have in many ways already become structured around the false idea of race, merely ridding ourselves of racial thinking will not magically transform those structures and the legacies of that history. But let me turn to Levinson’s specific concerns.

Perhaps I was too caught up in the traditional understanding of the distinctive contribution of philosophy to take Levinson’s proposed operationalizing as my province. But I am indeed concerned about how teachers at all levels can make use of the insights of morally and philosophically informed race theory (and my own views in particular) in teaching in various disciplinary contexts. I work with both K-12 teachers and high school students on racial matters and this challenge is of continuing concern to me. With regard to the issue of racialization, Levinson seems to me overfocused on the purely linguistic dimension of the idea of racialization – substituting ‘racialization’ language for ‘race’ language. For me, the main task is to help students recognize the falsity of the popular idea of race, while helping them to recognize the complex ways that belief in races has affected and continues to affect the experiences of racialized groups. The PBS series, ‘Race: The Power of an Illusion’, that aired in spring 2003 seems to me to have the outlines of the educational task basically correct. One teaches about the biology and genetics of race, showing that genetics does not support the idea of the inherent differences between groups and similarities within groups required for those groups to be races. One also teaches about the historical genesis of the idea of race in North America (as I discuss in my book), which reveals that race did not arise as a scientifically-based idea (not even bad science) but an ideological rationalization for slavery and the displacement of Native Americans.

I imagine that both the scientific and the historical stories can be told to students at different grade levels: The message not only did Whites bring Africans over to work for them, but they said they were a different ‘race’ that was inferior can frame a part of the historical dimension of the racialization and ‘no race’ ideas at many grade levels. Levinson imagines ‘Ellen’, a fifth grade
teacher of 10 and 11 year olds, and suggests – I am not sure why – that my view about racialization would require Ellen to have an opinion with regard to every group whether it is racialized or not. For most purposes, however, Blacks, Native Americans, Asians and Whites – the primary racialized groups in the US context – would encompass quite a good deal of the pertinent history and of the human material required for teaching the science of race. Fine-tuning of the racial classification schemes and practices (where do South Asians, Middle Easterners and so on, fit?) can be done in later grades. I am sure that biology teachers have thought of ways of teaching the elements of genetics to young children. Even without getting into hard science, educators have devised various ‘sameness/difference’ lessons that can contribute to staving off racialist thinking – such as having students pair off and asking them to list ‘likenesses’ and ‘differences’ between them. Such an exercise helps to counter and discourage not only racial but all kinds of group essentialist thinking. In a more distinctly racial variant of this exercise, physical differences can be highlighted, mixing ‘non-racial features’ (height, ear shape, eye color, width of face) with ‘racial’ ones, to help weaken the equating of ‘looks like’ with ‘is of the same racialized group as’ (and thereby fend off racial thinking). Even a focus on skin color alone, in the context of a fairly racially or ethnically mixed class, is likely to turn up something much more like degrees of variation than the binarity implied in racial thinking.

Getting the non-racialist message across is much more important than the resultant linguistic forms in which that message may be encapsulated. Perhaps I was not as clear on this point in the book as I might have been. Students can themselves be invited to think about and brainstorm the different ways that, and linguistic forms in which, the insights about race can be expressed. Levinson is certainly correct that there is no perfect solution here. I do not know how old children have to be to understand the concept of scare quotes (for ‘Black’, as a way to indicate racialized groups and so on). But if they are merely made aware that the color terms that have come to express the idea of race are problematic, I think this would be educationally valuable.

As Levinson’s hypothetical fifth grade teacher suggests, there is nothing new in my prescriptions for teaching about racism and other racial ills in society. Instructing about King and the Civil Rights Movement, slavery, the Pilgrims and the Narragansett, the teacher will have to refer to racialized groups and properly so. What was impressive about the PBS race series mentioned above is that it did not remain content to show the falsity and problematic historical origins of the idea of race. It also made clear that ‘racialization matters’. Once racialized groups and group identities are created, their interaction has a life of its own not determined solely by a continued belief in races. Specifically, the PBS program highlighted the historical and current racial dynamics of
wealth accumulation and the housing market, among (the racialized groups we now call) Whites and Blacks; these dynamics required little in the way of belief in actual races. For example, ‘white flight’ can respond to the idea that blacks bring down property values in a neighborhood, without any accompanying belief in inherent black inferiority.

The creation and sustaining of racial injustice, as well as the resistance to it, form an overarching framework for the reality of racialization. Undoubtedly teaching about racial injustice and oppression runs the risk of falling into racialist thinking, as Levinson suggests. If one continues to use standard ‘racial’ terminology without periodically articulating that and how, that terminology tends to carry false associations, students will naturally be inclined to import those common associations into that usage. On the other side, some who give undue importance to the unreality of race often wish also to accord short shrift to the history of racial wrongs, as if rejecting race required denying racism and other racial ills. As Levinson notes, I am particularly concerned to avoid this pitfall. However, balancing important but contrasting truths poses no different pedagogical challenges in the racial area than in any other. To take another example, history teachers must strive for a balance between recognizing the role of large impersonal forces in history and recognizing the role of individuals.

Even if one were to devise an educational approach that could capture the ‘no race’ idea while giving racism its due, Levinson lodges a deeper challenge to my idea of racialization, or, more precisely, to its educational value as a part of anti-racist education. Before explaining this challenge, let me comment on the idea of ‘anti-racist education’ which makes no appearance in my book but about which I have written elsewhere (Blum, 1999a, 1999b, 2000). I accept the usefulness of that terminology, especially as a strand distinct from, or possibly within, the vaguer ‘multicultural education’ or ‘diversity education.’ In the light of my argument in INRB that the term ‘racism’ should be reserved for only one part, albeit the most morally serious part, of the much broader domain of racial ills, I would just want to make it clear that I conceive of ‘anti-racist education’ as encompassing that broader range of moral concerns. Thus when Levinson distinguishes teaching respect for a racial(ized) group from teaching only that the group is not inferior, I would certainly want to include such respect as part of the broader ‘race education’ project in question.

Levinson recognizes this, but questions whether the idea of a racialized identity will allow the teaching of accomplishments of African-Americans to promote respect for current African-American students in a given class among both African-American and non-African-American students. I am not certain the basis of her concern, but it may be that she thinks of a racialized identity as nothing more than a given group of individuals being thought of as inferior
and being treated as such by others. How, then, could such a group be thought of positively and admirably? But this way of looking at racialization omits the genuine historical groupness and peoplehood involved in the idea of a racialized group. Racialized groups are social and historical entities that can engage in pride-worthy behavior and accomplishments – such as resisting oppression and discrimination, persisting in contributing to the larger society in the face of racial obstacles, uniting to defend the rights of others, helping to educate others about the evils of racism and so on. The reason it makes sense for current Blacks to take pride in the accomplishments of historical Blacks is because they are members of the same historical group. ‘Blacks’ (or, more precisely, taking account of the contextualization of racialization, ‘African-Americans’) are not simply a group of individuals who have been seen and treated as racially inferior; they are also an historical people who have responded to this ill-treatment in various ways (some of which are deserving of pride and respect), have developed cultural modes around this historical experience and so forth. There is no more reason for a current Italian-American to take pride in Leonardo da Vinci; in both cases, a genuine, historical people is involved, that allows for familiar sentiments of pride, shame and so on. Indeed, in a sense there is more reason for such identification and pride in the case of Blacks, because their historical inferiorization provides a stronger basis for pride in accomplished forbears overcoming obstacles than is present in a merely ethnic, non-inferiorized case of historical identification.

**CAN TEACHING ABOUT RACE AFFECT PEOPLE’S RACIAL ATTITUDES?**

Levinson also questions the anti-racist value of teaching the ‘no race’ view by reference to two bodies of social psychological literature. One suggests that members of all groups, advantaged and disadvantaged alike, develop psychic structures that support the status quo. Blacks internalize negative stereotypes and evaluations of their own group, for example. The second body of research is Claude Steele’s ‘stereotype threat’ theory, according to which ‘members of stigmatized groups worry about confirming a negative stereotype about their group through their performance on a task and then, precisely because of this anxiety, end up performing worse on the task than they otherwise would – thus paradoxically performing true to negative stereotype’ (Levinson, 2003: 276). Levinson takes these two bodies of theory/data to raise doubts whether teaching people, especially inferiorized racial groups, that there are no races will have any effect on reducing racist and racialist assumptions about their own inferiority.

At one point, Levinson (2003: 275) suggests that the reason I think doing
so will have such an effect is that members of the racialized group will be able to choose their identity rather than having it foisted upon them. I do not make this argument. Being ‘Black’ and ‘White’ (racialized) are no less imposed identities than are black and white (racial). In both cases one is born into the group in question and that is the criterion of membership. One can ‘pass,’ perhaps, but not actually become un-Black (racial or racialized).

On a different matter, both racial and racialized identities allow for the individual to embrace or to distance herself from that identity. Blacks who believe that Blacks are inherently inferior (racial) may still distance themselves from their Blackness, trying to make their Blackness as insignificant a part of their overall identity as they can – just as ‘Blacks’ (racialized) may do in light of the recognition that non-Blacks see them as inferior. And many non-racialist Blacks have embraced their (merely racialized) Blackness, as have many racialist Blacks their (alleged) Blackness. (I argue in the book that Blacks are able to embrace racial Blackness because Blacks are better able than other groups to be racialist without believing in their [imputed] inferiority.)

I do think the two quite important and fascinating sets of findings Levinson cites carry some force against my view independent of this argument about identity choice, because they appear to suggest that even people who repudiate racial inegalitarianism (the empirical, not the normative, version) carry negative stereotypes of socially inferiorized groups, including their own. This is indeed sobering. I was not clear, however, whether the researchers systematically compared ‘racialists’ and ‘non-racialists’. Perhaps non-racialists hold significantly fewer racialist stereotypes than do racialists. There is also a question of who counts as a non-racialist. No doubt many people who avow racial egalitarianism do not really believe what they avow; they still think Blacks are inferior. If one excludes this latter group from the non-racialists, differences between racialists and non-racialists with respect to racial stereotyping might be even greater.

But these are quibbles. The research Levinson cites suggests that socially salient stereotypes and evaluations are carried at a level of consciousness not readily accessible to explicit pedagogic interventions. This is indeed depressing. At the same time, it is difficult to read Levinson herself as despairing over the effectiveness of anti-racist education. Otherwise, why criticize me for failing to spell out the implications of my view for it? One can only hope that, as some research has shown, people are able to learn to recognize these pervasive and unconscious stereotypes in themselves and, having done so, learn to act not on them but as much as possible on their conscious egalitarian beliefs. In that case, helping students to adopt racially egalitarian beliefs would indeed be a worthy and possible educational goal. Since Levinson presents no research suggesting that teaching non-racialism bears no empirical connection to the
adoption of egalitarian beliefs and the taking of action stemming from such beliefs, I will retain my intuition that it does; though I would reiterate that the moral damage done by racialism lies not only in its ‘horizontal’ perpetuation of racial hierarchy, but its ‘vertical’ supporting of moral distancing between members of different racial groups (INRB, 2002: 102–05, 128).

Finally, I want to repeat that I nowhere suggest that changing people’s thinking about race and racism is the best way to achieve racial equality, racial harmony, or even the elimination of racialist thinking itself. As Levinson notes, I say, and want to reemphasize here, that ‘Seriously weakening popular attachment to race requires doing battle with the political foundations of race thinking; to that end the achievement of a more just and less racially divided society is the crucial task’ (INRB, 2002: 146).

**Racial Scalarity: ‘Degrees of Blackness’**

In one short section in INRB (2002: 160–2) – fortunately not much related to the rest of the book – I attempt to make sense of a familiar use of racial concepts, in which people are spoken of as being ‘more Black’, ‘not very Black’, ‘more White’, and so on. Such locutions are confusing, since we are also inclined to say that people are either Black or not, White or not and so on. The scalar use and the binary use seem at odds with one another.

Garcia does not challenge my suggested account of what people generally mean when they use racial scalar (what he also calls ‘intensive’) concepts – that they may mean any one of a number of different things, such as that a ‘more Black’ person is more ‘culturally’ Black, or has stronger ties to the Black community, or has a stronger commitment to Black welfare (than some other reference group of Blacks) (Blum, 2002b: 161). Nevertheless, he is entirely right to criticize me for not adequately subjecting this way of talking to normative scrutiny and for implying that, even if it might be problematic to do so, people use scalar racial concepts and there is not much that can be done about it.

As Garcia mentions, when he first suggested these criticisms to me in personal communication, I attempted to change the section in question for the paperbound edition of the book. The publisher would not permit this and, in light of Garcia’s thoughtful criticisms, I want to take this opportunity to state my position on the matter. I agree that scalar talk is beset with serious moral pitfalls. It much too readily lends itself to inappropriate excluding from a community (excluding the ‘not Black enough’). It can be and often is a source of divisiveness in stigmatized or politically powerless communities. Scalar race talk can also involve inappropriate forms of criticism of persons for matters that should be left to personal taste and choice. If Joe, a Black person, enjoys the Clancy Brothers but not Miles Davis, he should be able to
do so without being vulnerable to being called ‘less Black’ or ‘insufficiently Black’ (and the converse is true of an Irish person).

I think we should try our best to avoid using scalar race talk at all, particularly as a way of explicitly criticizing persons for their degree of possession of any of the number of characteristics I identify as implied in most scalar race talk (cultural, political and so on). I am less certain, however, that I wish to follow Garcia’s implication that it is always inappropriate to engage in such criticism (using non-scalar language to do so). For example, it seems to me an entirely morally coherent position to think that Blacks should have a special concern for the welfare of other Blacks. No doubt a case can be made against this view. For example, it can be argued that injustices against any group should be equally the concern of members of any group. However, I do not think that this dispute can be settled simply as a consequence of ruling out scalar race talk.

Garcia does not exactly deny this point. But he seems to imply that the valid criticisms of scalar race talk automatically rule out any of the value judgments that I claimed in the book are implied in such talk. As I say, I agree with Garcia that many of those judgments are indeed inappropriate, such as criticizing someone for insufficient attachment to cultural forms associated with racialized groups. But not all of the corresponding value judgments seem to me equally problematic. Thus it seems to me not inappropriate for liberal Blacks to criticize Clarence Thomas for what they perceive as his retreat from judicial doctrines that protected Black rights; it would only be inappropriate for them to express this judgment by saying that Thomas is ‘not Black enough’.

NOTES

1. Racial disparities in K–12 education are present in grades, test scores, retention and dropout rates, graduation rates, identification for special education and gifted programs, extracurricular and co-curricular involvement and discipline rates (Mikelson, 2003: 1055).

2. I explore the moral logic of structural racism in only one place in the book – in an account of what has been called ‘institutional racism’ (Blum, 2002b: 22–6). There I argue that that term should be reserved for the operation of distinct institutions (a school, a hospital, the health care system in a given community or society) or practices in generating unjust racial inequity. It should not be used to apply to any and all societal or systemic racial inequities and the processes that generate them, independent of a determination that the inequities are unjust or that the processes themselves are devoid of moral merit. (More on this issue later)

3. This fraternity example is discussed in more detail in Blum, 2002c: 209.

4. One study found that 40–60 percent of all Whites ‘believe that the average Black person is faring as well or better than the average White person’ (Bush, 2002: 26).
5. The idea that the disaggregating of race from class should constitute a crucial measure of racial injustice is propounded by Smith (1996), as implied in his definition of ‘institutional racism’.

6. Among children from families making US$80,000 to US$100,000, the gap in SAT scores is between Asian-Americans and Whites is 63 points (Hacker, 2003: 167).

7. The issue of differing equality-related standards applying in differing life domains is explored in Blum, 2002a.

8. Bernard Boxill (1992) also deals extensively with racial inequality between Blacks and Whites. Boxill aims to show that racial discrimination plays a larger part in generating such inequality than certain thinkers whom he considers claim and that the views of other thinkers fail to come to grips with the morally troubling inequalities. However, except to the extent that he implies (rightly in my opinion) that inequality caused by racial discrimination is morally wrong for that reason, he does not explore why other types of inequality between Whites and Blacks might be morally troubling. In that sense, his project does not have the ambitious scope of Loury’s.


10. Loury connects the moral legitimacy of race egalitarian policy to a rejection of ‘race blindness’ (often called ‘color blindness’) in favor of ‘race egalitarianism.’ The critique of race blindness is central to Loury’s project in the book.

11. The failure to explore the moral character of different domains is particularly striking in Loury’s frequent invocation of the wide racial disparity in the prison population as deeply troubling, without any examination of whether there are racially different rates in the commission of crimes, surely a morally pertinent factor in assessing the morally troubling character of incarceration rates. Disparities in infant mortality or maternal mortality (Loury, 2002: 203, 204) present a very different and much less complex (and more disturbing) moral picture.

12. Discrimination in contact sustains previous inequities, Loury argues, because the resources for human development are, to a large extent, drawn from one’s associations and networks within which discrimination in contact operates (Loury, 2002: 99–103).

13. ‘I want to suggest with the stigma idea that a withholding of the presumption of equal humanity is the ultimate mechanism of racism in American public life’ (Loury, 2002: 88). Loury briefly suggests that stigma also plays a role in discrimination in contact (Loury, 2002: 101) – in Whites preferring other Whites to Blacks – but he does not press this point. He regards the domain in which contact discrimination operates as appropriately protected from state intervention and also sees it as a domain that, in a liberal social order, is also essentially immune from moral criticism. (‘It is far less obvious that there is anything wrong in principle with forming or avoiding close association with another person partly on the basis of racial identity’ [Loury, 2002: 96]. It should be noted here that Silliman provides an interestingly comparable analysis of
the nature of the moral sentiments that allow Whites to countenance racial injustice against Blacks. Though Silliman proffers this only as a suggestion, what he cites in this context is an absence of imaginative empathy, which he sees sustained by Enlightenment rationalism, bureaucracy and various depersonalizing forces in modern mass culture. This deficiency in moral sentiment is not, in Silliman’s view, racial in character (as stigma is in Loury’s view), but it plays the same morally deleterious role in sustaining racial injustice (‘structural racism,’ in Silliman’s terminology).

14. ‘The educational achievement and school retention rates of African-American children have lagged behind those of Whites for as long as records have existed. At the college level, for example, only 38 percent of Black entrants graduate within six years, compared with 58 percent of White entrants. Those African-Americans who do graduate typically earn grade point averages (GPAs) two-thirds of a letter grade below those of White graduates’ (Steele and Aronson, 1998: 402). Loury states that the average Black 17 year old reads at the same level as the average White 13 year old (Loury, 2002: 122). (See note 1 for further data on racial disparities in education.)

15. ‘Black teenagers lag well behind their White counterparts in reading and mathematics and this skill deficit explains most of the racial difference in wage outcomes among young adults’ (Johnson and Neal, 1998: 480).

16. Lee is discussing John Ogbu’s *Black American Students in an Affluent Suburb: A Study of Academic Disengagement* (2002). Winerip is discussing recent research (on a population similar to Ogbu’s) by Ronald Ferguson. Both Ogbu and Ferguson are leading researchers of racial disparities in school achievement. I am intentionally omitting from my list of explanatory factors the hypothesis that Black students are discouraged from achieving by other Black students who accuse high achievers of ‘acting White.’ This hypothesis has been much bandied about in the media, but the evidence in favor of it is very spotty (Cook and Ludwig, 1998).

17. ‘We know that, on average, Black and Hispanic four- and five-year-olds score lower on tests of school readiness than Whites.’ (Ferguson, 2001: 350)

18. Ferguson remarks, ‘As a Black parent, I acknowledge that there might be differences in what we do with our pre-school children that would put them on a more equal footing with Whites on the first day of kindergarten’. (Winerip, 2003)

19. Ferguson finds that among the teachers studied, most racially differentiated expectations are of the second (assessment of past performance based) rather than the first (stereotype-based).

20. This scenario suggests the unfortunate interaction between initial skill deficiencies and reasonable expectations. If Black students begin school with a deficit, teachers who base expectations on past performance will expect less of them. On the further hypothesis (assumed in my account in the text) that expectations play a causal role in future performance, the initial gap will therefore be increasingly widened as the Black and White students proceed through school (holding all other factors constant).
21. A case can be made that it is wrong for teachers to have race differentiated expectations, no matter what their source, in particular whether the source be racial bias or past student performance. It could be argued that a teacher’s professional responsibility is to tailor their expectations to the highest potential of the individual student, minimizing the role of past performance in determining this potential. Ferguson, in the article mentioned earlier (Ferguson, 1998), differentiates from the other two this third form of teacher expectation, though he does not go so far as to normatively recommend it as a professional responsibility (Ferguson, 1998: 281–83). Also, although teachers are not to blame for pre-school parental verbal interaction practices, it would not be inappropriate for teachers who recognize the importance of this factor to attempt to devise programs (in tandem, say, with community groups) that would encourage Black parents to read to their pre-school children.

22. One does not want to go so far with Loury’s ‘epistemological fog’ that one refuses to engage in informed speculation of longer-term causal factors, such as the depressed educational expectations that can be carried through several generations in the same families and communities. These might, for example, lie behind a current Black parent’s placement of their child in a less demanding track (as in the example in the text) and thus link that proximal cause – which still requires moral attention in its own right – with larger historical factors.

23. Garcia takes issue with a different aspect of my notion of racialization – its relation to my claim that Latino/Hispanics in the USA constitute a ‘partially racialized’ group. I basically agree with his combination of criticism and fine-tuning of what I say on this matter.

24. I note that Garcia sees my project as falling under a general rubric of conceptual or philosophical sociology in which general social categories are subjected to ‘rigorous logical and linguistic analysis’. This is a very different spirit from Levinson’s open-ended conception of the appropriate form of inquiry in this area. I am at this point undecided on my own view of the matter, feeling pulled toward both Levinson’s application view and Garcia’s more theoretical one.

25. The European provenance of the idea of race is somewhat different, but there is also a good deal of overlap.

26. For more such exercises, see Schniedewind and Davidson (1998) and Derman-Sparks and the A.B.C. Task Force (1989).

27. By ‘racialist’ I here mean ‘belief in the reality of races’. Levinson chides me for using the same term also to mean ‘making too much of someone’s racial identity.’ Perhaps she is right to do so.

28. Levinson says, ‘If one recognizes that ‘Blacks’ as a group are a result of racialization . . . and hence exist only in light of a history of mistreatment, discrimination, prejudice and oppression, then it takes essentially a willfully bizarre reading of history to put a positive (or even neutral) spin on one’s identity as a Black person’ (Levinson, 2003: 279).
I cannot agree with Levinson that there would be no reason for African-American students to feel that learning about African-American heroes and exemplars such as Tubman, Ashe and Angelou has any relation to themselves, or to how others see them, unless they regard themselves as actually being of the same race as those exemplars. Racialized groups are real entities – groups with shared histories, historical memory and meaning-systems formed by racism and the resistance to it. Membership in such groups is quite meaningful and does not require a belief in actual race to provide that meaning (Shelby, 2002 gives a sustained argument in favor of this proposition).

Armour (1997: 130–39) gives an extended argument to the effect that though we are not able to control our having of stereotypes, we are able to control our reactions to them and can learn to prefer the actions prompted by egalitarian beliefs over those that would be prompted by stereotypes. Armour’s argument is based largely on research conducted by the social psychologist Patricia Devine.

Garcia is correct to say, however, that I do not relate the understanding of ‘race’ implied in those usages to my general account of race in the book.

Shelby, 2002 and Wilkins, 1993 both make a case for such special concern.

It would be a subject for further exploration whether, to judge members of group A to be wanting in their commitment to the welfare of that group, someone is morally required to have a certain ‘standing’ in order to proffer such a criticism – for example by being a member of group A, or by being committed to the welfare of group A.

REFERENCES


BIографICAL NOTE

Lawrence Blum is Professor of Philosophy and Distinguished Professor of Liberal Arts and Education at the University of Massachusetts, Boston. In addition to I'm Not a Racist, But . . . , Blum is the author of Friendship, Altruism, and Morality; A Truer Liberty: Simone Weil and Marxism (with V.J. Seidler); and Moral Perception and Particularity. He specializes in moral philosophy, moral education, multiculturalism, and race studies. Blum works with K-12 teachers on racial issues, and teaches a course on Race and Racism at his local, very racially and ethnically mixed, high school. Blum has taught as a visiting professor at Teachers College, Stanford School of Education, and UCLA (Philosophy Department). Correspondence to: Professor Lawrence Blum, 149 Prospect ST, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA, e-mail: Lawrence.Blum@umb.edu