one is a member of that category. In the case at hand, it is
the category, woman. Being a woman is a major factor in my
not having a better job than I do; being a woman selects me
as a likely victim of sexual assault or harassment; it is my be-
ing a woman that reduces the power of my anger to a proof
of my insanity. If a woman has little or no economic or pol-
itical power, or achieves little of what she wants to achieve,
a major causal factor in this is that she is a woman. For any
woman of any race or economic class, being a woman is sig-
nificantly attached to whatever disadvantages and depriva-
tions she suffers, be they great or small.

None of this is the case with respect to a person’s being a
man. Simply being a man is not what stands between him
and a better job; whatever assaults and harassments he is
subject to, being male is not what selects him for victimiza-
tion; being male is not a factor which would make his anger
impotent—quite the opposite. If a man has little or no ma-
terial or political power, or achieves little of what he wants
to achieve, his being male is no part of the explanation. Be-
ing male is something he has going for him, even if race or
class or age or disability is going against him.

Women are oppressed, as women. Members of certain
racial and/or economic groups and classes, both the males
and the females, are oppressed as members of those races
and/or classes. But men are not oppressed as men.

... and isn’t it strange that any of us should have been
confused and mystified about such a simple thing?

NOTES

1. This example is derived from Daddy Was A Number Runner, by
Louise Meriwether (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1970),
p. 144.

The first philosophical project I undertook as a feminist was
that of trying to say carefully and persuasively what sexism
is, and what it is for someone, some institution or some act
to be sexist. This project was pressed on me with consider-
able urgency because, like most women coming to a feminist
perception of themselves and the world, I was seeing sexism
everywhere and trying to make it perceptible to others. I
would point out, complain and criticize, but most frequently
my friends and colleagues would not see that what I declared
to be sexist was sexist, or at all objectionable.

As the critic and as the initiator of the topic, I was the one
on whom the burden of proof fell—it was I who had to ex-
plain and convince. Teaching philosophy had already taught
me that people cannot be persuaded of things they are not
ready to be persuaded of; there are certain complexes of will
and prior experience which will inevitably block persuasion,
no matter the merits of the case presented. I knew that even
if I could explain fully and clearly what I was saying when I
called something sexist, I would not necessarily be able to
convince various others of the correctness of this claim. But
what troubled me enormously was that I could not explain it
in any way which satisfied me. It is this sort of moral and in-
tellectual frustration which, in my case at least, always gen-
erates philosophy.
The following was the product of my first attempt to state clearly and explicitly what sexism is:

The term ‘sexist’ in its core and perhaps most fundamental meaning is a term which characterizes anything whatever which creates, constitutes, promotes or exploits any irrelevant or impertinent marking of the distinction between the sexes.¹

When I composed this statement, I was thinking of the myriads of instances in which persons of the two sexes are treated differently, or behave differently, but where nothing in the real differences between females and males justifies or explains the difference of treatment or behavior. I was thinking, for instance, of the tracking of boys into Shop and girls into Home Ec, where one can see nothing about boys or girls considered in themselves which seems to connect essentially with the distinction between wrenches and eggbeaters. I was thinking also of sex discrimination in employment—cases where someone otherwise apparently qualified for a job is not hired because she is a woman. But when I tried to put this definition of ‘sexist’ to use, it did not stand the test.

Consider this case: If a company is hiring a supervisor who will supervise a group of male workers who have always worked for male supervisors, it can scarcely be denied that the sex of a candidate for the job is relevant to the candidate’s prospects of moving smoothly and successfully into an effective working relationship with the supervisees (though the point is usually exaggerated by those looking for excuses not to hire women). Relevance is an intrasystematic thing. The patterns of behavior, attitude and custom within which a process goes on determine what is relevant to what in matters of describing, predicting or evaluating. In the case at hand, the workers’ attitudes and the surrounding customs of the culture make a difference to how they interact with their supervisor and, in particular, make the sex of the supervisor a relevant factor in predicting how things will work out. So then, if the company hires a man, in preference to a more experienced and knowledgeable woman, can we explain our objection to the decision by saying it involved distinguishing on the basis of sex when sex is irrelevant to the ability to do the job? No: sex is relevant here.

So, what did I mean to say about ‘sexist’? I was thinking that in a case of a candidate for a supervisory job, the reproductive capacity of the candidate has nothing to do with that person’s knowing what needs to be done and being able to give properly timed, clear and correct directions. What I was picturing was a situation purified of all sexist perception and reaction. But, of course, if the whole context were not sexist, sex would not be an issue in such a job situation; indeed, it might go entirely unnoticed. It is precisely the fact that the sex of the candidate is relevant that is the salient symptom of the sexism of the situation.

I had failed, in that first essay, fully to grasp or understand that the locus of sexism is primarily in the system or framework, not in the particular act. It is not accurate to say that what is going on in cases of sexism is that distinctions are made on the basis of sex when sex is irrelevant; what is wrong in cases of sexism is, in the first place, that sex is relevant; and then that the making of distinctions on the basis of sex reinforces the patterns which make it relevant.

In sexist cultural/economic systems, sex is always relevant. To understand what sexism is, then, we have to step back and take a larger view.

Sex-identification intrudes into every moment of our lives and discourse, no matter what the supposedly primary focus or topic of the moment is. Elaborate, systematic, ubiquitous and redundant marking of a distinction between two sexes of humans and most animals is customary and obligatory. One never can ignore it.

Examples of sex-marking behavior patterns abound. A couple enters a restaurant; the headwaiter or hostess addres-
ses the man and does not address the woman. The physician addresses the man by surname and honorific (Mr. Baxter, Rev. Jones) and addresses the woman by given name (Nancy, Gloria). You congratulate your friend—a hug, a slap on the back, shaking hands, kissing; one of the things which determines which of these you do is your friend’s sex. In everything one does one has two complete repertoires of behavior, one for interactions with women and one for interactions with men. Greeting, storytelling, order-giving and order-receiving, negotiating, gesturing deference or dominance, encouraging, challenging, asking for information: one does all of these things differently depending upon whether the relevant others are male or female.

That this is so has been confirmed in sociological and socio-linguistic research, but it is just as easily confirmed in one’s own experience. To discover the differences in how you greet a woman and how you greet a man, for instance, just observe yourself, paying attention to the following sorts of things: frequency and duration of eye contact, frequency and type of touch, tone and pitch of voice, physical distance maintained between bodies, how and whether you smile, use of slang or swear words, whether your body dips into a shadow curtsey or bow. That I have two repertoires for handling introductions to people was vividly confirmed for me when a student introduced me to his friend, Pat, and I really could not tell what sex Pat was. For a moment I was stopped cold, completely incapable of action. I felt myself helplessly caught between two paths—the one I would take if Pat were female and the one I would take if Pat were male.

Of course the paralysis does not last. One is rescued by one’s ingenuity and good will; one can invent a way to behave as one says “How do you do?” to a human being. But the habitual ways are not for humans: they are one way for women and another for men.

Interlaced through all our behavior is our speaking—our linguistic behavior. Third person singular pronouns mark the sex of their referents. The same is true for a huge range of the nouns we use to refer to people (‘guy’, ‘boy’, ‘lady’, ‘salesman’, etc., and all the terms which covertly indicate the sex of the referent, like ‘pilot’, ‘nurse’, etc.), and the majority of given proper names (‘Bob’, ‘Gwen’, etc.).* In speaking, one constantly marks the sexes of those one speaks about.

The frequency with which our behavior marks the sexes of those we interact with cannot be exaggerated. The phenomenon is absolutely pervasive and deeply entrenched in all the patterns of behavior which are habitual, customary, acceptable, tolerable and intelligible. One can invent ways of behaving in one situation or another which are not sex-marking, which do not vary with the sexes of the persons involved, but if one were to succeed in removing sex-marking from one’s behavior altogether, one’s behavior would be so odd as to precipitate immediate crises of intelligibility and strenuous moral, religious or aesthetic objections from others. Everything one did would seem strange. And this is a matter of no small moment. We are a gregarious species. Our lives depend on our abilities to interact with others in relations of work, of exchange and of sympathy. What one cannot do without seeming excessively odd or unintelligible, one cannot do without severe disturbance to patterns of interaction upon which one’s life depends. Sex-marking behavior is not optional; it is as obligatory as it is pervasive.

* Languages differ in their degree of “gender-loading” and there is evidence that these differences correlate with differences in the ages at which children “attain gender identity.” In “Native Language and Cognitive Structures—A Cross-cultural Inquiry,” Alexander Z. Guiora and Arthur Herold detail this evidence. They characterize English as having “minimal” gender-loading, Hebrew as having “maximum gender-loading” and Finnish as having “zero.” If English, whose gender-marking seems so very prevalent to me, is an example of “minimal gender-loading,” it seems safe to assume that gender-marking in human languages is indeed a significant factor in human experience generally. (The Guiora and Herold article may be requested from Dr. Guiora at Box No. 011, University Hospital, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109.) I am indebted to Barbara Abbott for bringing this article to my attention.
Closely connected with habitual and obligatory sex-marking is a constant and urgent need to know or be able to guess the sex of every single person with whom one has the slightest or most remote contact or interaction. If we are going to mark people’s sexes in every situation, then we have to know their sexes. I needed to know whether “Pat” was endowed with a clitoris or a penis prior to making the first step in getting acquainted. If I am writing a book review, the use of personal pronouns to refer to the author creates the need to know whether that person’s reproductive cells are the sort which produce ova or the sort which produce sperm. I cannot ask the time of day without first knowing or presuming I know my informant’s potential role in reproduction. We are socially and communicatively helpless if we do not know the sex of everybody we have anything to do with, and for members of such a species as ours, such helplessness can be life-threatening. Our habitual behavior patterns make knowledge of each person’s sex both pervasively pertinent and of the first importance. Furthermore, the importance and urgency of having such knowledge is intensified by another sort of factor which I think most people rarely notice because they do usually know the sexes of others.

In a culture in which one is deemed sinful, sick or disgusting (at least) if one is not heterosexual, it is very important to keep track of one’s sexual feelings and the sexes of those who inspire them. If one is permitted sexual expression or gratification, or even mere feeling, with persons of one sex but not of the other, one has to know what sex each person is before one can allow one’s heart to beat or one’s blood to flow in erotic enjoyment of that person. Much of our ordinary and apparently nonsexual interaction and communication involves elements of sexual or erotic message, and these are rigidly regulated by sex taboos, including the taboo on homosexuality. The adjustment or maladjustment of these messages to the sex of the person in question can have wonderful or disastrous consequences. The thought that one might misapprehend the sex of another conjures nothing less than the holy dread of unwitting violation of powerful taboo. Thus all the tension connected with sexual taboo and repression intensifies the urgency of being acceptable and intelligible, and our need to know everyone’s sex carries much of the weight of an acute and emotionally fraught survival need.

The pressure on each of us to guess or determine the sex of everybody else both generates and is exhibited in a great pressure on each of us to inform everybody all the time of our sex. For, if you strip humans of most of their cultural trappings, it is not always that easy to tell without close inspection which are female, which are male. The tangible and visible physical differences between the sexes are not particularly sharp or numerous. Individual variation along the physical dimensions we think of as associated with maleness and femaleness are great, and the differences between the sexes could easily be obscured by bodily decoration, hair removal and the like. One of the shocks, when one does mistake someone’s sex, is the discovery of how easily one can be misled. We could not ensure that we could identify people by their sex virtually any time and anywhere under any conditions if they did not announce themselves, did not tell us in one way or another.

We do not, in fact, announce our sexes “in one way or another.” We announce them in a thousand ways. We dress ourselves from head to toe with garments and decorations which serve like badges and buttons to announce our sexes. For every type of occasion there are distinct clothes, gear and accessories, hairdos, cosmetics and scents, labeled as “ladies’” or “men’s” and labeling us as females or males, and most of the time most of us choose, use, wear or bear the paraphernalia associated with our sex. It goes below the skin as well. There are different styles of gait, gesture, posture, speech, humor, taste and even of perception, interest and attention
that we learn as we grow up to be women or to be men and that label and announce us as women or as men. It begins early in life: even infants in arms are color coded.

That we wear and bear signs of our sexes, and that this is compulsory, is made clearest in the relatively rare cases when we do not do so, or not enough. Responses ranging from critical to indignant to hostile to meet mothers whose small children are not immediately sex-identifiable, and hippies used to be accosted on the streets (by otherwise reserved and polite people) with criticisms and accusations when their clothing and style gave off mixed and contradictory sex-announcements. Anyone in any kind of job placement service and any Success Manual will tell you that you cannot expect to get or keep a job if your clothing or personal style is ambiguous in its announcement of your sex. You don’t go to a job interview wearing the other sex’s shoes and socks.

The buzz on this last example indicates another source of pressure to inform each other of our sexes, namely, once again, the requirement that one be and appear heterosexual. Querly enough, one appears heterosexual by informing people of one’s sex very emphatically and very unambiguously, and one does this by heaping into one’s behavior and upon one’s body even more and more conclusive sex-indicators.

For homosexuals and lesbians who wish to pass as heterosexual, it is these indicators that provide most of the camouflage; for those who wish to avoid being presumed heterosexual, the trick is to deliberately cultivate ambiguous sex-indicators in clothes, behavior and style. In a culture in which homosexuality and lesbianism are violently and almost universally forbidden, and heterosexuality is announced by announcing one’s sex, it always behooves one to announce one’s sex.

The information as to what sex one is is always wanted, and supplying it is always appropriate to one’s own and others’ most constant and pervasive interests—interests in being and remaining viable in the available human community.

The intense demand for marking and for asserting what sex each person is adds up to a strenuous requirement that there be two distinct and sharply dimorphic sexes. But, in reality, there are not. There are people who fit on a biological spectrum between two not-so-sharply defined poles. In about 5 percent of live births, possibly more, the babies are in some degree and way not perfect exemplars of male and female. There are individuals with chromosome patterns other than XX or XY and individuals whose external genitalia at birth exhibit some degree of ambiguity. There are people who are chromosomally “normal” who are at the far ends of the normal spectra of secondary sex characteristics—height, musculature, hairiness, body density, distribution of fat, breast size, etc.—whose overall appearance fits the norm of people whose chromosomal sex is the opposite of theirs.3

These variations notwithstanding, persons (mainly men, of course) with the power to do so actually construct a world in which men are men and women are women and there is nothing in between and nothing ambiguous; they do it by chemically and/or surgically altering people whose bodies are indeterminate or ambiguous with respect to sex. Newborns with “imperfectly formed” genitals are immediately “corrected” by chemical or surgical means, children and adolescents are given hormone “therapies” if their bodies seem not to be developing according to what physicians and others declare to be the norm for what has been declared to be that individual’s sex. Persons with authority recommend and supply cosmetics and cosmetic regimens, diets, exercises and all manner of clothing to revise or disguise the too-hairy lip, the too-large breast, the too-sleender shoulders, the too-large feet, the too-great or too-slight stature. Individuals whose bodies do not fit the picture of exactly two sharply dimorphic sexes are often enough quite willing to be altered or veiled for the obvious reason that the world punishes them severely for their failure to be the “facts” which would verify the doctrine of two sexes. The demand that the world be a world in which there are exactly two sexes is inexorable, and we are all com-
pelled to answer to it emphatically, unconditionally, repetitiously and unambiguously.

Even being physically "normal" for one's assigned sex is not enough. One must be female or male, actively. Again, the costumes and performances. Pressed to acting feminine or masculine, one colludes (co-lude: play along) with the doctors and counselors in the creation of a world in which the apparent dimorphism of the sexes is so extreme that one can only think there is a great gulf between female and male, that the two are, essentially and fundamentally and naturally, utterly different. One helps to create a world in which it seems to us that we could never mistake a woman for a man or a man for a woman. We never need worry.

Along with all the making, marking and announcing of sex-distinction goes a strong and visceral feeling or attitude to the effect that sex-distinction is the most important thing in the world: that it would be the end of the world if it were not maintained, clear and sharp and rigid; that a sex-dualism which is rooted in the nature of the beast is absolutely crucial and fundamental to all aspects of human life, human society and human economy. Where feminism is perceived as a project of blurring this distinction, antifeminist rhetoric is vivid with the dread that the world will end if the feminists have their way. Some feminists' insistence that the feminist goal is not a "unisex" society is defensive in a way that suggests they too believe that culture or civilization would not survive blurring the distinction. I think that one of the sources of the prevalence and profundity of this conviction and dread is our immersion in the very behavior patterns I have been discussing.

It is a general and obvious principle of information theory that when it is very, very important that certain information be conveyed, the suitable strategy is redundancy. If a message must get through, one sends it repeatedly and by as many means or media as one has at one's command. On the other end, as a receiver of information, if one receives the same in-

formation over and over, conveyed by every medium one knows, another message comes through as well, and implicitly: the message that this information is very, very important. The enormous frequency with which information about people's sexes is conveyed conveys implicitly the message that this topic is enormously important. I suspect that this is the single topic on which we most frequently receive information from others throughout our entire lives. If I am right, it would go part way to explaining why we end up with an almost irresistible impression, unarticulated, that the matter of people's sexes is the most important and most fundamental topic in the world.

We exchange sex-identification information, along with the implicit message that it is very important, in a variety of circumstances in which there really is no concrete or experientially obvious point in having the information. There are reasons, as this discussion has shown, why you should want to know whether the person filling your water glass or your tooth is male or female and why that person wants to know what you are, but those reasons are woven invisibly into the fabric of social structure and they do not have to do with the bare mechanics of things being filled. Furthermore, the same culture which drives us to this constant information exchange also simultaneously enforces a strong blanket rule requiring that the simplest and most nearly definitive physical manifestations of sex difference be hidden from view in all but the most private and intimate circumstances. The double message of sex-distinction and its pre- eminent importance is conveyed, in fact, in part by devices which systematically and deliberately cover up and hide from view the few physical things which do (to a fair extent) distinguish two sexes of humans. The messages are overwhelmingly dissociated from the concrete facts they supposedly pertain to, and from matrices of concrete and sensible reasons and consequences.

Small children's minds must be hopelessly boggled by all this. We know our own sexes, and learn to think it a matter of first importance that one is a girl or a boy so early that we
do not remember not knowing—long before physical differences in our young bodies could make more than the most trivial practical differences. A friend of mine whose appearance and style have a little bit about them that is gender-ambiguous walked past a mother and child, and heard the child ask the mother, “Is she a man or a woman?” The struggle to divine some connection between social behavior and physical sex, and the high priority of it all, seem painfully obvious here.

If one is made to feel that a thing is of prime importance, but common sensory experience does not connect it with things of obvious concrete and practical importance, then there is mystery, and with that a strong tendency to the construction of mystical or metaphysical conceptions of its importance. If it is important, but not of mundane importance, it must be of transcendent importance. All the more so if it is very important.*

This matter of our sexes must be very profound indeed if it must, on pain of shame and ostracism, be covered up and must, on pain of shame and ostracism, be boldly advertised by every means and medium one can devise.

There is one more point about redundancy that is worth making here. If there is one thing more effective in making one believe a thing than receiving the message repetitively, it is rehearsing it repetitively. Advertisers, preachers, teachers, all of us in the brainwashing professions, make use of this apparently physical fact of human psychology routinely. The

* For some readers it will be useful to note a connection here with H.P. Grice’s doctrine of conversational implicatures. There is a conversational “rule” to the effect that a speaker should “be relevant.” As audiences we assume information given us is relevant, and if we cannot see its relevance we generally assume the relevance is to something hidden or that we are somehow missing something others see; or we invent a relevance by reconstruing the information as about something other than it initially appeared to be about. (Grice, “Logic and Conversation,” The Logic of Grammar, edited by Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman [Dickenson Publishing Company, Inc., Encino, California and Belmont, California, 1975], pp. 64-75.)

redundancy of sex-marking and sex-announcing serves not only to make the topic seem transcendently important, but to make the sex-duality it advertises seem transcendently and unquestionably true.

It is quite a spectacle, really, once one sees it, these humans so devoted to dressing up and acting out and “fixing” one another so everyone lives up to and lives out the theory that there are two sharply distinct sexes and never the twain shall overlap or be confused or conflated; these hominids constantly and with remarkable lack of embarrassment marking a distinction between two sexes as though their lives depended on it. It is wonderful that homosexuals and lesbians are mocked and judged for “playing butch-femme roles” and for dressing in “butch-femme drag,” for nobody goes about in full public view as thoroughly decked out in butch and femme drag as respectable heterosexuals when they are dressed up to go out in the evening, or to go to church, or to go to the office. Heterosexual critics of queers’ “role-playing” ought to look at themselves in the mirror on their way out for a night on the town to see who’s in drag. The answer is, everybody is. Perhaps the main difference between heterosexuals and queers is that when queers go forth in drag, they know they are engaged in theater—they are playing and they know they are playing. Heterosexuals usually are taking it all perfectly seriously, thinking they are in the real world, thinking they are the real world.

Of course, in a way, they are the real world. All this bizarre behavior has a function in the construction of the real world.

Sex-marking and sex-announcing are equally compulsory for males and females; but that is as far as equality goes in this matter. The meaning and import of this behavior is profoundly different for women and for men.
Imagine...

A colony of humans established a civilization hundreds of years ago on a distant planet. It has evolved, as civilizations will. Its language is a descendant of English.

The language has personal pronouns marking the child/adult distinction, and its adult personal pronouns mark the distinction between straight and curly pubic hair. At puberty each person assumes distinguishing clothing styles and manners so others can tell what type she or he is without the closer scrutiny which would generally be considered indecent. People with straight pubic hair adopt a style which is modest and self-effacing and clothes which are fragile and confining; people with curly pubic hair adopt a style which is expansive and prepossessing and clothes which are sturdy and comfortable. People whose pubic hair is neither clearly straight nor clearly curly alter their hair chemically in order to be clearly one or the other. Since those with curly pubic hair have higher status and economic advantages, those with ambiguous pubic hair are told to make it straight, for life will be easier for a low-status person whose category might be doubted than for a high-status person whose category might be doubted.

It is taboo to eat or drink in the same room with any person of the same pubic hair type as oneself. Compulsory heterogourmandism, it is called by social critics, though most people think it is just natural human desire to eat with one’s pubic-hair opposite. A logical consequence of this habit, or taboo, is the limitation to dining only singly or in pairs—a taboo against banquetism, or, as the slang expression goes, against the group gulp.

Whatever features an individual male person has which tend to his social and economic disadvantage (his age, race, class, height, etc.), one feature which never tends to his disadvantage in the society at large is his maleness. The case for females is the mirror image of this. Whatever features an individual female person has which tend to her social and economic advantage (her age, race, etc.), one feature which always tends to her disadvantage is her femaleness. Therefore, when a male’s sex-category is the thing about him that gets first and most repeated notice, the thing about him that is being framed and emphasized and given primacy is a feature which in general is an asset to him. When a female’s sex-category is the thing about her that gets first and most repeated notice, the thing about her that is being framed and emphasized and given primacy is a feature which in general is a liability to her. Manifestations of this divergence in the meaning and consequences of sex-announcement can be very concrete.

Walking down the street in the evening in a town or city exposes one to some risk of assault. For males the risk is less; for females the risk is greater. If one announces oneself male, one is presumed by potential assailants to be more rather than less likely to defend oneself or be able to evade the assault and, if the male-announcement is strong and unambiguous, to be a noncandidate for sexual assault. If one announces oneself female, one is presumed by potential assailants to be less rather than more likely to defend oneself or to evade the assault and, if the female-announcement is strong and unambiguous, to be a prime candidate for sexual assault. Both the man and the woman “announce” their sex through style of gait, clothing, hair style, etc., but they are not equally or identically affected by announcing their sex. The male’s announcement tends toward his protection or safety, and the female’s announcement tends toward her victimization. It could not be more immediate or concrete; the meaning of the sex-identification could not be more different.

The sex-marking behavioral repertoires are such that in the behavior of almost all people of both sexes addressing or re-
sponding to males (especially within their own culture/race) generally is done in a manner which suggests basic respect, while addressing or responding to females is done in a manner that suggests the females' inferiority (condescending tones, presumptions of ignorance, overfamiliarity, sexual aggression, etc.). So, when one approaches an ordinary well-socialized person in such cultures, if one is male, one's own behavioral announcement of maleness tends to evoke supportive and beneficial response and if one is female, one's own behavioral announcement of femaleness tends to evoke degrading and detrimental response.

The details of the sex-announcing behaviors also contribute to the reduction of women and the elevation of men. The case is most obvious in the matter of clothing. As feminists have been saying for two hundred years or so, ladies' clothing is generally restrictive, binding, burdening and frail; it threatens to fall apart and/or to uncover something that is supposed to be covered if you bend, reach, kick, punch or run. It typically does not protect effectively against hazards in the environment, nor permit the wearer to protect herself against the hazards of the human environment. Men's clothing is generally the opposite of all this—sturdy, suitably protective, permitting movement and locomotion. The details of feminine manners and postures also serve to bind and restrict. To be feminine is to take up little space, to defer to others, to be silent or affirming of others, etc. It is not necessary here to survey all this, for it has been done many times and in illuminating detail in feminist writings. My point here is that though both men and women must behave in sex-announcing ways, the behavior which announces femaleness is in itself both physically and socially binding and limiting as the behavior which announces maleness is not.

The sex-correlated variations in our behavior tend systematically to the benefit of males and the detriment of females. The male, announcing his sex in sex-identifying behavior and dress, is both announcing and acting on his membership in a dominant caste—dominant within his subculture and to a fair extent across subcultures as well. The female, announcing her sex, is both announcing and acting on her membership in the subordinated caste. She is obliged to inform others constantly and in every sort of situation that she is to be treated as inferior, without authority, assaultable. She cannot move or speak within the usual cultural norms without engaging in self-deprecation. The male cannot move or speak without engaging in self-aggrandizement. Constant sex-identification both defines and maintains the caste boundary without which there could not be a dominance-subordination structure.

The forces which make us mark and announce sexes are among the forces which constitute the oppression of women, and they are central and essential to the maintenance of that system.

Oppression is a system of interrelated barriers and forces which reduce, immobilize and mold people who belong to a certain group, and effect their subordination to another group (individually to individuals of the other group, and as a group, to that group). Such a system could not exist were not the groups, the categories of persons, well defined. Logically, it presupposes that there are two distinct categories. Practically, they must be not only distinct but relatively easily identifiable; the barriers and forces could not be suitably located and applied if there were often much doubt as to which individuals were to be contained and reduced, which were to dominate.5

It is extremely costly to subordinate a large group of people simply by applications of material force, as is indicated by the costs of maximum security prisons and of military supression of nationalist movements. For subordination to be permanent and cost effective, it is necessary to create conditions such that the subordinated group acquiesces to some extent in the subordination. Probably one of the most efficient ways to secure acquiescence is to convince the people that their subordination is inevitable. The mechanisms by which the
subordinate and dominant categories are defined can contribute greatly to popular belief in the inevitability of the dominance/subordination structure.

For efficient subordination, what’s wanted is that the structure not appear to be a cultural artifact kept in place by human decision or custom, but that it appear natural—that it appear to be a quite direct consequence of facts about the beast which are beyond the scope of human manipulation or revision. It must seem natural that individuals of the one category are dominated by individuals of the other and that as groups, the one dominates the other. To make this seem natural, it will help if it seems to all concerned that members of the two groups are very different from each other, and this appearance is enhanced if it can be made to appear that within each group, the members are very like one another. In other words, the appearance of the naturalness of the dominance of men and the subordination of women is supported by anything which supports the appearance that men are very like other men and very unlike women, and that women are very like other women and very unlike men. All behavior which encourages the appearance that humans are biologically sharply sex-dimorphic encourages the acquiescence of women (and, to the extent it needs encouragement, of men) in women’s subordination.

That we are trained to behave so differently as women and as men, and to behave so differently toward women and toward men, itself contributes mightily to the appearance of extreme natural dimorphism, but also, the ways we act as women and as men, and the ways we act toward women and toward men, mold our bodies and our minds to the shapes of subordination and dominance. We do become what we practice being.

Throughout this essay I have seemed to beg the question at hand. Should I not be trying to prove that there are few and insignificant differences between females and males, if that is what I believe, rather than assuming it? What I have been doing is offering observations which suggest that if one thinks there are biologically deep differences between women and men which cause and justify divisions of labor and responsibility such as we see in the modern patriarchal family and male-dominated workplace, one may not have arrived at this belief because of direct experience of un molested physical evidence, but because our customs serve to construct that appearance; and I suggest that these customs are artifacts of culture which exist to support a morally and scientifically insupportable system of dominance and subordination.

But also, in the end, I do not want to claim simply that there are not socially significant biologically-grounded differences between human females and males. Things are much more complex than that.

Enculturation and socialization are, I think, misunderstood if one pictures them as processes which apply layers of cultural gloss over a biological substratum. It is with that picture in mind that one asks whether this or that aspect of behavior is due to “nature” or “nurture.” One means, does it emanate from the biological substratum or does it come from some layer of the shellac? A variant on this wrong picture is the picture according to which enculturation or socialization is something mental or psychological, as opposed to something physical or biological. Then one can think of attitudes and habits of perception, for instance, as “learned” versus “biologically determined.” And again, one can ask such things as whether men’s aggressiveness is learned or biologically determined, and if the former is asserted, one can think in terms of changing them while if the latter is asserted, one must give up all thought of reform.

My observations and experience suggest another way of looking at this. I see enormous social pressure on us all to act feminine or act masculine (and not both), so I am inclined to think that if we were to break the habits of culture which generate that pressure, people would not act particularly mascu-
line or feminine. The fact that there are such penalties threatened for deviations from these patterns strongly suggests that the patterns would not be there but for the threats. This leads, I think, to a skeptical conclusion: we do not know whether human behavior patterns would be dimorphic along lines of chromosomal sex if we were not threatened and bullied; nor do we know, if we assume that they would be dimorphic, what they would be, that is, what constellations of traits and tendencies would fall out along that genetic line. And these questions are odd anyway, for there is no question of humans growing up without culture, so we don’t know what other cultural variables we might imagine to be at work in a culture in which the familiar training to masculinity and femininity were not going on.

On the other hand, as one goes about in the world, and in particular as one tries out strategies meant to alter the behaviors which constitute and support male dominance, one often has extremely convincing experiences of the inflexibility of people in this respect, of a resistance to change which seems to run much, much deeper than willingness or willfulness in the face of arguments and evidence. As feminist activists, many of us have felt this most particularly in the case of men, and it has sometimes seemed that the relative flexibility and adaptability of women and the relative rigidity of men are so widespread within each group respectively, and so often and convincingly encountered, that they must be biologically given. And one watches men and women on the streets, and their bodies seem so different—one hardly can avoid thinking there are vast and profound differences between women and men without giving up the hard won confidence in one’s powers of perception.

The first remedy here is to lift one’s eyes from a single culture, class and race. If the bodies of Asian women set them apart so sharply from Asian men, see how different they are also from Black women; if white men all look alike and very different from white women, it helps to note that Black men don’t look so like white men.

The second remedy is to think about the subjective experience we have of our habits. If one habitually twists a lock of one’s hair whenever one is reading and has tried to break this habit, one knows how “bodily” it is; but that does not convince one it is genetically determined. People who drive to work every day often take the same route every day, and if they mean to take another route one day in order to do an errand on the way, they may find themselves at work, conveyed along the habitual route, without having revised the decision to do the errand. The habit of taking that course is mapped into one’s body; it is not a matter of a decision—a mental event—that is repeated each day upon a daily re-judgment of the reasonableness of the course. It is also not genetic. We are animals. Learning is physical, bodily. There is not a separate, nonmaterial “control room” where socialization, enculturation and habit formation take place and where, since it is nonmaterial, change is independent of bodies and easier than in bodies.

Socialization molds our bodies; enculturation forms our skeletons, our musculature, our central nervous systems. By the time we are gendered adults, masculinity and femininity are “biological.” They are structural and material features of how our bodies are. My experience suggests that they are changeable just as one would expect bodies to be—slowly, through constant practice and deliberate regimens designed to remap and rebuild nerve and tissue. This is how many of us have changed when we chose to change from “women” as culturally defined to “women” as we define ourselves. Both the sources of the changes and the resistances to them are bodily—are among the possibilities of our animal natures, whatever those may be.

But now “biological” does not mean “genetically determined” or “inevitable.” It just means “of the animal.”

It is no accident that feminism has often focused on our bodies. Rape, battering, reproductive self-determination,
health, nutrition, self-defense, athletics, financial independence (control of the means of feeding and sheltering ourselves). And it is no accident that with varying degrees of conscious intention, feminists have tried to create separate spaces where women could exist somewhat sheltered from the prevailing winds of patriarchal culture and try to stand up straight for once. One needs space to practice an erect posture; one cannot just will it to happen. To retrain one’s body one needs physical freedom from what are, in the last analysis, physical forces misshaping it to the contours of the subordinate.

The cultural and economic structures which create and enforce elaborate and rigid patterns of sex-marking and sex-announcing behavior, that is, create gender as we know it, mold us as dominators and subordinates (I do not say “mold our minds” or “mold our personalities”). They construct two classes of animals, the masculine and the feminine, where another constellation of forces might have constructed three or five categories, and not necessarily hierarchically related. Or such a spectrum of sorts that we would not experience them as “sorts” at all.

The term ‘sexist’ characterizes cultural and economic structures which create and enforce the elaborate and rigid patterns of sex-marking and sex-announcing which divide the species, along lines of sex, into dominators and subordinates. Individual acts and practices are sexist which reinforce and support those structures, either as culture or as shapes taken on by the enculturated animals. Resistance to sexism is that which undermines those structures by social and political action and by projects of reconstruction and revision of ourselves.

NOTES


3. I rely here on lectures by Eileen Van Tassel in which she interpreted the generally available data on sex-characteristics, sex-differences and sex-similarities. One can refer, in particular, to Man and Woman, Boy and Girl, by John Money and Anke A. Ehhardt (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972) and Intersexuality, edited by Claus Overzier (Academic Press, New York and London, 1963). See also, for instance: “Development of Sexual Characteristics,” by A.D. Jost in Science Journal, Volume 6, No. 6 (especially the chart on page 71) which indicates the variety of “sex characteristics” which occurs in normal females and males; and “Growth and Endocrinology of the Adolescent,” by J. M. Tanner in Endocrine and Genetic Diseases of Childhood, edited by L. Gardner (Saunders, Philadelphia & London, 1969), which tries to give clinical standards for evaluating the hormonal status of adolescent youth, and in which the author characterizes individuals which are well within the normal curve for males as “feminized males,” thus, by implication, as “abnormal” males; and similarly, mutatis mutandis, for females.

4. See, for example, Sexual Suicide, by George F. Gilder (Quadrangle, New York, 1979). For an eloquent example of the Victorian version of this anxiety and the world view which underlies it, see “The Emancipation of Women,” by Frederic Harrison in Forthrightly Review, GCXCVII, October 1, 1891, as quoted in a talk given by Sandra Siegel at the Berkshire Conference on Women’s History, April 1981, entitled “Historiography, Decadence, and the Legend of ‘Separate Spheres’ in Late Victorian England,” which connects Victorian conceptions of civilization and the separateness and differentness of women and men.
5. See “Oppression,” in this collection.

6. See “Feminist Leaders Can’t Walk On Water,” by Lorraine Masterson, *Quest: A Feminist Quarterly* (Volume II, Number 4, Spring, 1976), especially pp. 55-56 where the author refers to Paulo Freire’s *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* and speaks to the special case of women’s belief that their subordination is inevitable because rooted in biology.

7. Cf., the early and powerful article by Naomi Weisstein, “Psychology Constructs the Female,” in *Woman in Sexist Society: Studies in Power and Powerlessness*, edited by Vivian Gornick and Barbara K. Moran (Basic Books, Inc., New York, 1971). Weisstein documents clearly that neither laypersons nor psychologists are the least bit dependable as observers of sex-correlated traits of people, and that theories of sex-difference based on “clinical experience” and based on primate studies are scientifically worthless.

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**THE PROBLEM THAT HAS NO NAME**

The phenomenon I analyze here is something I first began attending to under the rubric “male chauvinism.” That term seems to have gone out of fashion in the circles I move in, but the phenomenon hasn’t. Other words for it are ‘sexism’, ‘male supremicism’, ‘misogyny’. But none of them quite seem to fit; and notice that like ‘male chauvinism’ they are recently coined terms, made up by women trying to find a name for something their native language has no name for. It wants an “ism” sort of word, for it is not a single belief or simple attitude, but an attitudinal-conceptual-cognitive-orientational complex. Looking at it is looking at a cross section of a world view. One feels that with time and patience enough, one could reconstruct the entire multidimensional world view from what one can see in this slice. I made up the words ‘phallism’ and ‘phallist’ for this complex and the beast it belongs to, but the novelty and strangeness of the term bothers me. It suggests that the beast is novel or strange, whereas, in fact, he is very common and familiar. I might almost want

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* This is a shortened and revised version of an essay that appeared under the title “Male-Chauvinism—A Conceptual Analysis” in *Philosophy and Sex*, edited by Robert Baker and Frederick Elliston (Prometheus Books, Buffalo, New York, 1975), pp. 65-79. It appears here with the permission of the publisher.