Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Theory*

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Carol Gilligan's body of work in moral development psychology is of the first importance for moral philosophy.¹ At the same time certain philosophical commitments within contemporary ethics constitute obstacles to appreciating this importance. Some of these commitments are shared by Lawrence Kohlberg, whose work provided the context for Gilligan's early (though not current) work. I will discuss some of the implicit and explicit philosophical differences between Gilligan's and Kohlberg's outlooks and will then defend Gilligan's views against criticisms which, drawing on categories of contemporary ethical theory, a Kohlbergian can and does make of them.

Gilligan claims empirical support for the existence of a moral outlook or orientation distinct from one based on impartiality, impersonality, justice, formal rationality, and universal principle. This impartialist conception of morality, as I will call it,² in addition to characterizing Kohlberg's view of morality, has been the dominant conception of morality in contemporary Anglo-American moral philosophy, forming the core of both

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a Kantian conception of morality and important strands in utilitarian (and, more generally, consequentialist) thinking as well.

Recently impartialism has come under attack from several quarters. Bernard Williams's well-known critique takes it to task for leaving insufficient room for considerations of personal integrity and, more broadly, for the legitimacy of purely personal concerns. Thomas Nagel, though rejecting Williams's general skepticism regarding impartialist morality's claim on our practical deliberations, follows Williams's criticism of impartialism; Nagel argues that personal as well as impersonal (or impartial) concerns are legitimate as reason-generating considerations.

Gilligan's critique of Kohlberg and of an impartialist conception of morality is not at odds with these criticisms of impartialism, but it is importantly distinct from them. For personal concerns are seen by Nagel and Williams as legitimate not so much from the standpoint of morality, but from the broader standpoint of practical reason. By contrast Gilligan argues—drawing on the conceptions of morality held by many of her largely (but by no means exclusively) female respondents—that care and responsibility within personal relationships constitute an important element of morality itself, genuinely distinct from impartiality. For Gilligan each person is embedded within a web of ongoing relationships, and morality importantly if not exclusively consists in attention to, understanding of, and emotional responsiveness toward the individuals with whom one stands in these relationships. (Gilligan means this web to encompass all human beings and not only one's circle of acquaintances. But how this extension to all persons is to be accomplished is not made clear in her writings, and much of Gilligan's empirical work is centered on the domain of personal relations and acquaintances.) Nagel's and Williams's notions of the personal domain do not capture or encompass (though Nagel and Williams sometimes imply that they are meant to) the phenomena of care and responsibility within personal relationships and do not explain why care and responsibility in relationships are distinctively moral phenomena.

Thus Gilligan's critique of Kohlberg raises substantial questions for moral philosophy. If there is a "different voice"—a coherent set of moral concerns distinct both from the objective and the subjective, the impersonal and the purely personal—then moral theory will need to give some place to these concerns.

Gilligan does not suggest that care and responsibility are to be seen either as replacing impartiality as a basis of morality or as encompassing


all of morality, as if all moral concerns could be translated into ones of care and responsibility. Rather, Gilligan holds that there is an appropriate place for impartiality, universal principle, and the like within morality and that a final mature morality involves a complex interaction and dialogue between the concerns of impartiality and those of personal relationship and care.  

KOHHLBERG AND GILLIGAN: THE MAJOR DIFFERENCES  
One can draw from Gilligan’s work seven differences between her view of morality and Kohlberg’s impartialist conception. The subsequent discussion will explore the nature and significance of these apparent differences.  
1. For Gilligan the moral self is radically situated and particularized. It is “thick” rather than “thin,” defined by its historical connections and relationships. The moral agent does not attempt to abstract from this particularized self, to achieve, as Kohlberg advocates, a totally impersonal standpoint defining the “moral point of view.” For Gilligan, care morality is about the particular agent’s caring for and about the particular friend or child with whom she has come to have this particular relationship. Morality is not (only) about how the impersonal “one” is meant to act toward the impersonal “other.” In regard to its emphasis on the radically situated self, Gilligan’s view is akin to Alasdair MacIntyre’s (After Virtue) and Michael Sandel’s (Liberalism and the Limits of Justice).  
2. For Gilligan, not only is the self radically particularized, but so is the other, the person toward whom one is acting and with whom one stands in some relationship. The moral agent must understand the other

6. This is perhaps a slightly oversimplified picture of Gilligan’s views, as there is also some suggestion in her writings that there is a deep flaw present in the impartialist/rationalist approach to morality which is not present in the care/responsibility approach. One possible construal of Gilligan’s view in light of this seeming ambiguity is that she rejects any notion of justice as (morally and psychologically) fundamental or foundational to other virtues—especially to care, compassion, and the like. And that she rejects a conception of justice which is dependent on purely individualistic assumptions such as are sometimes seen as underlying more “foundational” views of justice. On this reading Gilligan would, e.g., reject any notion of justice generated from something like Rawls’s original position (though Rawls has recently argued that this individualistic characterization does not apply to his view; see John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 [1985]: 223–51). Yet on this construal of Gilligan’s views, she would accept a notion of justice which exists as one virtue among others, interacting with and no more fundamental than they. It is not clear how this acceptable, nonfoundational notion of justice is to be characterized in Gilligan’s work. In her paper at the Chapel Hill colloquium she suggests that it is to be conceived as something like “protection against oppression.” It is not clear whether, or how, this characterization is meant to connect with a nonfoundational notion of “fairness,” e.g. (such as Michael Walzer describes in Spheres of Justice [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983]).

person as the specific individual that he or she is, not merely as someone instantiating general moral categories such as friend or person in need. Moral action which fails to take account of this particularity is faulty and defective. While Kohlberg does not and need not deny that there is an irreducible particularity in our affective relationships with others, he sees this particularity only as a matter of personal attitude and affection, not relevant to morality itself. For him, as, implicitly, for a good deal of current moral philosophy, the moral significance of persons as the objects of moral concern is solely as bearers of morally significant but entirely general and repeatable characteristics.

Putting contrasts 1 and 2 together we can say that for Gilligan but not for Kohlberg moral action itself involves an irreducible particularity—a particularity of the agent, the other, and the situation.

3. Gilligan shares with Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good) the view that achieving knowledge of the particular other person toward whom one acts is an often complex and difficult moral task and one which draws on specifically moral capacities.8 Understanding the needs, interests, and welfare of another person, and understanding the relationship between oneself and that other requires a stance toward that person informed by care, love, empathy, compassion, and emotional sensitivity. It involves, for example, the ability to see the other as different in important ways from oneself, as a being existing in her own right, rather than viewing her through a simple projection of what one would feel if one were in her situation. Kohlberg’s view follows a good deal of current moral philosophy in ignoring this dimension of moral understanding, thus implying that knowledge of individual others is a straightforwardly empirical matter requiring no particular moral stance toward the person.

4. Gilligan’s view emphasizes the self as, in Michael Sandel’s terms, “encumbered.” She rejects the contrasting metaphor in Kohlberg, drawn from Kant, in which morality is ultimately a matter of the individual rational being legislating for himself and obeying laws or principles generated solely from within himself (i.e., from within his own reason). Gilligan portrays the moral agent as approaching the world of action bound by ties and relationships (friend, colleague, parent, child) which confront her as, at least to some extent, given. These relationships, while subject to change, are not wholly of the agent’s own making and thus cannot be pictured on a totally voluntarist or contractual model. In contrast to Kohlberg’s conception, the moral agent is not conceived of as radically autonomous (though this is not to deny that there exists a less individualistic, less foundational, and less morality-generating sense of autonomy which does accord with Gilligan’s conception of moral agency).

A contrast between Gilligan’s and Sandel’s conception of encumbrance, however, is that for Sandel the self’s encumbrances are forms of communal

identity, such as being a member of this or that nation, religious or ethnic group, class, neighborhood; whereas for Gilligan the encumbrances are understood more in terms of the concrete persons to whom one stands in specific relationships—being the father of Sarah, the teacher of Maureen, the brother of Jeff, the friend of Alan and Charles. In that way Sandel’s “encumbrances” are more abstract than Gilligan’s.

5. For Kohlberg the mode of reasoning which generates principles governing right action involves formal rationality alone. Emotions play at most a remotely secondary role in both the derivation and motivation for moral action.\(^9\)

For Gilligan, by contrast, morality necessarily involves an intertwining of emotion, cognition, and action, not readily separable. Knowing what to do involves knowing others and being connected in ways involving both emotion and cognition. Caring action expresses emotion and understanding.

6. For Kohlberg principles of right action are universalistic, applicable to all. Gilligan rejects the notion that an action appropriate to a given individual is necessarily (or needs to be regarded by the agent as) universal, or generalizable to others. And thus she at least implicitly rejects, in favor of a wider notion of “appropriate response,” a conception of “right action” which carries this universalistic implication. At the same time Gilligan’s view avoids the individual subjectivism and relativism which is often seen as the only alternative to a view such as Kohlberg’s; for Gilligan sees the notions of care and responsibility as providing nonsubjective standards by which appropriateness of response can be appraised in the particular case. It is a standard which allows one to say that a certain thing was the appropriate action for a particular individual to take, but not necessarily that it was the ‘right’ action for anyone in that situation.

7. For Gilligan morality is founded in a sense of concrete connection and direct response between persons, a direct sense of connection which exists prior to moral beliefs about what is right or wrong or which principles to accept. Moral action is meant to express and to sustain those connections to particular other people. For Kohlberg the ultimate moral concern is

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9. In “The Current Formulation of the Theory,” in his Essays on Moral Development (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), vol. 2, p. 291, Lawrence Kohlberg says that his view is distinguished from Kant’s in including a role for “affect as an integral component of moral judgment or justice reasoning.” Despite this remark, Kohlberg’s more frequently rationalistic characterizations of his views do not bear out this contention. What is true of Kohlberg, as we will see below, is that he sometimes allows a legitimacy to care (as involving emotion) as a moral phenomenon, though, as we will also see, he is not consistent in this acknowledgment. But even when he thus acknowledges care, Kohlberg almost always relegates it to a secondary or derivative moral status. In this regard it is not clear that Kohlberg’s view is significantly different from Kant’s, who, at least in some of his writings (especially the Doctrine of Virtue), allowed a secondary place for emotions in morality.
with morality itself—with morally right action and principle; moral responsiveness to others is mediated by adherence to principle.

**IMPARTIALIST REJOINDERS TO GILLIGAN**

Faced with Gilligan's challenge to have found in her respondents a distinct moral orientation roughly defined by these seven contrasts, let us look at how Kohlberg, and defenders of impartialist morality more generally, do or might respond to this challenge. Eight alternative positions regarding the relation between impartial morality and a morality of care in personal relations suggest themselves.

1. Position 1 denies that the care orientation constitutes a genuinely distinct moral orientation from impartialism. Strictly speaking there is no such thing as a morality of care. Acting from care is actually acting on perhaps complex but nevertheless fully universalizable principles, generated ultimately from an impartial point of view.¹⁰

2. Position 2 says that, while care for others in the context of relationships may constitute a genuinely distinct set of concerns or mode of thought and motivation from that found in impartialist morality, and while these can be deeply important to individuals' lives, nevertheless such concerns are not moral but only personal ones. My caring for my friend David is important to me, but actions which flow directly from it are in that respect without moral significance.

Position 2 treats concerns with relationships as personal or subjective ones, in Nagel's and Williams's sense. Such a view is implied in Kohlberg's earlier and better-known work,¹¹ where impartialism was held to define the whole of (at least the highest and most mature form of) morality and to exclude, at least by implication, relational or care considerations.

¹⁰ Kohlberg has himself taken such a position in his article "A Reply to Owen Flanagan," in *Ethics* 92 (1982): 513–28; however, this view appears hardly at all in his most recent writings—*Essays in Moral Development*, vol. 2, *The Psychology of Moral Development* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1984)—in which he attempts to answer Gilligan's and others' criticisms. There are several minor variations on the view that care is impartiality. One is to say that impartialist philosophies have all along been cognizant of the special moral ties and claims involved in particular personal relationships and have mustered their resources to deal with these. (George Sher's "Other Voices, Other Rooms? Women's Psychology and Moral Theory," in *Women and Moral Theory*, ed. E. Kittay and D. Meyers [Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987], pp. 187–88, is an example.) Another is to acknowledge that, while care is an important aspect of the moral life which has been largely neglected by impartialist theories, care considerations are nevertheless able to be fully encompassed by impartialism without disturbance to its theoretical commitments.


In his most recent work, replying to Gilligan, Kohlberg claims to have abandoned this consignment of care in personal relations to an entirely nonmoral status; but this view nevertheless continues to surface in his writing.  

In contrast to positions 1 and 2, the remaining views all accord, or at least allow for, some distinct moral significance to care.

3. Position 3 claims that concerns of care and responsibility in relationships are truly moral (and not merely personal) concerns and acknowledges them as genuinely distinct from impartiality, but it claims that they are nevertheless secondary to, parasitic on, and/or less significant a part of morality than considerations of impartiality, right, universal principle, and the like. Kohlberg makes three distinct suggestions falling under this rubric. (a) Our personal attachments to others intensify our sense of the dignity of other persons, a sense of dignity which is ultimately grounded in an impartialist outlook. Thus the husband’s love for his wife intensifies and brings home to him more vividly her right to life, shared by all persons. (b) In a different vein, Kohlberg says that impartialism defines the central and most significant part of morality—what is obligatory and required—whereas the area of personal relationships is supererogatory, going beyond what is required. The demands of justice must be satisfied, but action on behalf of friends, family, and the like, while good and even perhaps admirable, is not required. Thus care is, so to speak, morally dependent on right and justice, whereas impartiality, right, and justice are not morally dependent on care. (c) The development of care is psychologically dependent on the sense of justice or right, but not vice versa.

Position 3 differs from position 2 in granting some moral status to the concerns of relationship; care for friends is not only personally important but, given that one has satisfied all of one’s impersonal demands, can be morally admirable as well.

4. Position 4 says that care is genuinely moral and constitutes a moral orientation distinct from impartiality, but it is an inferior form of morality precisely because it is not grounded in universal principle. On the previous view (3), the concerns of a care morality lie outside the scope of impartialist morality and are less significant for that very reason. In 4, by contrast, a care morality and an impartialist one cover, at least to some extent, the same territory; the same actions are prescribed by both. I may help out a friend in need out of direct concern for my friend; this action has

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12. See, e.g., in “Synopses and Detailed Replies to Critics” (with C. Levine and A. Hewer), in The Psychology of Moral Development, p. 360, where Kohlberg says that many of the judgments in the care orientation are “personal rather than moral in the sense of a formal point of view.”

some moral value, but the action is also prescribed by some principle, stemming ultimately from an impersonal perspective. And it is better to act from impartial principle than care because, for example, impartial morality ensures consistency and reliability more than care or because impartialism is (thought to be) wider in scope than is care morality (covering impersonal as well as personal situations). So on view 4, acting out of direct care for a friend has some moral value but not as much as if the action stems from a firm and general principle, say, one of aid to friends.

This view might naturally regard the morality of care as a stage along the way to a more mature impartialist morality, and such a construal is suggested in some of Kohlberg's earlier writings, where care responses are treated and scored as "conventional" morality (in contrast to the more developed "postconventional" morality)—as conforming to social expectations of "being good."

Position 4 is importantly different from positions 1 and 2. For position 4, even though all the demands of a care morality can be met by impartialist morality, still a moral agent could in general or in some set of circumstances be animated by care morality entirely independent of impartialist morality. For positions 1 and 2 there is no such thing as a morality of care independent of impartialist morality.

5. Position 5 acknowledges a difference between care and impartiality but sees this as a difference in the objects of moral assessment; care morality is concerned with evaluation of persons, motives, and character, while impartialist morality concerns the evaluation of acts.14

6. In position 6, considerations of an impartialist right set side constraints within which, but only within which, care considerations are allowed to guide our conduct. Considerations of impartiality trump considerations stemming from care; if the former conflict with the latter, it is care which must yield. If out of love for my daughter I want her to be admitted into a certain school, nevertheless, I may not violate just procedures in order to accomplish this. However, once I have satisfied impartialist moral requirements in the situation I am allowed to act from motives of care.

Such a view is found in recent defenses of a neo-Kantian position by Barbara Herman, Onora O'Neill, Stephen Darwall, and Marcia Baron.15 And these writers generally see this view as implying view 3, that care is a less important element of morality than is impartiality. However, this implication holds only on the further assumption that considerations of impartial "rightness" are present in all situations. But many situations which involve care for friends, family, and the like seem devoid of demands

14. I owe the delineation of this position to William Lycan (in personal correspondence).
of justice and impartiality altogether. In such situations care is the more significant consideration. And if such situations constitute a substantial part of our lives, then even if impartialist morality were a side constraint on care—even if it were granted that when the two conflict the claims of impartiality always take precedence—it would not follow from this that impartially derived rightness is more significant, important, or fundamental a part of morality than care. For in such situations care will be operating on its own, no considerations of impartiality being present to constrain it.\footnote{16}

Thus by itself the side-constraint view of the relation between impartiality and care seems to leave open the possibility that a morality of care is a central element in a morally responsible life. In this way, view 6 is weaker as a critique of Gilligan than the previous five views (except perhaps 5), all of which relegate care to an inferior, subsidiary, or non-existent (moral) role. It is only with the additional, implausible, assumption that impartialist moral considerations apply in all situations that 6 implies 3.

But it might be thought that no defender of a Kantian-like view in ethics would accord such legitimacy and allow such importance to a nonrationalist, non-principle-based dimension of morality as I am construing in position 6. Let us examine this. As an interpretation of Kant, this neo-Kantian, side-constraint view (of O’Neill, Herman, and others) sees the categorical imperative essentially as a tester, rather than a generator, of maxims; the original source of maxims is allowed to lie in desires. This view rejects a traditional understanding of Kant in which moral principles of action are themselves derived from pure reason alone.

Nevertheless, such an interpretation leaves ambiguous the moral status accorded to the different desires which are to serve as the basis of maxims. The categorical imperative can, on this view, declare a desire only to be permissible or impermissible. But if we compare compassion

\footnote{16. It might be replied here that even if impartialist considerations do not arise in all situations, nevertheless, one must be concerned about them beyond those situations; for (on view 6) one must be committed beforehand to giving them priority over care considerations and so must be concerned with situations in which such considerations might arise, or in which one is not yet certain whether or not they are present. Yet even if this were so, it would not follow that one must be constantly on the lookout for impartialist strictures. An analogy: that considerations of life and death tend to trump or outweigh most other moral considerations does not mean that, in order to avoid causing death, one must in all situations be on the lookout for the possibility that one might be doing so. I can not here consider the further impartialist rejoinder that even when there are no impartialist strictures or considerations anywhere on the horizon, a commitment to heeding them still permeates all situations, and this grounds the claim that the impartialist dimension of morality is more fundamental and significant than care, even in the sphere of personal relations. The conclusion does not seem to me to follow from the premise; the inference seems to go from a hypothetical concern to an actual one. But more needs to be said on this. (See the discussion by Michael Slote, “Morality and the Practical,” in his Common-Sense Morality and Consequentialism [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985].)
for a friend or care for a child with a desire for an ice cream cone, or for food if one is hungry, then, even if both are permissible inclinations (in some particular situation), the compassion seems more morally significant in its own right than the desire for ice cream.

If the neo-Kantian admits this difference in the moral status of desires, she is then left with acknowledging a source of moral significance (the value of compassion compared with the desire for ice cream for oneself) which is not itself accounted for by the (neo-)Kantian perspective itself, but only bounded by it; and this is the position 6 discussed here—that care in personal relations does constitute a distinct dimension of morality, alongside, and subject to the constraints of, impartialist considerations of right.

To avoid this slide to position 6, the neo-Kantian can accept a moral distinction between types of permissible desires but attempt to account for this distinction in some kind of Kantian way—for example, by seeing the greater moral value of some desires (e.g., compassion) as a reflection of respect for rational agency, or of treating others as ends in themselves, or something along that line. A different move would be to bite the bullet of denying, as Kant himself seems to have done (in the notion that "all inclinations are on the same level"), any moral difference between a permissible compassion and a permissible desire to eat ice cream. Whether either of these incompatible positions is itself persuasive is a question that I cannot take up here.

The point of this excursus is to suggest that if one sees the thrust of impartialist morality as setting side constraints on the pursuit of other concerns, such as care in personal relations, it will be difficult to avoid view 6, in which care in personal relationships is accorded some moral significance, and a moral significance which cannot be systematically relegated to a status inferior to that of impartiality.

7. Position 7 claims that, while care considerations are distinct from universal principle and impartiality and while they are genuinely moral, nevertheless their ultimate acceptability or justifiability rests on their being able to be validated or affirmed from an impartial perspective.

This view distinguishes the level of practical deliberation from that of ultimate justification and sees the level of deliberation (in this case, care in personal relationships) as taking a different form from that provided by the standard of justification (that is, impartiality). On view 7, from an impartial and universal standpoint one can see how it is appropriate and good that people sometimes act directly from care rather than from impartialist considerations.

This view is distinct from view 1 in that there care considerations were held to be really nothing but considerations of universal principle, perhaps with some nonmoral accoutrements, such as emotions and feelings.

Unlike views 1 and 2, view 7 acknowledges that care is (part of) a genuinely distinct form of moral consciousness, stemming from a different source than does impartialism and not reducible to it. Impartiality gives its stamp of approval to care but does not directly generate it; care thus does not reflect impartiality.

View 7 is weaker than view 6 as an assertion of the priority of impartiality over care. It does not, for example, claim that impartialist considerations always trump care ones but allows the possibility that care might in some circumstances legitimately outweigh considerations of impartiality. It allows the possibility that, on the level of deliberation and of the agent’s moral consciousness, care would play as central a role as impartiality. The superiority of impartiality to care is claimed to lie merely in the fact that, even when the claims of care are stronger than those of impartiality, it is ultimately only an impartial perspective which tells us this.

Position 7 sees impartiality as more fundamental to morality than care because it is impartiality which ultimately justifies or legitimizes care. Yet this view seems an extremely weak version of impartialism; for unlike positions 1 through 4 (and perhaps 5 and 6), it is compatible with Gilligan’s own claim that the care mode of morality legitimately plays as significant and central a role in the morally mature adult’s life as does the impartialist mode. View 7 does not even require the moral agent herself to be an impartialist, as long as the mixture of care and impartialist considerations which animate her life can in fact be approved of from an impartial point of view.18

8. A final position bears mentioning because it is prominent in Kohlberg’s writings. This is that the final, most mature stage of moral reasoning involves an “integration of justice and care that forms a single moral principle.”19 This formulation taken in its own right—according care and justice equal status—does not really belong in our taxonomy, which is meant to cover only views which make impartiality in some way more fundamental to morality than care.20 In fact, Kohlberg does not spell out this integration of care and justice, and the general tenor of his work makes it clear that he regards care as very much the junior partner in

18. I do not discuss position 7 in this paper, as I have attempted to do so in my “Iris Murdoch and the Domain of the Moral,” esp. 351–53, where I argue that it is false. (For more on this, see n. 33 below.)
20. For this reason I have omitted views which defend some role for impartiality merely by claiming that it is not incompatible with care in personal relations. (Such a view is suggested, e.g., by Jerome Schneewind in “The Uses of Autonomy in Ethical Theory,” in Heller, Sosna, and Wellerby, eds., p. 73, though the argument there is about autonomy rather than impartiality.) For this view does not by itself grant impartiality any more significance than care; it simply says that the claims of impartiality do not get in the way of those of care. While such views are sometimes presented as if they constitute a defense of Kantian or some other impartialist ethical view, in fact by themselves (e.g., apart from views such as 1 through 7) they do not seem to me to do so.
whatever interplay is meant to obtain between the two moral perspectives. So that, it seems fair to say, Kohlberg's understanding of the position mentioned here actually collapses it into one of the previous ones.  

In assessing both Gilligan's claim to have articulated a distinct voice within morality and the impartialist's response to this claim, it is important to know which counterclaim is being advanced. These eight views are by no means merely complementary to each other. The earlier views are much more dismissive of the moral claims of care in personal relationship than are the latter. It is an important confusion in Kohlberg's work that he attempts to occupy at least positions 2, 3, 4, 6, and 8, without seeming to be aware that these are by no means the same, or even compatible, philosophical positions. (On the other hand, there is a noteworthy tentativeness in some of Kohlberg's formulations in the volumes I have drawn on, which suggests that he was not certain that he had yet found an entirely satisfactory response to Gilligan.)

Before taking on some of these impartialist responses, the connections between such an inquiry and the controversy between virtue ethics and Kantian or utilitarian ethics bears some comment. Some of the seven contrasts drawn between Gilligan's and impartialist views characterize as well the contrast between a virtue-based ethic and its rivals; and some of the impartialist counterarguments against these contrasts are ones which are directed against virtue theory. Nevertheless, it should not be thought that all of the concerns of a moral outlook or sensibility grounded in care and relationship can be encompassed within what currently goes by the name of virtue theory. And the converse of this is true also; as Flanagan and Jackson point out, attention to some of the concerns of virtue theory, for example, an exploration of some of the different psychological capacities contributing to a lived morality of care in relationships, would enrich the care approach.

Moreover, while Gilligan herself points to the existence of two distinct moral voices, once having questioned and rejected the notion of a single unitary account of the moral point of view, one might well question further why there need be only two psychologically and philosophically distinct moral voices. Why not three, or five? I would myself suggest that, even taken together, care and impartiality do not encompass all there is to morality. Other moral phenomena—a random selection might include community, honesty, courage, prudence—while perhaps not constituting full and comprehensive moral orientations, are nevertheless not reducible to (though also not necessarily incompatible with) care and impartiality. A satisfactory picture of moral maturity or moral excellence

21. Worthy of further exploration is the fact that, while Gilligan would agree with this formulation in its apparent granting of something like equal status to justice and care, Gilligan does not see the relation between the two voices as one of "integration" so much as the model of a full appreciation of the not readily integrated claims of both.

22. Flanagan and Jackson, p. 627.
or virtue will have to go beyond the, admittedly large, territory encompassed by care and impartiality.

THE MORAL VALUE OF CARE: RESPONSE TO IMPARTIALIST POSITIONS 1 AND 2

The foregoing, largely taxonomic discussion is meant primarily to lay out the conceptual territory in which the various impartialist responses to the claims of personal care in morality can be evaluated. A full discussion of views 1 through 7 is impossible, and I would like to focus most fully on positions 1 and 2, which most forcefully and conclusively deny that there is anything morally and philosophically distinct in the morality of care. Building on these arguments, I will conclude with briefer discussions of views 3 through 7.

Position 1 denies the contrast, drawn in points 1 and 2, between the particularity involved in Gilligan’s perspective and the universalism of Kohlberg’s; position 2 asserts that, whatever there is to such a distinction, it is without moral significance. Position 1 claims that, when a moral agent acts from care for another, her action is governed by and generated from universal principle derived from an impartial point of view. This means more than that there merely exists some principle which prescribes the action in question as right; for that is the claim made in position 4 and will be discussed below. The mere existence of a governing principle would be compatible with the agent’s action conforming to that principle by sheer accident; she could, for example, perform an action of aiding as prescribed by some duty of beneficence but do so for a wholly self-centred reason. There would be no moral value in such an action. What position 1 requires is that the agent who is acting from (what she regards as) care be drawing on, or making at least implicit use of, such an impartialist principle.

Both views 1 and 2 imply that what it is to be a morally responsible person—say, within the domain of personal relations—is captured by the conception of an agent coming to hold, and acting according to, universal principles. Let us approach this claim by considering some principles which might be considered universal and impartial and which might be thought to be applicable in the domain of personal relations, such as “Be loyal to friends,” “Nurture one’s children,” and “Protect children from harm.” Each particular morally right or good act within an agent’s role (as friend, as parent) would be (according to this claim) prescribed by some such principle, which applies to anyone occupying the role and which is in that sense universal.23 Benefiting the particular

23. There is another, somewhat more colloquial, sense of ‘universal’ which implies independence from particular roles. But for now I will adhere to the more formal, philosophical sense of ‘universal’ as implying applicability to anyone meeting a certain description (here, occupying a certain role within a personal relationship).
friend or child will then be an application of universal principle to a specific situation governed by it.

Yet while it may be true that, say, a father will regard himself as accepting general principles of protecting and nurturing his children, it does not follow that applying those universal principles is all that is involved morally in protecting and nurturing his children. I want to argue that what it takes to bring such principles to bear on individual situations involves qualities of character and sensibilities which are themselves moral and which go beyond the straightforward process of consulting a principle and then conforming one’s will and action to it. Specifically I will argue that knowing that the particular situation which the agent is facing is one which calls for the particular principle in question and knowing how to apply the principle in question are capacities which, in the domain of personal relations (and perhaps elsewhere too), are intimately connected with care for individual persons. Such particularized, caring understanding is integral to an adequate meeting of the agent’s moral responsibilities and cannot be generated from universal principle alone.

Consider the general principle “Protect one’s children from harm.” Quite often it is only a parent’s concerned and caring understanding of a particular child which tells her that the child’s harm is at stake in a given situation and, thus, which tells her that the current situation is one in which the principle “Protect children from harm” is applicable. One adult viewing a scene of children playing in a park may simply not see that one child is being too rough with another and is in danger of harming the other child; whereas another adult, more attentive to the situation, and more sensitive about children’s interaction, may see the potential danger and thus the need for intervention and protection. Both adults might hold the principle “Protect children from harm”; yet the second adult but not the first rightly sees the situation at hand as calling for that principle. Gilligan suggests that the sensitivity, caring, and attentiveness which leads the second adult to do so are moral qualities. This is supported by the foregoing argument, that such capacities are essential to the agent’s being a morally responsible person in the way which the principles in question are meant to articulate.24

In addition, care for particular persons often plays a role in knowing how to apply a principle to a situation, even once one knows that the situation calls for it. In order to know what it is to nurture, to care, to protect (his children) from harm, a father must take into account the

24. I do not mean to imply that every situation presents a significant issue of moral sensitivity or perception involved in knowing that a principle applies. If a child reaches to touch a hot stove, no one observing the situation could fail to see that here one needs to keep this from happening. But situations in life often do not come with their moral character so clearly declared to any and all beholders, a fact which is often masked in discussions of examples in philosophy, where the moral character of the situation is already given in the description.
particular children that his children are, the particular relationships that have evolved between himself and them, and the particular understandings and expectations implicit in those relationships. For example, suppose a father has to decide whether and how to deal with a situation in which his daughter has hit her younger brother. He must take into account what various actions, coming from himself in particular, would mean to each of them. Would his intervention serve to undermine (either of) his children's ability to work out problems between themselves? Would punishing his daughter contribute to a pattern of seeming favoritism toward the son which she has complained of recently? How might each of the children's self-esteem and moral development be affected by the various options of action open to him?

The father's knowing the answers to these questions requires caring about his children in a way which appreciates and manifests an understanding of each one as an individual child and human being, and of each of their relationship to each other and to himself. Such a particularized caring knowledge of his children is required in order to recognize how the various courses of action available to the father will bear on their harm in the situation. Merely holding or averring the principles "Protect one's children from harm" or "Nurture one's children" does not by itself tell one what constitutes harm (and thus protection and nurturance) in regard to individual children and in a given situation.

So it is no support to the impartialist view to assert that the role of particularity in moral action lies in the application of general role-principles to the particular case; for, I have argued, that process of application itself draws on moral capacities not accounted for by impartialism alone. Both knowledge of the situation and knowledge of what action the principle itself specifies in the situation are as much part of accomplishing the impartialist's own goal of acting according to the principle as is the intellectual task of generating or discovering the principle. Yet they are tasks which cannot be accounted for by an impartialist perspective alone.

I suggest then that both universality and particularistic care play a role in morally responsible action within personal relationships. Remember (see above) that it is no part of Gilligan's view to advocate replacing a concern for impartiality with care in personal relationships. If so, then acknowledging some role for universal principle even in the domain of personal relationships does not lead one to positions 1 or 2, which leave no distinct moral role for care in personal relations at all.\footnote{25. Note that the argument so far has been couched in terms of "universality." But universality is not the same as impartiality. A morality of personal relationship roles (such as father, friend) is not fully impartialist unless the precepts governing the role morality are derivable from the position of pure impartiality postulated by the impartialist view. For a criticism of this supposition, see my "Particularity and Responsiveness," in \textit{The Emergence of Morality in Young Children}, ed. J. Kagan and S. Lamb (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), where it is argued that even if a role morality, such as that involved in parenthood, is applicable 'universally' to all parents, the content of the moral precepts}
Nevertheless, the foregoing argument should not be taken to imply that all morally good action within personal relationships does in fact involve application of universal principle; my argument has been only that even when it does it often requires some care for particular persons as well. But one can certainly imagine individually worthy actions of friendship or parenthood which are animated not by a sense of applying principle but by a direct care for the friend or child. This can even be (though it is not always) true of unreflective and spontaneous impulses of care. But in addition, care which is direct and unmediated by principle need not be unintelligent, impulsive, or unreflective; it can be guided by intelligent attention to the particular friend's or child's good, yet not be derived from universal principles regarding children or friends in general.26

If care in personal relations is granted to be of moral significance, both as an integral part of what it is for one's life to be informed by certain principles of responsible friendship, parenthood, and the like, as well as in its own right, then we must reject both position 1—that there is no difference between care and universal, impartial principle—and position 2—that while there may be a difference it is of no moral significance.27

involved in it cannot be derived, even indirectly, from the impartialistic moral standpoint in which, from the point of view of the agent, each individual is to count for one and no more than one. If this is so, the acceptance given in the argument of the present paper to (some role for) universality is not tantamount to an acceptance of the same role for impartiality. But the argument advanced therein to show that universal principle itself cannot cover the whole territory of morality will apply ipso facto to the narrower notion of impartiality.

26. For a more elaborate argument that care and concern can be intelligent and reflective without involving moral principle, see my *Friendship, Altruism, and Morality* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), esp. chap. 2.

27. There seems to be a range of different types of moral personalities, a range in which both universal principle and care for particular persons have varying degrees and kinds of involvement and interaction with one another. To some persons, responsible friendship and parenthood comes more naturally than to others; they find it easier to keep attentive to, to remain in touch with the needs of, to consistently care for friends and children. By contrast, others, also responsible as friends and parents, might find it more often necessary self-consciously to remind themselves of the general principles governing friendship and parenthood—to use their principles to get them to do what the others do without an even implicit recourse to principles. Of course, the operation of principle in a person's motivation does not always show itself in explicit consulting of that principle. One might have so internalized a principle that one acts on it almost automatically, without having to call it up in one's mind. Yet, as positions 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7 acknowledge, there is still a difference between acting from an internalized but universal principle and acting purely from care and concern for a specific individual, even if this difference is hard to make out in many specific instances. It is only position 1 which denies such a distinction entirely. That there can be a range of differences among persons in the degree to which universal principles animate their actions does not mean that one can imagine a fully responsible moral agent for whom they play no role at all. It would be difficult to imagine a person fully confronting the complex responsibilities of modern parenthood and friendship.
IS CARE A UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLE?

One can imagine the following response to my argument against positions 1 and 2: "All right. One can acknowledge that specific relationships are central to the moral life of the individual and that, therefore, care for specific persons in its various modes of kindness, friendship, compassion, and the like are important human qualities which have a claim on being considered moral. Furthermore, one can admit that a moral decision procedure characterized by strict impartiality cannot be made to generate all the forms of moral response appropriate to this domain of morality.

"Nevertheless, in acting from love, care, compassion, is the moral agent not acting from some kind of 'principle'? Does not Gilligan want to say that everyone should be kind and caring, responsible to those to whom they are connected? Is she not saying we should all follow the principle, 'Be responsible within one's particular relationships,' or even 'Be sensitive to particulars'? If so, is she not therefore proposing a morality which is meant to be universal, indeed to be based on universal principle?"

This objection is useful in bringing out that in one important sense a morality of care is meant to be a morality for all. It is not a relativistic morality in the sense of applying to some but not others or of being confined to one particular group. However, the objection presents itself as if it were a defense of the strongest impartialist view, namely, position 1 (or perhaps position 2). Yet the notion of "universal principle" in the objection has moved entirely away from the sense in which universal principle is meant to contrast with a morality of personal care. It has become a notion which encompasses emotional response and which acknowledges that moral action—acting according to that principle—requires a care for particular persons which cannot be exhaustively codified into

without giving some thought to the general responsibilities, formulable as principles of some sort, attaching to the various roles which they inhabit. Yet at the same time it should not be forgotten that some people who are not especially reflective about their general responsibilities seem as if instinctively to know how to act well toward their particular friends, or toward their or others' children, much better in fact than some other people who are nevertheless quite articulate about the appropriate principles of responsible friendship and parenthood. To insist that seemingly unreflective persons must be acting according to general principles of action even when they are not able to articulate any such principles nor to recognize as their own ones suggested to them by others—to insist on this is to be blinded by rationalist prejudices.

28. This does not mean that Gilligan's view of morality is incompatible with all forms of relativism. Gilligan does not, I think, aspire, as Kohlberg does, to a timeless morality valid for all people in all historical times and cultures. It seems to me that Gilligan's view is compatible with the qualified relativism suggested in Williams's Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, chap. 9—the view that, e.g., a care morality is appropriate for any culture which is a real historical option for us; but we cannot say that it either is or is not valid for ones which are not. Something like this view is suggested in Gilligan's article with J. Murphy, "Development from Adolescence to Adulthood: The Philosopher and the Dilemma of the Fact," in Intellectual Development beyond Childhood, ed. D. Kuhn (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1979).
universal principles. In that sense it is a notion of "universal principle" which has abandoned the pure rationalism, the pure impartiality, and the sense that adherence to universal principle alone (perhaps together with a strong will) is sufficient to characterize the moral psychology of Kohlberg's maturely moral agent. It acknowledges that other moral capacities, involving perception and sensitivity to particulars and care and concern for individual persons, are equally central to moral agency. Such a view no longer involves a critique of a particularistic morality of care in relationships.

RESPONSE TO IMPARTIALIST VIEWS 3 THROUGH 7

Positions 3 through 7 will be considered more briefly. But first, one more point about position 2. Suppose it were replied to the argument of the previous section that the capacities of care, sensitivity to particular persons, and the like, may be good, and perhaps even necessary for the application of moral principle, but—precisely because they are not themselves a reflection of universal principle, impartiality, rationality, and the like—they are not themselves moral.

Naturally if 'moral' is defined in terms of impartiality, then anything outside of impartiality—even what is a necessary condition of it—is excluded. But then no independent argument will have been given as to why such a definition should be accepted.29

Let us consider position 3 in light of Kohlberg's suggestion that care in personal relations be seen as "supererogatory" and therefore secondary to or less significant than impartialist morality. 'Supererogatory' can mean different things. If supererogatory is taken to imply "having greater merit," then those who exemplify care would have greater merit than those who merely fulfilled obligations. In that case it would be hard to see why that which is supererogatory would have less importance than that which is merely obligatory.

On the other hand, if "supererogation" implies strictly "going beyond (impartial) duty" (with no implication of superior merit), then it seems implausible to see care in personal relations as supererogatory. For there would be no duties of the personal sort which acting from care within personal relations involves doing more of, since duties would all be impartialist. Yet if duties (or obligations) of personal relationship are countenanced, then, leaving aside questions about whether these can in fact be encompassed within an impartialist framework (see n. 25 above), it becomes implausible to regard all forms of care as going beyond these; for one thing, many caring actions can themselves be acts which are in

29. For a more detailed argument for not excluding considerations of care from the domain of the moral, see my "Particularity and Responsiveness," and "Iris Murdoch and the Domain of the Moral," esp. p. 361. See also the presentation above of position 6, in which the argument presented there has the force of shifting to the defender of Kant the burden of proof of denying moral worth to care and compassion and of restricting moral worth to that which is done from a sense of duty.
fact obligatory. Out of care I may do something for a friend which I am in fact obliged to do anyway. But also many acts of friendship, familial care, and the like seem outside the territory of obligation altogether rather than involving more of the fulfillment of obligation.  

Finally, if supererogation is taken more generally to refer to that which is (morally) good but not required, with no implication either of superior merit or of going beyond duty, then it seems contentious to relegate that which is supererogatory to a less significant domain of morality than that governed by impartial obligations. That (on this view) impartialist obligations are requirements while the supererogatory would not be, would mean only that one needed to satisfy the former first. This is the position taken in 6, and, as argued in the discussion of that view, nothing follows about which domain or orientation within morality is the more significant or valuable. For it can plausibly be argued that that which is (morally) good but not required casts a much wider net than the merely obligatory, and is, at least in that regard, a much more significant part of a typical human life.

View 4 says that, while care is distinct from impartiality and does have moral significance, it has less moral value than impartiality, which can also fully encompass all of its demands. The picture here is of a range of morally bidden acts, which are prescribed by both care and impartiality (though impartiality extends beyond this range as well).

First of all, it can be doubted whether all of the actions bidden by care morality can be seen as generated by principles of right or duty; as mentioned above, many caring actions seem outside the obligation structure altogether. But leaving this point aside, actions stemming from principles of right and acts stemming from care are not simply identical acts prompted by different motives. Leaving aside the problems of recognizing the situation as calling for the principle and knowing how to apply it (see above), it is also true, as suggested in the fifth contrast between Gilligan and Kohlberg, that within personal relations actions grounded in principle or duty alone will often not be seen by their recipients as expressing an attitude or emotion thought to be proper to that relationship. Thus while I can, out of adherence to a principle of aiding friends, do something to aid my friend, that action will not have entirely fulfilled what a fuller notion of friendship bids of me, which is to perform the action of aiding as an action expressing my care for my friend. If emotionally expressive action is an integral part of appropriate behavior within personal relationships, then a philosophy grounded in rational principle alone will be importantly deficient in this domain and cannot be seen as superior to one of care.

30. For an argument that many morally worthy acts of friendship, familial care, and the like, lie outside the structure of obligation or duty altogether, see my Friendship, Altruism, and Morality, chap. 7.

View 5 regards a morality of care as concerning the evaluation of persons and impartialist morality as involving the evaluation of acts. This seems unsatisfactory in both directions. Most important, care morality is meant to encompass not only inner motives but outward acts, specifically, as argued immediately above, emotion-expressing acts. Care involves a way of responding to other persons and does not merely provide standards for the evaluation of agents. What is true of a morality of care, which view 5 may be pointing to, is that it rejects a sharp distinction between act and motive which would allow for a standard of act evaluation wholly separate from one of agent evaluation.\footnote{32}

Apart from what has been said in the presentation of those views, positions 6 and 7 raise philosophical issues beyond the scope of this paper.\footnote{33} Nevertheless, as we noted in those discussions, neither of these views, as they stand, put forth a strong challenge to Gilligan’s views or to a morality of care.

Finally, it might be felt that the impartialist counterpositions discussed in this paper have served to push some of the contrasts 1–7, discussed earlier in the paper, into the background. This seems true. At the outset I claimed that Gilligan’s work is of the first importance for moral philosophy, and that pursuing its implications for an adequate moral theory will take one into territory not readily encompassed within the categories of contemporary ethics. This paper is meant only as a preliminary to that enterprise, clearing out of the way some of the intellectual obstacles within contemporary ethics to pursuing some of these more radical directions.\footnote{34}

\footnote{32. For a sustained critique of the sharp separation between act and motive presupposed in view 5, see Stephen Hudson, Human Character and Morality: Reflections from the History of Ideas (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), esp. chap. 3; and Blum, Friendship, Altruism, and Morality, chap. 7.}

\footnote{33. Some of the issues concerning view 7 are addressed in my “Iris Murdoch and the Domain of the Moral,” esp. pp. 350–54 (see n. 18 above). There it is argued that the reflective point of view outside of the specific individual’s caring for his friend, from which it can be seen that the individual’s caring action is a good one—or that compassion, concern for specific individuals’ welfare, and similar traits and sentiments can be acknowledged as having moral value—cannot be identified with the specific standpoint of “impartiality” found in impartialist moral theories. Such impartiality is, it is argued, only one possible reflective viewpoint. If this is so, then it is no support for position 7 to argue that all rational beings would include principles of care, compassion, and the like, as part of an ultimately acceptable morality, for the standpoint from which these rational beings do so is not necessarily an impartialist one.}