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THE SOCIOLOGY OF EMOTIONS

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Abstract
Recent work in the sociology of emotions has gone beyond the development of concepts and broad perspectives to elaboration of theory and some empirical research. More work has been done at the micro-level than the macro-level of analysis. At both analytical levels, emotion most commonly is treated as a dependent variable, although increasingly, its role as an intervening and independent variable in social processes is being recognized, especially with regard to problems in substantive fields as diverse as gender roles, stress, small groups, social movements, and stratification. Considerable gaps exist in sociological knowledge about emotions; in particular, little is known about distribution of different emotional experiences in the population, the content of emotion culture, emotional socialization processes, emotional interactions, and relationships between social structure and emotion norms. More empirical research is necessary, to build on the theoretical groundwork that has been laid. Problems in measuring emotional experience and aspects of emotion culture have not been addressed and are likely to become critical issues as empirical work accumulates in the future.

INTRODUCTION
Emotion is a relatively new substantive topic within sociology. Growing interest in emotion in evident in the establishment of a Sociology of Emotions Section within the American Sociological Association in 1986, and the recent proliferation of paper presentations and publications (see chapter references). Increasing attention to the topic is likely due to the recognition that humans are not motivated solely by rational-economic concerns. Emotional attachments to others and affective commitments (e.g. desires, attitudes, values, moral beliefs) influence a significant portion of human behavior (Etzioni 1988, Hochschild 1975).
Two previous reviews of this developing field have been published (Gordon 1981, Scheff 1983). These emphasize broad conceptual problems and perspectives, reflecting the initial stages of work in a new topic area. In this chapter, I focus on elaborated theories of emotion in general (as opposed to theories about specific emotions), discuss some empirical findings, and highlight researchable questions that have not been addressed. Due to space limitations, I am unable to review articles that trace emotions issues in earlier sociological thought, that use affect to integrate disparate theoretical approaches, that are suggestive for, but only indirectly related to, emotions per se, and that are emergent but as yet undeveloped emotion theories. I also restrict this review to sociological work (drawing primarily from US sociology), with only limited references to relevant work in psychology, anthropology, and social history.

I organize this review by two major approaches to emotion, “micro-level” (social psychological) and “macro-level” (structural-cultural). Within these broad levels, I examine emotion as it is treated theoretically: as a dependent variable, as an independent variable, and as an intervening or explanatory variable. I give more attention to emotions as micro-level phenomena because most theorizing and research efforts have been at this level.

It is necessary to define emotion as the term is used in this chapter. There are almost as many definitions of emotion as there are authors, but most definitions refer to its components (e.g. Gordon 1981, Kemper 1978, Thoits 1984, Frijda 1986). Emotions involve: (a) appraisals of a situational stimulus or context, (b) changes in physiological or bodily sensations, (c) the free or inhibited display of expressive gestures, and (d) a cultural label applied to specific constellations of one or more of the first three components. All four components need not be present simultaneously for an emotion to be experienced or to be recognized by others; for example, one can be afraid but not know why, and young children clearly become emotional (in viewers’ eyes) without having acquired the words with which to communicate their experience.

Emotions can be distinguished from feelings, affects, moods, and sentiments. The first two are less specific terms, the latter two, more specific. The general term feelings includes the experience of physical drive states (e.g. hunger, pain, fatigue) as well as emotional states. Affects refer to positive and negative evaluations (liking/disliking) of an object, behavior, or idea; affects also have intensity and activity dimensions (Heise 1979). Thus, emotions can be viewed as culturally delineated types of feelings or affects. Compared to emotions, moods are more chronic, usually less intense, and less tightly tied to an eliciting situation. (Moods rarely are examined by sociologists.) Sentiments are “socially constructed pattern[s] of sensations, expressive gestures, and cultural meanings organized around a relationship to a social object,
usually another person. . . or group such as a family” (Gordon 1981:566, 567); examples of sentiments include romantic love, parental love, loyalty, friendship, and patriotism, as well as more transient, acute emotional responses to social losses (sorrow, envy) and gains (pride, gratitude). As defined by Gordon, the term “sentiment” emphasizes relatively enduring social relationships as affect elicitors. The social emphasis in Gordon’s definition helps focus attention on what is important to sociologists about emotions, namely their social antecedents and their social acquisition and/or shaping.

Along with most sociologists, I assume that emotions are not simply innate, biophysiological phenomena. Evidence indicates (see Ekman 1982) that certain “basic” or “primary” facial expressions are culturally universal and thus probably innate. The basic emotions—interest, fear/surprise, anger, disgust, sadness, happiness/pleasure, and (perhaps) contempt (Ekman 1982, Ekman & Friesen 1986)—probably evolved as species-specific physiological reactions and expressive signals due to their utility for individual and group survival. But considerable variability exists historically and cross-culturally in the situational causes, experience, meaning, display, and regulation of emotions, including the basic ones (e.g. Steams & Steams 1986, Lutz & White 1986). Historical and cultural variability suggests that, to an important degree, subjective experiences and emotional beliefs are both socially acquired and socially structured. These processes, which intrigue and occupy sociologists, are explored in the sections below.

MICRO-LEVEL APPROACHES TO EMOTION

The Shaping of Emotion

Most commonly, social psychologists treat emotion as a dependent variable—the product of social influences. This is partially because considerable initial debate focused on the degree to which emotions are sociocultural products (Kemper 1980, 1981; Shott 1980, Hunsaker 1983).

Social construction theorists (Averill 1980, Gordon 1989b, McCarthy 1989, Harre 1986) and symbolic interactionists (Hochschild 1979, 1983; Shott 1979) view emotions as primarily dependent on definitions of the situation, emotion vocabularies, and emotional beliefs, which vary across time and location. In contrast, “positivists” (Kemper 1978, Scheff 1979, Mazur 1985) view emotions as invariant, automatic, patterned responses to particular classes of social stimuli. Similar debates have occurred in anthropology (see Levy 1973, Lutz 1982, Lutz & White 1986) and psychology (e.g. Zajonc 1980, 1984; Lazarus 1982, 1984); each debate springs from disagreements regarding the specificity of the links among emotional com-
ponents—situational stimuli, physiological changes, and expressive behaviors.

A “strong” version of social constructionism denies the existence of basic or primary emotions (Armon-Jones 1986), that is, there are no universally patterned links among physiological, expressive, and situational components of emotion. All emotions are socioculturally constructed concepts. A “weaker” version of social constructionism accepts the existence of basic emotions but deemphasizes their causal importance. Social constructionists generally focus on demonstrating the degree to which both basic and nonbasic emotions are socioculturally constituted or influenced (Armon-Jones 1986).

In contrast to constructionists, symbolic interactionists are more willing to recognize the influences of basic emotions in human action. They still assign considerable weight to sociocultural factors, however. Drawing from Schachter & Singer’s (1962) research, symbolic interactionists generally assume that the bodily changes accompanying emotions (at least the nonbasic emotions) are not specific; that is, environmental events elicit generalized arousal which, in turn, is interpreted as a particular emotion on the basis of salient situational factors. Emotions, then, are the joint product of generalized arousal and specific sociocultural factors (i.e. definitions of the situation and cultural labels). The same arousal may be experienced as joy or anger, depending on available situational cues (Schachter & Singer 1962).¹ Because situational definitions and emotion labels vary across time and cultures, so must emotional experiences, according to both constructionists and symbolic interactionists. Put another way, the key determinants of emotional experience are not physiological but sociocultural. Thus, by extension, as many different emotions exist as are distinguished within a culture and between cultures.

In contrast, positivists accept the “specificity” argument proposed originally by James (1890/1950) and revived more recently by Ekman and his associates (1983). James argued that one-to-one correspondences exist among the components constituting emotion. Certain classes of environmental stimuli elicit specific autonomic responses, specific expressive behaviors, and thus

¹The Schachter & Singer (1962) study has been criticized on a number of grounds (e.g. Kemper 1978), including the failure of similar experiments to replicate its results (see review in Thoits 1984). However, the least reasonable proposition in the two-factor approach has been the source of most criticism and the cause of nonreplication. The proposition that no emotion will be experienced by initially unaroused subjects who are confronted with situational provocations has been disconfirmed repeatedly. Schachter & Singer ignored the obvious possibility that initially unaroused subjects would become aroused by situational stimuli that were presented. The majority of experiments in the two-factor tradition do support the more interesting proposition that manipulating situational cues will influence subjects’ interpretations of their physiological arousal (Cotton 1981, Reisenzein 1983, Manstead & Wagner 1981).
specific emotions. Culturally universal emotions exist because at least some reactions are “wired in.” By extension, there are only a few basic or primary emotions; all others distinguished by cultures consist of varying intensities, blends, or rapidly alternating sequences of the basic few.

Recently, Kemper (1987) has attempted an integration of positivist and constructionist viewpoints. He suggests that physiologically grounded primary emotions become elaborated “through the attachment of social definitions, labels, and meanings to differentiated conditions of interaction and social organization” (1987:276). “Secondary emotions” (shame, guilt, love, anxiety, resentment, and so on) are acquired through the pairing of primary emotional experiences (in the learner) with the secondary labels attached (by socializing agents) to the specific circumstances eliciting the primary feeling or feelings.

Although one still might disagree with the positivist premises and/or the particular derivations of secondary from primary emotions made by Kemper (e.g. guilt from fear, shame from anger, and so on), this more balanced (and potentially testable) integration of perspectives may lead to more fruitful dialogues among camps regarding how emotions are socioculturally constructed and/or acquired through socialization. Other pressing sociological questions, however, need attention: How are various emotional experiences distributed across structural positions? What sociocultural factors and processes (e.g. emotional beliefs, differential socialization) influence individuals’ understandings of their own and others’ emotional experiences? What are the consequences of these understandings for social stability and social change? Sociologists have barely begun to scratch the surface of these issues, as is seen in each section below.

DISTRIBUTIONS OF EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCES Gordon (personal communication 1986) has pointed out that we lack basic information about the “epidemiology” of emotions, both in our own culture and across cultures. We hold many beliefs about the frequencies and distributions of emotional experiences, but these have not been tested systematically. For example, due

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2Thus, positivists (e.g. Kemper 1978) also might accept the assertion that situational events are the key determinants of emotion. However, positivists assume that certain classes of situational events (e.g. decrements in power or status) directly and universally stimulate the same emotion because event-emotion links are physiologically grounded, while constructionists and symbolic interactionists assume that the same classes of situational events may be interpreted as quite different emotions cross-culturally, regardless of their physiological grounding. (I am grateful to Steven Gordon for this observation.)

3Change in emotions across time also is relevant but is discussed below under “macro approaches.”
to differential gender socialization, women are thought to be more empathic, more loving, and less able to feel (or express) anger, while men are believed to feel (or express) fear and sadness less frequently compared to women (Hochschild 1981, Peplau & Gordon 1985, Cancian 1987). Negative feelings more often may be directed down the status hierarchy (toward less powerful individuals), while positive feelings are directed up (toward those more powerful) (Hochschild 1979). Thus, higher status individuals (men, whites, the married, those of higher socioeconomic status) should be happier and more satisfied, since positive emotional experiences should outnumber negative ones in experiential frequency. Although some suggestive evidence for these hypotheses exists (e.g. Eisenberg & Lennon 1983, Brody 1985, Peplau & Gordon 1985, Ross & Mirowsky 1984, Lombardo et al 1983, Frost & Averill 1978, Tavris 1982, Bradburn & Caplovitz 1965, Campbell et al 1976, Myers et al 1984), we have very little reliable knowledge about the distributions of affective experiences. The frequencies and distributions of various feelings across social positions (particularly “everyday” emotions rather than pathological states such as depression or phobias) are basic and necessary pieces of data for building a sociological theory of emotions.

BELIEFS ABOUT EMOTIONS We also lack a “social epistemology” of emotions (Gordon 1989b). Subjective experiences are influenced not only by a society’s emotion vocabulary, but by cultural beliefs about emotions. These include rules regarding what one should and should not feel or express; ideologies about emotions such as romantic love; shared understandings of the typical onsets, sequences, and outcomes of emotional experiences and interactions; socially defined exemption periods from expectations of emotional conformity; and beliefs about which emotions can and cannot be successfully controlled. These “ethnopsychologies” or “emotion cultures” (Gordon 1989a, 1989b) barely have begun to be studied. To date, sociologists mainly have attended to cultural feeling and display rules as they influence individual experience.

Hochschild (1979) and Ekman (1982) have elaborated the concepts of “feeling rules” and “display rules,” respectively. Feeling rules, or emotion norms, refer to beliefs about the appropriate range, intensity, duration, and targets of private feelings in given situations. Display rules, or expression norms, similarly regulate the range, intensity, etc, of emotional behaviors. Using respondents’ self-reports, participant observation, and experimental manipulations, several researchers have demonstrated such normative influences on individuals’ feelings and behaviors (e.g. Hochschild 1979, 1983, 1989a; Saarni 1979; Friesen 1972; Clark 1987). But despite these compelling demonstrations, several problems remain. Emotion and expression norms have not been identified systematically, the degree of consensus about each
norm is unknown, and whether particular norms are viewed as social conventions or moral obligations has not been assessed.

A recent exception is notable. Clark (1987) has examined sympathy norms and the rules of sympathy exchange, using participant observation, survey responses to vignettes, and content analysis of greeting cards, advice columns, etiquette books, song lyrics, and other media. People generally believe that they have a right to sympathy during times of trouble, that sympathy should be given to the deserving (i.e. those who are not exaggerating their needs and are not at fault for their plight, modified further by the victim's status characteristics relative to the giver), and that recipients of sympathy should be grateful or deferent and should reciprocate at some later time. Norm violations engender resentment, avoidance, and social condemnation, suggesting that sympathy norms carry moral weight. Similar studies of other feeling and display norms are needed. Investigators frequently take for granted that broad normative consensus exists and that individuals have internalized norms as moral obligations. These assumptions may be unwarranted.

Emotion cultures consist of more than feeling and expression rules, however (Gordon 1989a, 1989b). Societies develop nuanced vocabularies for certain feelings, complex ideologies about some emotions, and elaborated ethnopsychologies (folk beliefs about affective development and intrapsychic processes). Anthropologists have taken the lead in examining these aspects of emotion culture, primarily in non-Western and less developed societies (Gordon 1989b, Lutz & White 1986). Sociologists will need to study their own subjects' emotion cultures. Mapping the "cultural universe" of beliefs about feelings (e.g. "Women are too emotional to be President") is an important task not only because these beliefs influence individuals' experiences and behaviors, but because they reveal certain macro-level tensions as well (described below).

Emotion cultures also must be learned. How emotional knowledge is acquired and subjective experiences are shaped is the next issue. Here, again, major gaps in sociological research are revealed.

EMOTIONAL SOCIALIZATION Developmental psychologists have begun to study the role of various learning processes—reinforcement, role modeling, imitation, identification, instruction—in shaping children's emotional responses (Campos et al 1983, Lewis & Saarni 1985). They also are beginning to document the ages at which children have acquired certain affective knowledge and skills (Lewis & Michalson 1983, Harris & Olthof 1982, McCoy & Masters 1985, Saarni 1979). However, psychologists mainly examine sex and age-related variations in socialization practices and children's knowledge; ethnic, social class, and structural/contextual variations are over-
looked. Sociologists have much to contribute, especially in bringing attention to structural factors that should influence socialization processes and outcomes (e.g. Gordon 1989b, Kohn 1969, Hochschild 1983, Bernstein 1974). For example, societies deliberately structure children's environments so that the experiences of some emotions are more likely than others. The more a society's institutions are aged-graded (one consequence of modernization), the less children's knowledge of emotion should correspond to adults' (Gordon 1989b).

The few sociological investigations of emotional socialization that have been performed to date have focused on special subgroups, such as disturbed adults and children, medical students, athletes, and service workers (Wiley 1988, Pollak & Thoits 1989, Richman 1988, Smith & Kleinman 1989, Ortiz 1988, Adler & Adler 1988, Hochschild 1983). These are valuable as detailed descriptions of socialization practices and/or socialization outcomes. However, because these studies usually do not include comparison groups, they do not illuminate structural influences on the content and style of what is taught or learned. For example, Hochschild (1983) has argued that the requirements and rewards of service-sector jobs produce workers who specialize in "emotional labor," i.e. controlling their own feelings while attempting to enhance the positive feelings of others. She further argues that the differential requirements and rewards of blue-collar versus service-sector jobs should affect parents' emotional socialization practices. This in turn implies that middle class offspring should be more adept than lower class children at "feeling work"—i.e., transforming what they actually feel. But the frequency and types of emotion management that are actually employed by blue-collar and service-sector workers have yet to be directly compared; consequently, the further implications of Hochschild's argument may not hold.

The preceding discussion implied a "social structure and personality" approach to emotion. Individuals' feelings and their emotion work efforts are treated as products of exogenous macro factors, such as organizations, occupational structures, and broad cultural ideologies. Social structure and personality approaches might be called one of the "three faces" (House 1977) of the social psychology of emotion. The remaining "faces" (formal social psychological theories and symbolic interactionism) emerge below.

SOCIAL ANTECEDENTS OF EMOTION A different tradition of social psychological work examines social circumstances that elicit specific emotions or sentiments. This problem has been approached both inductively and deductively.

Perhaps the most ambitious qualitative study has been conducted by Scherer and his colleagues (1986). Through content analysis of open-ended questionnaires distributed to 779 college students in eight European countries,
Scherer et al found strong cross-cultural consistencies in beliefs about emotion-eliciting situations: Joy/happiness followed from developing relationships with friends, reunions with friends, and success experiences; sadness/grief followed from problems with friends and the death of loved ones; fear/fright followed from traffic situations, physical aggression by others, facing the unknown, and achievement-related situations; and anger/rage followed from failures of others to conform to social norms and from “inappropriate rewards for self.” The investigators speculated from these findings that physical and psychological well-being, relationship concerns, and concerns for social order and justice were cross-culturally common personal goals or needs that thus evoke the same subjective emotions (see also Frijda 1986).

Deductive theories specify fewer and more abstract situational antecedents than do those that have been enumerated inductively (also see Averill 1978, Shaver et al 1987). Two well-elaborated, formal deductive theories are notable: Kemper’s social interactional theory, and Heise’s affect control theory.

Kemper (1978, 1987) has argued that two fundamental dimensions of social relationships—power and status—are universal emotion-elicitors. Power refers to compliance obtained through coercion or the threat of coercion. Status refers to deference given voluntarily or willingly, because actor A has high regard for actor B. Specific “structural emotions” are evoked during interaction episodes, when relational power and status are either maintained or changed. (Mixed emotions often occur because actors always have both power and status relations with each other.) For example, possessing sufficient or adequate power produces feelings of security; receiving sufficient or adequate status produces happiness. Individuals feel guilty if they perceive themselves possessing excess power, and fear-anxiety if they lack sufficient power. They feel shame if they possess excess status, and depression if they receive insufficient status. Other emotions depend upon the individual’s attributions (self is to blame, other is to blame) for loses or gains of power and/or status during an interaction episode. Kemper further proposes (from a positivist position) that the emotional outcomes of power and status relationships have specific physiological correlates; in short, power and status relations are tied to certain basic emotions through specific physiological reactions, which is why both power and status dimensions of relationships and certain emotional experiences are cultural universals.

The validity of Kemper’s specificity assumptions, and the many ambiguous or inconsistent points in the theory, cannot be discussed here due to limited space. Despite these problems, one of the most important aspects of the theory is that it isolates abstract structural factors that might reliably influence emotional experiences (and subsequent behaviors, if one further assumes, as
Kemper does, that unpleasant emotions motivate attempts to restore power or status). As such, it is one of the few systematic sociological explanations of emotion as a dependent variable. Unfortunately, direct experimental tests of the theory have not been made.

Heise's affect control theory (1979, 1986, Smith-Lovin & Heise 1988) represents another highly systematic, sociological approach. Heise's goal actually is much broader than predicting specific emotions from antecedent social situational factors; his goal is to model entire sequences of symbolic interaction, using affective dynamics.

Heise posits that the meanings of settings, actors, personal attributes, emotions, and behaviors are primarily affective; in short, every meaningful social category is affective. Affect can be assessed on a good-bad dimension (evaluation), a powerful-weak dimension (potency), and a lively-quiet dimension (activity), yielding specific EPA (evaluation-potency-activity) profiles. College student samples have rated hundreds of nouns, adjectives, and verbs on these dimensions, producing average EPA ratings, which Heise terms "fundamental" sentiments; they are ratings of social categories "out of context." Student samples also have rated actors, settings, attributes, and behaviors on the same three dimensions "in context," i.e. when combined in short phrases or statements describing events (e.g. "The mother soothes the child"). In-context EPA ratings are termed "transient" sentiments. When transient EPA values (for example, for "mother" and "child") are close to fundamental EPA values (for "mother" and "child"), a described event is called "confirming"—it conforms affectively to what is expected, conventional, or normative. When transient sentiments differ from fundamental sentiments, the event is "disconfirming" (e.g. "The mother is whipping the child" disconfirms fundamental affects about "mother" and "child").

Impression-formation equations have been developed to model differences observed between transient and fundamental EPA ratings (Smith-Lovin 1988). These equations can be transformed to predict subsequent behaviors, because affect control theory assumes that people are motivated to experience transient feelings that confirm fundamental sentiments. For example, the equations can be used to solve for the next behavior that would bring transient feelings (e.g. about a mother who whips her child) back in line with fundamental feelings (about mother). Generally, when affective expectations are disconfirmed, identity-restoring behaviors are expected, although when discrepancies are extreme, a new understanding of the actor, behavior, recipient or setting may occur (just as people in real life reassess the meaning of their

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4Note the similarity of Kemper's power and status dimensions of relationships and Heise's potency and evaluation dimensions—powerful/weak and likable/dislikable. Both Kemper and Heise draw these dimensions from Osgood's semantic differential research (Osgood et al 1975), which indicates that these dimensions of meaning are cultural universals.
discrepant experiences). In short, Heise has developed simulation programs that not only identify expected and unexpected sequences of behavior, but may predict subsequent sequences of behavior from prior events, using affective dynamics.

Importantly, the emotions that must be felt by actors and/or receivers to produce observed transient ratings can be imputed from program equations. For example, the simulation program INTERACT (Heise & Lewis 1988) estimates that the whipped child is feeling “afraid,” “flustered,” or “horrified” (Heise 1988). Emotions are treated as consequences of events in affect control theory. INTERACT thus would permit systematic explorations of the kinds of social situations that produce different emotions. Further, when emotions are treated as identity-modifiers in INTERACT (e.g., “angry father,” “sad teacher”), they help predict subsequent behaviors toward an object. Thus, emotions can be independent variables as well.5

An important implication of affect control theory is that individuals need not know detailed rules, norms, values, or skills in order to behave in socioculturally appropriate ways. “In effect, the affective system provides a way for storing much of the cultural heritage of reasoned action. People do not have to solve each problem anew, they do not even have to understand the logic of old solutions, they only have to acquire sentiments, and then they produce reasonable action as if by instinct” (Heise 1988:15-16). Reasonable action occurs because affects are combined and transformed in lawful ways that appear to hold cross-culturally (Smith-Lovin 1988).

Although Heise’s theory offers a powerful explanatory scheme, it radically minimizes the complexity of cultural knowledge and of meaning. In the theory, culture and meaning are equivalent to affects which are attached to situations, actors, and so on. Individuals’ active, purposive use of their cultural knowledge and the inferences individuals draw about themselves and others from emotions are missing from Heise’s scheme. This problem is not unique to Heise’s approach, as may be seen below.

Kemper’s and Heises’s theories could be said to represent a “second face” of social psychological approaches to emotion: they are formal theories

5Heise’s theory also might be used to identify emotion norms. The program estimates the degree to which actors’ and recipients’ feelings or displays in a described situation deviate from those that are expected, or normative. The smaller the deviation, the more normative the feeling or expressive display. Further, an approximation to the moral weight of these norms could be derived from predictions of recipients’ behaviors in response to an actor’s deviant emotional display. If the recipient avoids or punishes the actor, or attributes a deviant identity to the actor, then the emotional or expressive expectations that were violated were more than statistical conventions.

6This observation is relevant to an ongoing debate within psychology regarding whether “preferences need no inferences” or whether some information-processing precedes all affective responses (Zajonc 1980, 1984; Lazarus 1982, 1984).
explaining emotion itself as a phenomenon (Kemper), or treating emotions as key mechanisms linking social structure to individual behavior and vice versa (Kemper, Heise). Other formal theories (Scheff 1979, Collins 1981) are described below.

**Emotions as Motivators**

Emotion is treated as an independent variable much less frequently in micro-level approaches. Most sociologists assume, either explicitly or implicitly, that feelings motivate subsequent behaviors, but attempts to specify which emotions lead to which behaviors are rare (for exceptions, see Kemper 1978, Heise 1979, Smith-Lovin & Heise 1988). However, certain types of emotions have been linked theoretically to the outcome of social control.

Shott (1979) delineated a subset of emotions as “role-taking emotions.” Reflexive role-taking emotions include shame, guilt, and embarrassment (on the unpleasant side) and pride and vanity (on the pleasant side). Reflexive emotions motivate self-control. The individual feels proud or ashamed, depending on the imagined reactions of others to his/her thoughts or behaviors. When ashamed, guilty, or embarrassed, the actor inhibits unconventional behavior and often behaves altruistically to reduce shame and restore pride (self-esteem). Empathic role-taking emotions, or vicarious emotions, result from mentally placing oneself in another’s position and feeling what the other might feel in that situation; these emotions include empathy, sympathy, and pity. Empathic emotions also motivate prosocial behavior—one helps others to reduce one’s own vicarious distress. Role-taking emotions are crucial to the smooth functioning of society, Shott argues, because societal members cannot monitor and sanction each person’s behavior at all times. Role-taking emotions motivate self-control, which is crucial more generally to social control (see also Denzin 1984).

In a recent article, Scheff (1988) has focused exclusively on the conformity-producing functions of shame. He proposes that individuals are almost continually monitoring their thoughts and behaviors from the standpoint of others. Two types of shame (overt, undifferentiated shame and bypassed [nonconscious] shame) are likely to produce conforming behavior, according to Scheff, although individuals with high self-esteem should be better able to withstand the shame of nonconformity and thus yield less often to imagined social pressure, while those with low self-esteem should be overly and rigidly conforming.

That role-taking emotions produce conformity and/or prosocial behavior seems reasonable. Experimental studies of helping and altruism show that guilt and embarrassment do motivate helping efforts (Shott 1979). However, the full range of Shott’s and Scheff’s propositions require testing. Some studies (e.g. Stotland et al 1978) suggest that the relationship between
empathy and helping may be curvilinear; people experiencing very low and very high levels of empathy may be less willing to help. (High levels of empathy with victims may be so painful that individuals prefer to avoid victims rather than assist them.) Because role-taking emotions seem crucial in explaining the phenomena of social control and prosocial behavior, they deserve serious empirical attention.

**Emotions as Mediators**

Other social psychological approaches treat emotions as intervening variables in broader social processes. Emotions have been used to link macro factors to micro factors, micro to macro factors, or both. Kemper’s (1978) and Heise’s (Smith-Lovin and Heise 1988) theories make such links, as discussed earlier. Additional approaches are explored here.

Scheff’s (1979) theory of catharsis moves from macro to micro. Scheff observes that modern society strongly inhibits the release of negative emotions (the reasons for these inhibitions are left unspecified). Adopting a psychodynamic perspective, Scheff assumes that the discharge of distressing emotions (grief, fear, anger, embarrassment, boredom) is a biological necessity. Because individuals learn to repress distressing emotions, bodily tensions accumulate and cause rigid or neurotic behavior patterns (emotional inexpressivity, cognitive blocks, lack of empathy and cooperativeness). Fortunately, societies also provide means for the “safe” discharge of collectively held, distressing emotions, through ritual, drama, and contests. To the extent that these rituals provide optimal “aesthetic distance” from distress, individuals are able to discharge repressed emotions and restore physical and emotional well-being. Aesthetic or optimal distance consists of a balance between participating in and observing one’s own distress; one shifts attention back and forth between the distressing event (recalled from the past) and one’s safe position as an observer of the event (as audience in the present). Scheff defines optimal distance tautologically in terms of successful discharge (Scheff 1979:67). Following numerous critiques (see *Current Anthropology*, 1977, 18:490–504), Scheff began studying micromomentary changes in facial expression during the recall of past distressing events, to document alternations from emotional expression (i.e. presumed discharge) to emotional distance and back, to the final state of bodily relaxation (Scheff 1983).

This choice of research strategy has an unfortunate consequence. Attention is focused on minute changes in individuals’ expressive gestures and away from the broader sociological implications of the theory. As originally proposed (Scheff 1977), culturally universal negative experiences and collective emotion-management techniques (rituals, drama) were linked to individual behavior through a theory of emotion. These broader sociocultural phenomena, particularly the concept of collective emotion-management, deserve
elaboration. Why societies control the discharge of negative emotions, why some societies do so more than others, and whether there is a relationship between societal emotional regulation and the existence of collective discharge mechanisms are questions worthy of investigation.

Collins’ (1981) theory of interaction ritual chains moves from microlevel processes to macro ones. Collins argues that macro phenomena (e.g. institutions, organizations, social change) are simply the aggregate of micro interactions among actors; thus, one may study micro events to understand macro phenomena. The key mechanism guiding and motivating micro actions is emotion, specifically, emotional group identification and emotional confidence—together termed “emotional energies.” Emotional energies are obtained and maintained in “interaction ritual chains.”

Collins argues that conversations invoke shared realities, or myths; thus, conversations are simply chains of interaction rituals (IRs) which maintain shared myths. Participation requires cultural resources (acquiring the specific conversational styles and topics that symbolize and sustain group membership) and emotional energies (acquiring positive sentiments toward and from other group members). These produce another interaction resource, one’s social reputation (Collins 1987). Dominant individuals provide the conversational leadership (i.e. they lead in invoking reality), generate emotional identification (and obtain emotional confidence), and are the topic of others’ conversations (their reputations are enhanced).

Macrostructural realities of property, authority, and organization are created in the “particularized” content of conversation. Talk identifies people by title or organizational membership (paraphrasing from Collins: “the chairperson,” “her husband,” “he works for company x”) and talk implicitly gives certain individuals the right to and the reputation for holding property and/or authority (“I went into her office,” “He wrote a memo telling us to do x”). “Particular individuals enact [and thus perpetuate] the property and authority structure because their previous IR chains give them certain emotional energies and cultural resources, including the resource of the reputation for belonging in certain authority rituals and particular physical places” (Collins 1981:1004). Individuals who acquire large amounts of emotional energy (i.e. emotional attachments to others, emotional confidence) in the “marketplace” of ritual encounters will be able to instigate local, if not broader, structural changes through their verbal and nonverbal claims to property and/or authority. If they can marshall the emotional energies of others and manage an impression of a positive reputation (e.g. through the media), the market attractiveness of their coalition will be enhanced. To understand macro stability and macro change, then, one need only sample and audiovisually record conversations and behaviors across a large number of different social groups over time (Collins 1981:1011). Recordings can be analyzed in detail.
for indicators of the cultural and emotional resources attributed and claimed in ritual interactions.

Like Kemper and Heise, Collins emphasizes affective causes of symbolic interaction and of observable behaviors. In all three theories, affective dynamics mediate the relationship between broader culture and specific social structures (or patterned behaviors). However, Collins' goal—accounting for macro structure and macro change—is broader than that of Kemper or Heise, and the affective dynamics are different. Stability and change are produced by emotional rewards and costs in the interactional marketplace (as well as by stability and change in cultural resources). Beyond the debatable assumption that macro phenomena are the sum total of micro events and the potential tautology in cost/benefit analyses, two methodological problems are evident. First, the key theoretical mechanisms, emotional energies, are undefined (and their exact roles unclear), so appropriate operationalizations are not obvious. Second, sampling and analyzing micro-interactions in order to study larger structures seems impractical. Researchers who study facial expressions, body language, and linguistic structures complain that five minutes of recorded interaction can require literally hundreds of coding hours. Whether the deeper understanding of macro factors obtained is worth the considerable investment involved in micro analyses is an empirical question at present.

Note that in both Collins' and Heise's approaches, affect pervades interaction and affective principles or processes govern interaction. Missing from both approaches is an insight offered by symbolic interactionists: emotions have personal meaning for individuals. As several theorists (including Darwin and Freud) have pointed out, emotions serve a signal function, not only to others, but to the self (Hochschild 1983, Gordon 1989a, Heise 1979, Denzin 1984). Denzin (1984) perhaps makes this point most eloquently in describing emotion phenomenologically as "self-feeling." "An emotional experience that does not in some way have the self, the self-system, or the self or self-system of the other as its referent seems inconceivable. . . . It is through emotionality, imagination, sympathy, fellow-feeling, and revealed self-feelings that persons come to know themselves and one another" (Danzin 1984:50, 245). From a symbolic interactionist perspective, the self motivates behavior. Emotion becomes a meaningful object to be interpreted, controlled, used, or managed by social actors, who are engaged in understanding themselves and managing others' impressions of them. Recently, Stryker (1987) has attempted to integrate this insight into identity theory—his formal symbolic interactionist theory of society, self, and behavior.

Stryker conceptualizes the self as consisting of multiple identities, which are hierarchically ordered. Identities refer to internalized social roles (e.g. "I am a husband, father, professor, tennis player . . ."). Stryker (1987) notes that, like social structure itself, affect influences the probability that role
relationships will form. If affective meanings are shared with others, relationships should be affectively positive and intense and thus highly salient. People are more likely to enact identities to which intense positive affect is attached and will attempt to deny identities associated with intense negative affect. Identity-enactments in turn should influence feelings. Successful identity performances generate positive affect (e.g. self-esteem or pride in self, respect or liking in others); inadequate performances produce negative emotions (e.g. embarrassment or shame in self, disappointment or anger in others). Because identity-affirmations or -denials require confirming behaviors from role partners, emotional “outbursts” can be expected when role partners refuse to sustain a claimed identity. Emotions thus serve as signals to the self regarding the quality and acceptability of one’s identity claims and performances, and emotions can lead to changes in role behavior, network memberships, and ultimately, social structure. Strictly speaking, emotions are not intervening variables in this formulation; they are treated primarily as conditioning or moderating variables.

Related ideas can be found in Hochschild (1979, 1983), Thoits (1985), and Gordon (1989a). Hochschild (1983, 1989b) has shown that individuals work very hard to transform unconventional feelings or displays into normative ones to allay guilt or sustain a positive self-image. I have suggested that persistent emotional deviance leads individuals to redefine themselves as emotionally disturbed and to seek help (Thoits 1985). Gordon (1989a), however, qualifies the implicit assumption that individuals always are distressed by their nonnormative emotional experiences. He shows that individuals who hold “institutional” orientations to emotion infer their “true” or “real” selves from feelings that are consistent with normative expectations, and infer “spurious” or “inauthentic” selves from their unconventional feelings or displays. In contrast, individuals holding “impulsive” beliefs about emotion infer true selves from unconventional feelings and false selves from conventional feelings. Thus, what emotions signal to the self (and, by extension, signal to others) depends on the emotional beliefs that one has acquired. Note that, again, emotional states and subcultural orientations to emotion serve as conditions under which other self-relevant processes will occur.

Symbolic interactionist theorists have acknowledged the importance of receivers’ interpretations and subsequent reactions to senders’ emotional signals but so far have not studied these nor their subsequent consequences in any detail (but see Hardesty 1986, Flaherty 1984). How do quarrels escalate? How do emotional support-giving attempts fail? How do service-workers successfully manipulate clients’ emotions? The reciprocal processes of perceiving, decoding, and responding to one another’s emotional signals deserve attention (see Buck 1984), as does variability in these processes by age, race/ethnicity, sex, and social class. Emotions are signals to the self, but also they are signals to others and the objects of others’ responses.
A number of formal emotion theories discussed earlier (e.g. Kemper 1978, Heise 1979, Collins 1981, Scheff 1979) treat affects as mechanical motivators: positive affect leads to some types of behavior, negative affect to others. Incorporating the meaning of emotions for the self (and others) into theory helps specify when (and what) actions will follow from feelings. Emotions may provide impetus for action, but concerns about impression management and self-esteem direct that action. Because the social self is both a key source of motivation and a conceptual link between social structure and individual behavior, it may be unnecessary to posit close ties between specific emotions and subsequent actions, as Kemper (1978) does, for example. Emotions become objects to be interpreted, transformed, and regulated through the social self as an active agent, rather than serving only as motivators. Thus, the symbolic interactionist perspective, which treats emotions as meaningful objects to social selves, can be viewed as the “third face” of social psychological approaches to emotion.

In addition to their mediating role in more abstract theories of social structure and behavior, emotion concepts increasingly are being incorporated as intervening variables in substantive work. A number of examples can be cited. Wasielewski (1985) has reanalyzed charisma, arguing that it is not a personality characteristic, but springs from leaders’ skillful, deliberate manipulations of feeling and display rules, evident in the content of speeches and audiovisual recordings. Hochschild (1989a, 1989b) has examined how gender-role ideologies (traditional, transitional, and egalitarian ideologies) regarding the household division of labor are translated into strategic lines of action in two-job couples. Women and men employ different emotion management strategies both to prepare for conflict over housework and to control feelings of anger, frustration, or guilt produced by unsuccessful negotiations. I have used emotions theory to derive new typologies of coping and social support responses to stress, and to identify conditions under which persistent emotional deviance will lead to self-attributions of psychological disturbance (Thoits 1984, 1985, 1986; see also Pugliesi 1987). Mills & Kleinman (1988) typologize battered women’s reactions to violence by analyzing the various relationships possible between cognitions and emotions. Ridgeway & Johnson (1988) have developed hypotheses about affective interchanges to account for unexplained characteristics of small group interaction. Markovsky & Lawler (1988) explicate the role of emotional attachment in establishing group solidarity and explaining solidarity’s consequences. Sprecher (1986) examines specific emotions resulting from types of inequity in intimate relationships and, by implication, the effects of these feelings on overall relationship satisfaction and/or longevity.

Although other examples might be cited, the point here should be clear. By “bringing emotions back in,” researchers in fields as diverse as social movements, gender roles, marriage and family, stress and mental health, deviance,
small group dynamics, and interpersonal relationships may further specify or explain important substantive phenomena.

MACRO-LEVEL APPROACHES TO EMOTION

In contrast to micro-level analyses, macro approaches usually treat emotions as dependent variables. There is one exception of which I am aware: Hammond (1983) views human “affective capacities” as socially causal (described below). Typically, the intensity of particular emotional experiences in the population (e.g. Lofland 1985) or changes in emotion culture (Stearns & Stearns 1986, Cancian 1987, Swidler 1980) are examined as outcomes of large-scale features of social life. Macro theorists tend focus on particular emotions, such as grief, anger, and love.

The Shaping of Emotional Experience and Emotion Culture

Lofland (1985) discusses sources of historical and cross-cultural variability in the experience of grief. She identifies four sociocultural factors which should affect the intensity and duration of grief in a society: (a) how much particular relationships are invested with significance, (b) the mortality rates of the group, (c) how much feelings are controlled or given free play, and (d) how much individuals are physically isolated from others in time and space, and thus able to focus on their feelings. Because these sociocultural factors vary over time and across societies, the private experience of grief likely varies as well (see also Aries 1982). For example, the higher the infant mortality rate, and thus the higher the risk of loss, the lower the emotional investment in children and the shorter and less intense the grief response to child deaths. In essence, Lofland suggests that one might study modal grief experiences as a function of demographic factors (among other sociocultural factors).

The difficulty, as Lofland points out, is lack of data on the dependent variable, especially historically: Clinical observations, interview studies, and first-person accounts are available only in recent history and Western cultures. (Data on mourning practices are not relevant, as it is what people feel rather than what they do in response to death that is crucial to Lofland.) Nevertheless, her argument might be tested provisionally by the strategic selection and comparison of contemporary subcultures which vary on at least some of the sociocultural dimensions she has identified (see also Lofland 1982).

Stearns & Stearns (1986) have studied historical changes in American anger from the colonial period to the present. Because aggregate data on subjective anger experiences were lacking, they concentrated on “emotionology” or “emotion culture”—conventions and standards regarding the experience and expression of anger. As indicators, they utilized recurrent themes in popular magazines, child-rearing manuals, marriage manuals, and other
documents intended to teach sectors of the American public about anger and appropriate anger control.

Drawing from Lasch (1977), Stearns & Stearns (1986) argue that industrialization and new market conditions in the mid-1800s caused the home to be reconceptualized as an emotional haven (for men) from a heartless, competitive world. Consequently, anger control (in women) became crucial for harmonious marriage and family life (see also Cancian & Gordon 1989). Then, early in the 1900s, rising rates of labor unrest and white collar and female employment prompted growing concern about workers' emotions. Maintaining morale and avoiding anger became labor relations goals thereafter. These workplace norms subsequently affected the family, in the form of child-rearing advice against anger. Anger has been and remains the "central emotional enemy" for contemporary Americans, Stearns & Stearns conclude (1986:211). More recently, Stearns (1988) has examined historical increases in American concerns about sibling jealousy, arguing that changes in the affective intensity of family life (due to smaller size and permissive rearing practices) actually created more jealousy and thus reason for worry.

Swidler (1980) also has examined Western emotional ideology, but in a more discursive way. She observes that traditional love myths once helped resolve contradictory cultural values, bridging the gap between the tasks of youth (self-realization, autonomy) and adulthood (commitment, self-sacrifice). Current love ideology emphasizes one side of the myth—self-actualization, growth, autonomy, and sexual expression, while de-emphasizing lifelong commitment, attachment, self-sacrifice, and sexual restraint. (The crucial unanswered question raised by these observations is, what has produced this shift in ideological emphasis?) Swidler (1985) later argues that culture provides a "tool kit" of values, traditions, rituals, and beliefs for use in constructing strategic lines of action, especially during unsettled periods. In other words, cultural values are the means by which behaviors are constructed, rather than ends in themselves. Applied to Swidler's previous observations, contradictions and complexities in love ideology can be used by individuals to justify very different strategic lines of action in their intimate relationships (see Hochschild 1989b for empirical examples). The key research question then becomes: Under what historical and structural conditions will some strategic lines of action, and thus some aspects of love ideology, become dominant? Swidler thus reframes the problem that a sociology of emotions might address.  

7A similar argument can be found in Elias (1978). In his monumental two-volume work, Elias traces the history of manners, which are rooted in feelings of disgust, shame, and embarrassment about human bodily functions. He connects the process of civilization (including changes in disgust and shame thresholds) to the rise of the modern state, and argues that hygienic reasons for certain practices served only as after-the-fact rationalizations for customs originating in structural change.
Cancian (1987) offers some answers to the problems raised by Swidler. She argues that the conflict between traditional love beliefs and the current emphasis on self-development is linked to an earlier polarization in gender roles. Modern American concepts of love (as dependency, tenderness, expressiveness, self-sacrifice) are feminized, while the notion of self-development (as autonomy, independence, self-reliance) is masculinized. This polarization in images, Cancian argues, was produced by the shift from an agrarian to capitalist economy and the resulting gender division of labor (and economic power) during the 1800s. Women became responsible for the home sphere and for emotions; men for the work sphere and for achievement. During the 1900s, a number of trends (consumer advertising, lower birth rates, higher divorce rates, women in the labor force) placed more emphasis on self-fulfillment for both women and men. But cultural lags in gender-based images of love create serious conflicts in modern relationships. Cancian proposes that the current trend toward extreme independence and individualism that worries social critics (e.g. Bellah et al 1985) is only one possible outcome of these conflicts; the emerging androgynous image of love contains a potential resolution—interdependence—where partners are equally responsible for sustaining a commitment. Economic shifts (from free market competition toward socialism) and changes in the masculine role (from emphasis on individual achievement toward cooperative achievement) may foster interdependence and new cultural forms of love.

Overall, these descriptive analyses suggest that changes in emotion culture follow from certain large-scale institutional changes. Unfortunately, the relationships between antecedent institutional changes and subsequent cultural changes have not been documented empirically in this literature. A structural-functional approach to emotion culture seems implicit in much of this work (e.g. Stearns & Stearns 1986, Cancian 1987)—i.e. emotion norms are produced by and function to sustain dominant institutional arrangements. Even more implicit are assumptions about the particular emotions that result from structural arrangements, emotions that then become encouraged or discouraged by norms (e.g. industrialization and capitalist competition produce anger in workers, which then becomes the object of normative regulation at work and at home). If underlying assumptions were made explicit, macro-level research might move more quickly from description and speculation to theory development and testing.

Macro-level efforts to trace the historical, structural, and ideological antecedents of particular emotional beliefs are important for three reasons. First, they generate hypotheses that can be tested more systematically (e.g. see Cancian & Gordon 1989). For example, if within one country anger norms vary historically with changes in economic structure, then cross-cultural comparisons of the relationship between anger norms and economic structures
seem warranted. Second, macro-level research may specify the conditions under which micro theories are applicable. For example, concern with power and status (Kemper 1978) may differ systematically across societies or within societies through time. Finally, as a byproduct, the macro analysis of particular emotional beliefs may help to disentangle the complex interplay of culture and social structure (Swidler 1985), and to identify the origins and functions of emotion norms.

**Affects as Organizing Principles**

One recent theoretical approach has reversed the usual causal direction of macro inquiry. Hammond (1983, 1988) has treated macro structure as the product of human affective capacities. Elaborating Durkheim, Hammond argues that social differentiation and social stratification are shaped by several “affective principles.” He assumes that social bonds are based on intense, positive affective arousal and that people seek arrangements which maximize this arousal (the principle of “affective maximization”). However, human affective resources are limited; prolonged intense arousal is physiologically debilitating, so humans must limit the number of others to whom they are affectively attached. Some individuals become the focus of intense arousal, and others not (the principle of “uneven attachment”). The greater the density of a population, the greater the likelihood that individuals will differentiate among others using observable characteristics (e.g. sex, age, race, language—classifications requiring little cognitive effort) and affectively stratify these differences (the principle of “social differentiation”). Thus, social inequalities are produced and sustained by innate affective motives and affective limitations, and vary positively with population density. Hammond (1988) explicitly contrasts the implications of affective maximization theory (which holds that virtually anyone or any group can become an object of affective attachment) with sociobiological predictions (which hold that innate tendencies favor kin selection). If reliable indicators of Hammond’s key concepts can be found (a potentially difficult task), the theory may be valuable in challenging sociobiological theory to a series of critical tests.

**DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS**

In this review I have attempted to highlight recent works that have rich implications for hypothesis-generation or that suggest problems for further empirical pursuit. I also have pointed to important gaps in sociological knowledge about emotions. At present, the field appears to be headed simultaneously in two major directions: the further understanding of emotions and emotional processes as sociological phenomena in their own right, and the application of emotion concepts and processes to substantive problems in
areas such as deviance and social control, marriage and family, gender roles, social movements, small group dynamics, stress and mental health, institutions, stratification, and the sociology of culture.

Clearly, the field has moved beyond the infancy stage of concept and perspective development into an early childhood of theory elaboration and exploratory research. Work is more often theoretical than empirical in nature at the micro level. In contrast, work is more often empirically descriptive and speculative than theoretical at the macro level. Additional systematic theory development at the macro level seems especially necessary. More descriptive research at both the micro and macro levels of analysis still is needed.

Qualitative and/or descriptive research at the micro level might address serious gaps in our knowledge regarding the “epidemiology” of various emotions, emotional socialization processes (for both children and adults), the significance of role-taking emotions for social control and prosocial behavior, and processes of emotional interaction. Both micro and macro researchers might examine the content of emotion culture (or of particular emotion subcultures) in more detail. At the macro level, historical and cross-cultural relationships between structural arrangements and emotion norms need further documentation and elaboration. More use of comparative strategies at both micro and macro levels of research clearly is needed. Some theoretical efforts at the micro level (e.g. Kemper 1978, Collins 1981, Heise 1988, Hochschild 1983, Lofland 1985) have been elaborated sufficiently to warrant serious hypothesis-testing; in most cases, testing has yet to be undertaken and is the crucial next step.

The need for more descriptive research and systematic hypothesis testing raises problems of measurement and methods, which I have side-stepped in this review because empirical efforts are so few, as yet. Sociologists of emotion have yet to confront measurement issues squarely.

Emotion indicators and problems of inference obviously depend on the investigator’s level of analysis. At the macro level, two types of indicators are common: (a) frequencies, intensities, or durations of various emotional experiences, as self-reported in surveys or qualitative materials, and (b) content codes for various emotional beliefs, obtained from documents, records, ethnographies, and media such as textbooks, advice books, manuals, magazine articles, newspaper columns, novels, films, and the like. When emotional ideology and norms are the focus, the relationship between cultural beliefs and actual experience becomes especially problematic. One can be tempted to generalize from the content of emotion culture to modal emotional experiences in the population. Potential discrepancies (and cultural lags) between public standards and private experience must be acknowledged by researchers, and, where possible, assessed with recourse to alternative indicators, such as personal interviews, diaries, letters, and trends in divorce rates, strike activities, and so on (Stearns 1985).
At the micro level, investigators have analyzed subjective self-reports (including personal introspection—see Ellis 1987), changes in facial expression, and physiological changes (the latter two more often done by psychologists) as indicators of emotional experience. Rarely do studies employ more than one type of indicator. The choice of measures is crucial for the validity of investigators’ inferences. Because feeling and display norms are influential, self-reports and observable behaviors are suspect; respondents’ impression management concerns may cause verbal dissimulation and behavioral masking. Physiological indicators are highly complex and considerable disagreement still exists regarding whether they are reliably associated with particular emotions in a one-to-one fashion. Consequently, using multiple indicators and exercising considerable care to reduce social desirability bias seem warranted at the micro level.

Methodological problems are likely to loom large as more empirical studies and conflicting findings accumulate in the next stage of the field’s development. These problems probably will not be insurmountable but must be addressed explicitly, because the continued legitimacy, utility, and growth of this field will depend next on careful empirical work.

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