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Anthropic Coincidences, Evil and the Disconfirmation of Theism (1992) Quentin Smith The following article was originally published in Religious Studues in 1992 (Volume 28, pp. 347-350). This article is also published at Infidels.org. The
anthropic principle or the associated anthropic coincidences have been
used by philosophers such as John Leslie (1989), William Lane Craig (1988)
and Richard Swinburne (1990) to support the thesis that God exists. In
this paper I shall examine Swinburne's argument from the anthropic
coincidences. I will show that Swinburne's premises, coupled with his
principle of credulity and the failure of his theodicy in The Existence of
God, disconfirms theism and confirms instead the hypothesis that there
exists a malevolent creator of the universe. 1. THE ANTHROPIC COINCIDENCES Swinburne
argues that the initial conditions of the universe and the physical
constants mentioned in the basic physical laws are fine-tuned for
intelligent life. The result is anthropic coincidences. The initial
conditions of the universe are the arrangements and properties of the
stuff (matter, energy, space) of the universe at its beginning. The big
bang singularity, occurring about 15 billion years ago, is the first state
of the universe and initial conditions pertain to this singularity or,
better, to the explosion of this singularity in the 'big bang' that
commenced the evolution of the universe. The physical
constants are the strengths of the forces and the masses of the particles
that are mentioned in the basic physical laws. There are four forces
(gravity, electromagnetic, strong and weak) and two types of particles
(bosons and fermions). Swinburne
does not offer a precise definition of fine-tuning, but the following
definition is both serviceable and consistent with the spirit of his
article. A certain set of values of initial conditions and physical
constants of a universe are fine-tuned for intelligent life if and only if
(a) each of the values of the initial conditions and physical constants in
this set is a physically necessary condition for the evolution of
intelligent life (1990: 164), (b) the values in this set are jointly
sufficient for ('give rise to' (1990: 157)) the evolution of intelligent
life, and (c) there is only an extremely small range of all physically
possible values of the initial conditions and physical constants that meet
conditions (a) and (b). If any value meets these three conditions, it is
an anthropic coincidence. An example
offered by Swinburne of an initial condition that is an anthropic
coincidence is the rate of expansion of the universe from the big bang
singularity. If this rate were slightly faster, galaxies, stars and
planets would not form; if slightly slower, the universe would collapse
before any atoms formed. Swinburne considers the objection that the
Inflation theories developed during the 1980s show that the expansion rate
is not an anthropic coincidence (since condition (c) is not met) and
offers a retort that will undoubtedly raise the eyebrows of physicists,
that it seems difficult to formulate any Inflation theory that is not 'ill
justified by data' (1990: 162-3). Given the virtually universal acceptance
of Inflation by contemporary physicists, it would seem that a more
rational response to this objection is to adopt Leslie's line (1989: 31)
and point out that Inflation theories presuppose anthropic coincidences of
their own, e.g. the fact that the two components of the cosmological
constant (bare lambda and quantum lambda) must cancel each other with an
accuracy better than one part in 1050 in order for galaxies and planets to
form. An example
of a value of a physical constant that is an anthropic coincidence is the
electron to proton mass ratio, mm/mn ~ (1836)-1. This small value is a
necessary condition of there being DNA molecules. This
explanation of the basic concepts in Swinburne's 'argument from the
fine-tuning of the universe' enables its formulation to be presented and
evaluated. 2. SWINBURNE'S ARGUMENT THAT THEISM IS CONFIRMED BY THE
ANTHROPIC COINCIDENCES The
anthropic coincidences confirm theism, Swinburne claims, since if theism
is true these coincidences are much more likely to occur than they
otherwise would be. This can be stated precisely. Where P = probability, e
= evidence, h = hypothesis and k = background knowledge, e confirms h if
and only if P(e/hk) > P(e/k). 'e confirms h' means P(h/ek) > P(h/k).
'e significantly confirms h' means P(h/ek) >> P(h/k). The argument
from the anthropic coincidences to God requires that: e = there are many
anthropic coincidences; h = God exists; k = there is a universe that
begins from an initial singularity and is governed by laws that have the
form of our four-force laws. Given this,
P(h/ek) >> P(h/k) since P(e/hk) >> P(e/k). In words, this
means that the probability that God exists given the anthropic
coincidences and a universe with an
initial singularity and four-force laws is much greater than the
probability that God exists given only a universe with an initial
singularity and four-force laws, since the probability of the anthropic
coincidences given the existence of God and a universe with an initial
singularity and four-force laws is much greater than the probability of
the anthropic coincidences given only a universe with an initial
singularity and four-force laws. The first
thing I want to say by way of evaluating Swinburne's argument is that e
confirms h': h' = there is a malevolent creator of the universe, no less
than it confirms h. By a 'malevolent spirit' I understand a spirit that
either has all evil intentions or has some evil intentions and some good
ones. (Hitler and Stalin were malevolent persons, but they both had some
good intentions.) A malevolent spirit would desire a universe with
intelligent life no less than would a benevolent spirit, since the
realization of moral evil requires the existence of intelligent life no
less than does the realization of moral good. A spirit cannot exercise her
malevolence on inanimate matter but has abundant opportunity to be cruel
if there are intelligent creatures capable of suffering, harm and
premature death. Accordingly, we may say about h' what Swinburne says
about h, namely that P(h'/ek) >> P(h'/k) since P(e/h' k) >>
P(e/k) It is not a
paradox that the same evidence e confirms equally well two incompatible
hypotheses; this is a familiar principle of confirmation theory, known
since Carnap's The Logical Foundations of Probability, section 86 (also
see (Salmon, 1975: 6-8)). If it appears paradoxical, it is because one is
confusing relative confirmation (which I am here using 'confirmation' to
express) with absolute confirmation (which I shall use 'makes highly
probable' to express). The same evidence cannot make highly probable each
of two incompatible hypotheses, but it can increase the probability of
each of two incompatible hypotheses (i.e. make the two hypotheses more
probable than they would have been without the evidence). A decision
between two hypotheses each of which is equally confirmed by the same
evidence e can be made if there is some further evidence e' that
disconfirms one of the hypotheses but confirms the other. In the case at
hand, e' = there is a large amount of gratuitous natural evil. Is e' true ?
It certainly seems to be. Consider one example from thousands. Psychoses
come in two main types, schizophrenia and bipolar disorder ('manic
depression'). Both are genetically inherited diseases. Bipolar disorder is
caused by a dominant gene on the X chromosome. Typically, the person with
this gene does not have this disease from birth but develops it later in
life, usually during adulthood. Suppose there is a person Alice with this
gene who is living a happy and morally good life up until age 33, when
there is a relatively rapid onset of the disease. Alice acquires a
chronic. endogenous, rapid cycling bipolar disorder and is mentally ill
for the remainder of her life. This is a natural evil. Is it
gratuitous? Swinburne
claims that despite appearances natural evils are justified since they are
logically necessary means to outweighing goods. In the case of incurable
diseases, the outweighing good is the empirical possibility they offer us
of eliminating any future occurrences of these diseases. 'Men can only
have the opportunity to prevent incurable diseases or to allow them to
occur, if there are naturally occurring incurable diseases' (1979: 207-8).
However, pace Swinburne, it is a self-evidently false moral principle that
the evil of an incurable disease is outweighed by the good of the
opportunity to prevent future occurrences of the disease. The falsity of
this principle needs little reflection to become manifest. Consider that
if this principle were true, we would rejoice in each new disease because
it would give us an opportunity to prevent future instances of that
disease. We would be currently celebrating the AIDS epidemic, because the
thousands or millions who have died and will die agonizing deaths from
this disease will give us the 'outweighing good' of the opportunity to
prevent future instances of AIDS. But this of course is morally absurd.
The evil of the actual instances of AIDS far outweighs whatever goodness
belongs to the opportunity to prevent possible instances of it. Given that
this is the case, Swinburne has failed to demonstrate that seemingly
gratuitous natural evils are not really gratuitous. Given in addition
Swinburne's principle of credulity ('things are as they seem to be, unless
and until proved otherwise' (1979: 168)) we may conclude that in the light
of the considerations Swinburne has offered, it is reasonable to conclude
that there are gratuitous natural evils. On the same basis, it is
reasonable to conclude that God does not exist, since God is omnipotent,
omniscient and perfectly good and thereby would not permit any gratuitous
natural evil. But since gratuitous natural evils are precisely what we
would expect if a malevolent spirit created the universe, it follows that
h' is confirmed. More exactly, P(h'/ee'k) >> P(h/ee'k) since
P(h'/ek) = P(h/ek) and P(h'/e'k) >> P(h/e'k). If any spirit created
the universe, it is malevolent, not benevolent. REFERENCES Craig,
William Lane [1989]. 'Barrow and Tipler on the anthropic principle vs.
divine design'. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 39,
389-95. Leslie, John
[1989]. Universes. New York: Routledge. Salmon,
Wesley [1975]. 'Confirmation and relevance'. In G. Maxwell and R.
Anderson, eds., Induction, Probability, and Confirmation.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Smith,
Quentin [1991]. 'Atheism, theism and big bang cosmology'. Australasian
Journal of Philosophy, 69, 48-66. Swinburne,
Richard [1979]. The Existence of God. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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