On the Cognitive Functioning of Aesthetic Emotions

Roger Pouivet

ABSTRACT

This article seeks to show that we cannot accept an opposition between aesthetics and logic on the basis of the distinction between aesthetic emotion and cognition. This false distinction is founded on another ill-founded one between private states of mind and public languages. Echoing works by R. de Sousa, we can talk about the rationality of emotions. Following N. Goodman and I. Scheffler, we are conducted to the notion of cognitive emotions. If there are aesthetic emotions, they are likely cognitive. The notion of supervenience seems very adequate to show how aesthetic emotion, even aesthetic pleasure, can be related to cognitive experience.

PRIVATE AND PUBLIC

In Cartesian terms, emotions are private mental states generating an immediate and infallible attention of the mind. In this view, emotions would have only contingent connections to their behavioral manifestations and the language in which they are expressed. This picture has become much less acceptable since Wittgenstein and what is called “the private language argument” [2]. Of course, this argument does not mean that we do not have “inner lives” or private mental states. Emotions are not necessarily made manifest; they may be kept hidden. The feeling that no one is able to share one’s emotions is perfectly natural. Such a feeling tilts the “grammar” of the term emotion as it does that of pain. No one is supposed to feel your toothache, but in order to learn how to say “I have a toothache” rightly (or falsely), you did not have to identify within yourself a mental state and then proceed inwardly to name it, but instead you had to master a “language game” that is specific to a linguistic community. In this sense, the inner character of my pains or emotions is the result of my learning the language (my being able to name my emotions and say “I have pain”), not of my labeling them inwardly in some private language that is then translated into a shared language. As Jacques Bouveresse notes,

A public ostensive definition may always be misunderstood; but a private ostensive definition cannot be understood, not just by someone else, but finally not even by the person offering it [3].

A private ostensive definition would imply a private rule—which is, at the very least, a contradiction in adjecto [4], and even probably an absurdity.

Aesthetic emotions are as deeply interior (or not), in the sense of inaccessible and inexpressible, as any other emotions. We learned to express this kind of emotion as interior (even as inaccessible and inexpressible) instead of labeling for the sake of others an inner experience we did not know how to name. We learned to behave in a certain way, to clap our hands, to “behold” pictures, and generally to express one such behavior or another when facing works of art. True, feeling an emotion does not consist of performing such behavior or saying certain things (“How beautiful!” “I like it very much,” and so forth). These behavioral or linguistic patterns can be used without any feeling whatsoever. But the possibility of feeling does not imply in any way that there should be anything more in the case of someone using such patterns while feeling something, something inner and hidden. There is no question that we do have inner lives, but they are not inner cells [5]. Our having inner lives is a function of a shared language and shared behavioral patterns, so that within this community there is a sense to the notion of aesthetic emotion, not within a theory implying that the term emotion refers to a private mental state.

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Emotions do not constitute a natural category; neither do aesthetic emotions. In order to feel an aesthetic emotion, one must go through some kind of (quite intricate) learning process in which occur, combined, the examples of behaviors already referred to, of linguistic patterns expressing satisfaction or inner upheaval ("You must go see that movie; it's just shattering") or even just interests (it is hard to imagine someone maintaining that he just loves painting, even though he would never visit a museum or look at an art book). This is not only a matter of our emotions being socially determined, and not at all a question of causal determination. We all learned that we have aesthetic emotions. We did not learn this by finding they were there inside of us in advance ("Gee, I have what are called 'aesthetic emotions'")), but by taking part in what Wittgenstein calls a "form of life" [6].

Consequently, the argument that aesthetic experience is private because it is emotional is unacceptable. Its correlativa—that aesthetic experience, being emotional, is at the furthest remove from any arm of rationality and a matter of pure inner sensitivity—has then to be reconsidered.

**THE RATIONALITY OF EMOTIONS**

Philosophers traditionally claimed that emotions are contrary to rationality. It was argued that reason should master passions and emotions or, conversely, that regardless of its own self-estimation, reason is nothing else but a slave to passions and emotions. In order to show that emotions need not be irrational, let us begin with a fatally schematic analysis of rationality [7].

An action is irrational if it runs counter to its manifest purpose. What you wish is irrational if it goes against some other clearly pursued intention of yours with which it is incompatible (you wish to stay at home and you wish to go places). A belief is irrational if it is implausible for it to be true (a magic word can make women fall in love with you) or if it was acquired in some way that is plainly contrary to the way true beliefs are generally acquired (you met an elf who gave you the magic word). Generally, I define *rationality* as the capacity to pursue some end without preventing oneself from reaching it. In regard to actions, rationality is a teleological concept; it is a logical one in regard to beliefs (which are irrational if and only if they are self-contradictory). To the extent that the functioning of our organs also may be described as helping toward an end, although these organs are not in themselves rational (yet there is a rational way of describing the functioning of our organs) nor do the beings to whom the organs belong need to be rational, rationality is not only teleological but also intentional. It does not just imply that our actions are not contradictory with an openly pursued end and help toward it, but also that our actions and beliefs are purposely addressed to the sought-for end.

Thus, the question becomes the following: Is an emotion necessarily contrary to rationality—that is, does it always have to bring a teleological or logical contradiction into the action, wish, or belief? If you answer in the affirmative, emotion is no longer rational. Still, there is no reason to answer yes. An emotion may be a particularly fitting behavior. Blushing in response to compliments, for instance, is fitting if you believe that displaying some humility is appropriate. Being deeply moved at a relative's death is a perfectly logical consequence of your wishing that person were alive. Emotions are so little in contradiction with what is expected from someone that it is broadly possible to anticipate the emotions felt by oneself or others by assigning plausible beliefs to them. This is also the reason that one can ascertain what people believe by watching their emotions. Of course, one cannot totally rely on this. Certain people do not show their emotions. But one would not judge that they are irrational from their display of emotions. Quite the opposite: having certain emotions presupposes that one is able to understand a situation and thus hold rational beliefs regarding it. An absence of emotions would often lead one to the opinion that the person who fails to have emotions is stupid rather than (highly) rational. Clearly, some emotions—say, jealousy—seem altogether irrational. But to someone with certain beliefs—for instance, that his wife is out to cheat on him, whether true or false—being jealous is not irrational. It seems to me self-evident that a false belief is not irrational, since one belief is only irrational in respect to another belief, and a false belief is false in respect to what is the case (really), not in respect to some other belief. The fact that certain emotions are such that they prevent us from reaching our goals simply shows that sometimes our emotions bring into our actions an element of contradiction, not that emotions are irrational in themselves. True, it could be said that an emotion is irrational if, once the belief implied by the emotion is corrected, the emotion does not change—is set, as it were. Someone resisting considerations that ought to bring him to correct his belief is, of course, irrational. Therefore, it can be said that an emotion is rational if it is justified—that is, if it does not imply a belief that is irrational.

If emotions can be rational—if indeed they are so much of the time—are they intentional? We are tempted to answer in the negative: I do not have whichever emotion I choose, and I even have emotions in spite of myself. We should, however, distinguish between the fact of having an emotion and the possibility of having one. It is not, of course, a matter of my own decision whether such or such an event brings an emotion to me. In this sense, even with a rational emotion—that is, an emotion in no way contradictory to a pursued goal—this would be a case similar to the case of the organ that indeed helps toward some end by means of its functioning but that does so unintentionally. In order, however, for someone to be described as capable of emotion, he has to be described as endowed with an inclination to it, and not just in terms of some biophysical mechanism. To a large extent, this inclination is of our own making because it is related to our beliefs. It could be objected that our beliefs are in turn determined, and particularly socially determined. But this is then a wholly different problem, far more general, which does not alter the fact that our beliefs constitute our emotions from the perspective of the inclinations, and that a change in our beliefs brings a change in our emotions (unless they are set). We are not helplessly given up to our emotions. If emotions were wholly irrational and unintentional, all operations biasing and altering inclinations would be utterly ineffective. But these operations are in many cases effective. Emotions are not in fact external to these inclinations but belong to them.

These inclinations to have an emotion can also be understood in terms of a linguistic learning process. We have become familiar with the vocabulary of emotions, thanks to what can be called "stories." They are slowly developed from early childhood and grow (more or less) intricate, owing to events in our daily lives, but also to paradigms that can be discovered, significantly within
literary works, and wherever feelings are involved. Do I have to mention that the emotion of love is a direct function of stories we know, thanks to which we apprehend roles being played by everyone, including ourselves? La Rochefoucauld said that there would be no falling in love unless it had been read that it could be done. This changes exactly nothing in the sincerity of one’s emotions, no more so than knowing that such and such walk will take you in front of such and such particularly remarkable “sights” alters the beauty of the landscape and our enjoyment of it. Stories may in turn be worked into meta-stories—that is, they may become the contents of a story. Then our emotions are explicitly offered as they appear in specific descriptions. (For instance, we live our jealousy in the mode described by Proust, and we enjoy knowing which mode it is.) Thus, our emotions grow to be more and more sophisticated, and our affective lives to be less and less perspicuous, because they obliquely refer to already described emotions, and to descriptions of descriptions of already described emotions [8]. Furthermore, certain stories turn out to be particularly unfitted to an objective situation. This is the cause of the irrationality of emotion: We interpret a situation in terms that are unsuited to it. Our beliefs regarding this situation are irrational because they keep bringing in a contradiction between two kinds of beliefs—the kind concerning the representation of the situation and the kind that is, as it were, more down to earth.

Among all other emotions, aesthetic emotions imply that certain stories are mastered. They get constituted piece by piece, generally becoming more sophisticated, through our learning in specific situations in which we respond to works of art. In this matter, sophistication allows us to avoid stereotypes. Aesthetic emotions are rational, too—that is, they do not in the least constitute unmanageable, sensitive outpourings. They are responses that match certain stimulation, just as blushing can in certain circumstances. They do not bring any contradiction into our beliefs. They are a function of certain stories, in function of which we respond in an aesthetic way. It is, of course, possible to suggest a sociological description of such stories. You then get a history of the reception of works of art. The philosopher would rather assign to himself the task of providing a general analysis of the functioning of such stories, not through a sociological description, but through the suggestion of a logical reconstruction of concepts that are structural to these stories, such as, for instance, the concepts of expression and fiction [9]. This logical reconstruction will show to what degree aesthetic emotion is not a purely sensitive response (and not even a response only a rational being should be capable of, except it is noncognitive, according to the suggestion of Kant [10]), but rather constitutes a certain way of using our semantic capacities.

**COGNITIVE EMOTIONS**

The central thesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment is his distinction between judgment of knowledge (conceptual judgment) and pure aesthetic judgment (nonconceptual judgment). Others have drawn the conclusion that aesthetic emotions are a matter of sheer sensitivity. Conversely, I suggest that we view aesthetic emotion as a function of a cognitive activity. I do not see aesthetic experience as noncognitive; nor do I see knowledge as a nonemotional process.

First, it can be noticed that certain intellectual operations implying pieces of knowledge are the prerequisite of aesthetic emotion. More generally, according to Robert Gordon, “Unless one knows or believes certain things, one cannot experience certain emotions at all” [11].

There is a conditional structure for emotions to the extent that we attribute only such and such emotions to a given individual because we attribute to this individual such and such piece of knowledge. As noticed by Nelson Goodman [12], in order to read a poem, you have to be able to read and put into play the various pieces of knowledge about the language you happen to be using (or even about other languages).

However, we find it hard to give up the idea that, somehow, art should be far more emotional than matters concerning knowledge—that it is of a sensitive, even spiritual, nature that is definitely different. Goodman says, “Paintings and concerts, and the viewing and hearing of them, need not arouse emotion, any more than they need give satisfaction, to be aesthetic” [13].

The fact that we may have an aesthetic emotion does not mean in any way that aesthetic experience is a matter of having an emotion, much less one of a specific kind. It could even be seen that too strong an emotion is a drawback to aesthetic experience. Aesthetic experience is not necessarily characterized even by limited emotion. Some works just do not foster emotion. Goodman’s examples include a late Rembrandt work, a late Mondrian, one quartet by Brahms, and one by Webern [14]. I would add that the same holds true for many contemporary musical pieces, Karlheinz Stockhausen’s Aus den sieben Tagen, for example. This is the very reason that we find them less accessible, such is the extent to which we are steeped in the aesthetics resulting from the Kantian, then Romantic, tradition, which conceives of aesthetic experience as having to be in a certain way emotional. I am not sure that some medieval pieces, such as Johannes Ockeghem’s Requiem, are particularly emotional. I hardly need to add that in such matters there is a complete relativism.

Emotion is a function of a much broader attitude, that of understanding, which involves an integration of the cognitive and the emotional. Such is the import of Kant’s analysis of aesthetic judgment as involving the powers of knowledge; but he also flatly repudiates the import as he denies this concept any part in aesthetic experience and makes pure aesthetic judgment a wholly independent class. The tradition of Kantism emphasizes the latter and looks for an essence of aesthetic experience in the purely sensible or the purely emotional.

I take this kind of investigation to rely on a major misunderstanding—one that separates the emotional and the cognitive and denies their integration into understanding. For instance, understanding a requiem comes down to grasping the relation between what is expressed by the music and the words; emotion implies, or even consists of, understanding that relation.

How is this emotion different from that which is felt by a scientist?

Indeed, in any science, while the requisite objectivity forbids wishful thinking, prejudicial reading of evidence, rejection of unwanted results, avoidance of ominous lines of inquiry, it does not forbid use of feeling in exploration and discovery, the impetus of inspiration and curiosity, or the cues given by excitement over intriguing problems and promising hypotheses.


What Goodman offers is a genuine plan for investigating the role of emotion in scientific research that was made explicit by Israel Scheffler in his paper.
"In Praise of the Cognitive Emotions" [16]. According to Goodman and Scheffler, scientific research does not occur without emotions. The working out of a theory, its patient testing, the efforts to answer objections—none of this is emotionally neutral. True, there may be such affective stakes at risk that the scientist will be induced to fake. Keeping a "scientific spirit" would then imply a break from the emotional, which is considered an epistemological barrier. Yet it is the other way around. The aspiration to truth and the emotion connected with this aspiration have their roles not only in rejecting errors, but also in determining a hypothesis. A scientist will proceed tentatively, feeling this or that to be true, sticking to such and such a hypothesis, not abandoning it easily, and so on. None of these phenomena should be neglected in any way. It is wrong for an ethereal description of the scientific process to forget about them. Scheffler emphasizes also "the thrill of verification" and "the feeling of surprise" [17]. To the extent that there is no pre-established harmony between what we believe and what we find, when this harmony is realized or, conversely, does not occur although it had been expected to, there is indeed a cognitive emotion. Surprise is not an irrational emotion; it is not just a contradiction of our beliefs (contradiction between a firmly planted belief and a present belief), because a scientific attitude implies that such a contradiction is possible and that it is given an epistemic status.

Understanding that there are cognitive emotions implies, however, renouncing the idea that emotions "act in the fashion of a flood overwhelming a dam," that they are an "intoxication" having "the effect on our physical condition of the stroke of an apoplexy," and other psychological remarks of the same kind that possess a far-reaching confusion between emotion and a brain seizure [18]. Such a description of emotion as can be found in Kant is a complete caricature. It goes without saying that intense terror or frantic raptures of joy are incompatible with reflection, but it is as manifestly untrue that all emotions are experienced as some kind of psycho-physiological paroxysm. On the other hand, as stated by Scheffler, "Indeed, emotion without cognition is blind ... and cognition without emotion is vacuous" [19].

Thus, drawing a line of separation between emotion and knowledge has no point; some of our emotions are indeed cognitive and they have a part in the scientist's attitude as well as in aesthetic experience. Such are the emotions that ought to be sought and cultivated. There is plainly a whole process of learning that is required for their enactment and development. We learn to have good emotions, the ones that can have profitable consequences for knowledge and aesthetic enjoyment. To a large extent, our education consists not only in the obtaining of knowledge, but also of emotional attitudes matching certain enjoyable activities. The same emotions are in play in both the sciences and aesthetic experience: looking for differences (distinguishing) or similarities (analogies, metaphors), organizing, rephrasing in an enlightening fashion, formalizing, and so forth.

THE SUPERVENIENCE OF AESTHETIC PLEASURE

It is a very great pleasure to learn, not only for philosophers but for all other men as well; although these share it only in a very small way. We do enjoy watching pictures because we may learn something by watching them, and find out what every thing is, that for instance this picture is so and so.

—Aristotle [20]

In this passage, Aristotle [21] claims there is a pleasure in knowing, which is the same as the pleasure in watching pictures. He is thus quite unwilling to separate art and emotion from knowledge. (True, this claim is related to his definition of art as mimesis. Aristotle also seems to consider the possibility of pleasure related to material qualities of the work of art [22], but this is just a brief mention that does not hold his attention or play a major part in his analysis of pleasure.)

I do not mean to enter the argument over the meaning of Aristotle's theory of pleasure. But it seems to me that the thesis I am supporting is quite close, mutatis mutandis, to Aristotle's idea that pleasure is an activity. We find this idea in his Nicomachean Ethics, books VII and X. To say that aesthetic experience is of a cognitive kind (it implies pieces of knowledge, functions as a conceptual activity, and fulfills an urge to know) seems to agree with Aristotle's argument about pleasure. It is the very activity of the mind that affords pleasure, so that pleasure is not a feeling that is distinct from the activity of knowing, but is intrinsic to the very practice of this activity [23].

Gilbert Ryle echoes Aristotle's point:

We say that a person who is so absorbed in some activity, such as golf or argument, that he is reluctant to stop, or even to think of anything else, is "taking pleasure in" or "enjoying" doing what he is doing, though he is in no degree convulsed or beside himself, and though he is not, therefore, experiencing any particular feelings. In this sense, to enjoy doing something, to want to do it and not want to do anything else are different ways of phrasing the same thing [24].

Aristotle would explain that pleasure is the activity itself (as opposed to the terminus ad quem of a process). Or again, pleasure is superimposed onto the activity when it does not run into checks. Aristotle thus says:

Pleasure perfects activity not as an inherent habit but as a kind of supervenient end, like the bloom of health perfects youth [25].

It seems that what has become a fundamental concept of analytical philosophy in recent years can be validly used at this point—that is, the concept of supervenience [26]. According to this concept, we shall say that pleasure supervenes on an activity. In the case at hand, I propose that aesthetic pleasure supervenes on a cognitive activity. We can consider that 

a set of properties, supervenes on G, another set of properties, with respect to a field X, if and only if two things belonging to X that cannot be distinguished in terms of G are as necessarily indistinguishable in terms of F: F is what supervenes, and G the basis for the supervenience. As Jaegwon Kim, picking up the original meaning of the term as found in texts of moral philosophy, explains, "Moral properties are said to be supervenient upon nonmoral properties in the sense that any two things that coincide in all nonmoral properties cannot diverge with respect to moral properties" [27].

The supervenience implies that both sets of properties (things, events, and so on) are co-variable, mutually dependent, and nonreducible [28]. This has become nowadays a fundamental notion in the philosophy of the mind. Mental life supervenes on physical characteristics, so that there is no mental difference apart from physical difference; yet, in Davidson's view [29], it does not follow from the supervenience of the mental on the physical that the mental can be reduced to the physical. As always, David Lewis finds a brilliant way of putting this:

"We have supervenience when there could be no difference of one sort without differences of another sort" [30].
As far as I am concerned, this would mean that aesthetic pleasure is certainly not the cognitive activity itself. Aesthetic pleasure supervenes on this activity, co-varies with it, and depends on it though it cannot be reduced to it. This is indeed aesthetic pleasure, and not just any pleasure, for we can suppose that the kind of cognitive activity at work in aesthetic experience and constituting it as aesthetic experience is, if not quite specific (which would imply necessary characteristics), at least determinable in function of certain specific symptoms. So, therefore, if there is indeed an aesthetic kind of cognitive activity consisting of mastering the particular functioning of symbolic systems and enacting certain relations between symbols and what they stand for, thus matching the description provided by Nelson Goodman in his Languages of Art [31], there is also a specific pleasure that supervenes on this kind of activity. True, a work of art does not need to produce pleasure. If pleasure supervenes on the cognitive activity, the basis of supervenience does not, however, determine the appearance of pleasure. The supervenience relation does imply a co-variance, but this relation does not enforce a determination of the supervening family by its basis of supervenience [32]. In other words, a cognitive activity cannot guarantee aesthetic pleasure, although I do not see how this kind of pleasure is possible apart from a specific cognitive activity within aesthetic experience.

CONCLUSION

We cannot accept an opposition between aesthetics and logic on the basis of the distinction between (aesthetic) pleasure and a cognitive anaesthetics. The understanding is an aesthete, and an aesthete practices an activity of understanding. If aesthetics and the cognitive are split in a drastic fashion, the result is distinctions that, although they are not entirely worthless (for example, that Kantian distinction between judgment of knowledge and aesthetic judgment [33]), bring quite unfortunate consequences because they prevent us from accounting for the kind of intellectual activity at work in aesthetic experience and the specific pleasure produced by it and supervening on this cognitive activity. This leads me to reject a face-to-face opposition of aesthetics and the cognitive.

References and Notes

1. This point is developed in R. Pouivet, Esthétique et logique (Liège, Belgium: Mardaga, 1996) Chapter 1.
8. For example, being jealous in the mode of Proust as described by some commentator of Proust, a Freudian one, for instance, who describes Proust’s mode of describing emotions by referring to Freud.
18. I am here quoting E. Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (The Hague: Niijhoff, 1974) p. 74. It seems to me that Kant is mistaken in seeing emotion as a non-intentional mental state.
21. See also Aristotle, Rhetorics 1371b, 4–12.
32. In this case, it could be called a weak supervenience that does not imply a necessary condition. According to Kim, a weak supervenience cannot guarantee A’s supervenience on B in all possible worlds. See Kim [26] pp. 60–61. For more information on supervenience, see also Pouivet [9]; M. Rowlands, Supervenience and Materialism (Aldershot, England: Avebury, 1995); and E.E. Savellos and U.D. Valcin, Supervenience, New Essays (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1995).
33. See Kant [10].

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