AESCHYLUS'S PHYSIOLOGY OF THE EMOTIONS

At least since the appearance of T. B. L. Webster's important article, "Some Psychological Terms in Greek Tragedy," it has been recognized that "Aeschylus is concerned to express as exactly as possible by imagery and description what happens in . . . moments of psychological stress." Yet Webster himself speaks of a "great overlap of meanings" in "psychological" terms as used by the tragedians; he attributes it "partly . . . to the convenience of poetry, partly to the traditional use of the same words for mental functions which were in Plato's time differentiated." An examination of Aeschylean use of such vocabulary, however, will suggest that whatever may be true of other poets before Plato, Aeschylus had a clear and, for the most part, a consistently maintained conception of the nature, the distinct functions, and the interrelations of the several faculties of thought and feeling. If there is any "overlap" at all, it is not significant. Thus I would like to argue that Aeschylean usage implies an even more "exact" explanation of how human beings think and feel than Webster and subsequent writers allow.

This discussion will concentrate on the three most common "psychological" terms in Aeschylus: the phren or phrenes, the kardia or kear, and the thumos—especially the latter two, since the essential character of the phren has been described by others. The phren and kardia, in Aeschylus, clearly can denote bodily organs as well as the processes that occur there (although whether the phren is the midriff or, as Onians argues, the lungs, is still disputed). The thumos, however, though it may have a physiological reality, seems not to be properly an

1JHS 77 (1957), 149-54. The quotations in this paragraph are from pp. 152 and 154 respectively. This article, standard editions of Aeschylus, and the following other works will be referred to by the author's name alone: R. B. Onians, The Origins of European Thought (Cambridge 1951); J. de Romilly, La crainte et l'angoisse dans le théâtre d'Eschyle (Paris 1958); David Sansone, Aeschylean Metaphors for Intellectual Activity (Hermes Einzelschriften 35) (Wiesbaden 1975). References to Aeschylean passages are from Page's OCT, except where indicated. Since the question of authenticity has not been settled, it seems reasonable to treat the Prometheus Bound as by Aeschylus.

2On Aeschylus's (relatively infrequent) use of other terms, see the end of this paper. The ἰμπαρ, about which enough has been said by Onians (pp. 84–89) and de Romilly (pp. 28–31), will enter the discussion below at only one point. I have found no difference in Aeschylus, in usage or meaning, between singular phren and plural phrenes, or between kardia and kear.
organ. Therefore, in speaking collectively of the phren, kardia, and thumos and their functions, I adopt the somewhat ambiguous term “faculties” rather than “organs.”

By the nature of dramatic poetry, Aeschylus offers, not an explicit theory, but allusions, at various points in his plays, to these faculties, whether singly (as often) or in combination. Most, perhaps all, such passages, however, refer to a coherent underlying conception of the faculties of thought and emotion. From them we can gain a cumulative understanding of that conception. And there is one choral ode that names thumos, kardia, and phren together with apparent emphasis on a clearly delimited relationship among them. That is the third stasimon of the Agamemnon. It contains the most detailed references to these faculties in all of surviving tragedy (a sign, perhaps, of Aeschylus’s particular concern with them). Even here, however, the style is allusive, the language obscure to a non-Greek audience; and although this ode will interest us especially, it will have to be approached through the use of other passages for comparison and illustration.

We shall be concerned mainly with these passages of the stasimon:

(1) a. Ag. 975–83:

τίπτε μοι τόδ’ ἐμπέδως
deíma proostatíriov
καρδίας τερασκόπου ποτάται;
μαντιπολεὶ δ’ ἀκέλευστος ἀμισθος ἀοιδά,  ouch’ ἀποπτύσαι δίκαιν
dυσκρίτων δνειράτων
θάρσος εὐπειθές ἣ.
ζει φρενός φίλον θρόνον.

b. Ag. 990–97:

tὸν δ’ ἀνευ λύρας ὄμως ὑμνωῦει
θρήνον Ἐρινύος αὐτοδίδακτος ἐσωθεν
θυμός, οὗ τὸ πᾶν ἔχων
ἐλπίδος φίλον θράσος.
sπλάγχνα δ’ οὔτοι ματά·
ζει πρός ἐνδίκοις φρεσίν
tελεσφόροις δίναις κυκλούμενον κέαρ.

c. Ag. 1025–34:

eἰ δὲ μὴ τεταγμένα
μοῖρα μοῖραν ἐκ θεῶν
eἰργε μὴ πλέον φέρειν,
προφθάσασα καρδία
The remarkable feature of these lines is that in describing the emotion aroused by Agamemnon's return from Troy, the way he enters the palace, and Clytemnestra's conduct, the chorus do not merely say, "for some reason I am afraid." They try to be much more precise. Their fear expresses itself as a physical sensation, and they attribute the causes of that sensation separately to the faculties that together constitute the personality. Each faculty evidently has its characteristic mode of response to a situation, which is described in terms particular to it: the *thumos* sings, the prophetic *kardia* whirls and at the end of the ode mutters painfully in darkness, the *phren* is inflamed. We can begin to sort out the differences among these faculties by considering the nature of the *phren* briefly.

I. The Phren in Relation to the Other Faculties

Webster and Sansone have argued in effect that the *phren* performs conscious, rational functions, whereas the *thumos* and *kardia* are seats of emotion, instinct, and other processes which today we would call "pre-conscious." According to Sansone, the *phren*’s characteristic functions are cognition, intellection, speech, and also prophecy—the *techne* of professional seers, whereas intuitive premonition originates in the *thumos* or *kardia* (cf. καρδίας τερασκόπου, *Ag.* 977). The *thumos* and *kardia* can also perform "intellectual operations," says Webster, but "probably only when emotion is involved." Conversely, the *phren* can feel emotion; but when it takes an active role (as opposed to being merely affected and—in some cases—dominated by emotion) it enables the person to reason and speak about the causes. And as we shall find later on, Aeschylus seems to conceive of a physiological process whereby feelings come to affect the *phren*.

---

3 For prophecy, see Sansone, pp. 40–53, and especially pp. 48–51 (on the third stasimon of the *Agamemnon*).
4 Webster, p. 152. Cf. Sansone, p. 84 (on the reception of speech): "if the perception of the *logos* is accompanied by an emotional reaction the organ of perception is the *kardia, thumos*, etc. If it is accompanied by understanding of a situation, a reasoned change of mind, etc., the organ of perception is the *phren*."

---
This "dualist" interpretation, however, has recently been challenged by Pierre Judet de la Combe in his commentary on the third stasimon of the *Agamemnon*.\(^5\) If this view necessarily entailed the consequences that he says it does—denial of an anatomical reference in *phren*, *thumos*, and *kardia*, and the assimilation to each other of the epithets ἐνδίκοις and τελεσφοροῖς in *Ag.* 996 and 997—his criticism would be just. But it does not. Judet de la Combe's main target is Fraenkel, who makes abstractions of the terms in question and considers the reason for the chorus's fear (δείμα, *Ag.* 976), and hence the entire situation, the object of their conscious knowledge.\(^6\) It is possible, however, to adopt the "dualist" position, to assign to the various faculties distinct anatomical connections, and to attribute different cognitive functions to them: the fear in this case is premonition of the *thumos* and *kardia*, as opposed to what would be the rational knowledge of the *phren*. Sansone take this view, in my opinion correctly. Judet de la Combe objects that the chorus's fear is well founded ("les organes font voir le vrai").\(^7\) And so it is; but it does not follow that the chorus, at this point in the play, comprehend what some (non-rational) part of them forebodes. In fact, it is essential for an understanding of the ode to recognize that they do not.\(^8\)

According to Judet de la Combe's own careful reading of the stasimon, in lines 995–97 the *phren*, the diaphragm or "stable center," understands the requirements of *dike* (Agamemnon's doom), and the *kardia*, by its swelling, sends this recognition and the accompanying fear in waves of blood to the periphery of the body and to ultimate fulfillment.

---


\(^6\)Fraenkel, pp. 447–50, 451–52. See especially p. 447 ("Anatomical details, however, should not be dragged in; they would obscure the meaning") and p. 451 ("In the words of this chorus everything is sharp and distinct . . . A firm line is drawn between dreams which admit of this or that interpretation, and the δείμα, which is so frightful because it is so certain").

\(^7\)Judet de la Combe, pp. 229–30, n. 2.

\(^8\)Sansone (p. 51) recognizes this point ("The chorus in the *Agamemnon* . . . feel in their *thymos* that something is not quite right but cannot say what it is"), but does not pursue it. Judet de la Combe unnecessarily limits the possibilities when he says (p. 229), "Le parti à prendre est clair: ou bien on donne à φρεσίν, avec Fraenkel, mais aussi Deniston-Page . . . un sens abstrait (‘esprit’), et les deux autres termes prennent alors une valeur vague (‘cœur’), propre à désigner le siège des émotions, ou bien l’on coordonne les trois organes dans une structure où, quelle que soit la fonction de chacun, ils sont associés à une perception commune." As will become apparent, I would also take issue with the last phrase.
Although the operations of *phren* and *kardia* are thus not opposed but complementary, this model retains the essential dualism—that it is intended to eliminate. And this dualism becomes more pronounced in the discussion of the end of the ode. By that point, it is claimed, the body is divided, and the *phren* and *kardia* have undergone a reversal in their functioning. Now the *kardia*, out of affection for Agamemnon, hopes, against the chorus's better knowledge, that the laws of *dike* will not be applied to him, and the *phren* is inflamed and reduced to silence. This reversal is an awkward, if not a hazardous, assumption. And there are other difficulties. It is not clear how the *thumos* fits into the proposed scheme. And the chorus's prayer in lines 998–1000, expressed in the first person, leads Judet de la Combe to postulate, as fundamental to his whole interpretation, an implausible divorce and opposition between the “I” (whatever it is) and the inner faculties that should be its constituent elements.9

There is, then, room for a different reading. For now, let us note that a dualism between the *phren* and the other faculties, between the intellect and the less rational elements, seems inescapable—especially in view of other Aeschylean uses of *phren* studied by Webster and Sansone. I would go further than those writers and suggest that in Aeschylus *phren* nearly always carries the notion of rational thought and intellectual understanding, even in most, if not all, of the passages in which, according to Sansone, it is used “loosely” and one of the other terms would have been equally appropriate.10 It is impossible to prove this statement, of course; the argument would necessarily be circular. I would claim only that those passages make good sense when read consistently with what, in the light of many other passages, is Aeschylus's normal usage of *phren*. I shall give one example, to clarify the distinction between the *phren* and the other faculties and to show how it might be applied to “questionable” occurrences of the word.

(2) In *Pers.* 10–11, the chorus locate their anxiety for the departed

---

9Such an opposition may appear at times in the Homeric poems (for sensible discussion see A. W. H. Adkins, *From the Many to the One: A Study of Personality and Views of Human Nature in the Context of Ancient Greek Society, Values, and Beliefs* [Ithaca 1970] 22–27, 45–47). But I know of no clear example of a similar distinction in surviving Aeschylus. In the present case, the implications of the first-person ending of the verb cannot fairly be pressed.

10Sansone, p. 25: *Ag.* 805 “is probably an example of the rather loose use of ‘phren’ when ‘kardia’ would do just as well.” There, and on pp. 16, 17–18, 51–52, and 70, he cites other Aeschylean passages as examples of the same imprecision.
army in the *thumos* (κακόμαντις ἀγαν ὀρσολοπεῖται / θυμός ἔσωθεν). Later (116) they speak of fear gashing the *phren* (μελαγχίτων φρήν ἀμύσσεται φόβῳ), whereas not long afterward the Queen uses the same verb of the effect of care on her *kardia* (161: καὶ με καρδίαν ἀμύσσει φροντίς). Then, a few lines later (165), she speaks of a “double anxiety” in her *phrenes*.\(^{11}\) We might dismiss this language as reflecting only a vague notion of inner processes; but—especially since the references appear so close together—we might equally wonder if it is not used with some degree of precision. The chorus begin with vague intimations of danger to their army. Lacking the gift of prophecy, they have only this intuition, of which the *thumos* is an appropriate source.\(^{12}\) But after their introductory anapaests they try to explain the causes of their anxiety. By line 116 they have mentioned the all-encompassing snares of Ate (93–100) and the Persians’ attempt to extend their supremacy on land (conferred by Moira) to the sea by bridging the Hellespont (101–14). They can now formulate precisely what it is they fear: that Susa, empty of men, will hear the lament for the Persian host. This fear is felt and understood by the *phren* (116–18). Thus we witness the process by which a premonition in the *thumos* is brought up to consciousness so that an account can be given of it. The Queen’s speech shows a parallel development. At first there is the emotion itself, located in the *kardia*. Then she begins to speak about it (ἐς δ’ ὑμᾶς ἔρω / μοθὸν, 161–62) and formulates it consciously (163–69). The transfer from *kardia* (161) to *phren* (165) is fitting and intelligible. Nor is there any contradiction between lines 116 and 161. Both *phren* and *kardia* can be “gashed” by emotion, and the *phren* can be “blackened” by it, like the *kardia* or *σπλάγχνα* elsewhere in Aeschylus (*Sup.* 785, *Cho.* 413). Although the way they are affected can be described in similar terms, these faculties are distinct in their essential character.

**II. Thumos and Kardia**

The “dualist” interpretation, though it seems correct, holds this danger, as Judet de la Combe points out: that one is tempted to lump together the irrational faculties in opposition to the *phren*. The question of the difference between the *thumos* and the *kardia*, when it is

---

\(^{11}\)Cf. Sansone, p. 74: “it would be foolish to press any distinction between the two organs here [i.e., *phren* at 116 and *kardia* at 161].” Cf. his remarks on pp. 51–52.

\(^{12}\)Cf. the chorus’s description of themselves at 224 as θυμόμαντις, and Broadhead’s note on that line.
raised at all, usually elicits a confession of helplessness.\textsuperscript{13} Certainly these faculties are very closely related, but Aeschylus distinguishes between them in a uniform and essentially straightforward manner. Here we shall have to consider a number of passages other than the third stasimon of the \textit{Agamemnon}, but they will help us when we return to it in Section III below. They will show that, whereas both faculties are the seats of often violent emotion untempered by reason, the \textit{thumos} is involved in its onset, and when it has taken hold and become established, its location is the \textit{kardia}. Practically as a consequence of this rather mechanical distinction, the \textit{kardia} often feels more complex emotions than the \textit{thumos}. A good way to test for the basic difference is to consider those moments when \textit{thumos} and \textit{kardia} are said to undergo the same experience.

(3) Both can be objects of the verbs \textit{δάκω} or \textit{δάπτω}, which Aeschylus seems to have treated as roughly similar in meaning.\textsuperscript{14} In the parodos of the \textit{Suppliants}, the chorus describe their response to their predicament in this way (Sup. 70–71):

\begin{quote}
\textit{δάπτω τάν ἀπαλαν Νειλοθερῆ παρειαν ἀπειρόδακρυν τε καρδίαν}.
\end{quote}

The danger has threatened them for some time, and their state of fear and grief is a continuing one. More immediate is the onrush of desire that “bites” the \textit{thumos} in the presence of Helen, the \textit{δηξίθυμον ἔρωτος ἄνθος}, when sight of her strikes the eyes (Ag. 742–43). Contrast this in turn with Zeus’s love for Io, who “warms” his \textit{kear} with desire (P. V. 590–91); here not the initial response is referred to, but a feeling which has had time to settle in the heart, although it is clearly still intense. Again, the power that the \textit{daimon} wields through Agamemnon’s murderers is \textit{καρδιόδηκτον} to the chorus (Ag. 1471). Clearly the tyranny, continuing over time, will inflict a constant stab of pain upon the hearts of the oppressed. The best example, however, is the \textit{ὦμοδακῆς . . . ἰμερος} to fight his brother that seizes Eteokles (Sept. 692). This is surely the same as the \textit{θυμοπληθῆς δορίμαργος ἀτα} mentioned a few lines before, where the chorus urge him, \textit{κακοῦ δ’ ἐκβαλ’ ἔρωτος}

\textsuperscript{13} Webster refers to “\textit{thumos}/\textit{kardia},” and de Romilly translates both words indifferently as “coeur.” \textit{Thumos} drops out of Judet de la Combe’s discussion, as we have seen. Sansone briefly and inconclusively discusses the problem on p. 50, n. 27 (cf. de Romilly, pp. 42–43). Onians makes clear what the physiological distinction between \textit{thumos} and \textit{kardia} might be, but is not much concerned with differentiating their functions.

\textsuperscript{14} Cf. Sansone, pp. 11–12, where he lists the passages.
The impulse of the moment, in its initial assault (ἀρχή), fills the thumos.\(^{15}\)

(4) Fear can affect both kardia and thumos. The inhabitants of Egypt “trembled in their thumos” at the extraordinary sight of Io (θυμὸν πάλλοντο, Sup. 565–67), whereas the chorus’s kardia later throbs with fear (πάλλεται ... καρδία, Sup. 785). Although the same verb appears in both passages (it is actually more appropriate to the palpitation of the heart), in the first the Egyptians react at the moment of seeing Io (cf. Ag. 743 in [3] above). In the second, the chorus have already responded in agitated dochmiacs (Sup. 734–63) to the news of their cousins’ arrival, and they are now left alone to cope with their fear. This emotion, it could also be argued, is an extension of what they have felt throughout the play. Kardia is also used at line 799 of their settled aversion to the threatened marriage.

(5) “Don’t you know,” Okeanos asks Prometheus, “that words are the healers of a sick orge?” (P. V. 377–78). Prometheus replies (379–80):

εἶν τις ἐν καϊρῷ γε μαλθάσσῃ κέαρ
καὶ μὴ σφραγῶντα θυμὸν ἰσχναίνη βία.

“From these lines,” Sansone comments, “it is clear that thymos and kear represent the same thing, namely the seat of orge (‘disposition’).”\(^{16}\) Orge here seems to mean something stronger: wrath. The point at issue is when and how Zeus’s mind will “be lightened of” anger (χόλος, line 376). And thumos and kear seem to be distinct, to judge only from the different—indeed, antithetical—operations needed to assuage them. The thumos is said to be “swelling” and to require “drying out,”\(^{17}\) whereas the kear can be “softened.” The context will help us sort out this difference. Okeanos has offered to pacify Zeus, and Prometheus has replied that he cannot now be persuaded (P. V. 332–33). When Okeanos again invokes the power of words, Prometheus answers that it is not yet the right time for that. Καιρὸς seems to refer to some future

---

\(^{15}\) Contrast P. V. 437, of an emotion settled in the kear, by which Prometheus is “bitten” and which has been keeping him from speaking. Ag. 791–92 concerns the “bite of grief” going to the liver. In context, this is clearly an immediate response (everyone pretends to mourn over one in misfortune, but the true spontaneous feeling is not there). At Ag. 432 this spontaneity is not clearly indicated but may be implied (reference to the liver is thus more graphic than reference to the kardia would be). For the similarity of the liver’s response to that of the thumos, see example (12) below.

\(^{16}\) Sansone, p. 69.

\(^{17}\) On moisture as characteristic of the affected thumos, see Onians, pp. 46–48.
time when Zeus will be ripe for reconciliation;\textsuperscript{18} then the anger will have settled in his \textit{kear}, which will be susceptible to language's soothing effect. As it is now, this feeling is raw and new, and therefore in the \textit{thumos}. The violence of Zeus's rage can only be met by force, not with words.\textsuperscript{19} The passage thus beautifully illustrates the distinction between these faculties.

We come now to two more doubtful cases.

(6) Words can arouse as well as calm emotion. In \textit{Eum}. 465–67 they "goad" the \textit{kardia}, and at \textit{Sup}. 466 Pelasgos calls the Danaids' threat to hang themselves "a \textit{logos} that lashes the \textit{kardia}." But shortly before, words agitate the \textit{thumos} (\textit{Sup}. 448).\textsuperscript{20} In this last passage the subject is clearly the immediate reaction, and it would be entirely consistent with the context of the first to say that it concerns more permanent effects of speech. In \textit{Sup}. 466 Pelasgos may have in mind the agitation he will feel as long as his dilemma lasts (\textit{Sup}. 468–77). At \textit{Cho}. 410–11, the \textit{kear} (if that is the right reading) throbs in response to a lament just heard. But the chorus go on to describe a more lasting state of oscillation between hope and despair (\textit{Cho}. 412–17), and the reference to \textit{kear} may thus have point. The \textit{σπλάγχνα}, mentioned in line 413 as affected by speech, would include the \textit{thumos} as well as \textit{kear}. But we can be certain about none of these passages.

(7) A similar difficulty arises in connection with passages concerning zeal or partisanship. When the Danaids beg the king to hear them \textit{πρόφρονι καρδία} (\textit{Sup}. 348–49), they clearly want him to feel more than momentary favor. On the other hand, Athena says that she sides with the male \textit{άπαντι θυμῷ} (\textit{Eum}. 738). Does the phrase imply the promptness of her enthusiasm on every occasion on which she might have to make the choice, so that \textit{thumos} here is more emphatic than \textit{kardia} would have been? It is hard to be certain, even though a very similar meaning is surely suggested when Agamemnon tells his attendants to raise Iphigeneia above the altar \textit{παντὶ θυμῷ} (\textit{Ag}. 233). The attendants will have performed a repellent act like this sacrifice more on

\textsuperscript{18}For \textit{καυρός} in connection with this future moment, see \textit{P. V}. 523.

\textsuperscript{19}On the general sense of this passage, see schol. on line 380: νῦν οὖν ἐν ἀκμῇ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἐστὶ Ζεὺς καὶ οὐ πείσεται. Cf. also Thomson's note on the passage (his lines 393–96), especially for the medical connotations of the language, which seem to follow from \textit{ιατροὶ} in 378.

\textsuperscript{20}Speech can also charm away the effect of intemperate words (\textit{Sup}. 447), as in example (5), but which faculty it affects is not specified in this case. This line, however, is certainly out of order in the manuscript and may not belong here.
the impulse of the moment than by a settled resolution. (See also Cho. 421-22 in example [8] below.)

In a few cases, then, it may not be legitimate, though it is possible, to claim much difference between thumos and kardia. That is not surprising, or significant, in view of the kinship between the faculties that these words denote. The remarkable fact is that in the great majority of instances a distinction is maintained.

(8) A final group of passages will illustrate the general nature of these faculties: those in which they both seem roughly equivalent to what we would call “spirit.” In Cho. 831-32, kardia implies “resolve,” a fixed and stable emotion. Contrast Cho. 421-22:

λύκος γὰρ ὡστ’ ὠμόφρων ἄσαντος ἐκ
matroσ̃ esti thumοs̃.

Thumos here is at once “anger” and “the seat of anger,” and this term (rather than kardia) implies a readiness to respond instantly and fiercely at any moment, as the simile shows. Like a wolf, the thumos is alert, poised for attack, menacing. The animal simile reveals an essential aspect of the thumos, its instinctual nature. At moments of danger, especially in war, when human life approaches the conditions of the natural world, the thumos is aroused for the sake of destruction and self-preservation. So in Sept. 52-53 the Argives’ thumos breathes like that “of lions with Ares in their glance.” Of the other passages in this category, Pers. 767 implies that the phren governs and restrains what would otherwise be a reflexive and unmediated response (of the thumos) to a situation, and P. V. 536-39 envisions such responses in a positive form, on festive occasions.

21Cf. Ag. 48, of a war-cry proceeding from the thumos (as opposed to articulate speech, whose source is usually the phren), just before the famous vulture-simile.

22On the general sense of this line see Broadhead, p. 193 (he accepts, however, Tucker’s imprecise translation of thumos as “heart”). I differ here with Webster (p. 152), who considers thumos in this place interchangeable with kardia in Cho. 391 (discussed below, example [10]) because of the similar ship-metaphor. But as we have seen, the same figure of speech can be used of the operations of several faculties, which remain essentially distinct.

23I have concentrated here on passages in which kardia and thumos might at first seem the same. For some other examples of settled feeling clearly in the kardia, see Cho. 102, Eum. 679-80 (cf. Webster, p. 152), P. V. 184-85. Pers. 10-11 (thumos) and 161 (kardia) are more difficult (see example [2] above). Perhaps the chorus describe a feeling of dread that is particularly strong at this moment, although they have clearly been worried for some time, whereas the Queen lays stress on feelings about which she has been
The *thumos*, to judge from the passages considered above, can feel anger, fear, zeal, love (sudden, piercing desire), and battle-fury. We shall find later that it is probably also aroused by hatred, sudden shock, and envy, and it plays a part in premonition. Aside, perhaps, from premonition, these are what we might call “primary” emotions. The *kardia* can feel all of them, and more: hope (*Ag.* 11), joyful optimism (*Ag.* 479–81, 592), grief (*Sept.* 834, 968, *Cho.* 26–27), determination (*Cho.* 831–32), and others to which it would be harder to put a name (*Sup.* 799, *Eum.* 679–80, *Ag.* 1470–71, *P. V.* 184–85, 437, and perhaps *Cho.* 410–11 and *Sup.* 466). These are all irrational feelings, but many are more subtle than those proper also to the *thumos*. The affective life of the *kardia* is richer, more varied, more complex—as we should expect of a faculty connected not with the first onslaught of emotion but with its riper and more elaborated form.

Intensity of emotion in itself does not differentiate *thumos* from *kardia*; they are pretty much equal on that score, and feeling is not dulled when it settles in the *kardia*. Even when reference to the *thumos* lends particular immediacy and vividness to a passage, as in *Cho.* 421–22 (example [8] above), that is because the *thumos* is more autonomous and volatile than the *kardia*. If the *thumos* was indeed thought of as vapor from blood—blood that flows more strongly in heart and lungs at times of emotional stress—which would explain its character as Aeschylus seems to conceive it and its difference from the *kardia*.

### III. The interaction of Thumos, Kardia, and Phren

It is not so much the individual nature of these faculties in Aeschylus that is of final importance as the way they seem to be coordinated in a system, so that their interactions determine a character’s response to a situation. The notion of such a system evidently underlies Aeschylus’s thinking about “psychology” and motivation. The passages that suggest an interaction of two or three faculties point toward a particular conception of how it happens that a person makes choices rationally or else is overwhelmed by involuntary emotions. Preeminent among such passages is the third stasimon of the *Agamemnon*, to which we can now return.

meditating after her dream and the subsequent omen (*Pers.* 176–214). Or perhaps this is another doubtful instance, despite the consistency in distinguishing *phren* from *thumos* and *kardia*.

---

24Onians, pp. 46–50.
I have argued elsewhere\(^{25}\) that, in lines 1025–29 of this ode (example [Ic] above), the two moirai in the immediate context are those of the tongue and the *kardia* respectively. The general rule that one moira limits another is thus used to explain why the heart cannot get ahead of the tongue and “pour out these things.” Since articulate speech requires use of the tongue under prompting of the *phren*,\(^{26}\) the chorus cannot express what is in the *kardia* because that has not entered the *phren*. That is, they do not understand it rationally and therefore cannot transform it into a *logos*. Throughout the stasimon the chorus have tried to articulate the forebodings of their instinctive faculties, which have been aroused by the preceding episode. The pain in the *kardia* and the inflammation of the *phren* (lines 1030–34) are sensations that remain after this attempt at explanation has failed and the insight remains a disturbing presence deep within them.

Man’s inner constitution, then, conforms to the fundamental law of order in the world at large, whereby each element has its allotted place and function (moira) and must not intrude upon those of anything else—a rule that is the essence of *dike* in Aeschylus as in earlier Greek thinkers.\(^{27}\) Each faculty must therefore have its own particular physical location and activity. Lines 995–97 (example [Ib]) suggest this inner articulation. It is disputed whether the phrase πρός ἐνδικοῖς φρεσίν is to be taken with ματάξει or κυκλούμενον. I prefer the latter;\(^{28}\) but the choice does not affect the general argument. The preposition πρός implies proximity, and at the same time a distinction, a boundary, between the *phrenes* and either (with κυκλούμενον) the *kear* or (with ματάξει) the οπλάγχνα collectively, including the *kear*. If it is

\(^{25}\) Phoenix 39 (1985). A full analysis of the stasimon is of course not my purpose here.

\(^{26}\) Sansone, pp. 51, 82–83.

\(^{27}\) See M. Gagarin, Aeschylean Drama (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1976), 66–79.

\(^{28}\) Denniston-Page advocate connecting the phrase with ματάξει, and in his OCT Page punctuates accordingly (I have quoted without punctuation). The advantage of taking it with κυκλούμενον is that we thus obtain a concrete sense of the relation between *phrenes* and the *kardia* specifically. I do not understand why Denniston-Page translate πρός as “in the vicinity of” and then say that ἐνδικοῖς “favors the non-physical sense” of *phren*. Fraenkel (pp. 447–50) follows Hermann in taking the phrase with the participle, but as we have seen he gives both *phrenes* and ἐνδικοῖσ an abstract meaning. The adjective (whatever it means—see below) refers to the function of the *phren*; that does not rule out an anatomical reference. It is simpler, and more consistent, to consider that both the interaction between physical organs and the functions of those organs are implied equally.
specifically the heart that whirs against the *phrenes*, there is, as commentators have often noted, a close parallel in Io's description of her symptoms at *P. V.* 881: κραδία δὲ φόβῳ φρένα λακτίζει. Again we have the impression of two separate but neighboring organs. In the present passage, it has been suggested that κυκλούμενον implies a dance.29 These lines would then be closely related to the ones that precede (990-94): the heart dances to the singing of the *thumos*. The image would resemble that at Cho. 167: ὀρχεῖται δὲ καρδία φόβῳ.

In his discussion of Ag. 997, Fraenkel notices the sequence *thumos*—σπλάγχνα—*kear*, which begins at line 990, but he writes as if these terms were synonymous and interchangeable.30 They are not. As I have indicated, σπλάγχνα is evidently the collective term for the irrational faculties that together are opposed to the *phren*.31 Thus reference specifically to the *thumos* gives way to the general term (σπλάγχνα δ' οὖσι ματάζει— the disturbance in none of the irrational faculties is to be dismissed; cf. lines 980-83), and attention then narrows upon the *kear*. But is does not follow that the *thumos* and the *kear* are the same. Some parallel passages will help us understand that their activities here differ in the same way as in the examples discussed in Section II above.

(9) First, Cho. 1023-25:

φέρουσι γὰρ νικώμενον
φρένες δύσαρκτοι, πρὸς δὲ καρδία φόβος
ἀδειν ἐτοίμος ἦδ' ὑπορχείσθαι κότω.

With the approach of madness, Orestes is losing command over his mind. In Webster's neat formulation, “*phrenes* here is diseased intellect, the power of control which has become itself uncontrollable.”32 This condition, which is like Io's *φρενοσπλήγες μανία* (*P. V.* 878-79), is the counterpart on the level of reason of a disturbance in the lower faculties which—as in the third stasimon of the *Agamemnon*—manifests itself as a song. Fear prepares to sing “against” or “near” the *kardía* and, according to the manuscript reading in line 1025, also to dance in ac-

29Groeneboom (on his lines 994-1000). In this case the literal meaning of *threnos* should not be pressed, for laments were not accompanied by the dance. The main idea is conveyed by ὑμνώσει, and *threnos* is used metaphorically to pervert the verb's usual favorable, or at least neutral, associations.

30Fraenkel, p. 448.

31Cf. Cho. 413, where the thought passes from the throbbing of the heart to the darkening of the σπλάγχνα in general.

32Webster, p. 152
companiment. But with Abresch's ἦ δὲ for ἦδ οὐ, we get the heart dancing to fear's song—a more lucid picture, surely. Line 1025 would thus resemble Cho. 167 (see above), with κότῳ in a parallel construction with φόβῳ there. Φόβος appears here also, but in a significantly different connection.

As Fraenkel points out, this passage is one of a number in Aeschylus in which an emotion (in this case fear) is said to be near, rather than in, the kardia. Where, then, is it? As in Ag. 996, πρῶς implies a neighboring but distinct place. Fraenkel implies, and Sansone explicitly suggests, that this place is the phrenes. But that would go against the nature of the phrenes as Sansone himself sets it forth. As an irrational emotion, fear might in the end infect the phren, but it is unlikely to originate there. What more appropriate source is there than the irrational thumos which, if it is associated with blood, can be said to be near the heart as well as near the phrenes (if these are the lungs, as Onians proposes), and to whose singing the heart may also dance in Ag. 990–97? This simple and obvious (but evidently overlooked) suggestion is consistent with the wording of other passages and in fact clarifies them. Let us examine them in this light.

(10) Cho. 388–92:

티 γάρ κεύ-
θω φρενός οἶνων ἔμμιας
ποτάται; πάροιθεν δὲ πρῶς
δριμύς ἄντας κραδίας
θυμός, ἐγκυτον στύγος.

Except for Hermann's οἶνων (θεῖον M) and κραδίας (καρδίας M), this is the manuscript text. With it, φρενός must be taken as local (Sidgwick)—a possible construction, which gives satisfactory sense. The emotion "hovers in the phren"; for the speaker it is conscious ("why should I hide it?") and able to be articulated. The last two words of the quotation, in fact, name it as hatred. But this feeling is the conscious manifestation of the more primitive and violent operation of the irratio-

---

33This emendation is accepted by Tucker, Sansone (p. 72, tentatively), and apparently also Webster.
34Fraenkel, p. 108 (on Ag. 179), Sansone, p. 72. De Romilly (pp. 43–44) observes that speaking of fear near the heart implies that both have a physical reality, but does not specify where the emotion is, except for referring to the Latin praecordia.
35Webster's explanation of phren in this passage as "the imagination which foresees vengeance" (p. 152) seems fair enough. But the emotional quality of that foresight
nal faculties which is described in the second sentence. The *thumos* blows before the heart’s prow. Again, they are neighboring but distinct faculties. And, very clearly, the emotion near the heart is in the *thumos*—in fact, is the *thumos*, for the faculty and its content are here identified. This passage would fit Onians’ theory that *thumos* is vapor from the blood particularly well.36

(11) **Sept.** 287–90:

μέλει, φόβω δ’ ούχ ὑπηνώσει κέαρ,

γείτονες δὲ καρδίας

μέριμναι ζωπυροῦσι τάρβος.

The cares (μέριμναι), “neighbors of the *kardia,*” might well originate with the response of the *thumos*. They “kindle” dread (τάρβος), and this feeling is perhaps communicated to the *kardia*, which then “does not sleep for fear.”37

(12) **Ag.** 1121–22: ἐπὶ δὲ καρδιαν ἔδραμε κροκοβαφής/σταγών.

Here an emotion or a shock, pictured as a liquid, runs to the *kardia*. From where? Is the “saffron-dyed drop” blood38 or bile?39 Probably the latter, as in **Cho.** 183–84, where bile is near the heart:40

ought also to be emphasized, and the text makes it clear that this state is not the result of the operation of the *phren* in itself but arises from the agitation of the *thumos* and *kardia*.

36See Onians, p. 54. There are, of course, difficulties with the syntax in this passage, and the text has been suspected. But the interpretation given here seems to me most likely. De Romilly (p. 43) objects to taking καρδιάκα with πορφος, but does not make clear how she would construe the word. Page’s πάροιθ ; ἐκ would give a better construction for φρενος but would muddle the nautical image (winds do not blow from a ship’s prow but against or in front of it).

37Μέριμναι is no obstacle to this view, despite Pers. 165, where it is used of care in the *phrenes*; it does not seem to have originated there (see discussion of example [2] above). The emotion is appropriate for an irrational faculty and hence for the *thumos*, although elsewhere Aeschylus does not connect μέριμνα with a particular faculty (but cf. Sept. 843, just after mention of a chill falling around the *kardia*, 834). Fraenkel, in his note on **Ag.** 1531, says that this word is close in meaning to φροντίς in the preceding line; this would make the language intolerably redundant. There, as in Pers. 165, μέριμνα denotes the emotional aspect of thought, no matter whether the ms. reading in 1531 is retained or Enger’s emendation is adopted. In *Sept.* 287–90, if there is any difference between (plural) μέριμναι and (singular) τάρβος, it is that the former are the particular cares arising immediately from the situation, and the latter is the settled feeling of dread which they produce (and which is thus fittingly passed on to the *kardia*).

38Fraenkel, pp. 507–508 (on **Ag.** 1122), closely followed by Denniston-Page, p. 170.

39Onians, p. 84. Cf. de Romilly, p. 32.

40That is, with Scaliger’s καρδια. M’s καρδιας would mean “in the heart” (local genitive).
κάμοι προσέπτη καρδία κλυδώνιον χολής, ἐπαίθην δ’ ὡς διανταῖφ βέλει.

But the choice between liquids is unimportant, and the two passages are closely comparable. For according to Onians, “bile was . . . believed to enter the organs above the diaphragm as liquid” and in Homer is said to be in the *thumos*, the heart, the *phrenes*, or the chest. The liver, which “came to be regarded as the inmost spring of the deeper emotions, stirred only by powerful stimuli,” is also “a huge blood-gland.” “Thus before Homer’s day it might well be believed to send up to heart and lungs not only χόλος but also blood and so θυμός.” Thus, although the ultimate source may be the liver, the liquid, and the emotion it conveys, might reasonably be associated with the *thumos*. The same can be said of envy in *Ag.* 834, which is called δύσφρον . . . ἰός καρδίαν προσήμενος. And finally, in *Ag.* 179–80 (στάζει δ’ ἐν γ’ ὑπνῷ πρὸ καρδίας/μνησιπήμων πόνος: so Page, but the textual problem is not relevant here) it is probably a disturbance of the *thumos* that is being described.

These passages all accord with what was said about the relation between *thumos* and *kardia* in Section II above, and they enable us to make fairly exact sense of the beginning of the third stasimon of the *Agamemnon* (*Ag.* 975–79). The “fear before the heart,” I suggest, has aroused the *thumos*, and it is there that “the unbidden, unpaid song prophesies” (979). The heart responds by becoming prophetic also (καρδίας τερασκόπου). Interpreted this way, these lines agree with the description of symptoms in the antistrophe, where the *thumos* is explicitly said to sing (the metrical correspondence between lines 979 and 991 makes it all the more likely that the same song is referred to in both places). The heart, agitated by the *thumos* (this is implied in the strophe), whirs against the *phrenes*, and here, as in the strophe, it is prophetic (τελεσφόροις δίναις, 997). The *phren*, for its part, is also mentioned in the strophe, but in a negative way: confidence (θάρσως) does not dominate it (980–83). Now we find that it is next to, and probably beaten upon by, the whirling *kardia*.

---

41Onians, pp. 84–85.
42For the *thumos* as prophetic, cf. *Pers.* 10–11, where θυμός ἐσωθεν resembles ἐσωθεν θυμός here. As for προστατήριον in *Ag.* 976, if, as is probable, the extended meaning “dominating” is to be understood as well as the basic sense “in front of” (so Fraenkel), it is secondary.
43Only in this ode does Aeschylus connect θάρσως or θράσως with a particular faculty. Sansone (p. 50) deduces from line 982 that the seat of confidence is the *phren*;
The boundary holds, however. What is in the heart does not pass fully to the *phren*. The old men of the chorus are conscious of a terror deep within themselves, and the knowledge that there is something to fear "inflames" the *phren* (1034).\(^{44}\) Some of the quality of that instinctive alarm, that is, permeates to the conscious awareness. What has caused it, however, what the *kardia* foresees, remains mysterious at this level, and therefore the old men cannot say what it is. The difficult ἐνδίκοι (996) does not go against this view. Even if the epithet is given its most "ethical" sense ("in which justice dwells," Denniston-Page, and similarly Fraenkel), that does not necessarily mean that the chorus have a clear idea that Agamemnon is now about to expiate past wrongs, as the editors just cited think. The *phrenes* might merely be designated as the faculty *capable* of judging right and wrong, if the chorus only had the requisite knowledge. In that sense the word reinforces the *phren's* difference from the *kardia* and *thumos*—especially in proximity to *telēsphōroί*, which marks the *kardia*’s intuitive divining power.

On the other hand, the *kardia*’s drive to unburden itself is checked by the tongue’s *moira*. So it remains in pain,\(^ {45}\) and can only make mean-
ingless noise (βρέμει), with no hope of ever attaining intelligible utterance (οὐδὲν ἐπελπομένα ποτὲ καύριον ἐκτολυπέσειν). The concluding lines of the ode describe, with precision and emotional force, the chorus's impasse. Revelation will come—from Cassandra at first, although the chorus cannot fully understand, or do not want to believe, what she tells them (Ag. 1246–55, 1338–42). Full comprehension of the horrible truth must wait until Clytemnestra appears with her victims' corpses.

In this stasimon, and in the parallel passages discussed above, Aeschylus seems to envision the process by which a person responds to an external event, as follows. An immediate and unthinking emotion is aroused in the thumos (fear, anger, desire, and so forth). This feeling is then communicated to the kardia, which reacts by throbbing or whirling. The kardia shares the thumos's instinctive insight into the situation, and is just as passionately aroused. But now, with the activity of the kardia, the emotion has taken firm hold within the person. From the kardia the emotion affects the phren to a greater or lesser degree, and the phren may also be able to think rationally about the situation, what its causes and consequences are, and whether there is any way of changing it. In that case, the person can try to cope with it by talking meaningfully about it. Some passages (see example [12] above) suggest that at least under certain conditions the first stage is a disturbance in the liver, which sends bile or blood into the chest. The emotion in turn becomes a property of the thumos and is then conveyed to the kardia. All the stages in this process are not usually represented together. But whenever Aeschylus mentions the response of just one faculty or two, a clear idea of this internal organization, with the nature and function of its constituents differentiated, is surely in the background of his thought.

There is an elegant coherence in this system, yet it is also flexible. It underlies a variety of overt responses in Aeschylus's plays. The decisive factor in each case is how, and to what extent, the phren is affected. The Queen and the chorus in the Persians feel a premonitory dread, but this is, or becomes, fully conscious so that they can reason and speak about probable causes with phrenes that feel, but are not overwhelmed by, the emotion (example [2] above). For the chorus of the Agamemnon, the phren is aware only of the other faculties' agitation, so that comprehension and speech are impossible. Io and Orestes, who experience the same symptoms in their lower faculties as those old men, go mad, and the phren, dominated by a frenzy, loses its rational capacity (example [9]). Orestes, in particular, sees a vision inaccessible to the
chorus, who are in a normal state of awareness. In this respect, they resemble the chorus of the *Agamemnon*, and we observe how, under some circumstances, continued control by the *phren* can be limiting. Eteokles, too, seems completely possessed by passion for battle with Polyneikes (example [3]). His condition, however, has something of heroic determination as well as the *ate* of which the chorus speak (but perhaps there is not much difference). Cassandra provides a contrast with these other possessed figures, and also with the chorus of the *Agamemnon*. Frenzied though she is, she has a conscious vision of past and impending events. Her prophetic gift from Apollo enables her to prophesy with her *phren*.46

The operation of the several faculties is clearest when men are facing a crisis and are in abnormal states of stress. By the nature of Aeschylean tragedy, nearly all descriptions of such functions occur at these moments. But Aeschylus also has a vision of what might be the proper relation among faculties that will ensure a secure and peaceful life. He states it succinctly in a single line, *Pers.* 767: φρένες γὰρ αὐτοῦ θυμὸν ὣκοστρόφουν. But the Furies in the *Eumenides* give a fuller and more revealing description (*Eum.* 517–25):

\[
\text{ἐσθ' ὄπου τὸ δεινὸν εὖ}
\]
\[
\text{kai φρενῶν ἐπίσκοπον}
\]
\[
\text{δεὶ μένειν καθήμενον·}
\]
\[
\text{ἔμμφηρει}
\]
\[
\text{σωφρονεῖν ὑπὸ στένει.}
\]
\[
\text{τὶς δὲ μηδὲν ἐν +φάει+}
\]
\[
\text{καρδίαν ἀνατρέφων}
\]
\[
\text{ἡ πόλις βροτός θ' ὁμοί-}
\]
\[
\text{ως ἐτ' ἄν σέβοι Δίκαν;}
\]

And here we find that terror, aroused so often by disaster, is the basis for reverence (σέβας) as well. Mme. de Romilly has discussed this aspect of it in detail,47 but I would not agree with her division of fear into “good” and “bad” kinds. The emotion is the same, though its benefits can always be perverted, just as horror ultimately can also have good results. A shift in emphasis, in fact, occurs in the *Eumenides*, so that fear be-

46Sansone, p. 50.
47De Romilly, pp. 107–14 (especially 111–12).
comes salutary. Whereas for the chorus of the *Agamemnon* fear (δείμα) "hovered before" the heart, so as to dominate it (προστα- 
τήριον...ποτάται, *Ag.* 975–77), by a similar personification though in 
a slightly different metaphor, dread (τὸ δείνον) is now to "sit and watch 
over" the *phrenes* (φρενῶν ἐπίσκοπον). Since it is to be a settled and 
permanent emotion (καθήμενον), always ready to affect the *phrenes*
whenever there is temptation to do wrong, this dread is located, natu-
rally, in the *kardia*. A man must therefore "nourish his *kardia* in [fear]" 
(*Eum.* 522–23—unfortunately with corruption, but either δέει or 
φόβῳ—emendations for φάει cited in Page's apparatus—would give 
what is clearly the required sense). In Aeschylus's vision of harmony as 
much as in his depiction of moral chaos, the irrational has a crucial role 
to play.

These lines are sung by the chorus before Orestes' trial, and their 
view may seem partial. But it is fully vindicated by the incorporation of 
the Furies themselves into Athens. They represent the presence of fear 
in the collective *kardia* of the city; for the *polis* is seen as the aggregate 
of its citizens (it is mentioned in parallel with the individual at *Eum.* 
524, above). This settled fear will preserve the proper orientation of the 
citizens' *phrenes* and will thus ensure fulfillment of the chorus's prayer 
(*Eum.* 984–86):

χάριμα τα δ' ἀντιδιδόειν
κοινοφιλεὶ διανοία 
και στυγεῖν μιᾶ φρενί.

In this state of inner harmony there is to be, in the individual and in the 
citizen-body as a whole, not irrational turmoil blocked from the con-
scious awareness, but emotion accessible to the reason and guiding con-
duct, not the overthrow of the entire personality by a part, but a hierar-
chy among the faculties, wholeness and integration. Webster remarks 
that Aeschylus's account of the emotions "is a satisfactory description of 
the divided personality at moments of decision and in its description of 
conflict between *phrenes* and *thymos/kardia* foreshadows the Platonic 
description of the divided soul."48 We can also appreciate how Aeschy-
lus's ideal of the unified city anticipates Plato's concept of the *polis* as a 
projection of the individual psyche.

Lack of evidence, however, makes it very difficult to place Aeschylus 
very securely in the context of pre-Platonic literature and thought in 
regard to usage of the terms examined here. Considered very generally,
thumos, kardia, and phren in Aeschylus seem roughly to resemble, in essential character, the faculties designated by those words in Homer. But Aeschylus uses these terms more systematically, with a more specific sense of the differences and the relations between faculties, and with greater clarity of definition than Homer appears to do.\(^4\) And Aeschylus's conception of mind and feeling is more economical: several words that figure prominently in Homer beside thumos, kardia, and phren occur infrequently and with a restricted range of meaning in Aeschylus (see below). After Aeschylus, the other tragedians and Herodotus and Thucydides, as far as I can judge, do not show the sustained and consistent usage of this vocabulary that he does; they do not seem to differentiate the faculties thoroughly according to their functions, or to suggest a distinct notion of "psychological" processes created by the interactions among those faculties.\(^5\)

The question of Aeschylus's position is complicated by the lack of scholarly agreement about whether his references to the operation of the faculties are (in some places at least) figurative or are meant to describe actual anatomical conditions.\(^6\) My own opinion should be obvious by now: that such passages describe at once physical processes and emotional and intellectual states—or better, states that are the result of definite physical processes that are always present to the poet's mind. The same uncertainty besets study of Homeric usage. David Claus has recently argued that, with the exception of kardia, already in Homer the terms we have examined here, and others, have lost whatever original connection they may have had with specific bodily organs and clus-

\(^4\)For Homer, see E. L. Harrison, "Notes on Homeric Psychology," \textit{Phoenix} 14 (1960) 63–80 (especially pp. 66–68, 71–72, 74–75), and Adkins (note 9 above) 15–21. Note especially Harrison, p. 72: "It is typical of Homeric usage that νόσης and θυμός stand in juxtaposition here [Il. 4.309], with no notion of interaction between them" (emphasis added). It should be stressed that, as both authors recognize, Homeric usage does not imply an inability to conceive of the self; Homer's model, arising evidently from direct experience of situations that precipitate thought and emotion in varying combinations, is fully adequate for his needs.

\(^5\)So, at least, I conclude from an examination of the relevant words in these authors. Webster too (p. 152), as we have noted, seems to recognize Aeschylus's distinctiveness from the other tragedians.

\(^6\)At the former extreme is Fraenkel (pp. 447–48, on \textit{Ag}. 997); at the latter is Onians. Others—de Romilly, Webster, and Sansone—take varying intermediate positions. For discussion, see Sansone, pp. 2–4. I think, at any rate, that the dangerously misleading term "metaphor" in connection with names of the faculties ought to be abandoned, or at least confined to those cases where, e.g., the kardia is said to be "bitten" (the figure of speech here is in the verb, not in the reference to the organ). In \textit{Sept}. 593, the example Sanson gives (p. 3), "furrow" and "reaping" are metaphorical, not phren.
ter around certain concepts ("life-force" and, in the case of phren, "contextual 'thought' and its personification"). If this is correct, then apparently the anatomical connection re-emerges in Aeschylus, though (if we follow Claus's argument) without being maintained by subsequent writers.

Aside from this point, in some respects Aeschylus might, on Claus's terms, be considered as in a transitional stage between Homer and the later fifth century (Claus himself does not treat Aeschylus directly). In Aeschylus, ἕτορ occurs once, μένος appears comparatively rarely and with very restricted meaning; ψυχή is still relatively unimportant but in a few places clearly designates a "psychological agent," and kardia is used, as in later authors, as "the seat of deep and vital feeling" much more often than in Homer. The case of phren (singular and plural) is more complicated. It expands in use as a "psychological agent" over Homer but it is not simply a "seat of feeling" as, according to Claus, it becomes later on; in Aeschylus its function is typically rational thought. So far, Aeschylus can be placed within the development from Homer to the late fifth century that Claus finds, but other words put him outside this trend. νοῦς is strikingly rare in his usage (and νοεῖν does not occur, though ἐννοεῖν appears once). Except, perhaps, at Cho. 742, it always means "mentality" or "mental disposition," in contrast to both Homeric and later usage. Above all, κηρ, in the uncontracted form κέρα, plays an important role in Aeschylus, whereas it

52 David B. Claus, Toward the Soul: An Inquiry into the Meaning of ψυχή Before Plato (Yale Classical Monographs 2) (New Haven and London 1981) 11–47. For examples of a different opinion, see Harrison and Adkins (note 49 above). On their view of Homer, Aeschylus would be generally similar to Homer on this point, but I would argue that the physiological basis of the operation of the faculties is more consistently present to Aeschylus's mind.

53 For the words that follow in Homer, see Claus, pp. 26–45, and in Herodotus, Thucydides, and Euripides, pp. 48–56. Claus's thesis is likely to be controversial. I am using it only for the sake of argument, to highlight Aeschylean usage through comparison and contrast by showing what might be said of it in relation to Claus's conclusions.

54 It is used of either impersonal force (physical might, the force of non-human things, or in periphrasis for monstrous beings) or anger and other types of irrational fury. See the entries for this and the other words mentioned here in Italie, Index Aeschyleus, 2nd ed. (Leiden 1964).


56 Claus, p. 53.

57 Claus, p. 55.

58 That is, it is largely confined in Aeschylus to one of its several possible meanings in Homer—the one illustrated by, e.g., Od. 1.3. See K. von Fritz, "ΝΟΟΣ and NOEΙΝ in the Homeric Poems," CP 38 (1943) 79–93.
virtually disappears from later writers; and Aeschylus uses it interchangeably with *kardia* (Claus claims an independent range of meanings for it in Homer). Finally, in Aeschylus *thumos* is prominent and has undergone developments from Homeric usage as a more definite “psychological agent.” Later on, according to Claus, it occurs much less frequently, and when it does it shows an increase over Homer in the proportion of instances when it signifies “emotion per se” (in Aeschylus it sometimes—e.g., *Cho*. 392, example [10] above—seems ambiguous between agent and emotion, but it never refers unambiguously to emotion alone).

Overall, despite some continuities with other authors, Aeschylus gives the impression of uniqueness in his conception of the inner life, in three respects: in his marked preference for the terms *thumos*, *kardia*, and *phren*, in his evidently consistent grounding of mental and emotional states in anatomical conditions, and above all in the notion of the interrelationship and interaction among faculties that his usage implies. On the other hand, it is difficult to believe that he invented this conception. There is no evidence that would enable us to identify his sources (popular thought? Scientific speculation?), but we can suggest why such a clearly articulated system would have appealed to him. It gave him a way of exploring in his dramas, as he so magnificently did, the relation between a person’s passions and his or her reason, of showing how mortals must try to find their way through agonizing situations, and to gain safety in a world not always kindly to humanity, with the resources of their fallible nature. Through it, in short, he could suggest why human beings act as they do. Euripides, of course, had similar concerns; but he fulfilled them in his own ways and used the relevant vocabulary differently. Aeschylus’s depiction of the inner life has an equal claim on our attention. But his fascination with states of emotion was as much a matter of his dramaturgy as of his intellectual interests (and who would wish to distinguish between them in this poet?). By describing internal processes, he could give his audience a sense not just of feelings in the abstract but of their physical reality within the characters they saw before them. In this respect, as in so many others, his drama gained tremendous force from the drive to represent intangible things concretely. Whatever kinds of tradition he drew upon, it must have been particularly congenial to Aeschylus’s mind and art to stress the physiological basis of emotion.

William G. Thalmann

Hobart and William Smith Colleges