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Lawrence Blum's "Multiculturalism, Racial Justice, and Community: Reflections on Charles Taylor's 'Politics of Recognition'" is an expanded and revised version of his "Philosophy and the Values of a Multicultural Community," originally published in Teaching Philosophy 14, no. 2 (June 1991), pp. 127-34, which is adapted with permission.


David B. Wong's "Coping with Moral Conflict and Ambiguity" originally appeared in a slightly different form in Ethics 102 (July 1992), pp. 763-84, © 1992 by the University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
any philosophers are wary about recent calls for greater cultural diversity in university curricula, especially demands that non-Western traditions and modes of thought be given significant recognition. Philosophy departments are often among the last to institute such changes and to join interdisciplinary efforts at implementing this diversity. Philosophy has, until very recently, contributed little to the public and campus debates concerning multiculturalism and has even been slow to take up the more strictly "philosophical" issues involved. But, I will suggest, attention to multiculturalism should be seen as a boon to philosophy, and philosophy may have a unique contribution to make in this area.

Important as the strictly disciplinary area is, philosophy also has a role to play in contributing to making campus communities "just, caring, open, and civil," in the words of the important 1990 Carnegie Foundation report "Campus Life: In Search of Community." A significant step toward overcoming philosophy's isolation in both the public and the campus domains has been taken by the authors of Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition" — especially by Charles Taylor in his long lead essay, "The Politics of Recognition," but also by Amy Gutmann in her introduction, and Susan Wolf, Michael Walzer, and Steven Rockefeller in their comments on Taylor. This superb and important work is the first major statement of a distinctly philosophical approach to the issue of multiculturalism that engages directly with the current controversies on campus. Its existence significantly raises the level of debate, and I will assess its contribution as part of my own discussion of multiculturalism.
My primary substantive claim is that there is a range of values desirable in a multiracial, multicultural campus specifically concerned with racial/cultural difference. These values are seldom clearly distinguished and are often entirely run together. For example, the Carnegie study just mentioned devotes a chapter each to six characteristics it advocates for college communities: purposeful, open, just, disciplined, caring, and celebrative. The report takes up racial/cultural issues primarily in its “Just Community” chapter, possibly implying a conceptual unity to the diverse issues of access and retention, ignorance of groups and traditions other than one’s own, outright discrimination, and minority in-group exclusiveness. And racial/cultural issues are not mentioned at all in the “Caring Community” chapter, thus implying either that a sense of interracial “caring” is not particularly important, or that there are no special problems about developing caring across racial or ethnic divides. Both of these implications are incorrect and stem from a failure to see the diversity of values surrounding racial and ethnic differences in multiracial colleges. Failure to note this range and diversity of values understates the complex tasks involved in realizing them all, blinds us to possible tensions among them, and diverts us from raising the question of how best to minimize those tensions in the best realization of all these values.

I will begin to sort out these normative issues by discussing three values one would want embodied in a college community (both in and out of its classrooms): (1) opposition to racism (concern for racial justice); (2) multiculturalism; and (3) sense of community, connection, or common humanity. The terminology is somewhat arbitrary, but each will be explained in turn. I will also occasionally bring in a fourth value — respecting persons as individuals — that is central to Taylor’s argument.

**OPPOSITION TO RACISM**

The notion of “racism” is a highly charged one and is used in contemporary parlance in a number of ways. Although the number of unquestionably racist incidents on campuses has increased in the past decade, there have also been frequent yet more controversial charges of racism for various sorts of remarks and behavior. I want to suggest that the core meaning of “racism” is connected with the *domination or victimization* of some groups by others, and with beliefs and attitudes that directly support such domination by de-
claring the subordinate groups inferior or less worthy than the dominant groups. I will call an act, belief, attitude, or reaction “racist” if it expresses (explicitly or implicitly) a view of members of a racial group as being inferior or of lesser worth. Racism need not be conscious. A remark may be racist whether its maker realizes this or not; and a person may hold a racist attitude without realizing she is doing so. For this and other reasons, it is misleading to confine racism to explicit beliefs.

This conception of racism retains the commonsense idea that racism can be manifested by individuals, and that such individual racism is something to be condemned, on the grounds that it denies human equality across racial differences. I make this point to counteract a tendency to see racism solely as an attribute of social systems—for example, ones that disadvantage one group based on its race. Such views either entirely define away the possibility of using “racist” and “racism” as terms for the moral assessment of individual behavior, attitudes, and remarks, or they lead to a reductionist and misleading collapsing of the individual level into the systemic one (for instance, by declaring an act racist if it in fact contributes to supporting a racist system, not racist if it does not).

Nevertheless, on my view the existence of systemic social racism does remain an essential reference point in the evaluation of individual racism. Individual racist remarks, attitudes, and the like are to be condemned partly because they are precisely the sorts of attitudes that provide normative and psychic underpinning to racist social structures. That is, we do not fully understand the moral opprobrium rightly attaching to individual racist comportment if we see it only as a denial of human racial equality. We must, in addition, be aware that this denial on the individual level has been an essential part of the maintenance of systemic social structures that subordinate groups who are the target of racism.

The moral value underlying opposition to racism is, then, the basic human equality accepted (at least in principle) by most democratic societies. Divergence from this value on the basis of race is rightly regarded as one of the most pernicious and damaging forms of the denial of human equality and is, for this reason, widely condemned (if less widely avoided in practice).

On this account of “racism” the following phenomena, often called “racist,” are not (necessarily, or usually) racist: (1) departure from pure meritocratic justice: for example, affirmative action programs that select a student of color with lower test scores over a white student with higher ones; (2) minority exclusiveness: for example, black students sitting together in the
college dining room, with the effect (not necessarily intended) of making nonblacks feel uncomfortable joining them; (3) stereotyping: for example, a white student's automatically and unthinkingly assuming that a Latino student is from a lower socioeconomic background than his own.

The first of these is not (generally) racist, because the purposes and rationale of such affirmative action programs is not the presumption of inferiority of the nonpreferred groups but is, rather, compensation for past discrimination or a counterweight to (often difficult-to-pin-down) current prejudice against the preferred groups. The second phenomenon (minority exclusiveness) is not racist, because wanting to be with "one's own kind," especially (but not only) in contexts in which one's group has not been, or is currently not, fully accepted, is not typically premised on a sense of superiority to nonmembers of one's group. (It would be racist, on my account, however, if members of the black group did believe in white inferiority.) The third example (stereotyping), too, does not necessarily involve the stereotyper believing that Latinos are inferior; although many stereotypes do involve a negative view of the group stereotyped, not all do.

The failure of these three phenomena (necessarily) to be racist does not mean, however, that these actions and policies cannot be criticized as violating some other moral value appropriate to culturally pluralistic and multiracial communities (especially college communities). An overemphasis on in-group solidarity, even among groups not fully accepted, can be harmful to the achievement of a sense of community across racial divisions, as well as constricting to the individuality of members of the group in question. And stereotyping, whether negative or not, is inimical to seeing other persons as individuals and readily plays into (when it is not itself yet) racism. Poorly handled affirmative action programs can also be harmful to some multicultural ends — a sense of community, for example — even while they may serve the goal of racial justice; and there may be other values connected with justice (though not necessarily racial justice) violated by certain affirmative action programs. My point here is precisely that there are several values relevant to a multiracial community — values (such as opposition to racial injustice, interracial community, treating persons as individuals) that are distinct from one another, and that can conflict.

Although all racism is bad, on my account of racism as "dominance-attitude" not all manifestations of racism are equally bad. There is a moral asymmetry in manifestations of racism. To oversimplify a complex issue, racist attitudes that lend support to an actually existing systemic structure of
racial injustice, and in which the possessor of the racist attitude is a member of a dominant group, are (ceteris paribus) worse than racist attitudes held by a member of a subordinate group toward a member of a dominant group; for the latter do not support an existing structure of domination, while the former do. For example, beliefs in and doctrines of white inferiority to people of color are genuinely racist and deserve condemnation. Yet these manifestations of racism toward whites are not as bad, dangerous, or condemnable as doctrines of white superiority to people of color (or attitudes expressing those doctrines), because the latter but not the former play a role in supporting actual structures of injustice. This is why, in the United States, white supremacist groups are more morally objectionable than, say, black racist groups, though both are deeply objectionable.

The source of the moral asymmetry here is that racism supporting actually existing subordination invokes and reinforces the social weight of this structure of dominance, bringing it down against its victim; thus (other things being equal) it more deeply shames and harms its victim than does subordinate-to-dominant racism, which does not carry that social and historical resonance. The different force of the formally similar expressions "honkie" and "n*gger" illustrates this point. The latter (when used by whites) carries historical associations of keeping African Americans in their (inferior and subordinate) place, while the former does not do the same to whites; yet both are hurtful, objectionable, racist expressions.

This asymmetry helps clarify the frequent mutual incomprehension of white and nonwhite students concerning racism. Many African-American and other nonwhite students tend to think of racism solely as a phenomenon of whites against blacks (or other nonwhites). Many white students, by contrast, tend to equate—and condemn equally—all attitudes of racial insult, exclusion, or differentiation by any racial group toward any other.

Putting aside the point made earlier that some of what these white students call "racism" is not actually racism (according to my account), each group is onto part of the truth here. The students of color see that the core and most socially dangerous expression of racism is the actual, historical domination or victimization of one group by another, and the attitudes of superiority (whether conscious or not) that directly support that domination. Many white students fail entirely to see this, not acknowledging—or not acknowledging the significance of—the historical and continuing subordinate status (in the United States) of people of color. Their view is rooted in an understanding of racism that sees it solely as an individual phenomenon—a matter
of individual people having objectionable attitudes and sometimes behavior toward others. This view neglects entirely the systemic and historical dimensions of racism.

The white students, on the other hand, are correct to see clearly that all manifestations of racial contempt and superiority are worthy of condemnation, in part (as explained above) because they are the sorts of attitudes that do underpin racial subordination by denying the moral equality of human beings. The students of color's attitude discussed here has the effect of almost entirely letting people of color off the hook for objectionable attitudes of superiority or contempt toward other groups. These attitudes may be referred to—often somewhat dismissively—as mere "prejudice," implying that unless one's prejudices are backed up by power over the group one is prejudiced against, they are of little moral significance. But no racial prejudice is insignificant or "mere," and all manifestations of racism, no matter the race of the perpetrator, are to be strongly condemned.

The mutual incomprehension between the races on this issue is striking. Part, I believe, of what drives each of the two groups to their extreme and false views is the blindness of the other group to what (rightly) seems to the one group an obvious truth.

This analysis of racism has implications for all its manifestations, including that of members of subordinate or vulnerable groups toward one another—Korean Americans toward African Americans, or African Americans toward Jews. The subordination or vulnerability of the target of the racism, rather than of its perpetrator, is the crucial factor in the moral asymmetry. Even if Korean Americans are not themselves a dominant, privileged, or powerful group, their racism against African Americans reinforces the subordination of the latter and thus is a more damaging form of racism than that of either group toward whites, where there is no subordination to reinforce.

This discussion of racism is meant to identify more precisely the phenomenon that is to be opposed when a campus commits itself to opposition to racism (and to racial injustice). I will not focus on specific programs that exemplify this value, though some will be mentioned in the discussion of the Taylor volume, but I want to note three implications of the foregoing analysis. First, racism on a campus can have the effect of impinging on the victim groups' full and equal access to the education provided at that institution. In that sense opposition to racism can be seen not only as a moral or social value but as a component, or prerequisite, of a purely educational value—the equal access of all students to the education being offered.
Second, and on the other side, opposition to racism should be frankly acknowledged and accepted as a moral value as well, not only an academic or intellectual one. And I suggest that value needs to be seen as part of colleges’ responsibility to educate future citizens of a democratic polity. Insofar as racism undermines genuine democracy and the moral equality that it requires, opposition to racism becomes a value commitment required by democratic citizenship. In this respect too, it is an educational value.

Third, there are both curricular and noncurricular implications of taking opposition to racism seriously. The curricular implications will be discussed later. On the noncurricular side, this value implies a role for the often-maligned but potentially quite valuable workshops, supplemental education programs, and the like that are explicitly meant to “sensitize” faculty and students alike to racism, to the experience of groups with which they might not be very familiar, and to the dynamics of racial prejudice and how it can be avoided.

MULTICULTURALISM

Like “racism,” this is a term of great currency yet imprecise usage. For me it encompasses the following two components: (1) understanding and valuing one’s own cultural heritage, and (2) having respect for and interest in the cultural heritage of members of groups other than one’s own. Note that condition (2) takes multiculturalism beyond what is often referred to as “cultural pluralism,” which may refer to the mere coexistence of different groups, perhaps along with tolerance for and recognition of the right of others to pursue their own cultural exploration and learning. “Multiculturalism” as I am understanding it goes beyond the latter as well, to encompass a positive interest in and informed respect for other cultures.

In curricular contexts, a common association of “multiculturalism” is with, first, giving students of color an understanding of and validation of their own cultural heritages (and thereby also broadening the sense of inclusion in the university’s overall intellectual enterprise), and, second, expanding white students’ intellectual horizons and reducing their ethnocentrism. Yet these two albeit crucial goals do not comprise the whole of what I mean by “multiculturalism.” For in addition my definition implies that members of every group be involved in overcoming their own ethnocentrism, one possible curricular implication being the one taken by the University of California
at Berkeley—that every student ought to study two cultures other than her own.

The value of multiculturalism appears to stand in need of justification in a way that opposition to racism does not, or may not appear to. For racism is a violation of familiar values rooted in Western as well as distinctly U.S. moral and political traditions—of equality, of equal respect for persons independent of race, of freedom from oppression. But multiculturalism, with its valuing of group differences, seems more problematic.

Charles Taylor's extremely rich and multifaceted essay "The Politics of Recognition" attempts just such a philosophical justification of multiculturalism. Part of the attraction of Taylor's view is that, far from seeing multiculturalism as either a full-scale attack on the Western tradition (as some conservative commentators claim), or as a relatively harmless but also educationally insignificant value, Taylor places multiculturalism quite firmly within the liberal tradition of political thought, as expressive of important liberal values. The historical grounding Taylor gives in his account provides a needed situating of and perspective on the often ill-informed and overheated current debates on multiculturalism.

Taylor distinguishes two strands within the liberal tradition—one blind to difference, the other recognizing difference, yet both deriving from the familiar liberal ideals of equal dignity and respect. The first is the more familiar one that sees persons as possessing certain individual rights (freedom of speech, religion, pursuance of career, due process, and the like) that accrue to them independent of differences. This liberal, "difference-blind" strand is simultaneously individualist and universalist. It sees rights as accruing to individuals as individuals; it is universalist in that it grounds those rights in common features of human beings (typically rationality, humanity, moral agency, and the like). (The "universality" in question is, however, sometimes restricted to a certain domain—for instance, to the citizens of a given society—but within that domain is difference blind.) This strand of liberalism sees the recognizing of differences as diverting from, or threatening, its own favored focus on commonality.

But Taylor finds another, "difference-recognizing" strand in the history of liberalism, also grounded in the values of dignity and respect. This second strand enters by way of the notions of recognition and of distinctness, the former of which Taylor locates historically in Rousseau and Hegel, and the latter in Herder (who gave it both an individual and a group form). This view sees people's identities as formed in dialogue or interaction with others. It
provides an important corrective to the overly atomistic, individualistic, and Cartesian picture of the self that informs (implicitly or explicitly) much popular debate (as well as philosophical theory), which Taylor has so trenchantly criticized in many other writings. On his view here, what it is to respect the dignity of another is to recognize her distinct identity—not what she has in common with others, but what is distinctive to her. On this account, differences between persons are acknowledged as part of the value captured in the "recognition" strand of respect for dignity.

Multiculturalism can emerge from this strand in that a person's cultural identity, with its distinctive set of traditions, history, and practices, is a central part of her overall individual identity. Hence recognizing cultures and cultural identity becomes part of respecting individual persons. At the same time, this strand involves an irreducibly social or group aspect of identity, hence is in that respect nonindividualist.

Taylor and the other authors trace out the consequences of this view in two areas—society as a whole, and the college curriculum. At the former level, Taylor discusses two forms of liberal society, corresponding roughly to (1) a privileging of the first—individualist and difference-blind—strand of liberalism, and (2) a more equal combining of the difference-blind and the difference-recognizing (multicultural) strands. The first form of liberal society is discussed more fully by Amy Gutmann in her excellent introductory essay, and by Michael Walzer in his brief comments. Essentially (1) allows for but does not positively support cultural recognition and goods connected with cultural affirmation. The state remains entirely neutral and gives no official support or sanction to cultural goods. Their pursuit must only come privately from individuals and groups. Gutmann says: "Liberal democracy is suspicious of the demand to enlist politics in the preservation of separate group identities or the survival of subcultures that otherwise would not flourish through the free association of citizens" (p. 10).

Citing the case of Canada and its relation to the province of Quebec, Taylor sketches an alternative picture of a liberal society—(2)—that takes as its public philosophy not only the individualist but also the group-recognizing strand of liberalism. Thus he supports Quebec's regulating which families may attend English-speaking (as opposed to French-speaking) schools, and its requirements that commercial signs be printed in French and that large businesses be conducted in French. The basis for Taylor's support is the claim that the survival of French Canadian culture (with its distinctive language) depends on such measures.
In society (2), the cultures receiving state support and public recognition must not themselves violate certain basic individual rights (life, due process, free exercise of religion, and the like). Acceptance of these rights accorded to individuals is essential to the larger society’s being accounted as “liberal.” But Taylor distinguishes from these basic rights other less fundamental liberties—such as the liberty to have one’s commercial sign in the language of one’s choice and in no other—that could be outweighed in particular cases by the values of cultural preservation and expression. The official recognition provided by the larger society to cultures within it distinguishes this conception from (1), which merely permits cultural activity as one good among others, one that happens to be shared by a particular group of individuals. In (2) cultural survival is accorded official recognition and state support as a good, one that (in the case of one of the component subcultures) might conflict with an individual member’s pursuit of her own individual conception of the good.

Not only is version (2) of liberalism not neutral regarding the conceptions of the good held by its members; neither is it neutral in the sense of being a meeting ground for all subcultures to coexist. On the contrary, Taylor says, liberalism in both its forms—(1) and (2)—is a “fighting creed” and is not compatible with all cultures (for example, ones that do not accept its fairly strong separation between church and state). (Taylor says that Islamic culture, for example, does not accept this.) Liberalism should not promote itself on the basis of cultural neutrality but rather for its superiority as a cultural/political system. Of the two liberalisms, Taylor favors (2) as incorporating both strands of liberalism—the individualist and the multicultural.11

Multiculturalism and Recognition

How does this argument bear on multiculturalism in a university setting? Taylor mentions that current demands for multiculturalism are often rooted in a protest by members of a given culture (African Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans) against the demeaning of their culture. He cites Frantz Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth as an important text in advancing the idea that dominant groups impose an image of inferiority on subjugated groups, which members of those groups internalize, thus damaging their own self-image.12 Eschewing Fanon’s prescription of violence against the dominant as any kind of solution to this problem, Taylor apparently sympathetically notes that the domain of education broadly construed becomes thereby an important locus in the “struggle for a changed self-image” (p. 65).
Taylor mentions that expanding or changing the "canon" to encompass groups that have gone unrecognized (or insufficiently recognized) is a natural expression of this need for recognition and an image of positive worth. Thus Taylor begins to draw curricular implications from his argument about recognition of difference. Yet he does not develop this line of thought. Instead, when he turns his explicit attention to "curricular multiculturalism," Taylor takes a quite different tack, which I will discuss in a moment.

It is Susan Wolf, in her essay on Taylor, who more directly and fully pursues the curricular implications of Taylor's recognition argument. African Americans, Native Americans, Asian Americans are, she says, members of the college community; they are part of the "us" that constitutes it. To make effective this recognition of members of these groups is, in part, to recognize their traditions as part of the traditions (of thought, culture, history) that we see as "ours," and that we study precisely (and justifiably) because they are ours. Unless members of the groups previously marginalized see themselves, their histories, and their traditions reflected in the curriculum, they will not be being "recognized" in Taylor's sense. For example (mine, not Wolf's), failure to regard W. E. B. Du Bois as a significant American thinker (not only as an African-American thinker) exemplifies failure to accord due recognition to African Americans, including African-American members of a particular college community. Failure (say, in history courses) to study the complex role of Mexican Americans in U.S. life (especially in the West and Southwest) exemplifies a failure to recognize that group and its members.

This argument has noncurricular implications as well. It could be taken to support official recognition for campus ethnic-based groups, residences with ethnic-based "themes," and preference in admissions to members of one ethnic group.11

Wolf is correct to distinguish this recognition-based argument for curricular inclusion from the view that Taylor himself develops, which shifts the ground from the idea of recognition of others' identity to the affirming of value in non-Western cultures as a reason for them to be given curricular attention. All cultures should be studied, he argues, because members of every culture can come to appreciate what is of value in cultures other than their own (as well as in their own). This line of thought is based on a presumption that Taylor states as follows: "One could argue that it is reasonable to suppose that cultures that have provided the horizon of meaning for large numbers of human beings, of diverse characters and temperaments, over a long period of time—that have, in other words, articulated their sense of the good, the holy, the admirable—are almost certain to have something that
deserves our admiration and respect, even if it is accompanied by much that we have to abhor and reject” (pp. 72–73).

I do not have space to explore Taylor’s own complex and illuminating argument here, the main burden of which is to show the incoherence of a subjectivist and “deconstructionist” form of multiculturalism that claims to abjure standards of value altogether. A similar argument is given by Gutmann, and both do a masterful job of discrediting a strong relativist grounding for “curricular multiculturalism.” But Wolf is correct to see that Taylor’s “recognition” line of thought is quite distinct from this one, which draws on the idea that the main criterion for a work or tradition’s worthiness to be included in the curriculum is that it be of general value (not only value to members of that cultural tradition). By contrast, the “recognition” view (as Wolf plausibly develops Taylor’s notion) implies that some things are studied not because they are seen as having intrinsic worth but simply because they are part of our traditions, our heritage. The same item may be included for both reasons; for example, we may study Chinese thought both because it has intrinsic merit (a merit that has been insufficiently appreciated from a Western-dominated point of view) and because those traditions of thought are part of the cultural identity of Chinese Americans, that is, part of us. Although Taylor provides the philosophic underpinning of this latter line of thought, he does not actually adopt it and thus does not appear to recognize the dual nature of the “curricular multiculturalism” that Susan Wolf articulates.

Even though Taylor, Gutmann, and Wolf (in their somewhat different ways) provide a “liberal” grounding for the value of multiculturalism, their essays do not make it entirely clear in which domains and levels that value is and is not meant to operate. One level on which Taylor’s account does operate is that of a larger society containing component subcultures. The larger society manifests its support for the cultural existence and integrity of the subcultures, one practical implication being that unequal resources may be required to sustain the different groups. Thus Canada must provide unequal resources to Quebec.14 (The account also requires Quebec to acknowledge [individually based] minority rights of, for example, non–French Canadians living in Quebec, but this requirement is not strictly a recognition value itself, but a constraint on one.)

What the account does not prescribe is the active sense of informed respect for cultures other than one’s own that the second condition of my definition of multiculturalism expresses, that is, taking it beyond what is often called
"cultural pluralism." It does not, for example, require either Canada or Quebec to promote in the students in their schools this informed respect for different cultures. So, even though the citizens of Quebec, in preserving their own culture, exemplify multicultural value in and for the larger society of Canada, they themselves are not necessarily (on Taylor's definition) required or encouraged to exemplify intercultural respect.

Again, this problem may simply be one of level of analysis. I am concerned with the promotion of the three values I discuss here (opposition to racism, multiculturalism, sense of community) in individuals, especially students in college; whereas Taylor's examples concern how larger social entities exemplify it. (Taylor says earlier in the essay [p. 37] that recognition is an issue in intimate relations as well as in the more impersonal contexts of a society. But this point does not precisely specify the agency of the multicultural form of value—which entities are meant to instantiate it—not do Taylor's examples indicate a general view of this.) Taylor's idea of "recognition," understood as a norm, does apply to individuals; the prescription is that each individual is to "recognize" cultural differences that form the identities of other individuals. To do so is to respect the dignity of those individuals.

So Taylor's view may contain the resources to express the fuller sense of individual intercultural respect that I am advocating; but Taylor does not develop his argument in this direction.

Multiculturalism and Opposition to Racism

No doubt my definition (like Taylor's) leaves many questions unanswered: What constitutes a "culture"? How do we decide which cultures should count for curricular and noncurricular attention? How do the values connected with multiculturalism cohere with other educational values, such as the development of critical thinking? What exactly does it mean to "respect" a culture, and how does that respect inform the assessment and criticism of cultures? I will bypass these issues to focus on how the value I have called "multiculturalism" is a value distinct from what I have called "opposition to racism (and racial injustice)," yet how both values are essential in a multi-racial community. In doing so, I will argue that Taylor, Gutmann, and Wolf fail to distinguish clearly between these two values and fail to accord opposition to racial injustice its due in the larger framework of values that they are concerned to explicate and clarify.

So, to the differences between multiculturalism and opposition to racism:
First, the two approaches categorize groups according to different criteria. Race and racial identity are not the same as cultural or ethnic identity. The point here is not that race is a biological characteristic and ethnicity a social one. For, putting aside the issue of the purely scientific status of the concept of "race," my interest is in race as racial identity, which is also an irreducibly social categorization (though it has a purported, and in part actual, biological dimension). It concerns the way persons see themselves and are seen by others within a particular society and culture. (For example, in England, East Asians are referred to as "blacks," while in the United States they are not.)

Construed as a social designation, racial identity is very much bound up with a group's place in (historic and current) systems of racial dominance and subordination, justice and injustice, advantage and disadvantage. Part of the experience of one's racial identity—in the United States, for example—is precisely that one's group occupies some general location in these hierarchical systems. At least in the United States, "white" and "black" are, in part, defined in relation to one another; the identity of being "white" has historically been bound up with being superior to "black." It may be that there are, or will become, societies in which racial designations carry no such implications—where groups are racially identified but exist on a plane of relative equality—but in that society racial identity (and even the concept of "race" itself) will have a significantly different meaning than it has in our own.

Ethnic or cultural identity is grounded in lineage, heritage, and tradition—elements of self-identification not coextensive with racial identification. For example, Haitian immigrants to the United States are racially "black" (and their ancestry is African); but they are not usually thought of as "African American." "African American" is an ethnic or cultural designation; it may presuppose a shared racial designation (neither white South African immigrants nor Americans of Algerian extraction are generally seen as "African Americans"), but it is not coextensive with it. Similarly Polish Americans, Italian Americans, and Irish Americans are all (now seen as) "white"; but their ethnicities are distinct. The term "Asian American" has the form of an ethnic designation, but in fact is treated more like a racial designation; the term masks substantial "cultural" differences among Vietnamese, Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, and others.

A second, related difference between the antiracist and the multicultural approaches to groups concerns the aspects of those groups salient in each. Broadly, the antiracist perspective looks at (racial) groups primarily in their
role as subordinates and as resisters of subordination. For example, from an antiracist perspective, to study Native Americans or African Americans involves looking at the way these groups have been oppressed, undermined, and mistreated, by white America; at the beliefs and policies that have supported this mistreatment; and at the subordinate group’s resistance to this mistreatment.

By contrast, to learn about cultural groups from a multicultural perspective involves studying and acknowledging a group’s customs, rituals, language, systems of thought and religion, forms of cultural expression, accomplishments, and contributions to the wider societies of which they are a part, and the like. The two foci are quite distinct. Examining a group in regard to its subordination and resistance to that subordination omits (or omits important dimensions of) cultural expression and accomplishment. Conversely, studying the culture of a group may not capture (or not fully capture) its members’ racially based experience as part of a subordinate or dominant group.

The contrast between race focus and culture focus resides not so much in distinct institutional and cultural forms of the groups in question. Subordinate groups’ forms of cultural expressions are often so intimately bound up with their oppressed status and history that no simple demarcation is possible. Black Christianity, for example, is from one vantage point a mark of oppression, in that it was an essential element in white slave owners’ deliberate attempt to strip African Americans of their African heritage and “pagan” religions. At the same time, at various historical junctures black Christianity in the United States played an important role in resistance to slavery, to segregation, and, more generally, to unjust treatment of African Americans. Yet, in addition, the African-American church was an important source of some of the most distinctive cultural contributions of African Americans to U.S. life—spirituals, gospel music, black preaching styles and language.

A third difference between multiculturalism and opposition to racism has already been mentioned: the normative underpinnings of the two approaches. Multiculturalism is, as Taylor argues, based on a valuing of difference, specifically cultural difference. By contrast, opposition to racism is grounded ultimately in a value of commonality, of common humanity and equality. Racism is wrong because it denies—by declaring some humans inferior to others—the fundamental moral equality of all persons grounded in our common humanity; opposition to racism is a reassertion of this denied value.
There is no fundamental opposition between these two values. We value each other both because of our commonalities and because of our differences. An Asian American can both regard a Chicana as her moral equal and also respect and value the latter’s distinct Mexican cultural heritage. But these are distinct value orientations; neither can be reduced to the other. An individual may be genuinely (if not, perhaps, fully) antiracist without having the sort of appreciation and respect for other cultural groups required by multiculturalism. For example, many European Christian rescuers of Jews during the Nazi occupation expressed a fully antiracist outlook in attempting their noble and dangerous rescue efforts; but few had genuine respect for Jews as a distinct cultural/religious group.17

In fact, older forms of opposition to racism—before the current recognition and emphasis on cultural identity—often had this character. Many persons devoted a good part of their lives to the struggle against racism and believed truly in the moral equality of all persons independent of race—without, however, grasping (much less positively appreciating) the cultures of the subordinate groups whose racist treatment they opposed. Because of the current prominence of the specifically multicultural form of valuing of ethnic/racial groups, it may seem that without multiculturalism there can be no genuine antiracism; that, for example, a person who does not appreciate the culture of another group must actually have racist attitudes toward that group. This is a mistake. Although it may be true that the fullest forms of antiracism have to include some degree of cultural appreciation, it is not true that a person who lacks multicultural appreciation cannot truly believe in the moral equality of all persons, oppose racial injustice, and be sincerely antiracist in her actions.

The distinctness of multiculturalism and antiracism can be shown in the other direction as well. A person can be genuinely interested in and have an informed respect for other cultures, yet not be sensitive to the racist injustice suffered by that group. Again, in the case of some groups more than others, the fullest flowering of multicultural respect may require some degree of antiracism; this is partly because for some groups (for instance, African Americans) many of their distinctive cultural expressions are so deeply bound up with their racial sufferings. Yet the two attitudes are clearly analytically distinct; and it is partly in recognition of this that some educators particularly concerned about racial injustice are wary of “multiculturalism” as diverting full and direct attention from racial inequality and injustice.18

It is important to keep the values of multiculturalism and opposition to
Multiculturalism, Racial Justice, and Community

racism distinct, in part in order correctly to identify the different issues at stake in some of the recent campus developments. For example, extracurricular meetings often somewhat derisively referred to as "sensitivity sessions," whose goal is to make students aware of issues facing other distinct groups of students (students of color, lesbians, gays and women), are not usefully seen as driven primarily by "multicultural" concerns. They are more centrally aimed at making students (or other members of the university community) aware of the damage of racism and other forms of discrimination, and of how these can prevent students who are the object of such behavior from being able to participate as full and equal members of the educational community.

Nor is the proposed "opening up of the canon" solely a multicultural concern to recognize previously excluded groups, though this is certainly a large part of its rationale. Consider, for example, the encouraging of greater curricular attention to the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, to the U.S. civil rights movement, and to philosophic investigation of racial justice. These might be put forth under the multicultural-sounding "more attention to people of color" rubric. But surely a central impulse behind such suggestions is to teach (and perhaps encourage greater concern) about the unjust treatment of certain groups and their reactions and resistance to that treatment—rather than to learn about their culture and traditions. That is, the impulse is as much antiracist as multicultural.¹⁹

One practical reason why it is important to keep multiculturalism and antiracism distinct is in order not to minimize the tasks educational institutions face in living up to educational and civic ideals appropriate for their newly culturally and racially diverse membership. A campus that takes this matter seriously must be both antiracist and multicultural and should devise policies aimed at promoting both values.

Taylor and Opposition to Racism

Taylor's theory of multiculturalism does not really capture this antiracist dimension in the campus developments he and the other authors of Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition" label "multicultural." The notion of "recognition" as Taylor explicates it does not, for example, fully capture the source of complaint that students of color make that their ability to take full advantage of the education being offered them (at a given institution) is impaired by a racist or racially insensitive atmosphere (constituted,
for example, by occasional overt racist acts, more subtle intimations that one is not respected or fully welcome, and the like). The operative desire here is not so much recognition as a removal of (racism-based) obstacles to a good that the students seek (individually or collectively). Part of what students from previously excluded (and still disadvantaged) racial groups want in the name of justice — college education, good jobs, and so on — has little to do with appreciation of their distinct culture by others; it is simply equal access to the same goods that members of the dominant group want.

The removal of race-based obstacles to social goods is, of course, not all there is to racial justice. Also implied is that members of all groups have a certain attitude toward others — namely, regarding those others as moral equals (independent of race). Someone who accepts the general principle of justice — that racial justice demands the removal of race-based obstacles to equality of opportunity — may nevertheless lack this attitude of equal respect toward members of other groups. Although acknowledgment of the principle, too, could perhaps be seen as a kind of "recognition," the more personally directed attitude of respect is a better candidate for the kind of recognition that Taylor has in mind.

Yet, one would still want to distinguish between this equality-based form of recognition and a multicultural form of recognition. The former is a recognition of a kind of sameness — that the African-American or Asian-American student has equal standing to the white student as a member of the community. But the multicultural form of recognition, as Taylor emphasized, is a recognition of a person or a group in its cultural particularity — not in its commonality with other cultures.

Taylor does make a connection between the idea of recognition and that of equality. But he does so by seeing the modern demand for "recognition of difference" precisely as an equality-based demand: "Everyone should be recognized for their unique identity" (p. 38). But this formulation conflates two distinct strands within "recognition" — one, recognizing someone as an equal (a recognition involved in racial justice), and the other recognizing someone in her distinct (cultural or other) identity.

Taylor does develop the notion of recognition in one direction that bears directly on the issue of racism. As noted earlier, he suggests that a group's failure to attain recognition — as when the dominant society mirrors back to its members a "demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves" — naturally leads to the group's internalizing this devaluing. Such a conception of recognition incorporates the hierarchical, dominant/subordinate dimension
captured by the antiracist perspective but not articulated in the purely multicultural one.

Taylor is surely right to suggest that this sort of damage to one's self-worth is an important harm caused by racism. Yet it will not do as a full account of the harm of racism and thus will not fully capture a concern with racism within the concept of "cultural recognition." Much of racism's damage has little to do with psychic harms such as internalized self-devaluing by the harmed group but is simply (as just noted) the deprivation of substantive goods such as opportunity, education, political and economic power, material well-being, and the like.

Moreover, the "internalized self-disvaluing" view of racism overstates the psychic damage done to the racially subordinate by racial domination. Even though I am not familiar with the research on this matter, common sense suggests that although many members of a dominated group do internalize the negative view that the dominant hold of them (in the way Fanon explains), many do not. This lack of uniformity in the impact of injustice on self-worth may seem perplexing, but it shouldn't. Even if there were a general tendency for the dominated to internalize the dominant group's negative image of themselves, there are so many other factors influencing particular persons' self-image—family relationships, other personal relationships, cultural resources, other groups that serve as reference points for one's sense of worth, individual temperament—that it would be highly unlikely that such a tendency would result in anything like a uniform effect (absence of self-worth) in members of the group.

Susan Wolf invokes the case of women in acknowledgment of the distinctness of concern for racial justice and strictly multicultural concerns. "The predominant problem for women as women is not that the larger or more powerful sector of the community fails to notice or be interested in preserving women's gendered identity, but that this identity is put to the service of oppression and exploitation" (p. 76). Wolf is concerned to make the point that the way the issue of recognition functions in the case of women differs from that of cultural/racial groups. Although this is partly correct, it is misleading to suggest that cultural/racial groups do not have both concerns—for justice as well as for cultural recognition. (Moreover, there are many feminists who would see something like "cultural recognition" of a distinct "women's voice" or "culture" as a significant aspiration for women as well.)

Taylor does on some occasions note a difference between concerns of racial (or other group) justice and multicultural recognition. For example, he
notes that affirmative action programs seek a remedy for group injustice through preference to the victim group (p. 40). Taylor's point here is that insofar as affirmative action programs rest on the need to bring about, in the future, a "level playing field" on which individuals can compete according to color-blind rules, their rationale does not express the desire for affirmation of difference that underlies much of what is urged in the name of the politics of recognition.

This is certainly true. Taylor assumes, however, that if a program or endeavor concerning groups is not grounded in "recognition of difference," then it is grounded in a "sameness" approach that is entirely individualistic. This assumption falsifies the depth and significance of group- (for example, race-) based identities that inform the desire for racial justice. The aspect of one's group identity that one wants acknowledged when seeking justice for one's own group (by means of affirmative action programs, race-based scholarships, racial "set-aside" programs for contractors, and the like) may be no less deep or significant than the aspect concerned with recognition of the distinctness of one's particular culture and traditions. This is so even if the ultimate goal is a purely individually based equality of opportunity, which in any case is not the only possible understanding of "racial (or gender) justice."

It is true that one may favor affirmative action plans without being concerned about how deeply significant the racial identity of the "target" groups is to its members. In that sense the issue of group justice can be severed from that of racial identity in a way that cultural recognition cannot be severed from cultural identity. Nevertheless, the account of the basis of affirmative action in terms of an individualistic sameness is misleading if it implies that affirmative action and other racial justice issues do not—in contrast to multiculturalism—implicate group identities. (An analogous point can be made for gender justice issues.) As long as the idea of a concern for justice for a racial group is intelligible—not merely a confused way of talking about individuals—and as long as some members of that group take their racial identification as salient in their own identities, then a concern for racial justice falls into neither of the options presented by Taylor: (1) cultural recognition of difference, (2) concern for individually based "sameness" (for instance, of educational opportunity).21

While I have been arguing for the distinctness of antiracism and multiculturalism as goals and values, obviously they are also, or can be, mutually supportive. Learning to value a different culture can certainly help to bring home to a student (including one who is already in agreement on the princi-
ple that racism is wrong) the wrongness of that culture’s mistreatment at the hands of others. It can awaken students for whom opposition to racism does not run very deep to the humanity of others—in its particular manifestation in the culture being studied. The antiracist perspective enriches an understanding of the cultures of particular groups, insofar as that culture is bound up with the group’s (current and historical) place in a hierarchy of power. Both antiracism and multiculturalism involve taking those outside one’s own group seriously. Though they do so in different ways, both have the power to combat egocentrism and ethnocentrism, and thus to contribute to moral and civic education.

**SENSE OF COMMUNITY, CONNECTION, OR COMMON HUMANITY**

In addition to exemplifying the values of opposition to racism and multiculturalism, college communities should constitute and foster a cross-racial sense of connection or community. This value is in part simply a consequence of the general recognition that education is a collective enterprise and that each college is, or ought to be, a community with which its members identify; that students develop a sense of attachment and identification with one another that flows naturally from their shared educational endeavor and loyalty. This particular sense of connection holds in the same way for persons of the same race as for persons of different races.

The importance of community is strengthened if one accepts, as I have suggested we should, that college education should in part be a form of civic education—preparing future citizens of a democratic polity. Such education can develop only by promoting community within the college itself, as a setting in which the civic virtues are practiced, as well as opening out to and preparing for a sense of connection to and civic participation in the larger society as a community.

The value of community has been recently revived in the communitarian movement, yet neither this development nor proponents or opponents of multiculturalism have attended to the specifically interracial dimension of community, especially on college campuses. For opponents, this omission has its source partly in an overly individualistic conception of education that supports and is itself supported by rejection of the “group” consciousness involved in multiculturalism. Attention to groups—for example, in regard to affirmative action programs in admission or greater inclusiveness in the cur-
riculum—is framed as departing from a strict meritocratic conception of education: only the “best” should be admitted, only the “best” should be studied. This focus overemphasizes (without strictly entailing) purely individualized merit and learning.

In general the defenders of multiculturalism have come closer to recognizing community and connection as a value for educational institutions. Some (for example, Susan Wolf in Multiculturalism) emphasize that inclusion in the educational enterprise is an important grounding of multicultural expansion of the curriculum. But inclusion is only a necessary condition for community, not the thing itself. Inclusion may promote respect, and it may entail the encouragement of treating previously marginalized or excluded groups with dignity. But it does not expressly require the developing of a sense of personal acceptance, connection, comfort, and shared identification among members of the different groups.

The omission of a full sense of community is striking in some recent work of Joan Scott, one of the most compelling and lucid defenders of multicultural education. In “The New University: Beyond Political Correctness” Scott mentions the notion of community in order to criticize “homogeneous” conceptions of it that suppress gender and cultural differences. She rightly decries calls for community that mask the imposition of a dominant (male, Eurocentric) culture on others ostensibly included in that community. The dimension of power is omitted in these discussions of community, and Scott rightly emphasizes that the identities of different groups are constituted through relations of power. “White” is not just different from “black,” but the very identity of whites, especially in the United States, is premised on superiority to blacks.

Scott is correct to note these faulty conceptions of community, and she cites conditions—recognition of diversity, acknowledgment of power relations and the contesting of them—that any conception of community must address. Yet what is lacking in Scott’s essay is any positive notion of community as a sense of personal connection and loyalty among the members of the university community and across these acknowledged differences. The problem is partly that Scott’s conception is pitched almost entirely at the level of intellectual community—a sense of shared intellectual heritage. But the notion of community appropriate to a college, encompassing many dimensions of interaction between students, involves a more multifaceted sense of mutual involvement and personal connection. The connection is exhibited outside the classroom too, and inside it in the form of a sense of shared learning.
and commitment in a communal enterprise. It is not only a matter of adherence to a set of shared intellectual traditions.

Charles Taylor’s argument provides some foundation for this fuller sense of community. By emphasizing the interactive or dialogical character of any individual’s identity, he makes clear the limitations of the purely individualistic analysis of the educational process that infects much of the conservative critique of multiculturalism. Who we are and what we learn in educational settings is deeply shaped by the others with whom we carry out this enterprise—both the individual persons (students, faculty) and the larger entities (the college, the outer society) that project often implicit messages as to who are and who are not fully legitimate participants in this enterprise.

And yet, perhaps surprisingly, neither Taylor nor any of his commentators develops this insight in the direction of an explicit focus on the value of (interethnic) community, in either an educational or larger social context. This is, of course, partly because the burden of the book is primarily to defend cultural recognition by grounding it in recognizable, liberal notions of dignity and respect. Nevertheless, just as the book omits or submerges opposition to racial injustice as an important component in the current multicultural initiatives, so it leaves out community, another important value implicated (though not always directly aspired to) in these initiatives.

Community, Cultural Respect, and Opposition to Racism

And yet can community really be a value distinct from the other two? Isn’t opposition to racism grounded in a sense of common humanity? Isn’t racism wrong because it violates that common humanity? And doesn’t the mutual respect involved in multiculturalism also express a sense of community?

I want to argue that a sense of (cross-racial) community is a distinct value. A genuinely antiracist individual does not necessarily have a true sense of connection to and community with those of another race or ethnicity, even while she or he regards those others in some sense as equals; this sense of community can be defeated not only by regarding others as inferior but simply by experiencing them as “other”—as apart from or distant from oneself, as persons one does not feel comfortable with because they are not members of “one’s own” group. It seems clear that many college students do not feel a genuine or full sense of cross-racial community, even though these same students are not racist in the sense defined here; they do not regard the other groups as inferior. (This is not to deny that a substantial number of
students are genuinely racist.) Yet to be a genuine community, and not just a collection of people seeing each other as equal individual learners, a learning community must embody more than a commitment to racial equality.

By contrast, multicultural value does directly involve one mode of community — intraethnic or intracultural community. Taylor describes this in his discussion of the Quebecois, and I have here posited the valuing of one's own culture (and, by implication, cultural community) as one of the components of multiculturalism. Though some critics of multiculturalism wrongly derogate this value as it is exemplified in intragroup socializing and residences, the sense of comfort and ease — of being at home with “one’s own kind” — is entirely natural and valuable. As Troy Duster points out eloquently in The Diversity Project: Final Report, a study of interethnic group relations at the Berkeley campus of the University of California: “Many of the students coming to Berkeley experience affirmation, for the first time, of their national, ethnic, racial, or cultural identity. They feel empowered and enhanced by this development. . . Many students from ethnic and racial groups feel affirmed by their engagement in these social circles.”

Nevertheless, this intracultural sense of community is importantly distinct from the intercultural/racial sense of community with which I am concerned. In explicitly recognizing those very racial/cultural differences, and thus not premising community on an already-existing sense of commonality, interracial community may in a sense never be as primal or (ceteris paribus) as comfortable as cultural identification and community. But it may also be less confining — avoiding a tendency in (at least campus forms of) intraracial community to give an ideological slant to the cultural/racial bond (“Are you really Chinese, black, Jewish, if you don’t subscribe to such-and-such view?”). (At the same time, a community based in shared culture and tradition has precisely the opposite potentiality as well — to be broadly encompassing of political and life-style differences, precisely because the cultural identification does not require that sort of uniformity.) But the differences between intra- and interracial community do not prevent the latter bonds from, potentially, being quite strong and substantial.

As Duster notes, there is no inconsistency whatever between promoting both intra- and intergroup community: “At the same time that we note the values of ethnic affinity, we emphasize how many students feel deprived of the experience of meeting and knowing and learning about other students from diverse backgrounds. This too needs to be affirmed and expressly and explicitly supported,” (ibid.).

So community is a value genuinely distinct from antiracism and multi-
culturalism. Pedagogically, it differs in another way as well. Community lends itself much less to being conveyed in curricular forms and, more generally, to being explicitly promoted. Although it is also true of both antiracism and multiculturalism that deeper groundings of these values require personal interaction and exposure, and not merely academic presentation, this is much more true for interracial community. Promoting personal bonds and communal identification across membership in different groups is best accomplished indirectly—not by calling attention to it. It is in the course of sharing activities not specifically focused on race and racial differences—for example, group work in classes, group study, social occasions, other focused projects, student organizations devoted to other goals (music, chess), sports, and so on—that a sense of comfort with and connection to others in spite of but not with blindness to (racial, cultural) differences among them is best promoted.26

These differences between community and the other two values allow for the possibility of tension between them. With regard to multiculturalism, the inward turning of its “self-affirmation” component can serve to thwart community, as well as dampen the motivation to seek it. At the same time, for some students of color, cultural self-affirmation might be a necessary condition for their being able to experience a sense of connection with white students from a base of cultural self-respect. Some of the most group-identified students can also be the ones with substantial numbers of friends of other races and groups. Still, the inward-looking aspect of multiculturalism can certainly pose a threat to (interracial) community.

The second component of multiculturalism (that is, respect for other cultures)—while outward rather than inward looking—still does not guarantee a sense of community: there are ways of presenting other cultures in the service of teaching respect for them that simultaneously promote a distancing from them; they give the message that one should not expect any sense of community with or connection to members of those cultures. Placing too much emphasis on the self-enclosed, self-coherent, and differentness of each culture is an example of a distance-promoting mode of presentation. Such a conception of cultures is intellectually deficient in not recognizing the diversity and tensions within each culture, a culture’s changes over time, influences from other cultures, and (in most cases) values or elements it shares with other cultures. My point here is that this intellectual error also has the unfortunate social and interpersonal tendency to lend support to a lack of community between members of different cultures.

Similar tensions may exist between antiracism and community. Focusing
on group A's oppression of group B, and group B's resistance to that oppression, can (in the absence of countervailing factors) serve to reinforce a we/they consciousness in members of group A and group B, thus straining any sense of connection. Conservative critics have rightly pointed out that this we/they consciousness can easily get filled in with resentment and distrust on the part of members of B, and anxiety, guilt, and resentment from members of A. But the point is more general. Taken by itself, the group focus of antiracist education — without which such education could not be responsibly carried out — has a tendency to overemphasize both similarities among persons in the same group and differences between members of one group and those of another. It thus tends to increase a sense of division between members of those different groups, no matter what particular content is given to those differences. This is true of multiculturalism's group focus as well, but when the differences are as highly charged as those involved in racism, that sense of division can be even further exacerbated.

Recognizing these potentially divisive or distancing effects of both antiracism and multiculturalism has been one source of opposition to both of them. "Why don't we just emphasize commonalities among our students and reinforce them through a curriculum emphasizing a common Western and national tradition?" ask some. But ignoring both racism and genuine culturally distinct sources of identity will not make them go away and is, moreover, educationally irresponsible. Both multiculturalism and opposition to racism represent distinct and worthy goals, essential to an educational program that takes its civic role seriously. Community should not come at the expense of racial justice and cultural identity.

Any sense of community in the absence of a recognition of racism and multiculturalism will be at best superficial and at worst false and deceptive. At the very least, community-affirming and connection-building practices can mitigate the anticommmunity tendencies of some forms of antiracist and multicultural education and practices. But the more fruitful lesson of the possible tensions among these values is to seek ways of teaching them, and of embodying them in the curricular and noncurricular practices of the community, that minimize those tensions. I mentioned in the case of multiculturalism not overstating the differences and the mutual inaccessibility of different cultures. And activities that allow members of one group a kind of access (imaginative, through literature, or participatory activities) to other cultures help to break down that we/they tendency. Similarly, in teaching about racism, continually pointing out the internal variety within groups studied
(some whites allied themselves with blacks, for instance, in the Underground Railroad, in the civil rights movement; some blacks actively resisted racism, others tried to escape its effect, others rebelled, others succumbed to paralyzing self-disvaluing; and the like) helps to mute the overstated sense of difference and distance that is an ever-present possibility in the essential group focus of antiracist education.  

In any case the tension among the three values is not the only lesson to be taken from their distinctness. Each of the values potentially enriches the others. Without a genuine sense of connection to members of other groups, an antiracist commitment and understanding can remain incomplete and abstract. The same is true of multicultural respect. Similarly, realistically facing up to racism in the context of interracial community may cause some tensions but is nevertheless more honest and realistic and ultimately leads to a stronger and more secure sense of connection. (Obviously, more could be said here.)

What is necessary, I suggest, is to take seriously the three distinct goals, to do what one can to promote them, to recognize that it may not always be possible to realize all simultaneously, but to search for ways — in the curriculum, the classroom, and the organization of life on campus — to minimize the conflict among them, and to teach those values in ways that do mutually enhance one another to the greatest extent possible.

I have presented here a mere sketch of a nest of complex philosophical and value issues concerning multiracial college classrooms and communities. Philosophy should not cede the discussion of these issues to the social scientists, historians, and literary theorists who have largely dominated the debate, especially in its public face. Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition" is an important philosophical contribution that will, I hope, begin to rectify this situation.  

There is vital clarificatory and constructive work to be done here to which philosophy brings an essential perspective:

NOTES

An earlier and much shorter version of this essay was published in Teaching Philosophy 14, no. 2 (June 1991).


3. Mention must be made of Iris Young's Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), an important philosophical engagement with multicultural issues, but one not particularly focused on current campus controversies.

4. See yearly reports by the National Institute against Prejudice and Violence, 31 S. Greene St., Baltimore, Md. 21201.

5. To simplify, I will continue to use the language of "dominant/subordinate," though this bypasses not insignificant differences among the terms "subordination," "victimization," "exploitation," "oppression," being "dominated," being "discriminated against," being "mistreated," being an "object of injustice"—all terms used in contexts of discussions of race, often as if they were interchangeable.

6. Thus it is misleading of Taylor to say, as he does in Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989): "Racists have to claim that certain of the crucial moral properties of human beings are genetically determined" (p. 7). Racism need not manifest itself as such a belief or claim.


9. Although everyone is formed by a particular culture, broadly speaking, not everyone has the same relation to her specific cultural identity. Not everyone feels a strong or deep identification with her culture of origin and, though some people may have a stronger connection to it than they would wish to acknowledge (including to themselves), I do not want to be taken to be implying a uniform sense of importance of cultural identity to all individuals.

10. Gutmann is not entirely consistent in regard to this "culturally neutral state" view; earlier in her essay (p. 5) she appears to grant that an individual's need for a secure cultural context to provide meaning to her life may require for its realization public action and recognition.

11. Walzer's view (pp. 99-103) on the two liberalisms bears note. He says that liberalism 2 may be good for Canada, but not, say, for the United States, where,
he suggests, we have in a sense already chosen liberalism 1. Part of his reason for this claim is that he treats the multicultural component of (2) as requiring territorial integrity for the component subculture, as in Taylor’s example of Quebec. But there are other forms of multiculturalism expressive of the spirit of Taylor’s view—involving, for example, bilingual education in the schools; state support for culturally based artistic expression; provision for the study of particular cultures in schools that have above a certain percentage of children from that culture; cultural “representation” on various policy commissions, and the like. So Walzer has given an argument against nonterritorial forms of liberalism 2.

Walzer also argues (p. 103) that immigrants to the United States have, by choosing to leave their country of origin, chosen a liberalism 1 society. But this begs the question against liberalism 2; for it may be that these immigrants would prefer that the United States be a liberalism 2 society rather than a liberalism 1 society, were the former option available. This is perfectly consistent with their preferring a United States with its liberalism 1 to their countries of origin.


13. Stanford University has four “ethnic” dorms (for Asian, black, Hispanic, and Native American students), with the proviso that up to but no more than 50 percent of the residents come from the ethnic group that provides the dorm’s identity. This solution seems to acknowledge the legitimacy—as instances of ethnic “recognition”—of ethnic social and residential grouping, and ethnic self-expression (for instance, providing a critical mass and natural base for staging cultural events); and, at the same time, it balances that value against the threats to a larger sense of community and of learning about others, attendant upon a total ethnic “balkanization.” See “Separate Ethnic Worlds Grow on Campus,” New York Times, May 18, 1991, for a description and brief assessment of some of these developments.

14. In Liberalism, Community, and Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), especially chapters 7–12, Will Kymlicka makes a fuller argument, the upshot of which Taylor accepts, that it is right for a liberal state to provide greater resources (than to other groups) for the support of cultures whose existence and integrity would otherwise be threatened. Kymlicka applies this argument to indigenous peoples in Canada, such as the Inuit, and it is plausible to assume that Taylor accepts this application of Kymlicka’s view. Taylor does not agree, however, with Kymlicka’s rationale for this “multicultural” result, which is that the health of a given culture provides the essential foundation for its individual members to pursue their own individual conceptions of the good life. Taylor points out that this too-individualistic argument provides no rationale for the continuance of the culture itself into the future; the purely individualistic, state-
neutrality rationale does not go far enough in affirming the culture itself. See Taylor for his assessment of Kymlicka (p. 40, n. 16).

15. For discussion of the question of criticism in light of multicultural respect, as well as fuller discussion of some of the issues in this article but in the context of K–12 education, see L. Blum, “Antiracism, Multiculturalism, and Interracial Community: Three Educational Values for a Multicultural Society,” Office of Graduate Studies and Research, University of Massachusetts, Boston, November 1991.


18. This criticism of “multiculturalism” by adherents of “antiracism” has been especially pronounced in England. See, for example, Barry Troyna, “Can You See the Join? An Historical Analysis of Multicultural and Antiracist Educational Policies,” in Racism and Education: Structures and Strategies, ed. Dawn Gill, Barbara Mayor, and Maud Blair (London: Sage, 1992).

19. In a (Taylorian) sense, however, curricular recognition of a group’s racist treatment is itself genuinely multicultural, even if it does not involve an explicit focus on that group’s “culture,” for acknowledgment of that group’s distinctive (race-based) historical experiences is a form of the “recognition” that multiculturalism enjoins.

20. Something like these two strands appear to be present in Taylor’s discussion of Rousseau (“Politics of Recognition,” pp. 34–35). (There is a similar account in Taylor’s Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992). Rousseau, according to Taylor, says that hierarchical, aristocratic societies conferred a kind of recognition on persons—one that attached to their particular place and role in the social hierarchy; Rousseau called for a form of democratic recognition that involved seeing persons as equals. This analysis appears to acknowledge a form of recognition that does not require equality, and another form that is precisely of equality. Cultural recognition possesses the first feature (though without the explicit acceptance of inequality).

21. In his brief discussion of affirmative action (“Politics of Recognition,” p. 40), Taylor suggests (without really saying so) that the purely individualistic, “level playing field” argument does not even fully capture the impulse behind affirmative action programs themselves. So it may be that he too thinks that there
is an irreducible "group identity" element in these programs — expressed in the desire for justice for one's group — that transcends the purely individualistic account of them.

22. In Aristocracy, Barber powerfully (if sometimes without sufficient supporting argumentation) articulates a conception of education as civic education requiring a recognition of the communal nature of the educational enterprise. The Carnegie report mentioned earlier is also an eloquent statement of this position.


26. The Diversity Project report recommends that faculty members take some responsibility for promoting this sense of community through creating group assignments in their classes, choosing the composition of those groups at random, neither allowing students to choose their own group (which may simply reinforce patterns of intergroup discomfort) nor picking the composition of the groups on an explicitly racial or cultural basis. The latter would place the group categories too much in the forefront of the exercise, detracting from the educational focus that will in fact be more effective in promoting the sense of interracial comfort and connection.

27. For more general guidelines about reducing tensions between antiracism or multiculturalism and community, especially regarding the K–12 educational context, see Blum, "Antiracism, Multiculturalism, and Interracial Community," pp. 18–20.