



## CHAPTER THIRTY-TWO

---

# IMPLEMENTING CHANGE

---

Jan T. Civian, Gordon Arnold, Zeldia F. Gamson,  
Sandra Kanter, Howard B. London

Higher education institutions have evolved into complex, decentralized organizations. These organizations have a mission that guides all campus activities and an endemic culture that further defines the relationships among faculty, administrators, and students. Like any organization, colleges and universities respond to economic conditions within and beyond themselves, and they do so in a framework of existing political agendas on campus. Navigating the political realm of curricular change is particularly treacherous because it involves attention to both the texts and the subtexts of the institution. The texts include all the obvious interests of the institutional players involved. The subtexts, however, are less readily known.

---

*Note:* The authors are grateful to the Exxon Education Foundation, which funded the Project on the Implementation of General Education from which this chapter draws. We deeply appreciate the continuing support of the foundation's former program officer, Richard Johnson, now of the Alliance for Higher Education in Dallas, Texas. Caryn Korshin has been an able successor as program officer. Coordinated by the New England Resource Center for Higher Education at the University of Massachusetts, Boston, the project was a field study designed to identify successful elements in the design and implementation of general education curriculum reform in comprehensive universities and liberal arts colleges. The study included a telephone survey of chief academic officers at seventy-one institutions followed by site visits at fifteen campuses. Several articles (Gamson, Kanter, and London, 1992; Gamson, 1992; Kanter, London, and Gamson, 1991) and working papers (Kanter, 1991; Kanter, London, and Gamson, 1990), as well as a book (Kanter, Gamson, and London, forthcoming) provide a fuller discussion of the results of the project.

---

## Impediments to Change

Accomplishing curricular change is a feat; one must consider both the academe's general norms and cultural constraints and the economic, structural, and political constraints on the institution. We consider these domains separately because they each pose a potential impediment to curricular change.

### General Constraints

Faculty are accustomed to freedom to do what they want in the privacy of the classroom. Protective of their classroom autonomy, faculty resist even hints of erosion in their freedom to teach what they want in the ways they deem appropriate.

Yet most curricular change requires, at least at the planning stage, that faculty relate the courses they teach to a larger view—to the discipline, to the department, to the college, to the institution as a whole. Faculty are typically more willing to make changes in their teaching if their discipline is moving in certain new directions. For instance, the requirement that undergraduates in sociology courses analyze computerized datasets has become *de rigueur* in most sociology departments. But even with disciplinary changes, no guarantee exists that individual faculty members will want to change. In disciplines like English, where there is much contention about new subfields and epistemologies, many faculty members resist changing the curriculum.

An important source of curricular change is the department, which in the majority of institutions is closely related to a discipline or professional field. Faculty even in small colleges view their departments as home, and they are likely to accept change emanating from their departments. They may agree to teach a new course or undertake an interdisciplinary or team-taught course for the fun of it, to help out a colleague, or to bring in more students. Of course, faculty may resist change emanating from the department if the change portends their departure or requires their retraining.

Faculty are most resistant to college or institution-wide curricular change. It is here that they feel most put-upon and most likely to defend the status quo. This is because the pull of collegiality and of disciplinary requirements becomes attenuated the further away from the department one goes. Institutional loyalty and a sense of shared collective culture across the disciplines and between the faculty and administration have become weaker across the sectors of higher education in the last thirty years. The lure of the research culture, the creep of bureaucracy, and increased state control have weakened faculty community. Since college and institution-wide curricular change requires faculty to engage with one another beyond their departments, in this arena resistance is greatest.

## Economic Constraints

Curricular change beyond the department is organizational change. This means that it plays into the political economy of colleges and universities in which enrollments determine—more or less directly—the number of faculty lines in a department. New curricula mean that some departments gain and others lose in this economy. No wonder, then, that despite the best intentions, departments get into turf battles over curricular change in which the winners are more likely to support change and the losers to oppose it.

Even if a new curriculum does not change faculty lines, there are increasingly severe economic constraints on change. After all, opportunity costs are involved in changing from one curriculum to another. If faculty are required to teach a new subject matter, employ new pedagogies, or team-teach, they must become prepared to do so, which takes time. And if faculty are already overemployed, there is little incentive for them to change. Certain departments like English and mathematics are stretched to the limit trying to cover remedial courses and general education requirements. Popular departments, like business or communications in the last decade, often find themselves with more students than they can handle. Their faculty may not be available, even with the best of intentions, to take on a new curriculum.

What about the departments whose faculty are underemployed? If they are willing to acknowledge this—and typically few are—they are likely supporters of a curriculum change that would bring students to their departments. But even here economic constraints are often severe. Faculty who have the time to devote to a new curriculum need support to learn unfamiliar material and pedagogies. And support for faculty development of this sort is in short supply, as institutional resources shrink and competition for external funds—for instance, from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the National Science Foundation, and private foundations—grows ever sharper.

## Structural Constraints

We have already noted that for most faculty, the department is home. It is where collegiality is likely to be strongest, and in disciplinary matters, where people can speak in incomplete sentences. This is because the modern American college and university are organized, in almost all cases, following the model of bureaucratic rationalism. Dominant in American organizations since the nineteenth century, this type of structural arrangement divides workers into departments according to competency, specialty, and shared knowledge. In the case of higher education, faculty are expected to be legitimate experts in their respective domains, and such legitimacy only comes with credentials demonstrating a thorough training in the

given field. This characteristic of organizational structure influences the shape of undergraduate educational curricula in important if not always apparent ways.

First, training in a specialty, especially if it involves doctoral study, provides a good deal of socialization regarding not only a shared body of knowledge, but also common attitudes, values, understandings, customs, and assumptions. Of course, within any discipline there is apt to be wide-ranging opinion about the particulars, but it would nonetheless be quite unusual to find, for example, a group of historians arguing about whether or not history was important. Thus the distribution of faculty among departments gives rise to departmental points of view as well as competing interests in the allocation of resources, so that coordination among departments is difficult to achieve. The implications for undergraduate curricular change are clear—increased departmentalization has made it more difficult for experts to understand each other and to share in each other's concerns, yet the creation and implementation of an undergraduate curriculum require such communication.

This is particularly problematic because all disciplines are subject to a chronic strain first defined by Hughes (1973). The professions claim to have knowledge and even the solution to mysteries that cannot be understood or used by anyone not properly initiated through a course of study and the learning of a common disposition toward the field. This claim leads to exclusiveness—only a biologist can say what, exactly, the contents of the required biology course ought to be, only the historian may do the same for the history courses, and so on. The second claim, however, is that their expertise rests upon some branch of knowledge that is universal, and that at least the rudiments of it can and ought to be learned by all students. This claim leads toward integration with the world of higher learning.

Yet on campuses where faculty already have difficulty communicating across departmental lines and where worldviews on matters academic may not be shared, how is the integration of disciplines to be determined? For example, the idea that some knowledge of cultures other than the dominant one is desirable is an attitude held widely in many disciplines, particularly in the humanities and social sciences, and so one can find examples where an undergraduate curriculum stresses such an awareness. However, persons trained in fields such as mathematics or physics, while they may agree with this idea generally, may recoil at the suggestion that they should include multicultural features in their own courses—arguing (probably correctly) that their fields, being more international in organization than most of the humanities and sharing a tighter agreement about scope and methods, are already more multicultural than many if not most of the humanities and social sciences.

Because the coordination of viewpoints across departments is difficult to achieve, colleges and universities tend to be what are called "loosely coupled

organizations" (Weick, 1976); that is, the various departmental (and other) subunits are not as tightly controlled at the day-to-day level as is sometimes the case in bureaucratic systems. Thus, while a dean might control a department's budget, or while the administration might override a recommendation on a matter of tenure, administrators have little or no control regarding what is taught in individual courses, what courses will be taught, or how they will be integrated with other courses.

On the other hand, while loose coupling proves an impediment to interdisciplinary change, it actually promotes curricular innovation at the disciplinary level. Because the various departments are relatively autonomous and disconnected, they can quickly respond to disciplinary changes, trends, and discoveries in their respective fields, and any decline in the fortunes of one department need not threaten the entirety of the organization.

### Political Constraints

In the real world of academe, the design and implementation of a curriculum can be highly political. Trade-offs are made in which parties mutually agree not to oppose the addition of courses from their respective departments. Trained as specialists, however, faculty usually prefer to teach their specialty rather than more general, introductory offerings. Thus, staffing an introductory course can become more difficult. A quick scan of the *Chronicle of Higher Education* position announcements reveals how often a willingness to teach introductory courses is viewed as a requirement to be fulfilled rather than a perquisite of the job. (Thankfully, not everyone sees it this way!)

The implications of this are significant, as the quality of a course is closely tied to the quality of instruction. Agreeing to have a new course added to the curriculum is a Pyrrhic victory if it is taught unenthusiastically by a senior faculty member filling out her load, or by an inexperienced graduate student who is poorly trained and supported.

Subtexts can also confound curriculum change. That is, alongside the discussion of how one or another curricular reform would be good for students, there is a parallel conversation regarding the hidden agendas of individuals or groups that can best be understood in relation to an institution's history and present struggles. Said differently, subtexts are formed by the joining of individual needs, institutional circumstances, and the historical moment. Examples of subtexts include how a curricular innovation might reverse a declining student enrollment, attract donors to the campus, assist in the consolidation of programs or campuses mandated by (in the case of public institutions) a state authority, thwart a threatened loss of accreditation, bolster a sagging college reputation, help faculty acquire

more influence over the academic life of the community, or bring students to a department so that faculty jobs will be retained. In our study of general education reform, we identified another and more subtle subtext: using general education reform as the vehicle through which a cohort of midcareer faculty attempts to gain political and cultural ascendancy on campus.

Changing a general education curriculum was, we found, often seen as a route to resolving more than one of these organizational problems. In organizational sociology, this is regrettably called the *garbage can* phenomenon (Cohen, March, and Olsen, 1972), the phrase referring to the assortment of problems thrown into one vessel, with the hope that if they cannot be carted away, their mixture will suggest a useful next step for an institution.

This is not to lose sight of the more intellectual reasons for curricular reform. The struggle for power within academic units and across a campus can include demands for the inclusion of new perspectives—feminist thought, multiculturalism, ethnic studies, or environmental studies—or conversely, for the preservation of tradition. Behind these issues, in turn, lies another organizational problem having to do with the social role of higher education, specifically whether the campus is to emphasize the conservation of knowledge or the fueling of social change. In extreme cases, the polarization that results can be substantial—the inclusion of certain ideas in the curriculum lends legitimacy not only to those ideas but also to those espousing them. Thus the competition among various voices in the academy for dominance, or at least a place at the table, can lead to difficulties that are largely unforeseen in curricular design and implementation. These difficulties are not easily sorted out.

---

## The Treacherous Terrain Of Curricular Change

Given the enormous impediments to change, curricular innovation occurs with varying degrees of success. Some kinds of curricular change are easier to accomplish than others. Curricular changes within the major are more easily accomplished than institution-wide curricular changes. Structurally, higher education is better configured to promote innovation at the departmental level, and change occurs much more easily there, where it can be based in the departmental faculty culture. This is not to discount the presence on nearly every campus of some fractious departments, nor to say that change at the department level takes place without struggle. Issues of professional accreditation, allocation of course loads, disagreements about discipline-related matters, as well as various subtexts can come into play. But these can all be addressed within the language and culture shared by faculty members who teach in the same discipline.

Changing a general education curriculum is considerably more difficult than curricular change within a department. First, it requires disparate parties to agree on the value of particular courses or arrays of courses—or, if they are not valued, to agree at least to allow their presence. Second, with the exception of only a very few elite campuses, this must occur when institutional resources are scarce, and the curriculum, if markedly different from its predecessor, will undoubtedly require money for proper implementation. Third, changes in a general education program can dramatically alter students' course-taking patterns, thus affecting the status of some departments and their claim on institutional resources. Where professional programs exist, turf wars often erupt as faculty in these departments oppose general education requirements that encroach on the number of credit hours required by accrediting associations, or that threaten to reduce the few electives their students have left. Before it reaches the president's desk, a new general education program is likely to face most of the complications and impediments outlined earlier in the chapter.

Just as departmental change is apt to meet fewer obstacles than change in general education, modest curriculum change is easier to accomplish than dramatic change. Virtually all the campuses in our study that attempted major change failed to accomplish it in the face of enormous political and financial pressures. Embittered visionaries involved in the failed change frequently retreated from active campus participation, so great was their disappointment in the compromises reached. Campuses in our study that attempted more modest change were much more likely to be successful in implementing an improved curriculum. Such programs—while obviously less innovative—are less threatening, less costly, and less likely to become lightning rods for insurmountable campus subtexts.

Where dramatic change is desirable, it is best accomplished in modest stages. Incremental changes can substantially improve a curriculum, but a failed comprehensive change benefits no one. Regular program reviews can keep the process of incremental change moving. The feedback loop helps in the resolution of unanticipated implementation problems and allows for ongoing discussion of the goals of the program.

Obviously, the primary goal of curricular change is to improve student educational outcomes. One of the unexpected positive byproducts of curricular reform, however, is not related to student outcomes at all, but to the faculty. By and large, faculty members who have been involved in curricular change report that they find the process of designing and implementing new curricula to be intellectually stimulating and professionally satisfying (except, of course, in extreme cases where the reform process has led to alienation). They enjoy being delivered from the routine of their teaching duties to participate in lively discussion about educational goals and curricular alternatives. When a program is at long

last hammered out, the sense of accomplishment is palpable and enhances feelings of community. If the process has been well modulated, participants are left with energy to continue the reform process through implementation, evaluation, and reconfiguration stages.

However, our study found that an implementation process can leave many casualties. Faculty members or administrators who choose to crusade for programs that dramatically alter the status quo are not only unlikely to succeed, but may end up bitter and disillusioned. In worst-case scenarios, administrators have lost their jobs when they tried to force dramatic curriculum change. Faculty members may end up retreating to a cloistered campus existence, giving up active campus participation. In some cases, these individuals may actually have managed to get some of their ideas adopted. Not only do these particular individuals become victims of the politics of the academy, but their programs cannot be sustained when others who must deliver them do not believe in them.

Adequate attention to implementation issues must occur during the program design stage, including a realistic assessment of the resources and new structures needed to maintain it. It is not unusual for faculty committees to invest hours in designing a new curriculum, yet fail to think through the implementation issues necessary for its survival. Most often we found that campuses failed to anticipate the cost and coordination necessary to implement a new curriculum. Costs associated with a new curriculum typically include professional development activities for faculty in new skill areas such as interdisciplinary teaching. Additionally, faculty release time and new staff hires are necessary elements of successful implementation where new courses are part of the curriculum package. Finally, depending on the complexity of the new program, resources are sometimes needed to fund a coordinator who will attend to the details of program implementation. Another important implementation issue that may or may not have financial implications concerns student advising. Failure to educate faculty and students about the revised requirements creates headaches for registrars and heartaches for students when graduation draws near. Failure to anticipate the multiple needs of curriculum revision will mean that the programs never realize their full potential and may eventually fail.

---

## Lessons from the Field

Two cases from our general education study serve to illustrate our points. At Plymouth State College (in New Hampshire), the faculty became dissatisfied with the existing loose distribution system of general education requirements. An ad



hoc committee composed of respected senior faculty members hammered out the framework for a new general education curriculum, and, aided by faculty liaisons from each department, further refined the new program. The curricular revisions were not extravagant: distribution requirements were tightened so that students had less choice in the content they took, a freshman seminar was instituted to introduce students to the college culture, and students had to take at least one new team-taught interdisciplinary course.

Much went well during Plymouth State College's change process. Faculty talked about being in control of the process. Administrators were seen as allies in the effort to improve the curriculum. Everyone felt consulted and informed: department liaisons worked diligently to keep lines of communication open, a committee member was given release time to act as an ambassador-negotiator, and the ad hoc committee published a newsletter to inform faculty about its thinking and solicit input. Faculty reported that the reforms were energizing and had made them better teachers and colleagues. They believed that the curricular changes had improved students' educational experience. Additionally, a great deal of attention was paid to issues of implementation including allocation of resources and structures to support the new program. Workshops for faculty in writing across the curriculum and interdisciplinary teaching were enthusiastically received.

Some matters of implementation proved difficult, however. Staffing and scheduling were problematic early in the program. Not enough science labs were provided for students to meet the science requirement in a timely manner. According to faculty, some courses were oversubscribed and too many adjunct faculty had been hired to teach the general education courses. Faculty interest in the freshman seminar waned after a while and few could be recruited to teach it despite substantial monetary incentives. Finally, the program suffered somewhat from a lack of formal assessment as to what worked and what needed improvement.

While Plymouth State faced some difficulties implementing the new general education requirements, their program remains relatively strong and their process a model for others. The goals of the new program were well understood by the community, program design included high levels of consultation with the faculty, professional development opportunities were adequate, and the specific elements of the program were realistic for the campus (that is, the committee rejected ideas that were unrealistic in terms of budget or student characteristics, such as a foreign language requirement).

At the University of Massachusetts, Boston, an administrative edict was the catalyst for reform. The university had two colleges, each with its own philosophy of education. College I was liberal and permissive in its requirements for graduation, an outgrowth of the 1960s. College II was traditional; the canon took

center stage. After a budget shortfall in the early 1970s, the two colleges were forced to merge and the new dean appointed a faculty committee to design a single liberal arts curriculum.

The faculty committee was large and included people from almost every point in the university's political spectrum. A group of faculty pushed for an innovative curriculum that emphasized critical skills as much as if not more than content. Despite opposition from traditionalists, the new curriculum, with a substantial number of new courses, was adopted.

Serious implementation problems soon arose despite thoughtful efforts to launch the program. While a Ford Foundation grant was acquired to train faculty and a new Center for the Improvement of Teaching was established to support the new curriculum, these efforts fell short. Many faculty believed that the multiple goals for each of the required core courses were impossible to attain; no one class could enhance academic skills through critical thinking, introduce one of seven broad areas of knowledge, and provide initiation into a traditional academic discipline. Most faculty were unfamiliar with the critical thinking movement—its language, knowledge base, and culture. Others who had some familiarity with these concepts simply did not know how to incorporate them all and work toward the goals in a single course. Despite their initial enthusiasm, many faculty felt pedagogically at a loss and wound up paying little or no attention to anything but the disciplinary material. Too little committed to the curriculum's goals, having inadequate expertise in teaching them, and feeling there was too little time in the course for them, they abandoned them. Principles and good intentions had bumped up against the real world of the classroom.

Other faculty—who thought from the beginning that the multiple goals were impossible to achieve in the same course—never had any intention of participating in the program. In short, the core courses were found to be too ambitious. There was little information circulating about what they were supposed to be and how they could be taught. Thus, the program floundered for two years until the problems were addressed by a faculty handbook. By then, however, a fracture between expectations and reality had developed, a fracture that never fully healed and forever hobbled the program.

Antagonism toward the curriculum never abated, so that when another budget crisis hit in the mid-1980s, the new curriculum was easy prey. Another faculty committee, appointed and supported by the dean, chose to make the curriculum more traditional and less skill-based. Most foundation courses were to be taught as if they were introductions to the disciplines. The educational innovators never forgave the dean for pushing this agenda. A number of them said that the results had made them wary about getting engaged in future campus affairs. The early fervor of these faculty was replaced by alienation and anger.

It is fair to say that reforming curriculum was a great deal more complicated at the University of Massachusetts, Boston, than at Plymouth State College. Boston is larger and more organizationally complex. Faculty there are torn between their teaching and research ambitions, while Plymouth State faculty are more comfortable in their teaching roles. The decision at Boston to create a new curriculum was made in the midst of organizational turmoil caused by the state's fiscal crisis; by contrast, the decision to revise Plymouth State's curriculum was an internal one, and the change was made during a relatively tranquil period in the college's history. While turmoil can create an opportunity for curricular change—and, indeed, enrollment or fiscal crisis served as the catalyst for curricular change on several of the campuses we studied—the change process itself tends to be more difficult during such periods due to high levels of fear and uncertainty. Despite the differences in the size and circumstances of these two institutions, we believe the contrasts in their approaches to curricular reform to be noteworthy. Plymouth State undertook reform by defining a clear framework, operationalizing their program in a modest way, paying painstaking attention to process and the inclusion of faculty and administration, and effectively training faculty in the implementation of the new program. Boston mounted an ambitious program without adequate grassroots support, and well-intentioned efforts to train faculty to teach skills-based core courses failed because the program was not well understood.

On the matter of designing a realistic program, we want to note that several campuses in our study failed to fully realize the scope of the curricular innovation envisioned by an ambitious design committee; after the compromising was said and done, the new program was only a minor improvement over the old one it was meant to replace. We have a few thoughts on why such curriculum change can be considered successful. First, at least a few participants on every campus are always energized by a campuswide discussion of educational goals and believe they improve as teachers. Second, administrators are often pleased that something concrete has been done, albeit small. Finally, curriculum change can successfully occur in waves; the innovations that do not make it into the first round of reform may well be adopted the second time around. Thinking back to the economic, cultural, structural, and political constraints described earlier in this chapter, it is no wonder that the garden variety of curriculum change tends to be modest . . . and, under the circumstances, it should be considered quite an accomplishment.

---

### **Eleven Suggestions for Good Practice**

Life is not linear or simple, and neither is curriculum reform. We are painfully aware of the difficulties of carrying out change in the curriculum, but we have

learned from close analysis of campuses that have tried to do so that it can be done, and often successfully. We conclude with eleven suggestions that should increase the odds for success.

- *Be realistic.* A curriculum should not be weighed down with multiple goals that are poorly understood by faculty. This does not mean that imaginative attempts at creating curricula with character and ambition should be discouraged; it does mean that people should not be set up for failure by attempting to do more than a campus's culture, politics, finances, and organizational constraints will realistically allow. Leaders need to know how far a campus can be stretched.

- *Anticipate implementation needs.* Good curriculum reform most often stumbles because no one is paying attention to the details of making it work. Inattention to implementation is almost always the weak link in the change process. Faculty education about the goals of the program and professional development to prepare faculty to teach the program are crucial. So too are financial support and coordination with the administrative offices likely to be affected, typically the offices of the registrar, admissions, advising, and publications.

- *Don't try to do everything in the first try.* Successful institutions tended to think of change as occurring on a continuum. Not everything needs to be accomplished on the first pass. Assessment and revision can be constant. Mistakes made in the first generation of reform can be corrected in the second generation, and so on.

- *Develop an appropriate administrative structure.* Successful programs are coordinated, monitored, assessed, protected, and nurtured by clear administrative structures. Programs that work well have a coordinator drawn from the administration or faculty, typically on release time, who works with a committee. Lack of clear authority for implementing the change is a common problem.

- *Provide rewards and incentives for participating in the program.* These can include public recognition, workload adjustments, release time, consideration of the participation in promotion and tenure decisions, and monetary rewards.

- *Ensure that professional development activities are adequate.* Current and new faculty must understand the goals and, if appropriate, the pedagogies, of the program. Therefore, faculty development activities prior to implementation are critical, especially those having to do with course development. Examples of professional development activities include workshops, retreats, release time to master new materials and teaching techniques, collaborative course development, and ongoing faculty seminars.

- *Actively recruit faculty to teach in the program.* Successful programs recruit qualified faculty to teach in them. They do not draft unwilling and poorly prepared teachers just to satisfy a department's need to staff courses. Qualified faculty can come both from within the institution and from the outside. Examples include recruiting practitioners, interdisciplinary faculty, and faculty representing cultures

and backgrounds that may be called for in the new program. Ideally, senior faculty members will be visible participants in the new program.

- *Resources should be adequate and predictable.* Large—and sustained—resources should be allocated to support all phases of the program. Even when outside grants sustain a new curriculum through its first few years (through, for example, professional development activities or the provision of release time for course development), securing long-term funding should be a campus priority. Symbolic resources are important also, specifically the creation by presidents, provosts, and deans of a climate of belief in and support for the program.

- *Develop an assessment timetable.* An ongoing, serious evaluation of the program should begin at implementation, before problems are set in stone. This implies that the program and its implementation should be defined and treated as fluid and subject to modification. An identifiable group—an ad hoc committee, for example—should be given formal responsibility for evaluating the program.

- *Have an open, participatory process.* Critics of higher education often cite faculty autonomy as a major obstacle to reform. Whatever one's view of faculty roles and responsibilities, faculty have a large say in how they spend their time on campus. Successful curriculum change depends on the goodwill and interest of the faculty. While some sectors in the economy can impose unwanted changes on their employees, it makes little sense to implement unwanted changes in higher education, where faculty can choose their level of participation.

- *Pay attention to subtexts but don't let them overwhelm the process.* Conducting a truly open, participatory curriculum change process is not easy. There will be a great deal of territorialism—the desire by faculty and administrators to make changes that protect or enhance their jobs. The art of curriculum change is to walk a tightrope—that is, to stay focused on the educational goals even while making accommodations to multiple interests and broader organizational needs.

Difficult though curricular reform may be, the rewards are many. In addition to improved student outcomes, faculty can benefit from professional development opportunities derived from the new curriculum as well as from the sense of community elicited by discussion of educational mission and curricular goals. Managed well, curricular reform can challenge all campus constituents to transcend individual subtexts for the collective text of serving the educational needs of students.

---

## References

- Cohen, M. D., March, J. G., and Olsen, J. P. "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice." *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1972, 17, 1-25.
- Gamson, Z. F. "The Realpolitik of Reforming General Education." *Proceedings of the Asheville Institute on General Education*. Washington, D.C.: Association of American Colleges, 1992.

- Gamson, Z. F., Kanter, S. L., and London, H. B. "General Education Reform: Moving Beyond the Rational Mode of Change." *Perspectives*, 1992, 22, 58-68.
- Hughes, E. C. (ed.). *Education for the Professions of Medicine, Law, Theology and Social Welfare*. Report prepared for the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973.
- Kanter, S. L. "The Buck Stops Here: Outside Grants and the General Education Curriculum Change Process." Working Paper #9. Boston: New England Resource Center for Higher Education, University of Massachusetts, 1991.
- Kanter, S. L., Gamson, Z. F., and London, H. B. (eds.). *Revitalizing General Education in a Time of Scarcity: A Navigational Chart for Administration and Faculty*. Needham Heights, Mass.: Allyn & Bacon, forthcoming.
- Kanter, S. L., London, H. B., and Gamson, Z. F. "Implementing General Education: Initial Findings." Working Paper #5. Boston: New England Resource Center for Higher Education, University of Massachusetts, 1990.
- Kanter, S. L., London, H. B., and Gamson, Z. F. "The Implementation of General Education: Some Early Findings." *The Journal of General Education*, 1991, 40, 119-132.
- Weick, K. E. "Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems." *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1976, 21, 1-19.