Cologne, October 13 -- Issue No.284 of the Augsburg paper is so inept as to find the Rheinische Zeitung to be a Prussian communist -- not a communist, to be sure, but still one that fanatically flirts with and platonically ogles communism.

Whether this ill-mannered fantasy of the Augsburger is unselfish or whether this idle trick of its excited imagination is connected with speculation and diplomatic affairs, the reader may decide -- after we have presented the alleged corpus delicti.

The Rheinische Zeitung, they say, has printed a communistic essay on Berlin family dwellings, accompanied by the following comment: This report "might not be without interest for the history of this important issue". From this it follows, according to the Augsburger's logic, that the Rheinische Zeitung "served up such dirty linen with approval". Thus, for example, if I say: "The following report from [Leipzig journal] Mefistofele about the household affairs of the Augsburg paper might not be without interest for the history of this pretentious lady," do I thereby recommend dirty "material" from which the Augsburg lady could tailor a colorful wardrobe? Or should we not consider communism an important current issue because it's not a current issue privileged to appear at court, since it wears dirty linen and does not smell of rosewater?

But the Augsburg paper has reason to be angry at our misunderstanding. The importance of communism does not lie in its being a current issue of highest moment for France and England. Communism has "European significance", to repeat the phrase used by the Augsburg paper. One of its Paris correspondents, a convert who treats history the way a pastry cook treats botony, has recently had the notion that monarchy, in its own fashion, must seek to appropriate socialist-communist ideas. Now you will understand the displeasure of the Augsburg paper, which will never forgive us for revealing communism to the public in its unwashed nakedness; now you understand the sullen irony that tells us: So you recommend communism, which once had the fortunate elegance of being a phrase in the Augsburg paper!

The second reproach to the Rheinische Zeitung deals with the conclusion of a report on the communist speeches given at the congress in Strasbourg, because the two stepsister papers had so divided the booty that the Rhineland sister took the proceedings and the Bavarian one the fruits of the Strasbourg scholars. The exact wording of the incriminating passage is:
"It is with the middle class today as it was with the nobility in 1789. At that time, the middle class claimed the privileges of the nobility and got them; today, the class which possesses nothing demands to share in the wealth of the middle classes that are now in control. Today, however, the middle class is better prepared for a surprise attack than the nobility was in 1789, and it is to be expected that the problem will be solved peacefully."

That Sieyes' prophecy has come true and that the tiers etat ["Third Estate"] has become everything and wants to be everything -- all this is recognized with the most sorrowful indignation by Bulow-Cummerow, by the former Berliner Politische Wochenblatt [Berlin Political Weekly], by Dr. Kosegarten, and by all the feudalistic writers. That the class that today possesses nothing demands to share in the wealth of the middle class is a fact that, without the Strasbourg speeches and the silence of the Augsburg paper, is clearly recognized in the streets of Manchester, Paris, and Lyon. Does the Augsburger really believe that indignation and silence refute the facts of the time? The Augsburger is impertinent in fleeing. The Augsburg paper runs away from captious issues and believes that the dust it stirs up, and the nervous invectives it mutters in its flight, will blind and confuse the uncomfortable issue as well as the comfortable reader.

Or is the Augsburger angry at our correspondent's expectation that the undeniable collision will be solved in a "peaceful way"? Or does the Augsburger reproach us for not having given immediately a good prescription and not having put into the surprised reader's pocket a report as clear as daylight on the solution of the enormous problem? We do not possess the art of mastering problems which two nations are working on with one phrase.

But, my dear, best Augsburger! In connection with communism, you give us to understand that Germany is now poor in independent people, that nine-tenths of the better educated youth are begging the state for their future bread, that our rivers are neglected, that shipping has declined, that our once-flourishing commercial cities have faded, that in Prussia very slow progress is made toward free institutions, that the surplus of our population helplessly wanders away and ceases to be German among foreign nations -- and for all these problem there is not a single prescription, no attempt to become "clearer about the means of achieving the great act that is to redeem us from all these sins! Or don't you expect a peaceful solution? It almost seems that another article in the same issue, date-lined from Karlsruhe, points in that direction when you pose for Prussia the insidious question of the Customs Union: "Does anyone believe that such a crisis would pass like a brawl over smoking in the Tiergarten?" The reason you off your disbelief is communistic: "Let a crisis break out in industry; let millions in capital be lost; let thousands of workers go hungry." How inopportune our "peaceful expectation", after you had decided to let a bloody revolution break out! Perhaps, for this reason, your article on Great Britain by your own logic points approvingly to the demagogic physician, Dr. M'Douall, who emigrated to America because "nothing can be done with this royal family after all."

Before we part from you, we would, in passing, like to call your attention to your own wisdom -- your method which, with no shortage of phrases but without even a
harmless idea here and there, makes you nevertheless speak up. You find that the polemic of Mr. Hennequin in Paris against the parceling out of the land puts him in surprising harmony with the Autonomes [aristocratic landowners]! Surprise, says Aristotle, is the beginning of philosophizing. You have ended at the beginning. Otherwise, would the surprising fact have escaped you that in Germany communistic principles are spread, not by the liberals, but by your reactionary friends?

Who speaks of handicraft corporations? The reactionaries. The artisan class is to form a state within a state. Do you find it extraordinary that such ideas, couched in modern terms, thus read: “The state should transform itself into an artisan class”? If the state is to be a state for the artisan, but if the modern artisan, like any modern man, understands and can understand the state only as a sphere shared by all his fellow citizens -- how can you synthesize both of these ideas in any other way except in an artisan state?

Who polemicizes about parceling out the land? The reactionaries. A recently published feudalistic writing (Kosegarten on land parceling) went so far as to call private property a privilege. This is Fourier's principle. Once there is agreement on principles, may not there then be disagreement over consequences and implications?

The Rheinische Zeitung, which cannot concede the theoretical reality of communist ideas even in their present form, and can even less wish or consider possible their practical realization, will submit these ideas to a thorough criticism. If the Augsburg paper demanded and wanted more than slick phrases, it would see that writings such as those of Leroux, Considerant, and above all Proudhon's penetrating work, can be criticized, not through superficial notions of the moment, but only after long and deep study. We consider such "theoretical" works the more seriously as we do not agree with the Augsburg paper, which finds the "reality" of communist ideas not in Plato but in some obscure acquaintance who, not without some merit in some branches of scientific research, gave up the entire fortune that was at his disposal at the time and polished his confederates' dishes and boots, according to the will of Father Enfantin. We are firmly convinced that it is not the practical Attempt, but rather the theoretical application of communist ideas, that constitutes the real danger; for practical attempts, even those on a large scale, can be answered with cannon as soon as they become dangerous, but ideas, which conquer our intelligence, which overcome the outlook that reason has riveted to our conscience, are chains from which we cannot tear ourselves away without tearing our hearts; they are demons that man can overcome only by submitting to them. But the Augsburg paper has never come to know the troubled conscience that is evoked by a rebellion of man's subjective wishes against the objective insights of his own reason, because it possesses neither reason nor insight nor conscience.
Private Property and Communism

Re. p. XXXIX. [This refers to the missing part of the second manuscript. - Ed.] The antithesis between lack of property and property, so long as it is not comprehended as the antithesis of labour and capital, still remains an indifferent antithesis, not grasped in its active connection, in its internal relation, not yet grasped as a contradiction. It can find expression in this first form even without the advanced development of private property (as in ancient Rome, Turkey, etc.). It does not yet appear as having been established by private property itself. But labour, the subjective essence of private property as exclusion of property, and capital, objective labour as exclusion of labour, constitute private property as its developed state of contradiction – hence a dynamic relationship driving towards resolution.

Re the same page. The transcendence of self-estrangement follows the same course as self-estrangement. Private property is first considered only in its objective aspect – but nevertheless with labour as its essence. Its form of existence is therefore capital, which is to be annulled “as such” (Proudhon). Or a particular form of labour – labour levelled down, fragmented, and therefore unfree – is conceived as the source of private property’s perniciousness and of its existence in estrangement from men. For instance, Fourier, who, like the Physiocrats, also conceives agricultural labour to be at least the exemplary type, whereas Saint-Simon declares in contrast that industrial labour as such is the essence, and accordingly aspires to the exclusive rule of the industrialists and the improvement of the workers’ condition. Finally, communism is the positive expression of annulled private property – at first as universal private property.

By embracing this relation as a whole, communism is:

1 In its first form only a generalisation and consummation of it [of this relation]. As such it appears in a two-fold form: on the one hand, the dominion of material property bulks so large that it wants to destroy everything which is not capable of being possessed by all as private property. It wants to disregard talent, etc., in an arbitrary manner. For it the sole purpose of life and existence is direct, physical possession. The category of the worker is not done away with, but extended to all men. The relationship of private property persists as the relationship of the community to the world of things. Finally, this movement of opposing universal private property to private property finds expression in the brutish form of opposing to marriage (certainly a form of exclusive private property) the community of women, in which a woman becomes a piece of communal and common property. It may be said that this idea of the community of women gives away the secret of this as yet completely crude and thoughtless communism. Just as woman passes from marriage to general prostitution, [Prostitution is only a specific expression of the general prostitution of the labourer, and since it is a relationship in which falls not the}
prostitute alone, but also the one who prostitutes – and the latter’s abomination is still greater – the capitalist, etc., also comes under this head. – Note by Marx [31] so the entire world of wealth (that is, of man’s objective substance) passes from the relationship of exclusive marriage with the owner of private property to a state of universal prostitution with the community. This type of communism – since it negates the personality of man in every sphere – is but the logical expression of private property, which is this negation. General envy constituting itself as a power is the disguise in which greed re-establishes itself and satisfies itself, only in another way. The thought of every piece of private property as such is at least turned against wealthier private property in the form of envy and the urge to reduce things to a common level, so that this envy and urge even constitute the essence of competition. Crude communism [the manuscript has: Kommunist. – Ed.] is only the culmination of this envy and of this levelling-down proceeding from the preconceived minimum. It has a definite, limited standard. How little this annulment of private property is really an appropriation is in fact proved by the abstract negation of the entire world of culture and civilisation, the regression to the unnatural simplicity of the poor and crude man who has few needs and who has not only failed to go beyond private property, but has not yet even reached it.

The community is only a community of labour, and equality of wages paid out by communal capital – by the community as the universal capitalist. Both sides of the relationship are raised to an imagined universality – labour as the category in which every person is placed, and capital as the acknowledged universality and power of the community.

In the approach to woman as the spoil and hand-maid of communal lust is expressed the infinite degradation in which man exists for himself, for the secret of this approach has its unambiguous, decisive, plain and undisguised expression in the relation of man to woman and in the manner in which the direct and natural species-relationship is conceived. The direct, natural, and necessary relation of person to person is the relation of man to woman. In this natural species-relationship man’s relation to nature is immediately his relation to man, just as his relation to man is immediately his relation to nature – his own natural destination. In this relationship, therefore, is sensuously manifested, reduced to an observable fact, the extent to which the human essence has become nature to man, or to which nature to him has become the human essence of man. From this relationship one can therefore judge man’s whole level of development. From the character of this relationship follows how much man as a species-being, as man, has come to be himself and to comprehend himself; the relation of man to woman is the most natural relation of human being to human being. It therefore reveals the extent to which man’s natural behaviour has become human, or the extent to which the human essence in him has become a natural essence – the extent to which his human nature has come to be natural to him. This relationship also reveals the extent to which man’s need has become a human need; the extent to which, therefore, the other person as a person has become for him a need – the extent to which he in his individual existence is at the same time a social being.

The first positive annulment of private property – crude communism – is thus merely
a *manifestation* of the vileness of private property, which wants to set itself up as the *positive community system*.

(2) Communism (*α*) still political in nature – democratic or despotic; (*β*) with the abolition of the state, yet still incomplete, and being still affected by private property, i.e., by the estrangement of man. In both forms communism already is aware of being reintegration or return of man to himself, the transcendence of human self-estrangement; but since it has not yet grasped the positive essence of private property, and just as little the *human* nature of need, it remains captive to it and infected by it. It has, indeed, grasped its concept, but not its essence.

(3) Communism as the *positive* transcendence of *private property* as *human self-estrangement*, and therefore as the real *appropriation* of the *human* essence by and for man; communism therefore as the complete return of man to himself as a *social* (i.e., human) being – a return accomplished consciously and embracing the entire wealth of previous development. This communism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully developed humanism equals naturalism; it is the *genuine* resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man – the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the species. Communism is the riddle of history solved, and it knows itself to be this solution.

[V] The entire movement of history, just as its [communism’s] *actual* act of genesis – the birth act of its empirical existence – is, therefore, for its thinking consciousness the *comprehended* and *known* process of its *becoming*. Whereas the still immature communism seeks an *historical* proof for itself – a proof in the realm of what already exists – among disconnected historical phenomena opposed to private property, tearing single phases from the historical process and focusing attention on them as proofs of its historical pedigree (a hobby-horse ridden hard especially by Cabet, Villegardeille, etc.). By so doing it simply makes clear that by far the greater part of this process contradicts its own claim, and that, if it has ever existed, precisely its being in the past refutes its pretension to *reality*.

It is easy to see that the entire revolutionary movement necessarily finds both its empirical and its theoretical basis in the movement of *private property* – more precisely, in that of the economy.

This *material*, immediately *perceptible* private property is the material perceptible expression of *estranged human* life. Its movement – production and consumption – is the *perceptible* revelation of the movement of all production until now, i.e., the realisation or the reality of man. Religion, family, state, law, morality, science, art, etc., are only
particular modes of production, and fall under its general law. The positive transcendence of private property as the appropriation of human life, is therefore the positive transcendence of all estrangement – that is to say, the return of man from religion, family, state, etc., to his human, i.e., social, existence. Religious estrangement as such occurs only in the realm of consciousness, of man’s inner life, but economic estrangement is that of real life; its transcendence therefore embraces both aspects. It is evident that the initial stage of the movement amongst the various peoples depends on whether the true recognised life of the people manifests itself more in consciousness or in the external world – is more ideal or real. Communism begins from the outset (Owen) with atheism; but atheism is at first far from being communism; indeed, that atheism is still mostly an abstraction.

The philanthropy of atheism is therefore at first only philosophical, abstract philanthropy, and that of communism is at once real and directly bent on action.

We have seen how on the assumption of positively annulled private property man produces man – himself and the other man; how the object, being the direct manifestation of his individuality, is simultaneously his own existence for the other man, the existence of the other man, and that existence for him. Likewise, however, both the material of labour and man as the subject, are the point of departure as well as the result of the movement (and precisely in this fact, that they must constitute the point of departure, lies the historical necessity of private property). Thus the social character is the general character of the whole movement: just as society itself produces man as man, so is society produced by him. Activity and enjoyment, both in their content and in their mode of existence, are social: social activity and social enjoyment. The human aspect of nature exists only for social man; for only then does nature exist for him as a bond with man – as his existence for the other and the other’s existence for him – and as the life-element of human reality. Only then does nature exist as the foundation of his own human existence. Only here has what is to him his natural existence become his human existence, and nature become man for him. Thus society is the complete unity of man with nature – the true resurrection of nature – the consistent naturalism of man and the consistent humanism of nature.

VI Social activity and social enjoyment exist by no means only in the form of some directly communal activity and directly communal enjoyment, although communal activity and communal enjoyment – i.e., activity and enjoyment which are manifested and affirmed in actual direct association with other men – will occur wherever such a direct expression of sociability stems from the true character of the activity’s content and is appropriate to the nature of the enjoyment.

But also when I am active scientifically, etc. – an activity which I can seldom perform in direct community with others – then my activity is social, because I perform it as a man. Not only is the material of my activity given to me as a social product (as is even the language in which the thinker is active): my own existence is social activity, and therefore that which I make of myself, I make of myself for society and with the consciousness of myself as a social being.
My general consciousness is only the theoretical shape of that of which the living shape is the real community, the social fabric, although at the present day general consciousness is an abstraction from real life and as such confronts it with hostility. The activity of my general consciousness, as an activity, is therefore also my theoretical existence as a social being.

Above all we must avoid postulating “society” again as an abstraction vis-à-vis the individual. The individual is the social being. His manifestations of life – even if they may not appear in the direct form of communal manifestations of life carried out in association with others – are therefore an expression and confirmation of social life. Man’s individual and species-life are not different, however much – and this is inevitable – the mode of existence of the individual is a more particular or more general mode of the life of the species, or the life of the species is a more particular or more general individual life.

In his consciousness of species man confirms his real social life and simply repeats his real existence in thought, just as conversely the being of the species confirms itself in species consciousness and exists for itself in its generality as a thinking being.

Man, much as he may therefore be a particular individual (and it is precisely his particularity which makes him an individual, and a real individual social being), is just as much the totality – the ideal totality – the subjective existence of imagined and experienced society for itself; just as he exists also in the real world both as awareness and real enjoyment of social existence, and as a totality of human manifestation of life.

Thinking and being are thus certainly distinct, but at the same time they are in unity with each other.

Death seems to be a harsh victory of the species over the particular individual and to contradict their unity. But the particular individual is only a particular species-being, and as such mortal.

<4> [In the manuscript: "5". – Ed.] Just as private property is only the perceptible expression of the fact that man becomes objective for himself and at the same time becomes to himself a strange and inhuman object; just as it expresses the fact that the manifestation of his life is the alienation of his life, that his realisation is his loss of reality, is an alien reality: so, the positive transcendence of private property – i.e., the perceptible appropriation for and by man of the human essence and of human life, of objective man, of human achievements should not be conceived merely in the sense of immediate, one-sided enjoyment, merely in the sense of possessing, of having. Man appropriates his comprehensive essence in a comprehensive manner, that is to say, as a whole man. Each of his human relations to the world – seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, thinking, observing, experiencing, wanting, acting, loving – in short, all the
organs of his individual being, like those organs which are directly social in their form, [VII] are in their objective orientation, or in their orientation to the object, the appropriation of the object, the appropriation of human reality. Their orientation to the object is the manifestation of the human reality. [For this reason it is just as highly varied as the determinations of human essence and activities. – Note by Marx] it is human activity and human suffering, for suffering, humanly considered, is a kind of self-enjoyment of man.

Private property has made us so stupid and one-sided that an object is only ours when we have it – when it exists for us as capital, or when it is directly possessed, eaten, drunk, worn, inhabited, etc., – in short, when it is used by us. Although private property itself again conceives all these direct realisations of possession only as means of life, and the life which they serve as means is the life of private property – labour and conversion into capital.

In the place of all physical and mental senses there has therefore come the sheer estrangement of all these senses, the sense of having. The human being had to be reduced to this absolute poverty in order that he might yield his inner wealth to the outer world. [On the category of “having”, see Hess in the Philosophy of the Deed].

The abolition [Aufhebung] of private property is therefore the complete emancipation of all human senses and qualities, but it is this emancipation precisely because these senses and attributes have become, subjectively and objectively, human. The eye has become a human eye, just as its object has become a social, human object – an object made by man for man. The senses have therefore become directly in their practice theoreticians. They relate themselves to the thing for the sake of the thing, but the thing itself is an objective human relation to itself and to man, [In practice I can relate myself to a thing humanly only if the thing relates itself humanly to the human being. – Note by Marx] and vice versa. Need or enjoyment have consequently lost its egotistical nature, and nature has lost its mere utility by use becoming human use.

In the same way, the senses and enjoyment of other men have become my own appropriation. Besides these direct organs, therefore, social organs develop in the form of society; thus, for instance, activity in direct association with others, etc., has become an organ for expressing my own life, and a mode of appropriating human life.

It is obvious that the human eye enjoys things in a way different from the crude, non-human eye; the human ear different from the crude ear, etc.

We have seen that man does not lose himself in his object only when the object becomes for him a human object or objective man. This is possible only when the object becomes for him a social object, he himself for himself a social being, just as society becomes a being for him in this object.

On the one hand, therefore, it is only when the objective world becomes everywhere
for man in society the world of man’s essential powers – human reality, and for that reason the reality of his own essential powers – that all objects become for him the objectification of himself, become objects which confirm and realise his individuality, become his objects: that is, man himself becomes the object. The manner in which they become his depends on the nature of the objects and on the nature of the essential power corresponding to it; for it is precisely the determinate nature of this relationship which shapes the particular, real mode of affirmation. To the eye an object comes to be other than it is to the ear, and the object of the eye is another object than the object of the ear. The specific character of each essential power is precisely its specific essence, and therefore also the specific mode of its objectification, of its objectively actual, living being. Thus man is affirmed in the objective world not only in the act of thinking, but with all his senses.

On the other hand, let us look at this in its subjective aspect. Just as only music awakens in man the sense of music, and just as the most beautiful music has no sense for the unmusical ear – is [no] object for it, because my object can only be the confirmation of one of my essential powers – it can therefore only exist for me insofar as my essential power exists for itself as a subjective capacity; because the meaning of an object for me goes only so far as my sense goes (has only a meaning for a sense corresponding to that object) – for this reason the senses of the social man differ from those of the non-social man. Only through the objectively unfolded richness of man’s essential being is the richness of subjective human sensibility (a musical ear, an eye for beauty of form – in short, senses capable of human gratification, senses affirming themselves as essential powers of man) either cultivated or brought into being. For not only the five senses but also the so-called mental senses, the practical senses (will, love, etc.), in a word, human sense, the human nature of the senses, comes to be by virtue of its object, by virtue of humanised nature. The forming of the five senses is a labour of the entire history of the world down to the present. The sense caught up in crude practical need has only a restricted sense.> For the starving man, it is not the human form of food that exists, but only its abstract existence as food. It could just as well be there in its crudest form, and it would be impossible to say wherein this feeding activity differs from that of animals. The care-burdened, poverty-stricken man has no sense for the finest play; the dealer in minerals sees only the commercial value but not the beauty and the specific character of the mineral: he has no mineralogical sense. Thus, the objectification of the human essence, both in its theoretical and practical aspects, is required to make man’s sense human, as well as to create the human sense corresponding to the entire wealth of human and natural substance.

<Just as through the movement of private property, of its wealth as well as its poverty – of its material and spiritual wealth and poverty – the budding society finds at hand all the material for this development, so established society produces man in this entire richness of his being produces the rich man profoundly endowed with all the senses – as its enduring reality.>

We see how subjectivity and objectivity, spirituality and materiality, activity and suffering, lose their antithetical character, and – thus their existence as such antitheses
only within the framework of society; <we see how the resolution of the theoretical antitheses is only possible in a practical way, by virtue of the practical energy of man. Their resolution is therefore by no means merely a problem of understanding, but a real problem of life, which philosophy could not solve precisely because it conceived this problem as merely a theoretical one.

We see how the history of industry and the established objective existence of industry are the open book of man’s essential powers, the perceptibly existing human psychology. Hitherto this was not conceived in its connection with man’s essential being, but only in an external relation of utility, because, moving in the realm of estrangement, people could only think of man’s general mode of being – religion or history in its abstract-general character as politics, art, literature, etc. – ||IX| as the reality of man’s essential powers and man’s species-activity. We have before us the objectified essential powers of man in the form of sensuous, alien, useful objects, in the form of estrangement, displayed in ordinary material industry (which can be conceived either as a part of that general movement, or that movement can be conceived as a particular part of industry, since all human activity hitherto has been labour – that is, industry – activity estranged from itself).

A psychology for which this book, the part of history existing in the most perceptible and accessible form, remains a closed book, cannot become a genuine, comprehensive and real science.> What indeed are we to think of a science which airyly abstracts from this large part of human labour and which fails to feel its own incompleteness, while such a wealth of human endeavour, unfolded before it, means nothing more to it than, perhaps, what can be expressed in one word – “need”, “vulgar need”?

The natural sciences have developed an enormous activity and have accumulated an ever-growing mass of material. Philosophy, however, has remained just as alien to them as they remain to philosophy. Their momentary unity was only a chimerical illusion. The will was there, but the power was lacking. Historiography itself pays regard to natural science only occasionally, as a factor of enlightenment, utility, and of some special great discoveries. But natural science has invaded and transformed human life all the more practically through the medium of industry; and has prepared human emancipation, although its immediate effect had to be the furthering of the dehumanisation of man. Industry is the actual, historical relationship of nature, and therefore of natural science, to man. If, therefore, industry is conceived as the exoteric revelation of man’s essential powers, we also gain an understanding of the human essence of nature or the natural essence of man. In consequence, natural science will lose its abstractly material – or rather, its idealistic – tendency, and will become the basis of human science, as it has already become – albeit in an estranged form – the basis of actual human life, and to assume one basis for life and a different basis for science is as a matter of course a lie. <The nature which develops in human history – the genesis of human society – is man’s real nature; hence nature as it develops through industry, even though in an estranged form, is true anthropological nature.>

Sense-perception (see Feuerbach) must be the basis of all science. Only when it
proceeds from sense-perception in the two-fold form of sensuous consciousness and sensuous need – is it true science. All history is the history of preparing and developing “man” to become the object of sensuous consciousness, and turning the requirements of “man as man” into his needs. History itself is a real part of natural history – of nature developing into man. Natural science will in time incorporate into itself the science of man, just as the science of man will incorporate into itself natural science: there will be one science.

Man is the immediate object of natural science; for immediate, sensuous nature for man is, immediately, human sensuousness (the expressions are identical) – presented immediately in the form of the other man sensuously present for him. Indeed, his own sense-perception first exists as human sensuousness for himself through the other man. But nature is the immediate object of the science of man: the first object of man – man – is nature, sensuousness; and the particular human sensuous essential powers can only find their self-understanding in the science of the natural world in general, just as they can find their objective realisation only in natural objects. The element of thought itself – the element of thought’s living expression – language – is of a sensuous nature. The social reality of nature, and human natural science, or the natural science of man, are identical terms.

<It will be seen how in place of the wealth and poverty of political economy come the rich human being and the rich human need. The rich human being is simultaneously the human being in need of a totality of human manifestations of life – the man in whom his own realisation exists as an inner necessity, as need. Not only wealth, but likewise the poverty of man – under the assumption of socialism[32] – receives in equal measure a human and therefore social significance. Poverty is the passive bond which causes the human being to experience the need of the greatest wealth – the other human being. The dominion of the objective being in me, the sensuous outburst of my life activity, is passion, which thus becomes here the activity of my being.>

(5) A being only considers himself independent when he stands on his own feet; and he only stands on his own feet when he owes his existence to himself. A man who lives by the grace of another regards himself as a dependent being. But I live completely by the grace of another if I owe him not only the maintenance of my life, but if he has, moreover, created my life – if he is the source of my life. When it is not of my own creation, my life has necessarily a source of this kind outside of it. The Creation is therefore an idea very difficult to dislodge from popular consciousness. The fact that nature and man exist on their own account is incomprehensible to it, because it contradicts everything tangible in practical life.

The creation of the earth has received a mighty blow from geognosy – i.e., from the science which presents the formation of the earth, the development of the earth, as a process, as a self-generation. Generatio aequivoca is the only practical refutation of the theory of creation.[33]
Now it is certainly easy to say to the single individual what Aristotle has already said: You have been begotten by your father and your mother; therefore in you the mating of two human beings – a species-act of human beings – has produced the human being. You see, therefore, that even physically man owes his existence to man. Therefore you must not only keep sight of the one aspect – the infinite progression which leads you further to inquire: Who begot my father? Who his grandfather? etc. You must also hold on to the circular movement sensuously perceptible in that progress by which man repeats himself in procreation, man thus always remaining the subject. You will reply, however: I grant you this circular movement; now grant me the progress which drives me ever further until I ask: Who begot the first man, and nature as a whole? I can only answer you: Your question is itself a product of abstraction. Ask yourself how you arrived at that question. Ask yourself whether your question is not posed from a standpoint to which I cannot reply, because it is wrongly put. Ask yourself whether that progress as such exists for a reasonable mind. When you ask about the creation of nature and man, you are abstracting, in so doing, from man and nature. You postulate them as non-existent, and yet you want me to prove them to you as existing. Now I say to you: Give up your abstraction and you will also give up your question. Or if you want to hold on to your abstraction, then be consistent, and if you think of man and nature as non-existent, then think of yourself as non-existent, for you too are surely nature and man. Don’t think, don’t ask me, for as soon as you think and ask, your abstraction from the existence of nature and man has no meaning. Or are you such an egotist that you conceive everything as nothing, and yet want yourself to exist?

You can reply: I do not want to postulate the nothingness of nature, etc. I ask you about its genesis, just as I ask the anatomist about the formation of bones, etc.

But since for the socialist man the entire so-called history of the world is nothing but the creation of man through human labour, nothing but the emergence of nature for man, so he has the visible, irrefutable proof of his birth through himself, of his genesis. Since the real existence of man and nature has become evident in practice, through sense experience, because man has thus become evident for man as the being of nature, and nature for man as the being of man, the question about an alien being, about a being above nature and man – a question which implies the admission of the unreality of nature and of man – has become impossible in practice. Atheism, as the denial of this unreality, has no longer any meaning, for atheism is a negation of God, and postulates the existence of man through this negation; but socialism as socialism no longer stands in any need of such a mediation. It proceeds from the theoretically and practically sensuous consciousness of man and of nature as the essence. Socialism is man’s positive self-consciousness, no longer mediated through the abolition of religion, just as real life is man’s positive reality, no longer mediated through the abolition of private property, through communism. Communism is the position as the negation of the negation, and is hence the actual phase necessary for the next stage of historical development in the process of human emancipation and rehabilitation. Communism is the necessary form and the dynamic principle of the immediate future, but communism as such is not the goal of human development, the form of human society.}
Private Property and Communism

With the division of labour, in which all these contradictions are implicit, and which in its turn is based on the natural division of labour in the family and the separation of society into individual families opposed to one another, is given simultaneously the distribution, and indeed the unequal distribution, both quantitative and qualitative, of labour and its products, hence property: the nucleus, the first form, of which lies in the family, where wife and children are the slaves of the husband. This latent slavery in the family, though still very crude, is the first property, but even at this early stage it corresponds perfectly to the definition of modern economists who call it the power of disposing of the labour-power of others. Division of labour and private property are, moreover, identical expressions: in the one the same thing is affirmed with reference to activity as is affirmed in the other with reference to the product of the activity.

Further, the division of labour implies the contradiction between the interest of the separate individual or the individual family and the communal interest of all individuals who have intercourse with one another. And indeed, this communal interest does not exist merely in the imagination, as the “general interest,” but first of all in reality, as the mutual interdependence of the individuals among whom the labour is divided. And finally, the division of labour offers us the first example of how, as long as man remains in natural society, that is, as long as a cleavage exists between the particular and the common interest, as long, therefore, as activity is not voluntarily, but naturally, divided, man’s own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him. For as soon as the distribution of labour comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a herdsman, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood; while in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic. This fixation of social activity, this consolidation of what we ourselves produce into an objective power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught our calculations, is one of the chief factors in historical development up till now. [2]

The social power, i.e., the multiplied productive force, which arises through the co-operation of different individuals as it is determined by the division of labour, appears to these individuals, since their co-operation is not voluntary but has come about naturally, not as their own united power, but as an alien force existing outside them, of the origin and goal of which they are ignorant, which they thus cannot control, which on the contrary passes through a peculiar series of phases and stages independent of the will and the action of man, nay even being the prime governor of these.
How otherwise could, for instance, property have had a history at all, have taken on different forms, and landed property, for example, according to the different premises given, have proceeded in France from parcellation to centralisation in the hands of a few, in England from centralisation in the hands of a few to parcellation, as is actually the case today? Or how does it happen that trade, which after all is nothing more than the exchange of products of various individuals and countries, rules the whole world through the relation of supply and demand – a relation which, as an English economist says, hovers over the earth like the fate of the ancients, and with invisible hand allots fortune and misfortune to men, sets up empires and overthrows empires, causes nations to rise and to disappear – while with the abolition of the basis of private property, with the communistic regulation of production (and, implicit in this, the destruction of the alien relation between men and what they themselves produce), the power of the relation of supply and demand is dissolved into nothing, and men get exchange, production, the mode of their mutual relation, under their own control again?

**History as a Continuous Process**

In history up to the present it is certainly an empirical fact that separate individuals have, with the broadening of their activity into world-historical activity, become more and more enslaved under a power alien to them (a pressure which they have conceived of as a dirty trick on the part of the so-called universal spirit, etc.), a power which has become more and more enormous and, in the last instance, turns out to be the world market. But it is just as empirically established that, by the overthrow of the existing state of society by the communist revolution (of which more below) and the abolition of private property which is identical with it, this power, which so baffles the German theoreticians, will be dissolved; and that then the liberation of each single individual will be accomplished in the measure in which history becomes transformed into world history. From the above it is clear that the real intellectual wealth of the individual depends entirely on the wealth of his real connections. Only then will the separate individuals be liberated from the various national and local barriers, be brought into practical connection with the material and intellectual production of the whole world and be put in a position to acquire the capacity to enjoy this all-sided production of the whole earth (the creations of man). *All-round* dependence, this natural form of the world-historical co-operation of individuals, will be transformed by this communist revolution into the control and conscious mastery of these powers, which, born of the action of men on one another, have till now overawed and governed men as powers completely alien to them. Now this view can be expressed again in speculative-idealistic, i.e. fantastic, terms as “self-generation of the species” (“society as the subject”), and thereby the consecutive series of interrelated individuals connected with each other can be conceived as a single individual, which accomplishes the mystery of generating itself. It is clear here that individuals certainly make one another, physically and mentally, but do not make themselves.
This “alienation” (to use a term which will be comprehensible to the philosophers) can, of course, only be abolished given two practical premises. For it to become an “intolerable” power, i.e. a power against which men make a revolution, it must necessarily have rendered the great mass of humanity “propertyless,” and produced, at the same time, the contradiction of an existing world of wealth and culture, both of which conditions presuppose a great increase in productive power, a high degree of its development. And, on the other hand, this development of productive forces (which itself implies the actual empirical existence of men in their world-historical, instead of local, being) is an absolutely necessary practical premise because without it want is merely made general, and with destitution the struggle for necessities and all the old filthy business would necessarily be reproduced; and furthermore, because only with this universal development of productive forces is a universal intercourse between men established, which produces in all nations simultaneously the phenomenon of the “propertyless” mass (universal competition), makes each nation dependent on the revolutions of the others, and finally has put world-historical, empirically universal individuals in place of local ones. Without this, (1) communism could only exist as a local event; (2) the forces of intercourse themselves could not have developed as universal, hence intolerable powers: they would have remained home-bred conditions surrounded by superstition; and (3) each extension of intercourse would abolish local communism. Empirically, communism is only possible as the act of the dominant peoples “all at once” and simultaneously, which presupposes the universal development of productive forces and the world intercourse bound up with communism. Moreover, the mass of propertyless workers – the utterly precarious position of labour – power on a mass scale cut off from capital or from even a limited satisfaction and, therefore, no longer merely temporarily deprived of work itself as a secure source of life – presupposes the world market through competition. The proletariat can thus only exist world-historically, just as communism, its activity, can only have a “world-historical” existence. World-historical existence of individuals means existence of individuals which is directly linked up with world history.

Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the premises now in existence.
This sum of productive forces, capital funds and social forms of intercourse, which every individual and generation finds in existence as something given, is the real basis of what the philosophers have conceived as “substance” and “essence of man,” and what they have deified and attacked; a real basis which is not in the least disturbed, in its effect and influence on the development of men, by the fact that these philosophers revolt against it as “self-consciousness” and the “Unique.” These conditions of life, which different generations find in existence, decide also whether or not the periodically recurring revolutionary convulsion will be strong enough to overthrow the basis of the entire existing system. And if these material elements of a complete revolution are not present (namely, on the one hand the existing productive forces, on the other the formation of a revolutionary mass, which revolts not only against separate conditions of society up till then, but against the very “production of life” till then, the “total activity” on which it was based), then, as far as practical development is concerned, it is absolutely immaterial whether the idea of this revolution has been expressed a hundred times already, as the history of communism proves.

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**Forms of Intercourse**

Communism differs from all previous movements in that it overturns the basis of all earlier relations of production and intercourse, and for the first time consciously treats all natural premises as the creatures of hitherto existing men, strips them of their natural character and subjugates them to the power of the united individuals. Its organisation is, therefore, essentially economic, the material production of the conditions of this unity; it turns existing conditions into conditions of unity. The reality, which communism is creating, is precisely the true basis for rendering it impossible that anything should exist independently of individuals, insofar as reality is only a product of the preceding intercourse of individuals themselves. Thus the communists in practice treat the conditions created up to now by production and intercourse as inorganic conditions, without, however, imagining that it was the plan or the destiny of previous generations to give them material, and without believing that these conditions were inorganic for the individuals creating them.
[10. The Necessity, Preconditions and Consequences of the Abolition of Private Property]

Thus things have now come to such a pass that the individuals must appropriate the existing totality of productive forces, not only to achieve self-activity, but, also, merely to safeguard their very existence. This appropriation is first determined by the object to be appropriated, the productive forces, which have been developed to a totality and which only exist within a universal intercourse. From this aspect alone, therefore, this appropriation must have a universal character corresponding to the productive forces and the intercourse.

The appropriation of these forces is itself nothing more than the development of the individual capacities corresponding to the material instruments of production. The appropriation of a totality of instruments of production is, for this very reason, the development of a totality of capacities in the individuals themselves.

This appropriation is further determined by the persons appropriating. Only the proletarians of the present day, who are completely shut off from all self-activity, are in a position to achieve a complete and no longer restricted self-activity, which consists in the appropriation of a totality of productive forces and in the thus postulated development of a totality of capacities. All earlier revolutionary appropriations were restricted; individuals, whose self-activity was restricted by a crude instrument of production and a limited intercourse, appropriated this crude instrument of production, and hence merely achieved a new state of limitation. Their instrument of production became their property, but they themselves remained subordinate to the division of labour and their own instrument of production. In all expropriations up to now, a mass of individuals remained subservient to a single instrument of production; in the appropriation by the proletarians, a mass of instruments of production must be made subject to each individual, and property to all. Modern universal intercourse can be controlled by individuals, therefore, only when controlled by all.

This appropriation is further determined by the manner in which it must be effected. It can only be effected through a union, which by the character of the proletariat itself can again only be a universal one, and through a revolution, in which, on the one hand, the power of the earlier mode of production and intercourse and social organisation is overthrown, and, on the other hand, there develops the universal character and the energy of the proletariat, without which the revolution cannot be accomplished; and in which, further, the proletariat rids itself of everything that still clings to it from its previous
position in society.

Only at this stage does self-activity coincide with material life, which corresponds to the development of individuals into complete individuals and the casting-off of all natural limitations. The transformation of labour into self-activity corresponds to the transformation of the earlier limited intercourse into the intercourse of individuals as such. With the appropriation of the total productive forces through united individuals, private property comes to an end. Whilst previously in history a particular condition always appeared as accidental, now the isolation of individuals and the particular private gain of each man have themselves become accidental.

The individuals, who are no longer subject to the division of labour, have been conceived by the philosophers as an ideal, under the name "Man". They have conceived the whole process which we have outlined as the evolutionary process of "Man," so that at every historical stage "Man" was substituted for the individuals and shown as the motive force of history. The whole process was thus conceived as a process of the self-estrangement of "Man," and this was essentially due to the fact that the average individual of the later stage was always foisted on to the earlier stage, and the consciousness of a later age on to the individuals of an earlier. Through this inversion, which from the first is an abstract image of the actual conditions, it was possible to transform the whole of history into an evolutionary process of consciousness.

The Necessity of the Communist Revolution

Finally, from the conception of history we have sketched we obtain these further conclusions:

(1) In the development of productive forces there comes a stage when productive forces and means of intercourse are brought into being, which, under the existing relationships, only cause mischief, and are no longer productive but destructive forces (machinery and money); and connected with this a class is called forth, which has to bear all the burdens of society without enjoying its advantages, which, ousted from society, is forced into the most decided antagonism to all other classes; a class which forms the majority of all members of society, and from which emanates the consciousness of the necessity of a fundamental revolution, the communist consciousness, which may, of course, arise among the other classes too through the contemplation of the situation of this class.

(2) The conditions under which definite productive forces can be applied are the conditions of the rule of a definite class of society, whose social power, deriving from its property, has its practical-idealistic expression in each case in the form of the State; and, therefore, every revolutionary struggle is directed against a class, which till then has been in power. [4]
In all revolutions up till now the mode of activity always remained unscathed and it was only a question of a different distribution of this activity, a new distribution of labour to other persons, whilst the communist revolution is directed against the preceding mode of activity, does away with labour, and abolishes the rule of all classes with the classes themselves, because it is carried through by the class which no longer counts as a class in society, is not recognised as a class, and is in itself the expression of the dissolution of all classes, nationalities, etc. within present society; and

Both for the production on a mass scale of this communist consciousness, and for the success of the cause itself, the alteration of men on a mass scale is, necessary, an alteration which can only take place in a practical movement, a revolution; this revolution is necessary, therefore, not only because the ruling class cannot be overthrown in any other way, but also because the class overthrowing it can only in a revolution succeed in ridding itself of all the muck of ages and become fitted to found society anew.

Chapter II. Proletarians and Communists

In what relation do the Communists stand to the proletarians as a whole?

The Communists do not form a separate party opposed to the other working-class parties.

They have no interests separate and apart from those of the proletariat as a whole.

They do not set up any sectarian principles of their own, by which to shape and mould the proletarian movement.

The Communists are distinguished from the other working-class parties by this only: 1. In the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality. 2. In the various stages of development which the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole.

The Communists, therefore, are on the one hand, practically, the most advanced and resolute section of the working-class parties of every country, that section which pushes forward all others; on the other hand, theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement.
The immediate aim of the Communists is the same as that of all other proletarian parties: formation of the proletariat into a class, overthrow of the bourgeois supremacy, conquest of political power by the proletariat.

The theoretical conclusions of the Communists are in no way based on ideas or principles that have been invented, or discovered, by this or that would-be universal reformer.

They merely express, in general terms, actual relations springing from an existing class struggle, from a historical movement going on under our very eyes. The abolition of existing property relations is not at all a distinctive feature of communism.

All property relations in the past have continually been subject to historical change consequent upon the change in historical conditions.

The French Revolution, for example, abolished feudal property in favour of bourgeois property.

The distinguishing feature of Communism is not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property. But modern bourgeois private property is the final and most complete expression of the system of producing and appropriating products, that is based on class antagonisms, on the exploitation of the many by the few.

In this sense, the theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property.

We Communists have been reproached with the desire of abolishing the right of personally acquiring property as the fruit of a man’s own labour, which property is alleged to be the groundwork of all personal freedom, activity and independence.

Hard-won, self-acquired, self-earned property! Do you mean the property of petty artisan and of the small peasant, a form of property that preceded the bourgeois form? There is no need to abolish that; the development of industry has to a great extent already destroyed it, and is still destroying it daily.

Or do you mean the modern bourgeois private property?

But does wage-labour create any property for the labourer? Not a bit. It creates capital, i.e., that kind of property which exploits wage-labour, and which cannot increase except upon condition of begetting a new supply of wage-labour for fresh exploitation. Property, in its present form, is based on the antagonism of capital and wage labour. Let us examine both sides of this antagonism.

To be a capitalist, is to have not only a purely personal, but a social status in production. Capital is a collective product, and only by the united action of many
members, nay, in the last resort, only by the united action of all members of society, can it be set in motion.

Capital is therefore not only personal; it is a social power.

When, therefore, capital is converted into common property, into the property of all members of society, personal property is not thereby transformed into social property. It is only the social character of the property that is changed. It loses its class character.

Let us now take wage-labour.

The average price of wage-labour is the minimum wage, \( i.e., \) that quantum of the means of subsistence which is absolutely requisite to keep the labourer in bare existence as a labourer. What, therefore, the wage-labourer appropriates by means of his labour, merely suffices to prolong and reproduce a bare existence. We by no means intend to abolish this personal appropriation of the products of labour, an appropriation that is made for the maintenance and reproduction of human life, and that leaves no surplus wherewith to command the labour of others. All that we want to do away with is the miserable character of this appropriation, under which the labourer lives merely to increase capital, and is allowed to live only in so far as the interest of the ruling class requires it.

In bourgeois society, living labour is but a means to increase accumulated labour. In Communist society, accumulated labour is but a means to widen, to enrich, to promote the existence of the labourer.

In bourgeois society, therefore, the past dominates the present; in Communist society, the present dominates the past. In bourgeois society capital is independent and has individuality, while the living person is dependent and has no individuality.

And the abolition of this state of things is called by the bourgeois, abolition of individuality and freedom! And rightly so. The abolition of bourgeois individuality, bourgeois independence, and bourgeois freedom is undoubtedly aimed at.

By freedom is meant, under the present bourgeois conditions of production, free trade, free selling and buying.

But if selling and buying disappears, free selling and buying disappears also. This talk about free selling and buying, and all the other “brave words” of our bourgeois about freedom in general, have a meaning, if any, only in contrast with restricted selling and buying, with the fettered traders of the Middle Ages, but have no meaning when opposed to the Communistic abolition of buying and selling, of the bourgeois conditions of production, and of the bourgeoisie itself.

You are horrified at our intending to do away with private property. But in your
existing society, private property is already done away with for nine-tenths of the population; its existence for the few is solely due to its non-existence in the hands of those nine-tenths. You reproach us, therefore, with intending to do away with a form of property, the necessary condition for whose existence is the non-existence of any property for the immense majority of society.

In one word, you reproach us with intending to do away with your property. Precisely so; that is just what we intend.

From the moment when labour can no longer be converted into capital, money, or rent, into a social power capable of being monopolised, i.e., from the moment when individual property can no longer be transformed into bourgeois property, into capital, from that moment, you say, individuality vanishes.

You must, therefore, confess that by “individual” you mean no other person than the bourgeois, than the middle-class owner of property. This person must, indeed, be swept out of the way, and made impossible.

Communism deprives no man of the power to appropriate the products of society; all that it does is to deprive him of the power to subjugate the labour of others by means of such appropriations.

It has been objected that upon the abolition of private property, all work will cease, and universal laziness will overtake us.

According to this, bourgeois society ought long ago to have gone to the dogs through sheer idleness; for those of its members who work, acquire nothing, and those who acquire anything do not work. The whole of this objection is but another expression of the tautology: that there can no longer be any wage-labour when there is no longer any capital.

All objections urged against the Communistic mode of producing and appropriating material products, have, in the same way, been urged against the Communistic mode of producing and appropriating intellectual products. Just as, to the bourgeois, the disappearance of class property is the disappearance of production itself, so the disappearance of class culture is to him identical with the disappearance of all culture.

That culture, the loss of which he laments, is, for the enormous majority, a mere training to act as a machine.

But don’t wrangle with us so long as you apply, to our intended abolition of bourgeois property, the standard of your bourgeois notions of freedom, culture, law, &c. Your very ideas are but the outgrowth of the conditions of your bourgeois production and bourgeois property, just as your jurisprudence is but the will of your class made into a law for all, a will whose essential character and direction are determined by the
The selfish misconception that induces you to transform into eternal laws of nature and of reason, the social forms springing from your present mode of production and form of property – historical relations that rise and disappear in the progress of production – this misconception you share with every ruling class that has preceded you. What you see clearly in the case of ancient property, what you admit in the case of feudal property, you are of course forbidden to admit in the case of your own bourgeois form of property.

Abolition [Aufhebung] of the family! Even the most radical flare up at this infamous proposal of the Communists.

On what foundation is the present family, the bourgeois family, based? On capital, on private gain. In its completely developed form, this family exists only among the bourgeoisie. But this state of things finds its complement in the practical absence of the family among the proletarians, and in public prostitution.

The bourgeois family will vanish as a matter of course when its complement vanishes, and both will vanish with the vanishing of capital.

Do you charge us with wanting to stop the exploitation of children by their parents? To this crime we plead guilty.

But, you say, we destroy the most hallowed of relations, when we replace home education by social.

And your education! Is not that also social, and determined by the social conditions under which you educate, by the intervention direct or indirect, of society, by means of schools, &c.? The Communists have not invented the intervention of society in education; they do but seek to alter the character of that intervention, and to rescue education from the influence of the ruling class.

The bourgeois clap-trap about the family and education, about the hallowed correlation of parents and child, becomes all the more disgusting, the more, by the action of Modern Industry, all the family ties among the proletarians are torn asunder, and their children transformed into simple articles of commerce and instruments of labour.

But you Communists would introduce community of women, screams the bourgeoisie in chorus.

The bourgeois sees his wife a mere instrument of production. He hears that the instruments of production are to be exploited in common, and, naturally, can come to no other conclusion that the lot of being common to all will likewise fall to the women.

He has not even a suspicion that the real point aimed at is to do away with the status
of women as mere instruments of production.

For the rest, nothing is more ridiculous than the virtuous indignation of our bourgeois at the community of women which, they pretend, is to be openly and officially established by the Communists. The Communists have no need to introduce community of women; it has existed almost from time immemorial.

Our bourgeois, not content with having wives and daughters of their proletarians at their disposal, not to speak of common prostitutes, take the greatest pleasure in seducing each other’s wives.

Bourgeois marriage is, in reality, a system of wives in common and thus, at the most, what the Communists might possibly be reproached with is that they desire to introduce, in substitution for a hypocritically concealed, an openly legalised community of women. For the rest, it is self-evident that the abolition of the present system of production must bring with it the abolition of the community of women springing from that system, i.e., of prostitution both public and private.

The Communists are further reproached with desiring to abolish countries and nationality.

The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself the nation, it is so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word.

National differences and antagonism between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto.

The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster. United action, of the leading civilised countries at least, is one of the first conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat.

In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another will also be put an end to, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end to. In proportion as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end.

The charges against Communism made from a religious, a philosophical and, generally, from an ideological standpoint, are not deserving of serious examination.

Does it require deep intuition to comprehend that man’s ideas, views, and conception, in one word, man’s consciousness, changes with every change in the conditions of his
material existence, in his social relations and in his social life?

What else does the history of ideas prove, than that intellectual production changes its character in proportion as material production is changed? The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class.

When people speak of the ideas that revolutionise society, they do but express that fact that within the old society the elements of a new one have been created, and that the dissolution of the old ideas keeps even pace with the dissolution of the old conditions of existence.

When the ancient world was in its last throes, the ancient religions were overcome by Christianity. When Christian ideas succumbed in the 18th century to rationalist ideas, feudal society fought its death battle with the then revolutionary bourgeoisie. The ideas of religious liberty and freedom of conscience merely gave expression to the sway of free competition within the domain of knowledge.

“Undoubtedly,” it will be said, “religious, moral, philosophical, and juridical ideas have been modified in the course of historical development. But religion, morality, philosophy, political science, and law, constantly survived this change.”

“There are, besides, eternal truths, such as Freedom, Justice, etc., that are common to all states of society. But Communism abolishes eternal truths, it abolishes all religion, and all morality, instead of constituting them on a new basis; it therefore acts in contradiction to all past historical experience.”

What does this accusation reduce itself to? The history of all past society has consisted in the development of class antagonisms, antagonisms that assumed different forms at different epochs.

But whatever form they may have taken, one fact is common to all past ages, viz., the exploitation of one part of society by the other. No wonder, then, that the social consciousness of past ages, despite all the multiplicity and variety it displays, moves within certain common forms, or general ideas, which cannot completely vanish except with the total disappearance of class antagonisms.

The Communist revolution is the most radical rupture with traditional property relations; no wonder that its development involved the most radical rupture with traditional ideas.

But let us have done with the bourgeois objections to Communism.

We have seen above, that the first step in the revolution by the working class is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class to win the battle of democracy.
The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degree, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the State, i.e., of the proletariat organised as the ruling class; and to increase the total productive forces as rapidly as possible.

Of course, in the beginning, this cannot be effected except by means of despotic inroads on the rights of property, and on the conditions of bourgeois production; by means of measures, therefore, which appear economically insufficient and untenable, but which, in the course of the movement, outstrip themselves, necessitate further inroads upon the old social order, and are unavoidable as a means of entirely revolutionising the mode of production.

These measures will, of course, be different in different countries.

Nevertheless, in most advanced countries, the following will be pretty generally applicable.

1. Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes.  2. A heavy progressive or graduated income tax.  3. Abolition of all rights of inheritance.  4. Confiscation of the property of all emigrants and rebels.  5. Centralisation of credit in the hands of the state, by means of a national bank with State capital and an exclusive monopoly.  6. Centralisation of the means of communication and transport in the hands of the State.  7. Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the State; the bringing into cultivation of waste-lands, and the improvement of the soil generally in accordance with a common plan.  8. Equal liability of all to work. Establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture.  9. Combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; gradual abolition of all the distinction between town and country by a more equable distribution of the populace over the country.  10. Free education for all children in public schools. Abolition of children’s factory labour in its present form. Combination of education with industrial production, &c, &c.

When, in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character. Political power, properly so called, is merely the organised power of one class for oppressing another. If the proletariat during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of circumstances, to organise itself as a class, if, by means of a revolution, it makes itself the ruling class, and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class.

In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.

…
3. Critical-Utopian Socialism and Communism

We do not here refer to that literature which, in every great modern revolution, has always given voice to the demands of the proletariat, such as the writings of Babeuf and others.

The first direct attempts of the proletariat to attain its own ends, made in times of universal excitement, when feudal society was being overthrown, necessarily failed, owing to the then undeveloped state of the proletariat, as well as to the absence of the economic conditions for its emancipation, conditions that had yet to be produced, and could be produced by the impending bourgeois epoch alone. The revolutionary literature that accompanied these first movements of the proletariat had necessarily a reactionary character. It inculcated universal asceticism and social levelling in its crudest form.

The Socialist and Communist systems, properly so called, those of Saint-Simon, Fourier, Owen, and others, spring into existence in the early undeveloped period, described above, of the struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie (see Section 1. Bourgeois and Proletarians).

The founders of these systems see, indeed, the class antagonisms, as well as the action of the decomposing elements in the prevailing form of society. But the proletariat, as yet in its infancy, offers to them the spectacle of a class without any historical initiative or any independent political movement.

Since the development of class antagonism keeps even pace with the development of industry, the economic situation, as they find it, does not as yet offer to them the material conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat. They therefore search after a new social science, after new social laws, that are to create these conditions.

Historical action is to yield to their personal inventive action; historically created conditions of emancipation to fantastic ones; and the gradual, spontaneous class organisation of the proletariat to an organisation of society especially contrived by these inventors. Future history resolves itself, in their eyes, into the propaganda and the practical carrying out of their social plans.

In the formation of their plans, they are conscious of caring chiefly for the interests of the working class, as being the most suffering class. Only from the point of view of being the most suffering class does the proletariat exist for them.

The undeveloped state of the class struggle, as well as their own surroundings, causes Socialists of this kind to consider themselves far superior to all class antagonisms. They want to improve the condition of every member of society, even that of the most favoured. Hence, they habitually appeal to society at large, without the distinction of class; nay, by preference, to the ruling class. For how can people, when once they understand their system, fail to see in it the best possible plan of the best possible state of
Hence, they reject all political, and especially all revolutionary action; they wish to attain their ends by peaceful means, necessarily doomed to failure, and by the force of example, to pave the way for the new social Gospel.

Such fantastic pictures of future society, painted at a time when the proletariat is still in a very undeveloped state and has but a fantastic conception of its own position, correspond with the first instinctive yearnings of that class for a general reconstruction of society.

But these Socialist and Communist publications contain also a critical element. They attack every principle of existing society. Hence, they are full of the most valuable materials for the enlightenment of the working class. The practical measures proposed in them — such as the abolition of the distinction between town and country, of the family, of the carrying on of industries for the account of private individuals, and of the wage system, the proclamation of social harmony, the conversion of the function of the state into a more superintendence of production — all these proposals point solely to the disappearance of class antagonisms which were, at that time, only just cropping up, and which, in these publications, are recognised in their earliest indistinct and undefined forms only. These proposals, therefore, are of a purely Utopian character.

The significance of Critical-Utopian Socialism and Communism bears an inverse relation to historical development. In proportion as the modern class struggle develops and takes definite shape, this fantastic standing apart from the contest, these fantastic attacks on it, lose all practical value and all theoretical justification. Therefore, although the originators of these systems were, in many respects, revolutionary, their disciples have, in every case, formed mere reactionary sects. They hold fast by the original views of their masters, in opposition to the progressive historical development of the proletariat. They, therefore, endeavour, and that consistently, to deaden the class struggle and to reconcile the class antagonisms. They still dream of experimental realisation of their social Utopias, of founding isolated “phalansteres”, of establishing “Home Colonies”, or setting up a “Little Icaria” (4) — duodecimo editions of the New Jerusalem — and to realise all these castles in the air, they are compelled to appeal to the feelings and purses of the bourgeois. By degrees, they sink into the category of the reactionary [or] conservative Socialists depicted above, differing from these only by more systematic pedantry, and by their fanatical and superstitious belief in the miraculous effects of their social science.

They, therefore, violently oppose all political action on the part of the working class; such action, according to them, can only result from blind unbelief in the new Gospel.

The Owenites in England, and the Fourierists in France, respectively, oppose the Chartists and the Réformistes.
Chapter IV. Position of the Communists in Relation to the Various Existing Opposition Parties

Section II has made clear the relations of the Communists to the existing working-class parties, such as the Chartists in England and the Agrarian Reformers in America.

The Communists fight for the attainment of the immediate aims, for the enforcement of the momentary interests of the working class; but in the movement of the present, they also represent and take care of the future of that movement. In France, the Communists ally with the Social-Democrats (1) against the conservative and radical bourgeoisie, reserving, however, the right to take up a critical position in regard to phases and illusions traditionally handed down from the great Revolution.

In Switzerland, they support the Radicals, without losing sight of the fact that this party consists of antagonistic elements, partly of Democratic Socialists, in the French sense, partly of radical bourgeois.

In Poland, they support the party that insists on an agrarian revolution as the prime condition for national emancipation, that party which fomented the insurrection of Cracow in 1846.

In Germany, they fight with the bourgeoisie whenever it acts in a revolutionary way, against the absolute monarchy, the feudal squirearchy, and the petty bourgeoisie.

But they never cease, for a single instant, to instill into the working class the clearest possible recognition of the hostile antagonism between bourgeoisie and proletariat, in order that the German workers may straightway use, as so many weapons against the bourgeoisie, the social and political conditions that the bourgeoisie must necessarily introduce along with its supremacy, and in order that, after the fall of the reactionary classes in Germany, the fight against the bourgeoisie itself may immediately begin.

The Communists turn their attention chiefly to Germany, because that country is on the eve of a bourgeois revolution that is bound to be carried out under more advanced conditions of European civilisation and with a much more developed proletariat than that of England was in the seventeenth, and France in the eighteenth century, and because the bourgeois revolution in Germany will be but the prelude to an immediately following proletarian revolution.

In short, the Communists everywhere support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order of things.
In all these movements, they bring to the front, as the leading question in each, the property question, no matter what its degree of development at the time.

Finally, they labour everywhere for the union and agreement of the democratic parties of all countries.

The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communistic revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win.

**Working Men of All Countries, Unite!**

**Karl Marx  Critique of the Gotha Programme**

I

1. "Labor is the source of wealth and all culture, and since useful labor is possible only in society and through society, the proceeds of labor belong undiminished with equal right to all members of society."

*First part of the paragraph: "Labor is the source of all wealth and all culture."*

Labor is not the source of all wealth. Nature is just as much the source of use values (and it is surely of such that material wealth consists!) as labor, which itself is only the manifestation of a force of nature, human labor power. The above phrase is to be found in all children's primers and is correct insofar as it is implied that labor is performed with the appurtenant subjects and instruments. But a socialist program cannot allow such bourgeois phrases to pass over in silence the conditions that alone give them meaning. And insofar as man from the beginning behaves toward nature, the primary source of all instruments and subjects of labor, as an owner, treats her as belonging to him, his labor becomes the source of use values, therefore also of wealth. The bourgeois have very good grounds for falsely ascribing supernatural creative power to labor; since precisely from the fact that labor depends on nature it follows that the man who possesses no other property than his labor power must, in all conditions of society and culture, be the slave of other men who have made themselves the owners of the material conditions of labor. He can only work with their permission, hence live only with their permission.

Let us now leave the sentence as it stands, or rather limps. What could one have
expected in conclusion? Obviously this:

"Since labor is the source of all wealth, no one in society can appropriate wealth except as the product of labor. Therefore, if he himself does not work, he lives by the labor of others and also acquires his culture at the expense of the labor of others."

Instead of this, by means of the verbal river "and since", a proposition is added in order to draw a conclusion from this and not from the first one.

Second part of the paragraph: "Useful labor is possible only in society and through society."

According to the first proposition, labor was the source of all wealth and all culture; therefore no society is possible without labor. Now we learn, conversely, that no "useful" labor is possible without society.

One could just as well have said that only in society can useless and even socially harmful labor become a branch of gainful occupation, that only in society can one live by being idle, etc., etc. -- in short, once could just as well have copied the whole of Rousseau.

And what is "useful" labor? Surely only labor which produces the intended useful result. A savage -- and man was a savage after he had ceased to be an ape -- who kills an animal with a stone, who collects fruit, etc., performs "useful" labor.

Thirdly, the conclusion: "Useful labor is possible only in society and through society, the proceeds of labor belong undiminished with equal right to all members of society."

A fine conclusion! If useful labor is possible only in society and through society, the proceeds of labor belong to society -- and only so much therefrom accrues to the individual worker as is not required to maintain the "condition" of labor, society.

In fact, this proposition has at all times been made use of by the champions of the state of society prevailing at any given time. First comes the claims of the government and everything that sticks to it, since it is the social organ for the maintenance of the social order; then comes the claims of the various kinds of private property, for the various kinds of private property are the foundations of society, etc. One sees that such hollow phrases are the foundations of society, etc. One sees that such hollow phrases can be twisted and turned as desired.

The first and second parts of the paragraph have some intelligible connection only in the following wording:
"Labor becomes the source of wealth and culture only as social labor", or, what is the same thing, "in and through society".

This proposition is incontestably correct, for although isolated labor (its material conditions presupposed) can create use value, it can create neither wealth nor culture.

But equally incontestable is this other proposition:

"In proportion as labor develops socially, and becomes thereby a source of wealth and culture, poverty and destitution develop among the workers, and wealth and culture among the nonworkers."

This is the law of all history hitherto. What, therefore, had to be done here, instead of setting down general phrases about "labor" and "society", was to prove concretely how in present capitalist society the material, etc., conditions have at last been created which enable and compel the workers to lift this social curse.

In fact, however, the whole paragraph, bungled in style and content, is only there in order to inscribe the Lassallean catchword of the "undiminished proceeds of labor" as a slogan at the top of the party banner. I shall return later to the "proceeds of labor", "equal right", etc., since the same thing recurs in a somewhat different form further on.

2. "In present-day society, the instruments of labor are the monopoly of the capitalist class; the resulting dependence of the working class is the cause of misery and servitude in all forms."

This sentence, borrowed from the Rules of the International, is incorrect in this "improved" edition.

In present-day society, the instruments of labor are the monopoly of the landowners (the monopoly of property in land is even the basis of the monopoly of capital) and the capitalists. In the passage in question, the Rules of the International do not mention either one or the other class of monopolists. They speak of the "monopolizer of the means of labor, that is, the sources of life." The addition, "sources of life", makes it sufficiently clear that land is included in the instruments of labor.

The correction was introduced because Lassalle, for reasons now generally known, attacked only the capitalist class and not the landowners. In England, the capitalist class is usually not even the owner of the land on which his factory stands.

3. "The emancipation of labor demands the promotion of the instruments of labor to the common property of society and the co-operative regulation of the total labor, with a fair distribution of the proceeds of labor."
"Promotion of the instruments of labor to the common property" ought obviously to read their "conversion into the common property"; but this is only passing.

What are the "proceeds of labor"? The product of labor, or its value? And in the latter case, is it the total value of the product, or only that part of the value which labor has newly added to the value of the means of production consumed?

"Proceeds of labor" is a loose notion which Lassalle has put in the place of definite economic conceptions.

What is "a fair distribution"?

Do not the bourgeois assert that the present-day distribution is "fair"? And is it not, in fact, the only "fair" distribution on the basis of the present-day mode of production? Are economic relations regulated by legal conceptions, or do not, on the contrary, legal relations arise out of economic ones? Have not also the socialist sectarians the most varied notions about "fair" distribution?

To understand what is implied in this connection by the phrase "fair distribution", we must take the first paragraph and this one together. The latter presupposes a society wherein the instruments of labor are common property and the total labor is co-operatively regulated, and from the first paragraph we learn that "the proceeds of labor belong undiminished with equal right to all members of society."

"To all members of society"? To those who do not work as well? What remains then of the "undiminished" proceeds of labor? Only to those members of society who work? What remains then of the "equal right" of all members of society?

But "all members of society" and "equal right" are obviously mere phrases. The kernel consists in this, that in this communist society every worker must receive the "undiminished" Lassallean "proceeds of labor".

Let us take, first of all, the words "proceeds of labor" in the sense of the product of labor; then the co-operative proceeds of labor are the total social product.

From this must now be deducted: First, cover for replacement of the means of production used up. Second, additional portion for expansion of production. Third, reserve or insurance funds to provide against accidents, dislocations caused by natural calamities, etc.

These deductions from the "undiminished" proceeds of labor are an economic necessity, and their magnitude is to be determined according to available means and forces, and partly by computation of probabilities, but they are in no way calculable by equity.
There remains the other part of the total product, intended to serve as means of consumption.

Before this is divided among the individuals, there has to be deducted again, from it: First, the general costs of administration not belonging to production. This part will, from the outset, be very considerably restricted in comparison with present-day society, and it diminishes in proportion as the new society develops. Second, that which is intended for the common satisfaction of needs, such as schools, health services, etc. From the outset, this part grows considerably in comparison with present-day society, and it grows in proportion as the new society develops. Third, funds for those unable to work, etc., in short, for what is included under so-called official poor relief today.

Only now do we come to the "distribution" which the program, under Lassallean influence, alone has in view in its narrow fashion -- namely, to that part of the means of consumption which is divided among the individual producers of the co-operative society.

The "undiminished" proceeds of labor have already unnoticeably become converted into the "diminished" proceeds, although what the producer is deprived of in his capacity as a private individual benefits him directly or indirectly in his capacity as a member of society.

Just as the phrase of the "undiminished" proceeds of labor has disappeared, so now does the phrase of the "proceeds of labor" disappear altogether.

Within the co-operative society based on common ownership of the means of production, the producers do not exchange their products; just as little does the labor employed on the products appear here as the value of these products, as a material quality possessed by them, since now, in contrast to capitalist society, individual labor no longer exists in an indirect fashion but directly as a component part of total labor. The phrase "proceeds of labor", objectionable also today on account of its ambiguity, thus loses all meaning.

What we have to deal with here is a communist society, not as it has developed on its own foundations, but, on the contrary, just as it emerges from capitalist society; which is thus in every respect, economically, morally, and intellectually, still stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emerges. Accordingly, the individual producer receives back from society -- after the deductions have been made -- exactly what he gives to it. What he has given to it is his individual quantum of labor. For example, the social working day consists of the sum of the individual hours of work; the individual labor time of the individual producer is the part of the social working day contributed by him, his share in it. He receives a certificate from society that he has furnished such-and-such an amount of labor (after deducting his labor for the common funds); and with this certificate, he draws from the social stock of means of consumption as much as the same amount of labor cost. The same amount of labor which he has given to society in one form, he receives back in another.
Here, obviously, the same principle prevails as that which regulates the exchange of commodities, as far as this is exchange of equal values. Content and form are changed, because under the altered circumstances no one can give anything except his labor, and because, on the other hand, nothing can pass to the ownership of individuals, except individual means of consumption. But as far as the distribution of the latter among the individual producers is concerned, the same principle prevails as in the exchange of commodity equivalents: a given amount of labor in one form is exchanged for an equal amount of labor in another form.

Hence, equal right here is still in principle -- *bourgeois right*, although principle and practice are no longer at loggerheads, while the exchange of equivalents in commodity exchange exists only on the average and not in the individual case.

In spite of this advance, this equal right is still constantly stigmatized by a bourgeois limitation. The right of the producers is proportional to the labor they supply; the equality consists in the fact that measurement is made with an equal standard, labor.

But one man is superior to another physically, or mentally, and supplies more labor in the same time, or can labor for a longer time; and labor, to serve as a measure, must be defined by its duration or intensity, otherwise it ceases to be a standard of measurement. This equal right is an unequal right for unequal labor. It recognizes no class differences, because everyone is only a worker like everyone else; but it tacitly recognizes unequal individual endowment, and thus productive capacity, as a natural privilege. It is, therefore, a right of inequality, in its content, like every right. Right, by its very nature, can consist only in the application of an equal standard; but unequal individuals (and they would not be different individuals if they were not unequal) are measurable only by an equal standard insofar as they are brought under an equal point of view, are taken from one definite side only -- for instance, in the present case, are regarded only as workers and nothing more is seen in them, everything else being ignored. Further, one worker is married, another is not; one has more children than another, and so on and so forth. Thus, with an equal performance of labor, and hence an equal in the social consumption fund, one will in fact receive more than another, one will be richer than another, and so on. To avoid all these defects, right, instead of being equal, would have to be unequal.

But these defects are inevitable in the first phase of communist society as it is when it has just emerged after prolonged birth pangs from capitalist society. Right can never be higher than the economic structure of society and its cultural development conditioned thereby.

In a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labor, and therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical labor, has vanished; after labor has become not only a means of life but life's prime want; after the productive forces have also increased with the all-around development of the individual, and all the springs of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly -- only then then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banners: From each according to his ability, to each
according to his needs!

I have dealt more at length with the "undiminished" proceeds of labor, on the one hand, and with "equal right" and "fair distribution", on the other, in order to show what a crime it is to attempt, on the one hand, to force on our Party again, as dogmas, ideas which in a certain period had some meaning but have now become obsolete verbal rubbish, while again perverting, on the other, the realistic outlook, which it cost so much effort to instill into the Party but which has now taken root in it, by means of ideological nonsense about right and other trash so common among the democrats and French socialists.

Quite apart from the analysis so far given, it was in general a mistake to make a fuss about so-called distribution and put the principal stress on it.

Any distribution whatever of the means of consumption is only a consequence of the distribution of the conditions of production themselves. The latter distribution, however, is a feature of the mode of production itself. The capitalist mode of production, for example, rests on the fact that the material conditions of production are in the hands of nonworkers in the form of property in capital and land, while the masses are only owners of the personal condition of production, of labor power. If the elements of production are so distributed, then the present-day distribution of the means of consumption results automatically. If the material conditions of production are the co-operative property of the workers themselves, then there likewise results a distribution of the means of consumption different from the present one. Vulgar socialism (and from it in turn a section of the democrats) has taken over from the bourgeois economists the consideration and treatment of distribution as independent of the mode of production and hence the presentation of socialism as turning principally on distribution. After the real relation has long been made clear, why retrogress again?

4. "The emancipation of labor must be the work of the working class, relative to which all other classes are only one reactionary mass."

The first strophe is taken from the introductory words of the Rules of the International, but "improved". There it is said: "The emancipation of the working class must be the act of the workers themselves"; here, on the contrary, the "working class" has to emancipate -- what? "Labor." Let him understand who can.

In compensation, the antistrophe, on the other hand, is a Lassallean quotation of the first water: "relative to which" (the working class) "all other classes are only one reactionary mass."

In the *Communist Manifesto* it is said:
"Of all the classes that stand face-to-face with the bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class. The other classes decay and finally disappear in the face of modern industry; the proletariat is its special and essential product."

The bourgeoisie is here conceived as a revolutionary class -- as the bearer of large-scale industry -- relative to the feudal lords and the lower middle class, who desire to maintain all social positions that are the creation of obsolete modes of production. thus, they do not form together with the bourgeoisie "only one reactionary mass".

On the other hand, the proletariat is revolutionary relative to the bourgeoisie because, having itself grown up on the basis of large-scale industry, it strives to strip off from production the capitalist character that the bourgeoisie seeks to perpetuate. But the Manifesto adds that the "lower middle class" is becoming revolutionary "in view of [its] impending transfer to the proletariat".

From this point of view, therefore, it is again nonsense to say that it, together with the bourgeoisie, and with the feudal lords into the bargain, "form only one reactionary mass" relative to the working class.

Has one proclaimed to the artisan, small manufacturers, etc., and peasants during the last elections: Relative to us, you, together with the bourgeoisie and feudal lords, form one reactionary mass?

Lassalle knew the Communist Manifesto by heart, as his faithful followers know the gospels written by him. If, therefore, he has falsified it so grossly, this has occurred only to put a good color on his alliance with absolutist and feudal opponents against the bourgeoisie.

In the above paragraph, moreover, his oracular saying is dragged in by main force without any connection with the botched quotation from the Rules of the International. Thus, it is simply an impertinence, and indeed not at all displeasing to Herr Bismarck, one of those cheap pieces of insolence in which the Marat of Berlin deals. [Marat of Berlin a reference to Hasselmann, chief editor of the Neuer Social-Demokrat]

5. "The working class strives for its emancipation first of all within the framework of the present-day national states, conscious that the necessary result of its efforts, which are common to the workers of all civilized countries, will be the international brotherhood of peoples."

Lassalle, in opposition to the Communist Manifesto and to all earlier socialism, conceived the workers' movement from the narrowest national standpoint. He is being followed in this -- and that after the work of the International!

It is altogether self-evident that, to be able to fight at all, the working class must organize itself at home as a class and that its own country is the immediate arena of its
struggle -- insofar as its class struggle is national, not in substance, but, as the Communist Manifesto says, "in form". But the "framework of the present-day national state", for instance, the German Empire, is itself, in its turn, economically "within the framework" of the world market, politically "within the framework" of the system of states. Every businessman knows that German trade is at the same time foreign trade, and the greatness of Herr Bismarck consists, to be sure, precisely in his pursuing a kind of international policy.

And to what does the German Workers' party reduce its internationalism? To the consciousness that the result of its efforts will be "the international brotherhood of peoples" -- a phrase borrowed from the bourgeois League of Peace and Freedom, which is intended to pass as equivalent to the international brotherhood of working classes in the joint struggle against the ruling classes and their governments. Not a word, therefore, about the international functions of the German working class! And it is thus that it is to challenge its own bourgeoisie -- which is already linked up in brotherhood against it with the bourgeois of all other countries -- and Herr Bismarck's international policy of conspiracy.

In fact, the internationalism of the program stands even infinitely below that of the Free Trade party. The latter also asserts that the result of its efforts will be "the international brotherhood of peoples". But it also does something to make trade international and by no means contents itself with the consciousness that all people are carrying on trade at home.

The international activity of the working classes does not in any way depend on the existence of the International Working Men's Association. This was only the first attempt to create a central organ for the activity; an attempt which was a lasting success on account of the impulse which it gave but which was no longer realizable in its historical form after the fall of the Paris Commune.

Bismarck's Norddeutsche was absolutely right when it announced, to the satisfaction of its master, that the German Workers' party had sworn off internationalism in the new program.
A Contribution to German Cultural History Contra Karl Heinzen

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Shortly before and during the period of the Reformation there developed amongst the Germans a type of literature whose very name is striking — grobian literature. In our own day we are approaching an era of revolution analogous to that of the sixteenth century. Small wonder that among the Germans grobian literature is emerging once more. Interest in historical development easily overcomes the aesthetic revulsion which this kind of writing provokes even in a person of quite unrefined taste and which it provoked back in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

Flat, bombastic, bragging, thrasonical, putting on a great show of rude vigour in attack, yet hysterically sensitive to the same quality in others; brandishing the sword with enormous waste of energy, lifting it high in the air only to let it fall down flat;
constantly preaching morality and constantly offending against it; sentiment and turpitude most absurdly conjoined; concerned only with the point at issue, yet always missing the point; using with equal arrogance petty-bourgeois scholarly semi-erudition against popular wisdom, and so-called “sound common sense” against science; discharging itself in ungovernable breadth with a certain complacent levity; clothing a philistine message in a plebeian form; wrestling with the literary language to, give it, so to speak, a purely corporeal character; willingly pointing at the writer’s body in the background, which is itching in every fibre to give a few exhibitions of its strength, to display its broad shoulders and publicly to stretch its limbs; proclaiming a healthy mind in a healthy body; unconsciously infected by the sixteenth century’s most abstruse controversies and by its fever of the body; in thrall to dogmatic, narrow thinking and at the same time appealing to petty practice in the face of all real thought; raging against reaction, reacting against progress; incapable of making the opponent seem ridiculous, but ridiculously abusing him through the whole gamut of tones; Solomon and Marcolph, Don Quixote and Sancho Panza, a visionary and a philistine in one person; a loutish form of indignation, a form of indignant loutishness; and suspended like an enveloping cloud over it all, the self-satisfied philistine’s consciousness of his own virtue — such was the grobian literature of the sixteenth century. If our memory does not deceive us, the German folk anecdote has set up a lyrical monument to it in the song of Heineke, der starke Knecht. To Herr Heinzen belongs the credit of being one of the re-creators of grobian literature and in this field one of the German swallows heralding the coming springtime of the nations.

Heinzen’s manifesto against the Communists in No. 84 of the Deutsche-Brüsseler-Zeitung has been our most immediate instigation in studying that degenerate variety of literature whose historically interesting aspect for Germany we have indicated. We shall describe the literary species represented by Herr Heinzen on
the basis of his manifesto, exactly as literary historians characterise the writers of the sixteenth century from the surviving writings of the sixteenth century, for instance the “goose-preacher” [Thomas Murner]

**Deutsche-Brüsseler-Zeitung No. 87, October 31, 1847**

* My reason for answering Herr Heinzen is not to rebut the attack on Engels. Herr Heinzen’s article does not need a rebuttal. I am answering because Heinzen’s manifesto furnishes entertaining material for analysis. K. M. [134]

_Biron._ Hide thy head, Achilles: here comes Hector in arms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . _King._ Hector was but a Troyan in respect of this. _Boyet._ But is this Hector? _Dumain._ I think Hector was not so clean-timbered. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . _Biron._ This cannot be Hector. _Dumain._ He’s a god or a painter; for he makes faces. [Shakespeare, _Love’s Labour Lost_ [135]]

But that Herr Heinzen is Hector, of that there is no doubt.

“I have long been visited,” he confesses to us, “by a premonition that I would fall by the hand of a communist Achilles. Now that I have been attacked by a Thersites, the danger thus averted makes me bold once more,” etc.

Only a Hector can have a premonition that he will fall by the hand of an Achilles.

Or did Herr Heinzen derive his picture of Achilles and Thersites not from Homer but from Schlegel’s translation of Shakespeare?

If that is so, he assigns to himself the part of Ajax.

Let us look at Shakespeare’s Ajax.

_Ajax._ I will beat thee into handsomeness. _Thersites._ I shall sooner rail thee
into wit; but thy horse will sooner con an oration than thou learn a prayer
without book. Thou canst strike, canst thou? a red murrain o’ thy jade’s
tricks! Ajax. Toadstool, learn me the proclamation. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Thersites. Thou art proclaimed a fool, I think. . . . . . . . . . . . . Ajax. You
whoreson cur. Thersites. Do, do. Ajax, Thou stool for a witch! Thersites. Ay,
do, do;... thou scurvy-valiant ass! thou art here but to thrash Trojans; and
thou art bought and sold among those of any wit, like a barbarian slave ... a
great deal of your wit too lies in your sinews, or else there be liars. . . . . .
and down the field, asking for himself. Achilles. How so? Thersites. He must
fight singly tomorrow, and is so prophetically proud of an heroic
..cudgelling that he raves in saying nothing. Achilles. How can that
be? Thersites. Why, he stalks up and down like a peacock, a stride and a
stand; ruminates like a hostess that bath no arithmetic but her brain to set
down her reckoning; bites his lip with a political regard. as who would say,
“There were wit in this head, an ‘twould out”... I had rather be a tick in a
sheep than such a valiant ignorance.*

* Shakespeare, Troilus and Cressida.

Whichever character-mask Herr Heinzen now appears wearing — Hector or Ajax — scarcely has he entered the arena when he
proclaims to the spectators in a mighty voice that his adversary has
not dealt him the “coup de grâce”. With all the composure and
epic breadth of an ancient Homeric hero, he expounds the reasons
for his escape. “I owe my escape,” he tells us, “to an error on
nature’s part.” “Nature” has not “fitted” me for my adversary’s
level. He towers over him, the taller by two heads, and that is why
the two “swinging blows” of his “little executioner” could not
reach his “literary neck”. Herr Engels, it is stressed most
emphatically and repeatedly, Herr Engels is “little”, a “little
executioner”, a “little person”. He then says, with one of those
turns of phrase such as we only come across in the old heroic lays,
or in the puppet play of the giant Goliath and the small David: “If
you were hanging that high” — from a lamp-post — “nobody
would ever find you again”. That is the giant’s humour, at once
whimsical and spine-chilling.
It is not just his “neck”, but his whole “nature”, his whole body for which Herr Heinzen thus finds “literary” application. He has put his “little” adversary beside him in order to set off his own physical perfection in fitting contrast. The deformed “dwarf” carries an executioner’s axe under his tiny arm, perhaps one of those little guillotines which were given to children as toys in 1794. He, the terrible warrior on the other hand, wields no other weapon in his furious-playful arrogance than the “birch-rod”, of which, he informs us, he has long made use to “chastise” the “naughtiness” of those bad “boys”, the Communists. The giant is content to confront his “insect-sized foe” as a pedagogue, instead of crushing the rash little fellow underfoot. He is content to speak to him as the children’s friend, to teach him a lesson in morality and reprimand him with the utmost severity for vicious wickedness, especially “lying”, “silly, puerile lying”, “insolence”, his “boyish tone”, lack of respect and other shortcomings of youth. And if in the process the schoolmasterly warrior’s rod sometimes swishes cruelly about the pupil’s ears, if from time to time over-vigorous language interrupts his moral sentences and even partially destroys their effect, one should not for a moment forget that a warrior cannot impart moral instruction in the same way as ordinary, schoolmasters, for example a Quintus Fixlein, and that nature comes in again by the window if one chases her out of the door. One should furthermore reflect that what would repel us as obscenity from the mouth of an elf like Engels, has for ear and heart the splendid resonance of nature herself when it comes from the mouth of a colossus like Heinzen. And are we to measure the language of heroes by the restricted linguistic standards of the common citizen? No more so than we should think Homer descends to the level of, for instance, grobian literature, when he calls one of his favourite heroes, Ajax, “as stiff-necked as an ass”.

The giant’s intentions were honest when he showed the Communists his birch-rod in No. 77 of the Deutsche-Brüsseler-Zeitung. And the “little” wretch for whose opinion he did not even
ask—several times he expresses his warrior-like astonishment at the incomprehensible audacity of the pygmy—repaid him so unkindly. “It was not intended as a piece of advice,” he complains. “Herr Engels wants to kill me, he wants to murder me, the wicked man.”

And what of his own part? As when he faced the Prussian government, here too he had “enthusiastically begun a battle, in which he bore peace proposals, a heart of humane reconciliation between the opposing forces of the age, beneath his warlike coat”. [Karl Heinzen, Steckbrief.] But: “Enthusiasm was dowsed with the acid-sharp water of malice.” [Ibid.]

Isegrim showing his rage and fury, stretched out his paws and came at him with wide-gaping jaws and with powerful leaping. Reineke, lighter than he, escaped his raging opponent. And then hastily wetted his coarse-haired tail-brush with his Acid-sharp water and trailed it through dust to load it with sand-grains. Isegrim thought, now he had him at bay! But sly Reineke struck him over the eyes with his tail, preventing him seeing and hearing. He had used such a stratagem often, many a creature had to his cost felt the noxious force of his acid-sharp water. [Goethe, Reineke Fuchs]

Deutsche-Brüsseler-Zeitung No. 90, November 11, 1847

“I have been a republican, Herr Engels, as long as I have concerned myself with politics, and my convictions have not been turning about, they have been without wavering and fickleness unlike what has gone on in the heads of so many Communists. [Heinzen’s Manifesto, Deutsche-Brüsseler-Zeitung No. 84.]

“It is true I have only just become a revolutionary. It is part of the Communists tactics that, aware of their own incorrigibility, they criticise their adversaries as soon as they correct themselves” [Ibid.]

Herr Heinzen never became a republican, he has been one since his political birth. On his side, therefore, immutability, the
immobility of a final state, consistency. On the side of his adversaries, wavering, fickleness, turning about. Herr Heinzen has not always been a revolutionary, he has become one. Now, of course, the *turning about* is on Herr Heinzen’s side, but then the *immoral* character of turning about has been turned about too; it is now known as “correcting themselves”. On the Communists’ side, on the other hand, *immutability* has lost its character of *high morality*. What has become of it? “Incorrigibility.”

*Remaining constant* or *turning about*, both are moral, both are immoral; moral on the side of the philistine, immoral on the side of his adversary. For the art of the philistine as critic consists in calling out *rouge et noir* [red and black, as at the gaming table, was given in the errata in the November 18 issue instead of the original “wohl und weh” — good and bad] at the right time, the right word at the right time.

*Ignorance* is generally considered a fault. We are accustomed to regard it as a negative quantity. Let us observe how the magic wand of the philistine as critic converts a minus quantity of intelligence into a plus quantity of morality.

Herr Heinzen reports amongst other things that he is still just as *ignorant of philosophy* as in 1844. Hegel’s “language” he has “continued to find *indigestible*”.

So much for the facts of the matter. Now for the moral processing of them.

Because Herr Heinzen has always found Hegel’s language “indigestible”, he has not, like “Engels and others”, succumbed to the immoral arrogance of ever priding himself on that same Hegelian language, any more than, by all accounts so far, Westphalian peasants “pride themselves” on the Sanskrit language. However, true moral behaviour consists in avoiding the *motivation*
for immoral behaviour, and how can one better secure oneself against immoral “priding oneself” on a language than by taking good care not to understand that language!

Herr Heinzen, who knows nothing of philosophy, has for that reason, as he thinks, not attended the philosophers’ “school” either. His school was “sound common sense” and the “fullness of life”.

“At the same time,” he exclaims with the modest pride of the just, “this has preserved me from the danger of denying my school.”

There is no more proven remedy for the moral danger of denying one’s school than not going to school!

Any development, whatever its substance may be, can be represented as a series of different stages of development that are connected in such a way that one forms the negation of the other. If, for example, a people develops from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy, it negates its former political being. In no sphere can one undergo a development without negating one’s previous mode of existence. Negating translated into the language of morality means: denying.

Denying! With this catchword the philistine as critic can condemn any development without understanding it; he can solemnly set up his undevelopable undevelopment beside it as moral immaculateness. Thus the religious phantasy of the nations has by and large stigmatised history, by transposing the age of innocence, the golden age, into pre-history, into the time when no historical development at all took place, and hence no negating and no denying. Thus in noisy eras of revolution, in times of strong, passionate negation and denial, as in the 18th century, there emerge honest, well-meaning men, well-bred, respectable satyrs like Gessner, who oppose the undevelopable state of the idylls to the corruption of history. It should nevertheless be observed to the credit of these idyll-poets, who were also critical moralists and
moralising critics of a kind, that they conscientiously waver as to who should be accorded the palm of morality, the shepherd or the sheep.

But let us leave our worthy philistine undisturbed to pasture on his own diligence! Let us follow him to where he fancies he attacks the “heart of the matter”. Throughout we shall find the same method.

“I cannot help it if Herr Engels and other Communists are too blind to realise that power also controls property and that injustice in property relations is only maintained by power. — I call any man a fool and a coward who bears the bourgeois malice on account of his acquisition of money and lets a king he on account of his acquisition of power.” [Heinzen’s Manifesto, No. 84 of the D-B-Z.]

“Power also controls property!”

Property, at all events, is also a kind of power. Economists call capital, for instance, “power over the labour of others”.

We are therefore faced with two kinds of power, on the one hand the power of property, in other words, of the property-owners, on the other hand political power, the power of the state. “Power also controls property” means: property does not control the political power but rather it is harassed by it, for example by arbitrary taxes, by confiscations, by privileges, by the disruptive interference of the bureaucracy in industry and trade and the like.

In other words: the bourgeoisie has not yet taken political shape as a class. The power of the state is not yet its own power. In countries where the bourgeoisie has already conquered political power and political rule is none other than the rule, not of the individual bourgeois over his workers, but of the bourgeois class over the whole of society, Herr Heinzen’s dictum has lost its meaning. The propertyless of course remain untouched by political
rule insofar as it directly affects property.

Whilst, therefore, Herr Heinzen fancied he was expressing a truth as eternal as it was original, he has only expressed the fact that the German bourgeoisie must conquer political power, in other words, he says what Engels says, but unconsciously, honestly thinking he is saying the opposite. He is only expressing, with some emotion, a transient relationship between the German bourgeoisie and the German state power, as an eternal truth, and thereby showing how to make a “solid core” out of a “movement”.

“Injustice in property relations,” continues Herr Heinzen, “is only maintained by power.”

Either Herr Heinzen here understands “injustice in property relations” as the above-mentioned pressure to which the absolute monarchy still subjects the bourgeoisie even in its “most sacred” interests, in which case he is only repeating what has just been said — or he understands “injustice in property relations” as the economic conditions of the workers, in which case his pronouncement has the following meaning:

The present bourgeois property relations are “maintained” by the state power which the bourgeoisie has organised for the protection of its property relations. The proletariat must therefore overthrow the political power where it is already in the hands of the bourgeoisie. It must itself become a power, in the first place a revolutionary power.

Again, Herr Heinzen is unconsciously saying the same thing as Engels is saying, but again in the steadfast conviction that he is saying the opposite. What he says he does not mean, and what he means he does not say.

Incidentally, if the bourgeoisie is politically, that is, by its state power, “maintaining injustice in property relations”, it is not
creating it. The “injustice in property relations” which is determined by the modern division of labour, the modern form of exchange, competition, concentration, etc., by no means arises from the political rule of the bourgeois class, but vice versa, the political rule of the bourgeois class arises from these modern relations of production which bourgeois economists proclaim to be necessary and eternal laws. If therefore the proletariat overthrows the political rule of the bourgeoisie, its victory will only be temporary, only an element in the service of the bourgeois revolution itself, as in the year 1794, as long as in the course of history, in its “movement”, the material conditions have not yet been created which make necessary the abolition of the bourgeois mode of production and therefore also the definitive overthrow of the political rule of the bourgeoisie. The terror in France could thus by its mighty hammer-blows only serve to spirit away, as it were, the ruins of feudalism from French soil. The timidly considerate bourgeoisie would not have accomplished this task in decades. The bloody action of the people thus only prepared the way for it. In the same way, the overthrow of the absolute monarchy would be merely temporary if the economic conditions for the rule of the bourgeois class had not yet become ripe. Men build a new world for themselves, not from the “treasures of this earth”, as grobian superstition imagines, but from the historical achievements of their declining world. In the course of their development they first have to produce the material conditions of a new society itself, and no exertion of mind or will can free them from this fate.

It is characteristic of the whole grobianism of “sound common sense”, which feeds upon the “fullness of life” and does not stunt its natural faculties with any philosophical or other studies, that where it succeeds in seeing differences, it does not see unity, and that where it sees unity, it does not see differences. If it propounds differentiated determinants, they at once become fossilised in its hands, and it can see only the most reprehensible sophistry when these wooden concepts are knocked together so that they take fire.
When Herr Heinzen, for instance, says that money and power, property and rule, the acquisition of money and the acquisition of power are not the same, he is committing a tautology inherent in the mere words themselves, and this merely verbal differentiation he considers an heroic deed which with all the faculties of a clairvoyant he brings into play against the Communists, who are so “blind” as not to stop in their tracks at this childlike first perception.

How “acquisition of money” turns into “acquisition of power”, how “property” turns into “political rule”, in other words, how instead of the rigid difference to which Herr Heinzen gives the force of dogma, there are rather effective relations between the two forces up to the point where they merge, of this he may swiftly convince himself by observing how the serfs bought their freedom, how the communes bought their municipal rights, how the townspeople on the one hand, by trade and industry, attracted the money out of the pockets of the feudal lords and vaporised their landed property into bills of exchange, and on the other hand helped the absolute monarchy to its victory over the thus undermined feudal magnates, and bought privileges from it; how they later themselves exploited the financial crises of the absolute monarchy itself, etc., etc.; how the most absolute monarchies become dependent on the stock-exchange barons through the system of state debts — a product of modern industry and modern trade; how in international relations between peoples, industrial monopoly turns directly into political rule, as for instance, the Princes of the Holy Alliance in the “German war of liberation” were merely the hired mercenaries of England,[137] etc.

This self-important grobianism of “sound common sense”, however, by fixing such distinctions as between acquisition of money and acquisition of power in the form of eternal truths whose nature is acknowledged by all” to be “such and such”, in the form of unshakeable dogmas, creates for itself the desired position for
pouring out its moral indignation about the “blindness”, “foolishness” or “wickedness” of the opponents of such articles of faith — an act of self-indulgence which in its blustering expectorations inevitably yields up a mess of rhetoric in which float a few meagre, bony truths.

Herr Heinzen will live to see the power of property even in Prussia achieve a *mariage forcé* with political power. Let us hear what he says next:

“You are trying to make *social questions* the central concern of our age, and you fail to see that there is no more important *social question* than that of *monarchy or republic.*” [Heinzen’s Manifesto, No. 84].

A moment ago, Herr Heinzen saw only the *distinction* between the power of money and political power; now he sees only the *unity* of the *political* question and the *social* question. Of course he continues to see the “ridiculous blindness” and “cowardly ignominy” of his antagonists.

The *political* relationships of men are of course also *social, societal* relationships, like all relations between men and men. All questions that concern the relations of men with each other are therefore also *social questions*.

With this view, which belongs in a catechism for eight-year-old children, this grobian naivety believes it has not only said something but has affected the balance in the conflicts of modern times.

It so happens that the “social questions” which have been “dealt with in *our own* day” increase in importance in proportion as we leave behind us the realm of absolute monarchy. Socialism and communism did not emanate from Germany but from England, France and North America.
The first manifestation of a truly active communist party is contained within the bourgeois revolution, at the moment when the constitutional monarchy is eliminated. The most consistent republicans, in England the Levellers,[138] in France Babeuf, Buonarroti, etc., were the first to proclaim these “social questions”. The Babeuf Conspiracy, by Babeuf’s friend and party-comrade Buonarroti, shows how these republicans derived from the “movement” of history the realisation that the disposal of the social question of rule by princes and republic did not mean that even a single “social question” has been solved in the interests of the proletariat.

The question of property as it has been raised in “our own day” is quite unrecognisable even formulated as a question in the form Heinzen gives it: “whether it is just that one man should possess everything and another man nothing.... whether the individual should be permitted to possess anything at all” and similar simplistic questions of conscience and clichés about justice.

The question of property assumes different forms according to the different levels of development of industry in general and according to its particular level of development in the different countries.

For the Galician peasant, for instance, the question of property is reduced to the transformation of feudal landed property into small bourgeois landownership. For him it has the same meaning as it had for the French peasant before 1789, the English agricultural day labourer on the other hand has no relationship with the landowner at all. He merely has a relationship with the tenant farmer, in other words, with the industrial capitalist who is practising agriculture in factory fashion. This industrial capitalist in turn, who pays the landowner a rent, has on the other hand a direct relationship with the landowner. The abolition of landed property is thus the most important question of property as it exists
for the English industrial bourgeoisie, and their struggle against the Corn Laws[139] had no other significance. The abolition of capital on the other hand is the question of property as it affects the English agricultural day labourer just as much as the English factory worker.

In the English as well as the French revolution, the question of property presented itself in such a way that it was a matter of asserting free competition and of abolishing all feudal property relations, such as landed estates, guilds, monopolies, etc., which had been transformed into fetters for the industry which had developed from the 16th to the 18th century.

In “our own day”, finally, the significance of the question of property consists in it being a matter of eliminating the conflicts which have arisen from large-scale industry, the development of the world market and free competition.

The question of property, depending on the different levels of development of industry, has always been the vital question for a particular class. In the 17th and 18th centuries, when the point at issue was the abolition of feudal property relations, the question of property was the vital question for the bourgeois class. In the 19th century, when it is a matter of abolishing bourgeois property relations, the question of property is a vital question for the working class.

The question of property, which in “our own day” is a question of world-historical significance, has thus a meaning only in modern bourgeois society. The more advanced this society is, in other words, the further the bourgeoisie has developed economically in a country and therefore the more state power has assumed a bourgeois character, the more glaringly does the social question obtrude itself, in France more glaringly than in Germany, in England more glaringly than in France, in a constitutional
monarchy more glaringly than in an absolute monarchy, in a republic more glaringly than in a constitutional monarchy. Thus, for example, the conflicts of the credit system, speculation, etc., are nowhere more acute than in North America. Nowhere, either, does social inequality obtrude itself more harshly than in the eastern states of North America, because nowhere is it less disguised by political inequality. If pauperism has not yet developed there as much as in England, this is explained by economic circumstances which it is not our task to elucidate further here. Meanwhile, pauperism is making the most gratifying progress.

“In this country, where there are no privileged orders, where all classes of society have equal rights” (the difficulty however lies in the existence of classes) “and where our population is far from ... pressing on the means of subsistence, it is indeed alarming to find the increase of pauperism progressing with such rapidity.” (Report by Mr. Meredith to the Pennsylvania Congress. [140])

“It is proved that pauperism in Massachusetts has increased by three-fifths within 25 years.” (From Niles’ Register, Niles being an American.)

One of the most famous North American political economists, Thomas Cooper, who is also a radical, proposes:

1. To prohibit those without property from marrying.

2. To abolish universal suffrage,

for, he exclaims:

“Society was instituted for the protection of property.... What reasonable claim can they have, who by eternal economic laws will eternally be without property of their own, to legislate on the property of others? What common motive and common interest is there between these two classes of inhabitants?

“Either the working class is not revolutionary, in which case it represents the
interests of the employers, on whom their livelihood depends. At the last election in New England, the master-manufacturers, to ensure votes for themselves, had the candidates’ names printed on calico, and each of their workers wore such a piece of calico on their trouser-fronts.

“Or the working class becomes revolutionary, as a consequence of communal living together, etc., and then the political power of the country will sooner or later fall into its hands, and no property will be safe any more under this system.” [Thomas Cooper, Lectures on Political Economy, Columbia, pp. 361 & 365.[141]]

Just as in England the workers form a political party under the name of the Chartists, so do the workers in North America under the name of the National Reformers [142] and their battle-cry is not at all rule of the princes or the republic, but rule of the working class or the rule of the bourgeois class.

Since therefore it is precisely in modern bourgeois society with its corresponding forms of state, the constitutional or republican representative state, that the “question of property” has become the most important “social question”, it is very much the narrow need of the German bourgeois that interjects: the question of the monarchy is the most important “social question of the time”. It is in a very similar way that Dr. List, in the foreword to his Nationalökonomie [F. List, Das nationale System der politischen Oekonomie] expresses his so naive irritation that pauperism and not protective tariffs should have been “misconstrued” as the most important social question of our time.

Deutsche-Brüsseler-Zeitung No. 92, November 18, 1847

The distinction between money and power was at the same time a personal distinction between the two combatants.

The “little” one appears as a kind of cut-purse who only takes
on enemies who have “money”. The daring muscle-man by contrast fights with the “mighty” of this earth.

*Indosso la corazza, e l'elmo in testa.* [Ariost Orlando Furioso: Harness on his back and helmet on his head]

And, he mutters,

“and incidentally, you are better off than I”. [Heinzen’s Manifesto, *Deutsche-Brüsseler-Zeitung* No. 84]

But best off of all are the “mighty” of the earth who visibly heave a sigh of relief whilst Herr Heinzen lashes out at his pupil:

“Like all Communists, you have now lost the capacity to recognise the connection between politics and social conditions." [ibid.]

We have just been present at a moral lesson, in which the great man revealed with surprising *simplicity* the *connection* between *politics* and *social* conditions in general. In the *rule of the princes* he now provides his pupil with a *tangible* application.

The princes, or the rule of the princes, he tells us, are the “chief authors of all poverty and distress”. Where the rule of the princes is eliminated, this kind of explanation is of course eliminated too, and the slave-economy, which caused the downfall of the republics of antiquity, the *slave-economy*, which will provoke the most fearful conflicts in the southern states of republican North America, [Cf. on this topic the memoirs of Jefferson, who was one of the group of founders of the American Republic and was twice president.] the slave-economy can exclaim, like John Falstaff, “if reasons were, as plenty as blackberries!” [Shakespeare, Henry IV]

And in the first place, who or what has created the *princes* or the *rule of the princes*?

Once upon a time, the people had to place the most eminent
personalities at their head to conduct general affairs. Later, this position became hereditary within families, etc. And eventually the stupidity and depravity of men tolerated this abuse for centuries.

If one were to summon a congress of all the most primitive would-be politicians in Europe, they would be able to give no other answer. And if one were to open all Herr Heinzen’s works, they would provide no other answer.

Doughty “sound common sense” believes it explains the rule of princes by declaring itself opposed to it. The difficulty, from the standpoint of this norm of common sense, would, however, seem to consist in explaining how the opponent of sound common sense and of the moral dignity of man was born and how he dragged out his remarkably tenacious life for centuries. Nothing is simpler. The centuries did without sound common sense and the moral dignity of man. In other words, the sense and morality of centuries were in accordance with the rule of the princes instead of contradicting it. And it is precisely this sense and morality of past centuries which today’s “sound common sense” does not understand. It does not understand it, but despises it. It takes refuge from history in morality, and now it can allow free rein to the whole armoury of its moral indignation.

In the same way as political “sound common sense” here explains the origin and continued existence of the rule of the princes as the work of unreason, in the same way does religious “sound common sense” explain heresy and unbelief as works of the devil. In the same way, irrereligious “sound common sense” explains religion as the work of the devils, the priests.

However, once Herr Heinzen has by means of moral platitudes proved the origin of the rule of the princes, the “connection between the rule of the princes and social conditions” follows quite naturally from this. Listen:
“An individual man takes possession of the state for himself, sacrifices a whole nation, more or less, not just materially, but morally too, to his own person and its entourage; institutes within it a scale of humiliation by degrees, classifies it variously into estates like so many fat and lean cattle, and basically just for the benefit of his own, individual person makes each member of the state society officially the enemy of the other.” [Heinzen’s Manifesto, loc. cit.]

Herr Heinzen sees the princes at the peak of the social structure in Germany. He does not for a moment doubt that they have created its social foundation and are re-creating it each day. What simpler explanation could there be for the connection between the monarchy and social conditions, whose official political expression it is, than by having the princes create this connection! What is the connection between the representative assemblies and modern bourgeois society which they represent? They created it. The political deity with its apparatus and gradations has thus created the secular world, whose most sacred object it is. In the same way the religious deity will have created earthly conditions, which are fantastically and in deified form reflected in it.

The grobianism which retails such homespun wisdom with appropriate sentiment cannot of course fail to be equally astonished and morally outraged at the opponent who toils to demonstrate to it that the apple did not create the apple-tree.

Modern histories have demonstrated that absolute monarchy appears in those transitional periods when the old feudal estates are in decline and the medieval estate of burghers is evolving into the modern bourgeois class, without one of the contending parties having as yet finally disposed of the other. The elements on which absolute monarchy is based are thus by no means its own product; they rather form its social prerequisite, whose historical origins are too well known to be repeated here. The fact that absolute monarchy took shape later in Germany and is persisting longer, is explained solely by the stunted pattern of development of the
German bourgeois class. The answers to the puzzles presented by this pattern of development are to be found in the history of trade and industry.

The decline of the philistine German free cities, the destruction of the knightly estate, the defeat of the peasants [143] — the resulting territorial sovereignty of the princes — the decay of German industry and German trade, which were founded entirely on medieval conditions, at the very moment when the modern world market is opening up and large-scale manufacturing is arising — the depopulation and the barbaric conditions which the Thirty Years War[144] had left behind — the character of the national branches of industry which are now rising again — as of the small linen industry — to which patriarchal conditions and relations correspond, the nature of exported goods which for the most part derived from agriculture, and which therefore went almost exclusively to increase the material sources of wealth of the rural aristocracy and therefore its relative power vis-à-vis the townspeople — Germany’s lowly position in the world market in general, as a result of which the subsidies paid by foreigners to the princes became a chief source of the national income, the dependence of the townspeople upon the court consequent upon this — etc., etc., all these relationships, within which the structure of German society and a political organisation in keeping with it were taking shape become, in the eyes of sound-common-sensical grobianism, just a few pithy utterances, whose pith however consists in the statement that the “rule of the princes in Germany” has created “German society” and is “recreating” it each day.

The optical illusion, which enables sound common sense to “discern” the springhead of German society in the rule of the princes instead of the springhead of the rule of the princes in German society, is easily explained.

It perceives at first glance — and it always considers its first
glance to be particularly perceptive — that the German princes are
preserving and maintaining control over the old social conditions
in Germany with which their political existence stands and falls,
and that they react violently against the elements of decomposition. Equally, it sees on the other hand the elements of
decomposition fighting against the power of the princes. The five
sound senses thus unanimously testify that the rule of the princes is
the basis of the old society, of its gradations, its prejudices and its
contradictions.

When looked at more closely, these appearances however only
refute the crude opinion of which they are the innocent occasion.

The violently reactionary role played by the rule of the princes
only proves that in the pores of the old society a new society has
taken shape, which furthermore cannot but feel the political shell,
— the natural covering of the old society — as an unnatural fetter
and blow it sky-high. The more primitive these new elements of
social decomposition, the more conservative will even the most
vigorou...
function, but to *decentralise*. Born from the defeat of the feudal estates and having the most active share in their destruction itself, it now seeks to retain at least the *semblance* of feudal distinctions. Formerly encouraging trade and industry and thereby at the same time the rise of the bourgeois class, as necessary conditions both for national strength and for its own glory, absolute monarchy now everywhere hampers trade and industry, which have become increasingly dangerous weapons in the hands of an already powerful bourgeoisie. From the town, the birth-place of its rise to power, it turns its alarmed and by now dull glance to the *countryside* which is fertile with the corpses of its old powerful opponents.

But by “the connection between politics and social conditions” Herr Heinzen actually understands only the connection between the rule of the princes in Germany and the distress and misery in Germany.

The monarchy, like every other form of state, is a direct burden on the working class on the material side only in the form of *taxes*. Taxes are the existence of the state expressed in economic terms. Civil servants and priests, soldiers and ballet-dancers, schoolmasters and police constables, Greek museums and Gothic steeples, civil list and services list — the common seed within which all these fabulous beings slumber in embryo is *taxation*.

And what reasoning citizen would not have referred the starving people to taxes, to the ill-gotten gains of the princes, as the source of its misery?

The German princes and Germany’s distress! In other words, taxes on which the princes gorge themselves and which the people pay with their sweat and blood!

What inexhaustible material for speechifying saviours of
mankind!

The monarchy is the cause of great expenditure. No doubt. just consider the North American national budget and compare what our 38 petty fatherlands have to pay in order to be governed and disciplined! It is not the Communists who answer the thunderous outbursts of such self-important demagogy, no, it is the *bourgeois* economists such as Ricardo, Senior, etc., in just two words.

The economic existence of the state is *taxes*.

The economic existence of the worker is *wages*.

To be ascertained: the *relationship* between taxes and wages.

*Competition* necessarily reduces the average wage to the minimum, that is to say, to a wage which permits the workers penuriously to eke out their lives and the lives of their race. Taxes form a part of this minimum, for the political calling of the workers consists precisely in paying taxes. If all taxes which bear on the working class were abolished root and branch, the necessary consequence would be the reduction of wages by the whole amount of taxes which today goes into them. Either the employers’ *profit* would rise as a direct consequence by the same quantity, or else no more than an alteration in the *form* of tax-collecting would have taken place. Instead of the present system, whereby the capitalist also advances, as part of the wage, the taxes which the worker has to pay, he [the capitalist] would no longer pay them in this roundabout way, but directly to the state.

If in North America wages are higher than in Europe, this is by no means the consequence of lower taxes there. It is the consequence of the territorial, commercial and industrial situation there. The demand for workers in relation to the supply of workers is significantly greater than in Europe. And any novice knows the truth of this already from Adam Smith.
For the bourgeoisie on the other hand both the way in which taxes are distributed and levied, and the use to which they are put, are a vital question, both on account of its influence on trade and industry and because taxes are the golden cord with which to strangle the absolute monarchy.

Having provided such profound insights into “the connection between politics and social conditions” and between “class relations” and the power of the state, Herr Heinzen cries out in triumph:.

“The ‘narrow-minded communist view’ which only treats people in terms of ‘classes’ and incites them against one another according to their ‘craft’, is something I must confess I have been innocent of in my revolutionary propaganda, because I make allowance for the ‘possibility’ that ‘humanity’ is not always determined by ‘class’ or the ‘size of one’s purse’.”

“Grobianist” common sense transforms the distinction between classes into the “distinction between the size of purses” and class contradictions into “craft-bickering”. The size of one’s purse is a purely quantitative distinction whereby any two individuals of the same class may be incited against one another at will. That the medieval guilds opposed each other “according to their craft” is common knowledge. But it is equally common knowledge that modern class distinctions are by no means based upon “craft” but rather that the division of labour brings about very different modes of work within the same class.

And this, his own “narrow-minded view”, derived entirely from his very own “fullness of life” and his very own “sound common sense” is what Herr Heinzen humorously calls a “narrow-minded communist view”.

But let us for a moment assume that Herr Heinzen knows what he is talking about, that he is therefore not talking about “the distinction between the size” of purses and “craft-bickering”.
It is perfectly “possible” that what individual persons do is not “always” determined by the class to which they belong, although this is no more crucial to the class struggle than an aristocrat going over to the tiers-état was crucial to the French Revolution. And then these aristocrats at least joined a specific class, the revolutionary class, the bourgeoisie. But for Herr Heinzen all classes melt away before the solemn concept of “humanity”.

However, if Herr Heinzen believes that whole classes which are based on economic conditions independent of their own will and are forced into the most virulent contradiction by these conditions, can by means of the quality of “humanity”, which attaches to all men, shed their real relationships, how easy must it be for one particular prince to rise by the power of “humanity” above his “princely condition”, above his “princely craft”? Why then does he resent it when Engels discerns a “good Emperor Joseph” behind his revolutionary phrases?

But if on the one hand Herr Heinzen obliterates all differences, by addressing himself vaguely to the “humanity” of the Germans, which would oblige him to include the princes in his exhortations too, on the other hand he nevertheless finds himself compelled to acknowledge the existence of one difference amidst German humanity, for without a difference there can he no contradiction and without a contradiction there can be no material for political sermonising.

So Herr Heinzen divides German humanity into princes and subjects. The perception and expression of this contradiction is on his part an exhibition of moral strength, a proof of personal daring, political understanding, outraged human feeling, serious-minded perspicacity and laudable bravery. And it would be a sign of intellectual blindness, of a policeman’s mentality, to point out that there are privileged and unprivileged subjects; that the former by no means see humiliating gradations in the political hierarchy, but
an elevating, upward line; that finally amongst the subjects whose subjection is considered a fetter, it is however considered a fetter in very different ways.

Along come the “narrow-minded” Communists now and see not only the political difference between prince and subject but also the social difference between classes.

Whereas Herr Heinzen’s moral greatness a moment before consisted in perceiving and expressing the difference, his greatness now consists rather in overlooking it, averting his eyes from it and hushing it up. Expression of the contradiction ceases to be the language of revolution and becomes the language of reaction and the malicious “incitement” of brothers, united in their humanity, against one another.

It is common knowledge that shortly after the July revolution, the victorious bourgeois, in the September Laws, made the “incitement of the various classes of the nation against each other” a serious political offence, probably for reasons of “humanity” too, with penalties of imprisonment, fines, etc. It is also common knowledge that the English bourgeois journals know no better way of denouncing the Chartist leaders and Chartist writers than by accusing them of inciting the various classes of the nation against each other. It is even common knowledge that German writers are lying in deep dungeons for this incitement of the various classes of the nation against each other.

Is not Herr Heinzen now speaking the language of the French September Laws, of the English bourgeois papers and the Prussian criminal code?

Not a bit of it. The well-meaning Herr Heinzen fears only that the Communists “were seeking to ensure the princes a revolutionary fontanel.”
Thus the Belgian liberals assure us that the radicals have a secret understanding with the Catholics; the French liberals assure us that the democrats have an understanding with the legitimists; the English free traders assure us that the Chartists have an understanding with the Tories. And the liberal Herr Heinzen assures us that the Communists have an understanding with the princes.

Germany, as I already made clear in the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, has its own Christian-Germanic brand of bad luck. Its bourgeoisie has got so very far behind the times that it is beginning its struggle against absolute monarchy and seeking to create the foundation for its own political power at the moment when in all advanced countries the bourgeoisie is already engaged in the most violent struggle with the working class and when its political illusions are already antiquated in the European mind. In this country, where the political wretchedness of the absolute monarchy still persists with its whole appendage of run-down, semi-feudal estates and relationships, there also already partially exist, on the other hand, as a consequence of industrial development and Germany’s dependence on the world market, the modern contradictions between bourgeoisie and working class and the struggle that results from them — examples are the workers’ uprisings in Silesia and Bohemia. The German bourgeoisie therefore already finds itself in conflict with the proletariat even before being politically constituted as a class. The struggle between the “subjects” has broken out even before princes and aristocracy have been chased out of the country, all the songs sung at Hambach notwithstanding.

Herr Heinzen can think of no other explanation for these contradictory circumstances, which of course are also reflected in German literature, except by laying them on his opponents’ consciences and interpreting them as a consequence of the counter-
revolutionary activity of the Communists.

The German workers meanwhile know very well that the absolute monarchy does not waver for a moment, nor can it do so, in greeting them, in the service of the bourgeoisie, with cannon-balls and whip-lashes. Why, then, should they prefer the brutal harassment of the absolute government with its semi-feudal retinue to direct bourgeois rule? The workers know very well that it is not just politically that the bourgeoisie will have to make broader concessions to them than the absolute monarchy, but that in serving the interests of its trade and industry it will create, willy-nilly, the conditions for the uniting of the working class, and the uniting of the workers is the first requirement for their victory. The workers know that the abolition of bourgeois property relations is not brought about by preserving those of feudalism. They know that the revolutionary movement of the bourgeoisie against the feudal estates and the absolute monarchy can only accelerate their own revolutionary movement. They know that their own struggle against the bourgeoisie can only dawn with the day when the bourgeoisie is victorious. Despite all this they do not share Herr Heinzen’s bourgeois illusions. They can and must accept the bourgeois revolution as a precondition for the workers’ revolution. However, they cannot for a moment regard it as their ultimate goal.

That the workers really react in this way has been magnificently exemplified by the English Chartists in the most recent Anti-Corn Law League movement. Not for a moment did they believe the lies and inventions of the bourgeois radicals, not for a moment did they abandon the struggle against them, but quite consciously helped their enemies to victory over the Tories, and on the day after the abolition of the Corn Laws they were facing each other at the hustings, no longer Tories and free traders, but free traders and Chartists. And they won seats in parliament, in opposition to these bourgeois radicals. [149]
No more than Herr Heinzen understands the workers does he understand the bourgeois liberals, for all that he is unconsciously working in their service. He thinks it is necessary to repeat, where they are concerned, the old warnings against the “easy-going ways and submissiveness of the Germans”. He, the philistine, takes in absolute earnest the obsequious expressions that were served up by a Camphausen or a Hansemann. The bourgeois gentlemen would smile at such naivety. They know better where the shoe pinches. They are aware that in revolutions the rabble gets insolent and lays hands on things. The bourgeois gentlemen therefore seek as far as possible to make the change from absolute to bourgeois monarchy without a revolution, in an amicable fashion.

But the absolute monarchy in Prussia, as earlier in England and France, will not let itself be amicably changed into a bourgeois monarchy. It will not abdicate amicably. The princes’ hands are tied both by their personal prejudices and by a whole bureaucracy of officials, soldiers and clerics — integral parts of absolute monarchy who are far from willing to exchange their ruling position for a subservient one in respect of the bourgeoisie. Then the feudal estates also hold back; for them it is a question of life or death, in other words, of property or expropriation. It is clear that the absolute monarch, for all the servile homage of the bourgeoisie, sees his true interest on the side of these estates.

The siren-songs of a Camphausen or a Hanseemann will no more convince Frederick William IV, therefore, than the honeyed language of a Lally-Tollendal, a Mounier, a Malouet or a Mirabeau could talk a Louis XVI into casting in his lot with the bourgeoisie rather than with the feudal lords and remnants of the absolute monarchy.

But Herr Heinzen is concerned neither with the bourgeoisie nor with the proletariat in Germany. His party is the “party of men”, in other words, of worthy and generous-minded dreamers who
advocate “bourgeois” interests in the guise of “human” ends, without however clearly understanding the connection between the idealistic phrase and its real substance.

Deutsche-Brüsseler-Zeitung No. 94, November 25, 1847

To this party, the party of men, or to humanity resident in Germany, the founder of states Karl Heinzen offers the “best republic”, the best republic he himself has hatched, the “federal republic with social institutions”. Rousseau once designed a “best” political world for the Poles [Rousseau, Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne, et sur sa réformation projetée] as did Mably for the Corsicans.[150] The great citizen of Geneva has found an even greater successor.

“I am contented” — what modesty! — “to claim that just as I can assemble a flower only from petals, so also I can assemble a republic only from republican elements.” [Heinzen’s Manifesto, Deutsche-Brüsseler-Zeitung No. 84]

A man who knows how to assemble a flower from petals, even though it were only a daisy, cannot fail in the construction of the “best republic”, let the wicked world think of it what it will.

Despite all slanderous tongues, the valiant founder of states takes as a model the charters of republican North America. Whatever seems offensive to him, he paints out with his grobian brush. Thus he brings about an amended edition — in usum delphini, [for the use of the Dauphin. — These words were used in the seventeenth century to mark the edition of Latin works intended for the heir to the French throne, from which “offensive” material had been removed] in other words for the use and edification of “German man”. And having thus “outlined the features of the republic, that is, of a specific republic”, he hoists his
“little” disrespectful pupil up into the air “by his communist ears” and dashes him down with the question whether he too could “create” a world, and indeed a “best world”? And he does not desist from hoisting the “little one” up “into the air” by his “communist ears” until he has “banged” his “nose” against the gigantic picture of the “new” world, the best republic. For with his very own hands he has hung a colossal picture of the world, devised by himself, on the highest peak of the Swiss Alps.

“Cacatum non est pictum,” [To shit is not to paint] hisses the voice of the impenitent “little” snake.

And horrified, the republican Ajax drops the communist Thersites to the ground and out of his shaggy bosom heaves the terrible words:

“You are carrying absurdity to extremes, Herr Engels!”

And really, Herr Engels! Do you not believe “that the American federal system” is the “best political form” “which the art of politics has yet devised”? You shake your little head? What? You deny absolutely that the “American federal system” has been devised by “the art of politics”? And that “best political forms of society” exist in abstracto? That’s going a bit too far!

You are at the same time so “devoid of shame and conscience” as to suggest to us that the honest German who wishes his faithful fatherland to enjoy the benefits of the North American Constitution — embellished and improved at that, that he resembles that idiotic merchant who copied his rich competitor’s accounts and then imagined that having possession of this copy, he had also taken possession of the coveted wealth!

And you threaten us with the “executioner’s axe” under your little arm, with the miniature guillotine which you were given as a toy in 1794? Barbaroux, you mumble, and other persons of
impressive height and girth, were shortened by a full head in those days when we used to play guillotine because they happened to proclaim “the American federal system” to be “the best political form”.[151] And such will be the fate of all other Goliaths, to whom it occurs in any democratic revolution in Europe and especially in Germany, which is still quite feudally fragmented, to wish to put the “American federal system” in place of the one indivisible republic and its levelling centralisation.

But good God! The men of the Comité de salut public[152] and those bloodhounds of Jacobins behind them were monsters, and Heinzen’s “best republic” has been “devised” by the “statecraft of heretofore” as the “best political form” for “men”, for good men, for human humans!

Really! “You are carrying absurdity to the extreme, Herr Engels!

And what is more, this Herculean founder of states does not copy the North American “federal republic” in every detail. He adorns it with “social institutions”, he will “regulate property relations according to rational principles”, and the seven great “measures” with which he disposed of the “evils” of the old bourgeois society are by no means wretched, insubstantial garbage begged at the doors of — abominable modern socialist and communist soup-kitchens. It is to the “Incas” and “Campe’s Books for Children” [153] that the great Karl Heinzen owes his recipes for the “humanisation of society”, just as he owes the latter profound slogan not to the Pomeranian philosopher Ruge but rather to some “Peruvian” grown old in wisdom. And Herr Engels describes all this, as arbitrarily concocted philistine dreams of world improvement!

We live of course in an age when “the better people are increasingly passing away” and the “best” are not even understood
Take, for instance, any well-meaning citizen and ask his honest opinion as to what is wrong with present “property relations”? And the decent fellow will put his index finger to the tip of his nose, twice draw deep and pensive breath and then express his “humble” view that it is a shame that many people have “nothing”, not even the barest necessities, and that others, to the detriment not only of propertyless wretches but also of honest citizens, are with aristocratic brazenness accumulating millions! *Aurea mediocritas!* Golden mediocrity! the honest member of the middle class will exclaim! It is just a matter of avoiding extremes! What rational political constitution would be compatible with these extremes, these oh so abominable extremes!

And now take a look at Heinzen’s “federal republic” with “social institutions” and its seven measures for the “humanisation of society”. We find that each citizen is assured a “minimum” of wealth below which he cannot fall, and a maximum of wealth is prescribed which he may not exceed.

Has not Herr Heinzen solved all the difficulties, then, by reiterating in the form of state decrees the pious desire of all good citizens that no person should have too little and none, indeed, too much, and simply by so doing made it reality?

And in the same manner, which is as simple as it is splendid, Herr Heinzen has resolved all economic conflicts. He has *regulated* property according to the *rational principles* corresponding to an honest bourgeois equity. And please do not object that the “rational rules” of property are precisely the “economic laws” on whose cold-blooded inevitability all well-meaning “measures” will necessarily founder, though they be recommended by Incas and Campe’s Books for Children and cherished by the stoutest patriots!
How unfair to bring economic considerations into play against a man who, unlike some people, does not “boast of studies in political economy”, but has from modesty managed so far in all his works rather to preserve the virginal appearance of still having before him his first study of political economy! It must be accounted very much to the credit of the man’s primitive level of education that with solemn countenance he serves up to his little communist foe all the considerations which already in 1842 had penetrated to the German fullness of fife through the channels of the Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung, [154] such as those concerning “acquired” property, “personal freedom and individuality” and the like. It really does show how low the communist writers have fallen that they seek out opponents who are schooled in economics and philosophy, but on the other hand provide no answer to the “unpresuming” fancies of grobianist sound common sense, to which they would first have to teach the elements of the economic relations in existing bourgeois’ society, in order to be able subsequently to enter into debate with it.

Since private property, for instance, is not a simple relation or even an abstract concept, a principle, but consists in the totality of the bourgeois relations of production — for it is not a question of subordinate or extinct but of existing bourgeois private property — since all these bourgeois relations of production are class relations, an insight which any novice must have acquired from his Adam Smith or Ricardo — , a change in, or even the abolition of, these relations can only follow from a change in these classes and their relationships with each other, and a change in the relationship of classes is a historical change, a product of social activity as a whole, in a word, the product of a specific “historical movement”. The writer may very well serve a movement of history as its mouthpiece, but he cannot of course create it.

For example, in order to explain the elimination of feudal property relations, modern historians have had to describe how the
bourgeoisie evolved to the point where it had developed its conditions of life sufficiently to be able to eliminate all the feudal estates and its own feudal mode of existence and hence also feudal production relations, which were the economic foundation of these feudal estates. The elimination of feudal property relations and the foundation of modern bourgeois society were thus by no means the product of a particular doctrine based upon and elaborated from a specific principle as its core. It was much more the case that the principles and theories put forward by the writers of the bourgeoisie during its struggle against feudalism were nothing but the theoretical expression of a series of real events; indeed one can see that the extent to which this expression was more or less utopian, dogmatic or doctrinaire corresponded exactly to the degree of advancement of the phase of real historical development.

And in this respect Engels was rash enough to talk to his terrible opponent, the Herculean founder of states, about communism, insofar as it is theory, as the theoretical expression of a “movement”.

But, expostulates the mighty man in honest indignation: “My purpose was to urge the practical consequences, to get the ‘representatives’ of communism to acknowledge those consequences”, that is, those absurd consequences which, for a man who has only fantastic conceptions of bourgeois private property, are necessarily linked with its abolition. He thus wanted to compel Engels “to defend the whole absurdity” which according to Herr Heinzen’s worthy scheme “he would have dug up”. And Reineke Engels has so bitterly disappointed the honest Isegrim that he no longer finds in communism itself even a “core” to “bite on” and thus asks himself in wonderment “how this phenomenon is to be served up, so that it can be eaten”!

And in vain the honest fellow seeks to calm himself with ingenious turns of phrase, for example, by asking whether a
historical movement is a “movement of the emotions”, etc., and even conjures up the spirit of the great “Ruge” to interpret this riddle of nature for him!

“After what has happened,” the disappointed man exclaims, “my heart is beating in a Siberian fashion, after what has happened I smell only treachery and dream of malice.” [Karl Heinzen, Steckbrief]

And really he explains the affair to himself finally by saying that Engels “denies his school”, “beats a retreat that is as cowardly as it is ridiculous”, “compromises the whole human race just so as to save his own person from being compromised”, “denies the party or deserts it at the crucial moment”, and a host of similar moralising outbursts of fury. Likewise Engels’ distinctions between “true socialism” and “communism”, between the utopian communist systems and critical communism — are all nothing but “treachery and malice”. Indeed nothing but Jesuitical “after-thought” distinctions, because they appear not to have been put at least so far to Herr Heinzen, nor to have been blown his way by the tempest of the fullness of life!

And how ingeniously Herr Heinzen manages to interpret these contradictions to himself, insofar as they have found literary expression!

“Then there is Weitling, who is cleverer than you, and yet can certainly be considered a Communist.”

Or else:

“What if Herr Grün claimed to be a Communist and were to expel Herr Engels?”

Arrived at this point, it goes without saying, the honest fellow, who could not “emancipate himself to the extent of considering loyalty and faith, outmoded though they might be, to be superfluous amongst rational beings” — serves up the most absurd
lies, for example, that Engels also intended to write about a “social movement in Belgium and France”. But K Grün had “forestalled him”. And then he had been “unable to find a publisher for his boring repetition” and other such fabrications Herr Heinzen has derived as “conclusions” from a “certain principle”.

That moralising criticism has turned out to be so wretched is due to its “nature” and is by no means to be regarded as a personal shortcoming of the Telamonian Ajax. For all his stupidities and baseness, this St. Grobian has the moral satisfaction of being stupid and base with conviction and thus being a fellow with some stuffing in him.

Whatever the “facts” may do, which even the great Karl Heinzen allows to “run their course” unimpeded:

“I”, he proclaims, thrice beating his honest bosom, “I, meanwhile, bear my principle unflinchingly about with me and do not ditch it when a person asks me about it.”

Heinrich LXXII of Reuss-Schleitz-Ebersdorf has also been parading his “principle” some 20 years now.

N.B. We would recommend Stephan [Born]’s critique, Der Heinzen'sche Staat, to the readers of the Deutsche-Brüsseler-Zeitung. The author has of course only used Herr Heinzen as a peg, he could just as well have seized upon any other literary nonentity in Germany to confront the reasoning and grumbling petty bourgeois with the viewpoint of the really revolutionary worker. Herr Heinzen knows of no other way of answering Stephan than by first of all asserting that what he has written is rubbish; so much for objective criticism. As he does not know Stephan personally, he resorts simply to calling him names like gamin and commis-voyageur. [guttersnipe and commercial traveller] But he has not yet blackened his opponent enough, he finally turns him into a policeman. One can see incidentally how just this last accusation
is, since the French police, presumably in league with Herr Heinzen, have confiscated 100 copies of Stephan’s pamphlet.

Having given the worker Stephan a practical moral lesson as described above, he apostrophises him in the following ingenuous terms:

“For my own part, gladly though I would have engaged in discussions with a worker, I fail to see in insolence a fit substitute for competence." [Heinzen, “Ein ‘Representant’ der Kommunisten”]

The German workers will feel elated at the prospect of the democrat Karl Heinzen engaging in discussions with them as soon as they approach the great man with due modesty. Herr Heinzen is seeking to conceal his incompetence concerning Herr Stephan by the insolence of his outburst.

K. M.