IV.—EMOTIONS versus PLEASURE-PAIN.

BY HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL.

In the 2nd chapter of my book, *Pain, Pleasure and Aesthetics*, I considered the nature of the Instincts and Emotions. I there took a “genetic” point of view: and held that if we grant the validity of the hypothesis of development by contest and survival we should expect to find certain coordinated instinctive complexes immediately reactive upon the approach or the departure of disadvantageous and also of advantageous objects. We should expect to experience (a) a wide instinctive reaction determined by the approach of an object which has in the past been advantageous to the individual of the race although it may not be known to the individual to be so: a condition of receptive expansiveness. We should look (b) for a quite different but equally wide instinctive reaction arising upon the approach of an object which in the past has been disadvantageous: a condition of general contraction or shrinking, as it were. We should expect to find other corresponding mental phases differing in quality and elemental width, which would appear (c) upon the departure of the advantageous and (d) upon the departure of the disadvantageous. Now if it be argued that there is a coincidence between nervous activities and mental changes we should surely expect that, in connection with these more or less definitely coordinated instinctive activities, corresponding mental states would appear, and these for convenience we may call “Instinct Feelings.”

We should therefore expect to find an “instinct feeling” (a) arising upon the approach of the advantageous; another (b) appearing “disadvantageous”; (c) arising “departure” advantageous; and still another (d) appearing upon the departure of the disadvantageous.

1 The word “feeling” is used here in its broad sense as equivalent to “mental experience.”
Now as a matter of fact we do find certain complex mental states which we call "Emotions" that arise spontaneously and re-actively, and apart from any influence of our reason or will, and which correspond to the conditions above mentioned.

(a) Joy, arising upon the approach of the advantageous.
(b) Dread, " " " disadvantageous.
(c) Sorrow, " " departure " advantageous.
(d) Relief " " " disadvantageous.

If we follow out the same line of argument in relation to our less passive life we shall be led to a fuller comprehension of the nature of the Emotions as a whole.

(e) Love, we find to be connected with a tendency to go out toward an advantageous object, in receptive mood.

(f) Fear, " " " with a tendency to flee from a disadvantageous object.

(g) Anger, " " " with a tendency to act to drive away a disadvantageous object;

and we might also expect to find

(h) an Emotion connected with a tendency to act in such a way as would attract advantageous objects to us.

But in fact we find no Emotion (h) such as seems necessary to complete the symmetry of our scheme. This fact may be accounted for by supposing that this instinct to-act-to-attract is one which does not lead to any immediate reactive spasm, so to speak; and that the reactionary effects and the consciousness corresponding thereto would therefore be slow to appear: and further by supposing that these acts brought about by this instinct may be so varied that no fixed mental elements would result from the instinctive reaction: for with the Emotions a, b, c, d, e, f and g, just considered, this immediacy of reaction, and a certain fixedness of the elements involved in each successive reaction, must be supposed to determine the attention to, and the definiteness and fixity of, the "instinct feelings": without this definiteness and fixity we could not expect them to have gained emotional names: for the attachment of names is a very late step in our racial life, whilst the instinctive reactions are determined by the experiences of untold generations of our ancestry before even the semblance of man's form had appeared.

That this supposition as to immediacy, and fixity of elements, in the reaction is not unreasonable appears upon considering the case of the well recognized imitation-instincts which must have corresponding "instinct feelings," but to which, if our argument be true, we should not expect to find emotional names attached, for the reason that the activities involved are
not immediately reactive nor of a definite fixed nature. As a matter of fact we have no emotional states corresponding with the imitative activities, although the imitation instinct is recognized by all to be of fundamental value to us.

What we are now led to ask therefore is this: whether there are any impulses within us that lead us, blind as to the end in view, to undertake activities that will result in the attraction of advantageous objects to us.

If there be such impulses we should expect to find in the first place tendencies to actions which would merely result in the attraction of attention to the individual: and such tendencies recognized in marked degree amongst the higher animals are clearly found in the human race in its barbaric state: nor can they be said to be totally lacking in the human species of higher types in our day. Prof. Baldwin suggests that we call these, "self exhibiting reactions."

Secondly, we should expect to find tendencies to produce objects or objective conditions which should attract by pleasing; and, thirdly, we should look for tendencies to act to attract by the production of results useful to those whose attraction is desirable.

The third class of tendencies is easily identifiable with those impulses to disinterested benevolence which are so prominent in modern life; and it may be noted here that neither the first nor this third class of instinctive tendencies results in immediate or definite reactions such as would lead us to expect the attachment of emotional names to their psychic counterparts.

What shall we say of the second class? Is there any widespread instinctive tendency within us which, with no knowledge on our part of the end in view, still does work for results which shall please others, and which has no other raison d'être than this pleasure giving; an instinctive tendency so slow in its reactionary development, and resulting in activities of so varied a nature, that no emotional name should be expected to attach to the reaction?

I think we have it in the blind instinct to produce Art works: in what is usually called the Art Impulse but which I speak of generally as the "Art Instinct." The Art Instinct certainly is blind to any end in view except the expression of the ideals which are present to the artist's mind; it none the less does have the effect of producing objects which delight and which attract by pleasing: moreover it certainly has in this a most valuable function, viz. that of social consolidation; and apart from this no evident raison d'être. Furthermore the impulse works itself out through slow and diverse processes
which in their nature could not bring distinct and immediate reactions such as seem to be necessary where emotional names are to become fixed.

Certain criticisms upon the above scheme\(^1\) lead me to think that it will be desirable to make a brief statement of my view in this particular in a manner which will make clear some points I have apparently left obscure in the treatment in my book.

It seems to me that the most logical view to be taken of the relation of mind to body is this; that each and every physical reaction has its coincident in mentality; only part of that mentality however having the characteristics which enable us to consider it as a conscious object, or in other words which serve to make it appear as an increment to our Ego. If this be granted then all instinctive reactions must have their co-incident “instinct feelings” as I have called them, these “instinct feelings” being mental complexes, some elements of which come clearly into consciousness and some of which do not. An “instinct feeling” is a pulse of mentality.

As a matter of fact we recognize an indefinite number of these instinctive reactions, but to comparatively few of them do we by common agreement attach distinct names. A certain narrow set of these “instinct feelings” we call Emotions, and upon examination we find, as we have seen, that these Emotions have two marked characteristics: 1st, in the main, fixed relations exist between the elements reacting; and 2nd, the reactions follow immediately upon the presentation of objects or of objective conditions.

We may fairly say then, I think, that each “instinct feeling” which is definite enough to be named as an Emotion, involves a more or less definite pulse of consciousness, a relatively fixed “content” complex, corresponding to instinctive reactions; and this, quite apart from any theory as to the functioning of outward or inward “waves of expression.” As I have wished so far as possible to avoid cumbering my argument with questions in dispute, I have purposely expressed no distinct opinion in reference to this controversial point, as it does not directly concern my argument.

But it is interesting to consider the fact just noted; viz. that relatively few of our recognized instinctive reactions have emotional names attached to them, and this, as I have said above, I surmise to be because the unnamed “instinct feelings” are coincidents of instinctive actions that are not immediately reactive, or which do not involve in the main fixed relations

\(^1\) Conf. Prof. J. Mark Baldwin in the *Psychological Review*, I. vi. p. 619 ff.
between the elements reacting. On this supposition it is easy to account for the fact that the "Imitation Instincts," the "Self Exhibiting Instincts," the "Benevolent Instincts," and the "Art Instincts" have no emotional names attached to them, as they have no recognized strictly emotional mental phases connected with them.

Prof. Baldwin has held¹ that I overlook the fact that "the greater the fixity of habit the less the consciousness"—which would naturally lead us to expect that the Emotions under my definition would be unconscious: but here I think he himself overlooks the basic facts which lead to his statement just quoted; these facts implying indeed that thoroughly fixed habitual reactions must usually become unconscious, but on the other hand implying that in their very nature the particular kind of fixed reactions which are the coincidents of emotional reactions must as a rule appear in consciousness.

Psychologists are apt to speak of the disappearance from consciousness of the psychic coincidents of physical actions as though these latter were surreptitiously forced out of sight by a quasi Herbartian opposition; or more often as though, with less invasion of their individual rights, they disappear by a sort of mental endosmosis through some kind of psychic septum, which is spoken of as the "Schwelle" or "threshold"; and that they reappear above this septum, if ever, only by a process of psychic exosmosis. But in my view it is more logical to suppose that the reactions never lose their mentality; that this mentality exists as often as the physical action is called forth; but that in certain cases this mentality fails to affect consciousness; either because of an actual disruption of the physical connection with the brain which is the centre of the consciousness that determines our thinking ego; or perhaps because of a disconnection caused by lack of commensurability of rhythm with the rhythm of the brain action; or because of failure to gain those qualities which enable mere mentality to become objective to the ego in reflective consciousness.

Apart from the disconnections above mentioned, the activities whose coincidents disappear from consciousness are those which are not subject to unusually forceful reactions, and especially those which become rhythmically regular in action, the regularity having produced a perfect adjustment of nutritive supply to stimulus demand. As an example of these states we may mention the instinctive activities connected with respiration; which have become fixed within us through the inheritance of untold ages, which are thoroughly rhythmical, and which not

often in normal life call for powerful reactions. But once bring about inequality or especial forcefulness of these respiratory reactions, and notwithstanding their ordinary unconsciousness they will immediately make themselves painfully apparent in consciousness. So indeed is it with the mental side of all the physical activities which are usually out of consciousness: for instance, the mentality connected with intestinal action.

But the Emotions which we have under discussion are in their very nature dependent upon irregularity of recurrence and forcibleness of reaction. The latter characteristic, connected with the immediacy of the reaction, must indeed be retained as part and parcel of the Emotion if it is to remain of marked protective value. If the emotional activity is to be effective to the individual as he is related to the race it is of the utmost importance that it should continue to be immediate in its reaction and therefore forceful.

The irregularity of recurrence of emotional reaction is at once recognizable: but as a matter of fact if we bring about regularity of recurrence of these Emotions and reduce the force of their reaction, we find that even they lapse into unconsciousness. The hard worked boxing master finds it impossible ordinarily to strike his opponent with conscious anger. The marks of every-day family affection are not accompanied by the vivid emotional thrill that was yielded by the lover's embrace in the beginning of his courtship. In fact the typical Emotions are irregularly called forth and they are effective only because of their forcible reaction: where they become regular in action and lose their forcefulness they grade into unconsciousness as all other mental states do.

It becomes apparent therefore, it seems to me, that the "Imitation Instinct," the "Self Exhibiting Instinct," the "Art Instinct," and the "Benevolent Instincts" cannot be expected to become "emotional" in character unless, or until, they become immediately reactive; and unless, or until, they become relatively fixed so far as "content" is concerned.

Now these states of which I have been above speaking as "emotional" have evident racial significance in so far as they relate to the organism which reacts as a whole; and in this sense they may be called "primitive," for their life history dates back to the beginnings of organic life. But Pleasure and Pain, I have argued, are indices of effective or ineffective action in specific organs and therefore relate only indirectly to effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the individual as a whole, and much more indirectly to the individual in his relation to his race.

Pleasure and Pain thus appear as "primitive" in a much more fundamental way, in a much deeper sense, than the
Emotions, and I am free to confess I now see that it would have been better had I expressed this view clearly in my book instead of making the general statement, that "in both cases" (those of emotion and pleasure-pain) "we are able to trace their genesis back to the earliest developments of consciousness." I made this general statement however without thought that it might be interpreted to mean that I considered the genesis of Emotion and Pleasure-pain to have been coincident in time, or that I considered the advantage and disadvantage towards which, and from which, they guide to be of the same type. I stated the case as I did because I wished to avoid polemical discussion on points which were upon their face extraneous to the subject matter of the argument I was making: it being merely needful in that connection to show why it was natural that psychologists in the past had confounded the very diverse states—Emotion and Pleasure-Pain.

Let me now say a word about the genetic form of argument above referred to. I hold very strongly to the doctrine already stated in my book that the value of the genetic argument, doubtful even as far as I carried it, becomes more so the further we proceed, because of the uncertainty as to the history of our racial development. I remember well a conversation with Prof. Croom Robertson, which convinced me of the superior insight of the man, during which he said to me that he considered that developmental doctrines had thrown all the light they could shed upon psychology until we had further elucidated the essential nature of psychic processes as we experienced them. It is quite possible that since that day this elucidation may have been carried far enough to warrant us in turning again for light to genetic theories: but it must not be forgotten that in psychology, as in archaeology, the further back we go the more we are compelled to depend upon unverifiable hypotheses; and whilst I grant great speculative value to developments of thought in this direction I am free to confess that I do not think such speculations can have argumentative force unless they clearly fall in line with other lines of reasoning. In fact I should not have presented the schematization of the Emotions as I did had it not been that I found it corroborative of theses upheld by many other arguments and by many observations of fact, and had it not thus appeared that the probability of the correctness of the schematization was strengthened in the very fact that it did fall in line with the resultants of other forms of argument.

I still hold however that the genetic argument must be
used with great caution, and must be considered speculative rather than decisive.

Turning to my argument for the dualism between Emotion and Pleasure-Pain I think it will be well for me to say a word about the current tripartite division of mind, which is principally influential in leading psychologists to class Pleasure-Pain and Emotions together under the class "Feeling."

I have held that there is no adequate evidence in favour of this doctrine. It had its inception in metaphysical hypothesis, and has not been built up on solid psychologic foundation. The principal argument for the division is that which depends upon the notable subjectiveness of Pleasure-pain and Emotion, which brings about the classification of the two together under "Feeling," of which I have just spoken. Of this doctrine I shall treat later, but I cannot help quoting here a few words from Herbart's Lehrbuch, § 198, in reference to the notion of a subjectiveness set off against each objectiveness, upon which notion this tripartite division is founded. "It is a powerfully productive and persistent error of Idealism," Herbart says, "that the Ego sets itself over against the non-Ego: as if the thing were originally burthened with the negation of egohood. Under such a view there would never exist a thou nor a he: never would another personality be known other than one's self. Rather, is it true that whatever is grasped within is, so far as possible, carried over into what is outside of us. On this account, there appears with the Ego at once the Thou: and almost at the same moment with both the We: which fact Idealism forgets and must forget unless it wish to be awakened from its dream."

The doctrine of tripartism involves the contention "that feeling," to use the words of Prof. Dewey, "is unique and unsharable...cannot be defined...can only be felt." Of course I am perfectly willing to grant that there is a possibility, but of metaphysical interest only, that there exists this "feeling" capacity which we feel but never know; that feelings, as Dr Jas. Ward says, "are not known by being made objects of reflection" but that "we can only say that we know of them by their effects, i.e., which they produce in the character and succession of our presentations."

I have said that there is this possibility of the existence of this realm of "feeling"; but I must confess that from the psychologist's standpoint I think it does not amount to a probability. There is as much, and no more, ground for such a supposition, it appears to me, as there would be for the postulation of a special region of "attention," quasi mental only, which
one might claim to be known only by its effects; or for the postulation of a special mind activity to grasp "reality," let us say: reality being known only by the effects, i.e. the changes which it produces in the character and succession of our presentations.

In similar manner it seems to me we might postulate a large number of other mentalities, if we may so speak of them; holding that they are known only by their effects, which effects are the special characteristics of mental life with which psychology deals.

This process of postulation seems to me a strained one, even from the point of view of metaphysics; and so far as I can see should in no event be allowed to affect psychology, which has to deal almost exclusively with what can become objective in reflection: a correct psychology using postulates which depend upon argument from sources other than experience in reflection, only when these postulates seem forced upon us by overwhelming evidence.

In a "note" published in *Mind*, N. S. ii. 6, Miss C. A. Foley, in describing the late George Croom Robertson's teaching, makes the following statement; "after setting forth the nature of ethical philosophy and its connection with logic and æsthetics, he opened thus. The fact that we can distinguish these three regulative bodies of doctrine,—mutually independent,—mutually unresolvable,—exhaustive, is to be regarded as a decisive argument for the tripartite division of mind.

"In psychology it is often hard to isolate the three, and secure independence for them, but we can distinguish well enough that Intellection in the end has to be made True, Conation in the end has to be made Good, Feeling has to be raised to the level of the Beautiful, and we cannot add thereto. The summary is exhaustive."

This is the only statement of this special argument in favour of the tripartite division of mind that I remember to have seen, although long before Miss Foley's notes were printed it had occurred to me as an argument which might be made, and I had fully considered it. I did not discuss it in my book, for at the time the chapter relating to this subject was written no expression of it had reached my eye; and when I saw the note I hesitated to add reference to it, for I felt that the book was already overcrowded with polemical discussion and that it was not worth while then to raise a point which was not likely to be brought forward in objection by others, and which I had already considered and answered to my own satisfaction. I think that in this connection however it may be well to
explain the reason why I do not consider the argument to be forceful.

In order to show that this “exhaustive threefoldness of the regulative bodies of doctrine,” as Robertson called it, is not a conclusive argument for the tripartite division of mind, I think one ought to be able to show what is the probable basis of this threefoldness of doctrine and that it can be conceived to have arisen without any dependence upon the supposititious tripartite division of mind. This I shall now attempt to do.

It seems to me that in our search for relative stability,—for reality,—in mental experience, we gain the general conception of the True. The conception of Truth is applicable to all of our mental life, so far as it presents to us the conditions of reality; that is so far as it presents stability in relation to the field in connection with which the special mental complex under consideration is conceived.

Again; for very obvious reasons, there arises naturally within us a distinction between receptive and reactive states of mind; between psychoses of impression and psychoses of expression. We undertake then to reach the real,—the relatively stable,—in these two great regions of experience.

Impression however gives us the most variable and relatively unpredictable of mental phenomena in Sensations, which are produced by the most variable of influences upon us from without ourselves. Some quality which goes with all of these Sensations, and which is determined by conditions of the organism rather than by those of the environment, and which quality might be held in relative stability, would be naturally seized upon here for use in our search after reality, and such a quality we have in Pleasure. But relatively stable Pleasure I have, in my book above mentioned, shown; I think, to be of the very essence of Beauty; hence it appears that the search for the real in the region of impression gives us the notion of the Beautiful.

If, on the other hand, we search for the real,—the relatively stable,—in the region of expression, our thought is turned to the mental states which we conceive of as the impulses to this expression; and we look therefore for relative stability of impulse, which in its turn gives us our ethic standards; and we thus obtain the conception of the Good.

Now, if this argument be correct, it is apparent that the True is a category which relates to all of our conceptions and must therefore relate to the Beautiful and to the Good themselves; and we have evidence of the correctness of this view in the fact that the Beautiful and the Good are always truly beautiful, and truly good; whilst on the other hand it cannot
be held that all of the true is beautifully true, nor that all of
the true can be considered good.

How then comes it that we hold the three in a trinity? Emphatic impression and emphatic expression when considered
with care do not cover all of our mental experience; a residuum
remains which is neither identifiable with the one nor with the
other. In the residual region, in the very nature of the case,
there being no impression, the category of the Beautiful will
not obtain; and there being no expression, the category of the
Good will not obtain; but the category of the True, which is all
pervasive, will still hold, and we thus obtain a very special
emphasis of the reality of Truth in the broad region of what is
called intellectual activity; so great an emphasis of it, in fact, that
we come ordinarily, yet quite improperly, to narrow the realm of
Truth to intellectual phenomena: i.e. to phenomena which are
neither notably impressive nor expressive. Thus, properly
speaking, the True is more fundamental than the Beautiful and
the Good, but as the Beautiful and the Good occupy so em-
phatic a part in our experience, we place them on a par with
the wider reality Truth, which appears marked where the
Beautiful and the Good are wanting.

It thus appears, it seems to me, that we are able satisfac-
torily to account for the existence of the “exhaustive three-
foldness of the regulative bodies of doctrine,” of which Robertson
spoke, without recourse to the hypothesis of the tripartite
division of mind. In fact I am much inclined to believe that
the existence of this trinity of Realities has been the main
basis of the statement of the doctrine of tripartism, although
there is certainly a further basis in psychologic experience
which I discuss below.

Now let us consider in part the argument for the dualism
between Pleasure-Pain and Emotion which I defend. Pleasures
and Pains are surely not identifiable without reserve with the
Emotions if we mean to describe by the word “Emotions”
those states of excitation of which the most typical cases are
Joy, Sorrow, Anger, Fear, Love, Surprise, etc. Nor can it be
shown in any way I feel sure that the “essence of Emotion is
Pleasure and Pain.” As Dr James so well says in his discus-
sion of this special statement by Dr Worcester, “this is a
hackneyed psychological doctrine but...one of the most artificial
and scholastic of the untruths that disfigure our science.” The
uninitiated student of psychology indeed who takes up the
ordinary standard text-books will come naturally to the opinion

1 Psychological Review, I. p. 525, September 1894.
that the best recognized authorities,—Professors Bain and Sully for instance,—do in some way class Pleasure-pain and Emotions together.

I would not claim that either Prof. Bain or Prof. Sully attempts to carry out anything like a thoroughgoing classification of "Pleasure and Pain" under "Emotions" nor on the other hand of "Emotions" under "Pleasure and Pain," but they surely are representative of a large body of psychologists who do think there is some basis for the identification of these two classes of psychic phenomena.

But if this doctrine has become current it must have some basis in psychologic experience, and we are compelled to ask how its existence can be accounted for if it be not valid.

This doctrine, in my opinion, has become current because of our attempt to bind together two distinctly diverse empirical methods of classification, both of which have been and are still most valuable aids in our study of psychic life, but which should properly be treated as diverse.

We have first a natural bipartite classification determined by the distinctions in consciousness which appear (1st) in the attitude of receptivity from our environment, and (2nd) in the attitude of reaction upon our environment.

We have secondly a more subtle classification, also bipartite, according to which objectivity is opposed to subjectivity. It seems to me that it is in the attempt to combine together these two forms of classification that we reach the current tripartite division of mental phenomena into Knowing, Feeling, and Willing.

I think the argument that is to follow may be made clearer by the use of a diagram, which, while somewhat fanciful, some may say, is on the whole accurate enough for our purpose here, and will serve to render clear the distinc-

1 I have already spoken of this in a discussion in Mind, N.S. Nov. 1894.
tions I make. The line on which is printed the words Sensation, Intellect, Pleasure-Pain, Emotion, Will, the names of the most marked natural divisions of mental phenomena, serves as a mere line of demarcation. Above it, so far as the receptive-reactive quality is concerned, all is receptive; below it all reactive. So far as the subjective-objective quality is concerned all above it is subjective; all below it objective. By the two curves I mean to indicate the regions of consciousness in which we notice the emphasis of each one of these two sets of mutually exclusive qualities. Where the receptive-reactive curve vibrates across the line, I mean to indicate indefiniteness in consciousness as to this quality.

It appears from the curves that there is a natural bond between Sensation and Intellect on both the receptive-reactive and the subjective-objective classifications: that there is a bond between Pleasure-pain and Emotion on the subjective-objective basis; the receptive-reactive quality being unmarked: that with Will there is a common and coordinate emphasis of the reactive, and also of the objective, after the subjective inception has passed out of consideration.

Knowing and the Willing are the elements in which are emphasized the distinct receptive and reactive characteristics, but Knowing and Willing are not beyond the pale of the objective-subjective distinction. On the other hand Pleasure-Pain and the Emotions are characterized by their notable subjectivity; and it is upon the importance of our subjective attitude in relation to pleasure and pain that some of our masters (Dr James Ward for instance) base their defence of this distinct nature of pleasure-pain: but in fact it seems to me also that the subjective-objective distinction is quite compatible with, although not co-ordinate with, the receptive-reactive distinction; the subjective-objective distinction surely is not limited to pleasure-pain nor to any of its supposed derivatives, but relates also in less clear-cut manner to the phenomena which are usually treated under “Knowing” and “Willing.”

The Emotions hold a position which is especially liable to make their classification difficult: for they are notably algodonc, and this connection with Pleasure and Pain leads us to class them on the subjective-objective scheme with pleasure-pain phenomena, which on the basis of this subjective-objective distinction, have come to be considered as a class apart; and thus Pleasure-pain and the Emotions are lumped together under the general class of “Feeling.” On the other hand the Emotions have also distinct characteristics which lead us to adopt the receptive-reactive classification; having a natural tendency to be held together with Will phenomena, as is apparent in the
classificatory distinctions which engaged the attention of philosophers from the time of Aristotle to that day when the weight of Kant's influence fixed upon us the baneful tripartite division.

It is the hidden fact that Dr James' Emotional theory breaks down the connection of Emotion with "Feeling" as subjective attitude that leads, I surmise, to the opposition to the acceptance of his view which appears among those who hold to the old time authoritative doctrine of the uncognitive nature of Pleasure-Pain and Will: but it seems to me that even though Dr James be not right in detail he surely has established one particular point, viz. that Emotion is less well classifiable on the subjective-objective scheme and better on the receptive-reactive scheme, as reactive.

I have argued that the typical states which give the word Emotion its distinctive meaning for us all, are those relatively fixed psychoses, which I have called "instinct feelings," which appear in consciousness as coincident with correspondingly fixed coordinations of instinctive activities, arising upon the presentation of determinate objective conditions.

Now if this be true it is certainly clear that the separation of Pleasure and Pain from the Emotions is a psychological necessity; for it is manifestly impossible to hold that Pleasures and Pains are "relatively fixed psychoses," or that they "correspond to fixed co-ordinations of instinctive activities," or "arise upon the presentation of determinate objective conditions." Or, to use Professor James' terms, it is clearly impossible to think of pleasures and pains as "our feelings of the bodily changes which follow directly the perception of existing facts."

Moreover, Pleasures and Pains are not determined by percepts as Emotions are; they are part and parcel of the elements which go to make up these percepts, as well as of the simpler states which we call Sensations, to go no further. Again, pleasure-pain modes do not differ radically with the differences of content to which they are attached, as Emotions do. The Pains of sorrow and the Pains of fear are not essentially diverse, nor are the Pleasures of love and those of triumph opposed in any way, notwithstanding the great distinction between the states to which they are attached. Moreover, the inhibition of the expressions of Pain and of those of Pleasure produces no reduction but more often an aggravation of the Pain, and certainly does not exclude the Pleasure: but with the Emotions, inhibition of expression at once produces a deduction from their very essence. Again, pleasure-pain modes cannot, with the least degree of certainty, be brought about by will or by accident, through the stimulation of the activities which have
before brought them to us, as Prof. James has shown to be possible to some extent with the Emotions. The identical objects, the very same sensations which on one day give us Pleasure on another day produce Pain.

It becomes apparent then, it seems to me, that the true relation between Pleasure-pain and the Emotions is this: The Emotions are complicated psychoses which almost invariably involve either repressions or hypernormal activities, either of which are determinants of Pleasure or Pain. The Emotions as a class, therefore, must be notably algogenic, as we find them; but this fact surely gives us no logical ground for the treatment of the "Emotions" as a sub-class under "Pleasure and Pain," nor of "Pleasure and Pain" as a class under "Emotions."